area handbook series 

Singapore 

a country study 



r 




i 

I 




Singapore 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Barbara Leitch LePoer 
Research Completed 
December 1989 



On the cover: Singapore past and present 



Second Edition, 1991; First Printing, 1991. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Singapore : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Barbara Leitch LePoer. — 2d ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series) (DA pam ; 550-184) 
"Research completed October 1989." 

"Supersedes the 1977 edition of Area Handbook for Singapore 
written by Nena Vreeland, et al." — T.p. verso. 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 285-301) and index. 
1. Singapore I. LePoer, Barbara Leitch, 1941- II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Area handbook for 
Singapore. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam ; 550-184. 
DS609.S55 1991 90-25755 
959.57— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-184 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The editor and authors are grateful to numerous individuals in 
the international community, in various agencies of the United 
States government, and in private organizations who gave of their 
time, research materials, and special knowledge to provide data 
and perspective for this study. Especially appreciated are the helpful 
suggestions and economic insights of Edward Chesky and Morris 
Crawford and the generous assistance of the staff of the Embassy 
of Singapore, Washington. 

The editor and authors also wish to express their appreciation 
to staff members of the Federal Research Division, Library of Con- 
gress, whose high standards and dedication helped shape this vol- 
ume. These include Martha E. Hopkins, who managed editing; 
Marilyn L. Majeska, who reviewed editing and managed book 
production; and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who did word 
processing. David P. Cabitto and Sandra K. Ferrell prepared the 
maps and other graphics for the book, Carolina E. Forrester re- 
viewed the maps, and Arvies J. Staton contributed to the charts 
on military ranks and insignia. Special thanks go to Kimberly A. 
Lord, who designed the illustrations for the cover of the volume 
and the tide pages of the chapters, and Donald R. DeGlopper, who 
assisted with many of the editorial duties. 

The following individuals are gratefully acknowledged as well: 
Shari Villarosa of the Department of State for reviewing all the 
chapters; Mimi Cantwell for editing the chapters; Cissie Coy for 
the final prepublication editorial review; Joan Cook for preparing 
the index; and Linda Peterson of the Printing and Processing Sec- 
tion, Library of Congress, for phototypesetting, under the direc- 
tion of Peggy Pixley. The inclusion of photographs in the book was 
made possible by the generosity of private individuals and public 
agencies, especially Ong Tien Kwan of Kuala Lumpur and Chiang 
Yin-Pheng and Joyce Tan of the Singapore Ministry of Commu- 
nications and Information. 

Finally, the editor and authors wish to thank Federal Research 
Division staff members Andrea M. Savada, Sandra W. Meditz, 
and Richard Nyrop for reviewing all or parts of the manuscript, 
and Robert L. Worden for assisting in the final stages of editing 
the completed manuscript. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xi 

Country Profile xiii 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting i 

Barbara Leitch LePoer 

PRECOLONIAL ERA 5 

Temasek and Singapura 6 

Johore Sultanate 7 

FOUNDING AND EARLY YEARS, 1819-26 9 

Anglo-Dutch Competition 9 

Raffles' Dream 10 

Early Administration and Growth 13 

A FLOURISHING FREE PORT, 1826-67 16 

Financial Success 17 

A Cosmopolitan Community 21 

CROWN COLONY, 1867-1918 24 

BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS, 1919-41 32 

WORLD WAR II, 1941-45 35 

The Japanese Malaya Campaign 36 

Shonan: Light of the South 38 

AFTERMATH OF WAR, 1945-55 41 

Economic and Social Recovery 42 

Political Awakening 43 

ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, 1955-65 47 

People's Action Party 48 

Singapore as Part of Malaysia 55 

TWO DECADES OF INDEPENDENCE, 1965-85 57 

Under Lee Kuan Yew 57 

Toward New Leadership 62 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 65 

Donald R. DeGlopper 

PHYSICAL SETTING 68 

POPULATION 70 



vii 



Population, Vital Statistics, and Migration 70 

Population Control Policies 73 

Population Distribution and Housing Policies 75 

ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC GROUPS 78 

Ethnic Categories 78 

The Chinese 79 

The Malays 82 

The Indians 87 

Singaporean Identity 88 

Language Planning 90 

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 92 

Ethnicity and Associations 92 

Social Stratification and Mobility 96 

Family, Marriage, and Divorce 100 

RELIGION 103 

Temples and Festivals 103 

Religion and Ethnicity 106 

Religious Change 108 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 110 

Medical Services and Public Health 110 

Mortality and Morbidity Ill 

AIDS Policy 112 

EDUCATION 112 

The School System 112 

Education and Singaporean Identity 116 

Chapter 3. The Economy 119 

Margaret Sullivan 

PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT 123 

ECONOMIC ROLES OF THE GOVERNMENT 127 

Budgeting and Planning 127 

Economic Boards 128 

Land Management and Development 131 

Forced Savings and Capital Formation 133 

State-Owned Enterprises 135 

Public Utilities 136 

Policies for the Future 137 

Privatization 138 

MANPOWER AND LABOR 140 

Industrial Relations and Labor Unions 140 

Wage Policies 143 

Foreign Labor 144 

Manpower Training 145 



viii 



INDUSTRY 146 

Industrialization Policy 146 

Information Technology 149 

Petroleum 150 

TRADE, TOURISM, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 151 

Foreign Trade 151 

Trading Partners 152 

Tourism 157 

Telecommunications 158 

FINANCE 159 

Currency, Trade, and Investment Regulation 160 

Financial Center Development 161 

International Financial Organizations 165 

TRANSPORTATION 165 

Sea 165 

Land 167 

Air 169 

AGRICULTURE 171 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 175 

Ronald J. Cima and Donald R. DeGlopper 

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 177 

Form of Government 177 

Constitutional Framework 180 

Major Governmental Bodies 181 

The Public Service 185 

The Public Bureaucracy 186 

Statutory Boards 188 

Public Enterprises 190 

Parapolitical Institutions 191 

POLITICAL PARTIES 192 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 195 

Power Structure 195 

Political Culture 197 

KEY POLITICAL ISSUES 198 

Succession 198 

Relations Between State and Society 200 

Political Opposition 205 

FOREIGN POLICY 207 

Governing Precepts and Goals 207 

Regional 209 

Superpowers 211 

THE MEDIA 214 



ix 



Chapter 5. National Security 217 

Rodney P. Katz 

THE ARMED FORCES 220 

Historical Development 221 

Organization and Mission of the Armed Forces 230 

Military Establishment 237 

Strategic Perspective 248 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 252 

Subversive Threats 256 

Crime and Law Enforcement 261 

Civil Defense 269 

Appendix. Tables 273 

Bibliography 285 

Glossary 303 

Index 307 

List of Figures 

1 Singapore, 1989 xx 

2 The Johore Sultanate, ca. 1700 8 

3 The Straits Settlements, 1826 14 

4 Plan of the Town of Singapore by Lieutenant Phillip 

Jackson, 1828 18 

5 Age-Sex Distribution, 1986 72 

6 Sources of Government Revenue, Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 ... 126 

7 Government Expenditures, Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 128 

8 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by Sector, Fiscal 

Year (FY) 1988 148 

9 Expressway System, 1989 168 

10 Mass Rapid Transit System, 1990 170 

11 Governmental Structure, 1989 178 

12 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 1989 208 

13 Japanese Campaign on Malay Peninsula, 1941-42 226 

14 Organization of the Armed Forces, 1989 232 

15 Military Rank Insignia, 1989 242 

16 Organization of the Police Force, 1989 264 

17 Organization of the Civil Defence Force, 1989 268 



x 



Preface 



The first edition of the Area Handbook for Singapore was published 
in 1977. Prior to that edition, Singapore was included in the Area 
Handbook for Malaysia and Singapore, which was published in 1965 
just before Singapore became a separate, independent nation. The 
current volume, a complete revision of the 1977 edition, covers 
a period of remarkable economic growth and political stability for 
a nation in existence for only a quarter century. During the 1977-89 
period, Singapore moved assuredly into the category of newly in- 
dustrializing economy, and its renowned port grew from being 
fourth in the world in terms of volume of shipping to being the 
world's busiest port. 

Singapore: A Country Study is an attempt to present an objective 
and concise account of the dominant social, economic, political, 
and national security concerns of contemporary Singapore within 
an historical framework. The volume represents the combined 
efforts of a multidisciplinary team, which used as its sources a vari- 
ety of scholarly monographs and journals, official reports of govern- 
ment and international organizations, and foreign and domestic 
newspapers and periodicals. Brief commentary on some of the more 
useful and readily accessible English-language sources appears at 
the end of each chapter. Full references to these and other sources 
appear in the Bibliography. 

The authors have limited the use of foreign and technical terms, 
which are defined when they first appear in the study. Readers 
are also referred to the Glossary at the back of the book. Spellings 
of Singaporean personal names used in the study conform to stan- 
dard Singaporean usage, and contemporary place names are gener- 
ally those approved by the United States Board on Geographic 
Names. All measurements are given in the metric system (see ta- 
ble 1, Appendix). 



xi 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Singapore 
Short Form: Singapore 
Term for Citizens: Singaporeans 
Capital: Singapore 

Date of Independence: August 9, 1965 (from Malaysia) 

Geography 

Location and Size: Located at narrow point of Strait of Malacca 
off southern tip of Malay Peninsula; connected with Malaysia by 
causeway. Land area in 1988 about 636 square kilometers, consisting 



xiii 



of one main island and 58 islets. Main island 42 kilometers long 
and 23 kilometers wide, with coastline of 138 kilometers. 

Topography: Mainly low-lying, with hills reaching 165 meters in 
island's center. Extensive reclamation and landfill along coasts. 

Climate: Tropical climate, with daily high temperatures moder- 
ated by sea breezes. Rainfall throughout the year but usually heav- 
iest from November to January. 

Society 

Population: 2,674,362 in July 1989. Low birth and death rates; 
at some points in the 1980s, negative rate of population increase. 

Languages and Ethnic Groups: Multiethnic population; 76.4 per- 
cent Chinese, 14.9 percent Malay, 6.4 percent Indian, 2.3 per- 
cent other. National language Malay but language of administration 
English. Four official languages — Malay, English, Chinese, and 
Tamil — but English predominates. Government policy for all 
citizens to be bilingual — competent in English and an Asian 
"mother tongue." Large resident alien population composed of 
unskilled laborers from neighboring countries and skilled managers 
and professionals from developed countries. 

Religion: Religious diversity reflects ethnic diversity. Major 
religions in 1988: Buddhist, 28.3 percent; Christian, 18.7 percent: 
no religion, 17.6 percent; Islam, 16 percent; Daoist, 13.4 percent; 
Hindu, 4.9 percent; "other," 1.1 percent. Rapid growth of Chris- 
tianity and decline of Chinese folk religion in 1980s. 

Health: Conditions approach those of developed countries; ade- 
quate number of physicians and hospitals. Government enforces 
strict sanitation and public health regulations. Heart disease, cancer, 
stroke, and pneumonia major causes of death. In 1987 life expec- 
tancy 71.4 years for males and 76.3 years for females. 

Education: British-inspired system with six-year primary and four- 
year secondary schools and two-year junior colleges for quarter of 
student population preparing for higher education. English primary 
language of instruction. Six institutions of higher education, govern- 
ment supported. Education system emphasizes English, science and 
technology, and vocational skills. 

Economy 

Salient Features: Export-oriented economy with large government 
role. Dependent on international trade, sale of services, export of 



xiv 



manufactures. Consistently high rates of economic growth (11 per- 
cent in 1988), balance of payments surplus, large foreign invest- 
ment, large foreign reserves (S$33 billion in 1988), minimal foreign 
debt. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): S$47.9 billion in 1988, S$17,950 
per capita. Manufacturing contributed 29 percent, financial and 
business services 27 percent, commerce 18 percent, transport and 
communications 14 percent, other services 12 percent. 

Industry: Major industries: electronics, petroleum refining and 
petrochemicals, machinery, shipbuilding, and ship repair. 

Foreign Trade: S$167.3 billion in 1988. Usual deficit in merchan- 
dise trade offset by surplus in services for positive balance of trade. 
Major exports: electronics, machinery, refined petroleum products. 
Major imports: machinery and electronic components, chemicals, 
fuels, and food. Major trading partners: United States, Japan, 
Malaysia, and European Community. 

Exchange Rates: Singapore dollar allowed to float since 1973. In 
late 1989, US$1 = S$1.94. 

Transportation and Communications 

Ports: Port of Singapore, world's busiest port in 1988, serves more 
than 36,000 ships per year. Five port terminals, each specializing 
in different type of cargo; fifteen kilometers of wharf; extensive 
warehouse and oil storage facilities. Singapore has fifteenth larg- 
est merchant fleet in world. 

Railroads: Malayan Railways provides service to Singapore. Main 
station in central business district. Major public transport 67-kilo- 
meter mass rapid transit system serving 800,000 passengers daily 
scheduled for completion in 1990. 

Roads: 2,810 kilometers of roads in 1989, mosdy paved; five express- 
ways, totalling 95 kilometers, with total 141 kilometers by 1991. 

Airports: Two major airports, Singapore Changi Airport for inter- 
national flights and Seletar for charter and training flights, and three 
smaller fields. 

Telecommunications: Excellent telecommunications facilities. 
Domestic telephone system with optical fiber network, 26 exchanges, 
and 48.5 telephones per 100 residents. Two satellite ground stations 
and submarine cable connections to neighboring countries. 



xv 



Government and Politics 



Government: Parliamentary system with written constitution. 
Unicameral parliament of eighty-one members (in 1989) elected 
by universal suffrage. President largely ceremonial head of state; 
government run by prime minister and cabinet representing major- 
ity of parliament. British- influenced judiciary; Supreme Court di- 
vided into High Court, Court of Appeal, and Court of Criminal 
Appeal. Subordinate courts include district courts and magistrate's 
courts. 

Politics: Nineteen registered political parties in mid-1980s, but Peo- 
ple's Action Party (PAP) won every general election from 1959 
to 1988, usually holding every seat in parliament. Opposition parties 
divided and weak. Lee Kuan Yew prime minister from 1959 
through 1989, providing unusual continuity in leadership and 
policy. PAP policies stressed economic development, government 
management of economy and society, firm government with little 
tolerance for dissent. 

Administrative Divisions: Unitary state with no second-order 
administrative divisions. Some advisory bodies based on fifty-five 
parliamentary electoral districts. 

Foreign Relations: Primary goals of maintaining sovereignty, sta- 
bility in Southeast Asia, and free international trade. Member of 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Commonwealth of Na- 
tions, Nonaligned Movement, World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, United Nations. 

Media: Seven newspapers, five radio stations, and three televi- 
sion channels publishing and broadcasting in four official languages. 
Government operates radio and television and supervises news- 
papers. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1989 regular armed forces of 55,500: army — 
45,000, air force— 6,000, navy— 4,500. Reserves totaled 182,000, 
and 30,000 in People's Defence Force, a national guard. All males 
eligible for conscription at age eighteen; most conscripts served 
twenty-four to thirty months active duty, with reserve obligation 
to age forty for enlisted personnel and fifty for officers. 

Military Units and Equipment: Army composed of one active 
and one reserve armored brigade, three active and six reserve in- 
fantry brigades, two commando battalions, and seventeen artillery 



xvi 



battalions. Equipment included light weapons, light tanks, armored 
personnel carriers, and 155mm howitzers. Navy had corvettes, mis- 
sile craft squadrons, patrol squadrons, transport ships, and mine- 
sweepers. Major weapons were Gabriel and Harpoon ship-to-ship 
missiles. Air force had twenty F-16 fighter-bombers on order for 
early 1990s, and in 1989 had estimated 125 combat aircraft in 6 
squadrons and 60 helicopters. Air defense provided by army and 
air force antiaircraft artillery and by Bloodhound 2, Rapier, and 
HAWK surface-to-air missiles. 

Military Budget: In 1988 estimated at US$1,003 million, 6 per- 
cent of Gross National Product (GNP). 

Foreign Military Relations: No formal military alliances or treaty 
relations, but participated in Five-Powers Defence Agreement with 
Britain, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand. Shared integrated 
air defense system with Malaysia. Singapore armed forces trained 
in or held joint exercises with Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Taiwan, 
and Australia. 

Police: In 1989 regular force of 7,000 supplemented by 3,000 con- 
scripts assigned to police and 2,000 citizen volunteers. Additional 
forces provided by 300-member Port of Singapore police and Com- 
mercial and Industrial Security Corporation whose 2,000 armed 
guard and escort personnel had police powers. Prison security and 
security force reserve provided by 700-member Gurkha contingent. 



xvii 




XX 



Introduction 



The world's busiest port, the modern nation of the Republic of 
Singapore, was founded as a British trading post on the Strait of 
Malacca in 1819. Singapore's location on the major sea route be- 
tween India and China, its excellent harbor, and the free trade status 
conferred on it by its visionary founder, Sir Thomas Stamford 
Raffles, made the port an overnight success. By 1990 the multiethnic 
population attracted to the island had grown from a few thousand 
to 2.6 million Singaporeans, frequently referred to by Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew as his nation's greatest resource. If Raffles 
had set the tone for the island's early success, Lee had safeguarded 
the founder's vision through the first quarter-century of Singapore's 
existence as an independent nation, providing the leadership that 
turned it into a global city that offered trading and financial ser- 
vices to the region and to the world. 

Modern Singapore would be scarcely recognizable to Raffles, 
who established his trading center on an island covered with tropical 
forests and ringed with mangrove swamps. Towering skyscrapers 
replace the colonial town he designed, and modern expressways 
cover the tracks of bullock carts that once led from the harbor to 
the commercial district and the countryside beyond. Hills have been 
leveled, swamps filled, and the island itself expanded in size through 
extensive land reclamation projects (see fig. 1). Offshore islands 
are used for recreation parks, oil refineries, and military training 
bases. Despite the scarcity of land for real estate, the government 
has worked to maintain and expand the island's parks, gardens, 
and other green spaces. By housing 88 percent of its population 
in mostly multistoried public housing, Singapore has kept a rein 
on suburban sprawl. In Raffles' s town plan, separate areas were 
set aside for the various ethnic groups of the time: Malays, Chinese, 
Arabs, Bugis, and Europeans. Government resettlement programs 
begun in the 1960s broke up the former ethnic enclaves by requir- 
ing that the public housing projects — called housing estates — that 
replaced them reflect the ethnic composition of the country as a 
whole. As a result, modern Singapore's three main ethnic groups — 
Chinese, Malays, and Indians — live next door to each other and 
share the same housing development facilities, shops, and trans- 
portation. 

Despite efforts to maintain an ethnic balance in housing, 
however, the stated goal of the nation's leaders is not that Singa- 
pore become a mini-melting pot, but, rather, a multiethnic society. 



xxi 




Figure 1. Singapore, 1989 



Of the country's 2.6 million inhabitants, about 76 percent are 
Chinese, 15 percent Malay, 6.5 percent Indian, and 2.5 percent 
other. There are, however, mixtures within this mixture. The desig- 
nation Chinese lumps together speakers of more than five mutually 
unintelligible dialects; Singaporean Malays trace their forebears 
to all of the major islands of the Indonesian archipelago, as well 
as to the Malay Peninsula; and the ancestral homes of Indians in- 
clude what are the modern states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
and Sri Lanka. Out of this diversity, the government leadership 
has attempted to establish what it calls ' 'Singaporean identity," 
which would include certain unifying and modernizing elements 
but yet retain essential variations, based on Asian culture and 
values. One of the unifying factors is the English language, selected 
as the medium for educational instruction both because of its neu- 
trality in the eyes of the three dominant ethnic groups and because 
of its position as the international language of business, science, 
and technology. In order not to lose touch with their Asian heritage, 
however, Singaporean school children are also required to study 
an appropriate "mother tongue," designated by the government 
as either Malay, Tamil, or Mandarin Chinese — a vast oversim- 
plification of the polyglot of Singaporean native languages. 

Singaporean identity, as envisioned by the country's leadership, 
calls for rugged individualism with an emphasis on excellence; the 
government constandy exhorts its citizens to be the best they can 
be. Education, home ownership, and upward mobility are all con- 
sidered appropriate goals. Although Singaporeans are expected to 
be modern in their outlook, they also are encouraged to retain a 
core of traditional Asian values and culture. In a society in which 
all share a common education system, public housing, recreation 
facilities, and military training, the government considers it im- 
portant to highlight the uniqueness of the three official ethnic 
groups — Chinese, Malays, and Indians — through the setting aside 
of national ethnic holidays and the sponsorship of ethnic festivals. 
Singaporean ethnic differences are usually maintained, however, 
not so much by these somewhat self-conscious displays of ethni- 
city but rather by membership in ethnically exclusive associations. 
Usually religious, charitable, or business in nature, many of these 
associations had their origins in colonial Singapore and represent 
finer distinctions of ethnicity than those supported by the govern- 
ment. Chinese trade associations, for example, are usually restricted 
to speakers of a particular dialect. Hindu temples are sometimes 
associated with worshipers who trace their heritage to a particular 
region of India. 



xxn 



Singapore is multireligious as well as multiethnic. Major reli- 
gious preferences reported in 1988 were Buddhism (28 percent), 
Christian (19 percent), no religion (17 percent), Islam (16 percent), 
Daoist (13 percent), and Hindu (5 percent). Singapore's nineteenth- 
century immigrants valued the social as well as religious aspects 
of their congregations, and their descendants are more likely to 
concern themselves with social activities centered around their tem- 
ples and mosques than with elaborate ritual or ceremony. The 
government, although secular, views religion as a positive force 
for instilling moral values in the society. At the same time, it keeps 
a watchful eye out for social or political activism within religious 
groups. Muslim fundamentalists and over-zealous Christian 
proselytizers alike are kept under careful scrutiny, lest they upset 
the religious and ethnic harmony of the country. 

Singapore closely resembles developed countries in terms of its 
low birth rates, high life expectancy (73.8 years at birth), and major 
causes of death — heart disease, cancer, and stroke. Although in 
the early years of independence the government mounted campaigns 
to lower the country's high birth rate, it became concerned in the 
1980s when the rate dropped below the replacement level. Cam- 
paigns and incentives were instituted to encourage those who could 
afford it to have more than two children. College-educated women 
were especially encouraged by exhortations and incentives to marry 
and have children. 

In terms of public health, Singapore also closely resembles de- 
veloped countries. Although some observers criticize the country's 
modern, sanitized environment and mourn the loss of the old port's 
charm, they probably either have forgotten or never knew the open 
sewers, tuberculosis sanatoriums, and opium dens of colonial Sin- 
gapore. Whereas the manufacture and sale of opium continued to 
be a major source of revenue for the colonial government up until 
World War II, the government effectively combats drug use in 
modern Singapore through antidrug campaigns, rehabilitation 
centers, and a mandatory death penalty for trafficking. The govern- 
ment heavily subsidizes services in order to make them affordable 
to all and sets aside 6 percent of the monthly income of each worker 
into a personal Medisave account, which can be used to pay hos- 
pitalization costs for any family member. The Medisave account 
is part of the Central Provident Fund, which is Singapore's com- 
pulsory national social security savings plan. Contribution rates 
due to be phased in in the early 1990s mandate a contribution of 
40 percent of the gross wages of employees under fifty- five, with 
employee and employer sharing the burden equally. Singaporeans 
can use these funds to invest in approved securities, to purchase 



xxiii 



homes in government housing projects, or to pay for hospitaliza- 
tion and retirement. By 1990 some 88 percent of Singaporeans lived 
in Housing and Development Board apartments, a vast public hous- 
ing and urban redevelopment project initiated in the early post- 
war years. Under the program, which began in earnest after 
independence, Singapore's slums and ethnic neighborhoods gradu- 
ally were replaced with modern housing estates, self-contained units 
providing shopping, restaurants, and recreation facilities as well 
as apartments of various sizes, scattered outward from the old cen- 
tral city. A network of superhighways and a state-of-the-art mass 
rapid transit system connect Singapore's housing estates with com- 
mercial and industrial areas. 

Although Singapore's founder and other nineteenth-century resi- 
dents would no longer recognize the island, they would at least be 
able to identify with certain aspects of its modern economy. The 
principle of free trade laid down by Raffles was still largely in ef- 
fect in the late 1980s, with only a few revenue tariffs levied on such 
things as tobacco and liquor. Trade continued to be the island's 
lifeblood; in 1988 the value of Singapore's international trade was 
triple the total of its gross domestic product (GDP). Although some 
aspects of the trade have changed, others remained the same. The 
island's initial success resulted from its role as a conveniently lo- 
cated and duty-free entrepot for the three-way trade among Chi- 
na, India, and various parts of the Malay Archipelago. This trade 
was an ancient commerce, and trading posts probably had flourished 
intermittently at that favored location for two millenia. In early 
colonial times, silks from China, manufactures from Europe, in- 
cense from India, and spices from the Moluccas all were shipped 
on the various seasonal trade winds to Singapore, where they were 
bought, sold, traded, or stored for a future customer. By the late 
nineteenth century, however, the British overlords of Singapore 
had extended their influence or control throughout the Malay Penin- 
sula, and the port acquired a large hinterland rich in resources. 
Singapore became the outlet for Malaya's tin and rubber, as well 
as the gateway through which were funneled supplies and workers 
for the peninsula's mines and plantations. Tin smelting and rub- 
ber processing were added to the list of services that Singapore 
provided — a long list that already included wholesaling, ship repair 
and provisioning, warehousing, and a host of banking and finan- 
cial services. 

In 1990 the economy of modern Singapore was still based on the 
same services that were performed by the colonial port, although 
most of these services had been greatly expanded or modified and 
new ones added. The major sectors of the economy were the regional 



xxiv 



entrepot trade, export-oriented manufacturing, petroleum refin- 
ing and shipping, production of goods and services for the domes- 
tic economy, and a vastly expanded services industry. 

When independence was suddenly thrust upon Singapore in 
1965, its economic prospects looked bleak, if not precarious. In 
the aftermath of World War II, Singapore had faced staggering 
problems of high unemployment, slow economic growth, inade- 
quate housing, decaying infrastructure, and labor and social un- 
rest. Separation from Malaysia meant the loss of its economic 
hinterland, and Indonesia's policy of military Confrontation di- 
rected at Singapore and Malaysia had dried up the entrepot trade 
from that direction. Moreover, with the announcement in 1968 
of Britain's departure from the island's bases, Singapore faced the 
loss of 20 percent of its jobs. These problems led Singapore's leader- 
ship to take a strong role in guiding the nation's economy. The 
government aggressively promoted export-oriented, labor-intensive 
industrialization through a program of incentives designed to at- 
tract foreign investment. By 1972 one-quarter of Singapore's 
manufacturing firms were either foreign-owned or joint-venture 
companies, with the United States and Japan both major inves- 
tors. The response of foreign investors to Singapore's favorable 
investment climate and the rapid expansion of the world economy 
at that time were factors in the annual double-digit growth of the 
country's GDP during most of the period from 1965 through 1973. 
By the late 1970s, however, government planners had adopted a 
policy of replacing Singapore's labor-intensive manufacturing with 
skill- and technology-intensive, high value-added industries. In- 
formation technology was particularly targeted for expansion, and 
by 1989 Singapore-was the world's largest producer of disk drives 
and disk drive parts. In that year, earnings from manufacturing 
accounted for 30 percent of the country's GDP. 

Although Singapore lost its former hinterland when it separated 
from Malaysia, its northern neighbor remained the leading source 
of primary imports and a major destination for Singapore's 
manufactured exports. Malaysia was Singapore's third largest over- 
all trading partner in 1988, and Singaporean companies were major 
investors in Malaysia's southern state of Johor. The entrepot trade 
with Indonesia had long since revived following the end of Con- 
frontation in 1966. By the late 1980s, Singapore was the world's 
third largest petroleum-refining center as well as third largest oil- 
trading center, serving the needs of oil-rich Indonesia and Malay- 
sia. By 1988 Singapore had nosed out Rotterdam as the world's 
busiest port in terms of tonnage. Some 700 shiplines used its modern 
facilities each year, including Singapore's own merchant fleet, which 



xxv 



ranked fifteenth worldwide. Four major shipyards employed about 
70,000 workers, about 40 percent of whom were from neighbor- 
ing Asian countries. 

One of the fastest growing sectors of the economy was Singa- 
pore's international banking and financial services sector, which 
accounted for nearly 25 percent of the country's GDP in the late 
1980s. Historically, Singapore served as the financial services center 
for Southeast Asia, and in the late 1980s it ranked with Hong Kong 
as the two most important Asian financial centers after Tokyo. The 
government provided incentives for the continuing diversification 
and automation of financial services, and Singapore's political sta- 
bility and top-notch infrastructure were important attractions for 
international bankers and investors. Trade, manufacturing, and 
international financial services were closely linked in Singapore, 
which in 1990 hosted more than 650 multinational companies and 
several thousand international financial institutions and trading 
firms. Singapore's reliance on the international economy, over 
which it had little control, provided incentive for the government 
to play a strong role in regulating domestic conditions. Soon after 
independence, the government brought under control the serious 
labor unrest of the 1950s and early 1960s in order to present a more 
favorable climate for foreign investment. Discipline imposed on 
the labor force was counterbalanced, however, by provisions for 
workers' welfare. While the booming economy of the late 1960s 
and 1970s brought new jobs to the private sector, government pro- 
vision of subsidized housing, education, health services, and pub- 
lic transportation created jobs in the public sector. The Central 
Provident Fund, built up by compulsory contributions by both em- 
ployer and employee, provided the necessary capital for govern- 
ment projects as well as for the country's comprehensive social 
security scheme. 

Singapore, Inc., as some observers refer to the country, spent 
the first twenty-five years of its independence under the same 
management. Led by Lee Kuan Yew, the country's first and only 
prime minister, the People's Action Party (PAP — see Glossary) won 
all or nearly all of the seats in parliament in the six elections held 
between 1959 and 1988. Based on a British parliamentary system, 
with free and open elections, the Singapore government was recog- 
nized for its stability, honesty, and effectiveness. Critics complained, 
however, that the government's authoritarian leadership reserved 
for itself all power of decision making and blocked the rise of an 
effective opposition. A small nucleus of leaders centered around 
Lee had indeed closely guided the country from its turbulent prein- 
dependence days and crafted the policies that led to Singapore's 



xxvi 



economic development. During the 1980s, however, a second gener- 
ation of leaders was carefully groomed to take over, and in early 
1990, only Lee remained of the first generation leaders. 

In late 1989, Lee announced that he would step down in late 1990 
and that his successor, First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, 
had already largely taken over the day-to-day management of the 
government. However, based on the prime minister's own asser- 
tions that he was not yet ready to relinquish all control, observers 
speculated on just what powers Lee would continue to hold. Goh 
acknowledged in late 1989 the growing sophistication and rising ex- 
pectations of younger Singaporeans, who want a greater participa- 
tion in the country's political life, and noted that he expected the 
opposition to claim a larger share of seats in parliament in the 1990s. 
In contrasting his leadership style with that of Lee, Goh stated that 
Lee "believes in firm government from the center . . . whereas our 
style is a little more consultative, more consensus-building." Be- 
hind Goh in the Singapore leadership queue was believed to be Lee 
Kuan Yew's son, Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong, who served 
in the cabinet as minister for trade and industry and second minister 
for defence. His meteoric rise in the late 1980s through the ranks 
of bureaucratic and political responsibility was regarded with in- 
terest by both foreign and domestic observers. 

The transition to a new generation of leaders was a phenome- 
non not unique to Singapore. In neighboring Malaysia and In- 
donesia, the independence generation was also rapidly dwindling, 
and the 1990s will surely mark the passing from the scene of Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad and President Soeharto as well as 
Lee Kuan Yew. The close relationship between Singapore and both 
its neighbors had been built to a large extent on personal ties be- 
tween Lee and his counterparts in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Nonetheless, the new leadership of these countries will very likely 
continue to build on the foundation laid by their predecessors. 

In late 1989, Goh discussed the prospect of Johor State, the 
nearby Indonesian island of Batam (currently being developed), 
and Singapore forming a "triangle of growth" within the region 
in a cooperative rather than competitive effort. There were also 
signs of increased military cooperation among the three countries. 
Singapore, for example, conducted bilateral land exercises for the 
first time with both Malaysia and Indonesia in 1989. Bilateral air 
and naval exercises had been conducted with both countries dur- 
ing most of the 1980s. All three countries (along with Thailand, 
Brunei, and the Philippines) were members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN — see Glossary), formed in 1967 
to promote closer political and economic cooperation within the 



xxvii 



region. The invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1978 brought in- 
creased unity to the organization throughout the 1980s, as it sought 
to find a peaceful solution to the Cambodian problem. Although 
there was considerable bilateral military cooperation among ASEAN 
states, the organization was not viewed by its members as a mili- 
tary alliance. However, Singapore and Malaysia, along with Brit- 
ain, Australia, and New Zealand, were also members of the 1971 
Five-Powers Defence Agreement, which provided for consultation 
and support by the latter three nations in the event of an attack on 
Singapore or Malaysia. Cooperation under the agreement diminished 
during the 1970s, but by the late 1980s extensive military exercises 
involving all five participants were again being held. 

In August 1989, Lee Kuan Yew created a stir within the region 
by stating that Singapore was 4 4 prepared to host some United States 
facilities to make it easier for the Philippines to host the United 
States bases there. ' ' Malaysia reacted negatively to the announce- 
ment, and other ASEAN countries expressed some dismay. In Oc- 
tober, however, the Singapore foreign ministry clarified the issue 
by stating that an increased use of Singapore's maintenance and 
repair facilities by United States ships had been agreed on by the 
two countries, as had short-term visits by United States aircraft 
to Singapore's Paya Lebar Air Base. The agreement followed a 
period of somewhat strained relations between the two nations, dur- 
ing which the United States had been critical of Singapore's use 
of its Internal Security Act to detain dissidents indefinitely, and 
Singapore had accused Washington of meddling in its internal af- 
fairs. The United States, however, was Singapore's largest trad- 
ing partner and foreign investor, and the relationship was one that 
neither country was eager to upset. 

By the last decade of the twentieth century, the former colonial 
port of Singapore had become a global financial, trading, and in- 
dustrial center that continued to live by its wits in the world of in- 
ternational trade, just as it had done in the nineteenth century. 
Singapore's leadership and its people have always managed to adapt 
to the changing demands of the world economy, on which so much 
of their livelihood depended. In the coming decade, however, a 
new generation of leaders will take full control of the nation's 
government and economy. Before them lies the task of reconciling 
the need to steer a steady course in the nation's continuing develop- 
ment with the people's growing aspirations for an increased share 
in political and economic decision making. 



March 17, 1990 



xxviii 



As Singapore faced what its policy planners refer to as ' 'the next 
lap," the future of the island nation appeared bright. The economic 
growth rate for 1990 topped 8 percent, led by a booming financial 
services sector and strong performances in industry and tourism. 
Not ones to rest on their accomplishments, Singapore's planners 
began unveiling strategies to internationalize the country's econo- 
my. Singaporean capital and management expertise increasingly 
was being invested abroad, not just in the growth triangle being 
formed among Singapore, Johor, and Indonesia's Riau Islands, 
but in Hong Kong, China (with which diplomatic relations were 
established in 1990), New Zealand, and other parts of the Asia- 
Pacific region. 

In August 1990, Singapore celebrated twenty-five years of in- 
dependence, and a few months later, on November 28, Goh Chok 
Tong was sworn in as the nation's second prime minister. As Lee 
Kuan Yew prepared to leave the office he had held for thirty-one 
years, former Foreign Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam remarked 
that there was no need to erect any monuments in honor of Lee 
because "Singapore is his monument." Lee, in any event, was 
expected to remain close at hand; he will continue to serve as a 
senior minister in the Singapore cabinet and as secretary general 
of the People's Action Party. Moreover, in January 1991, Parlia- 
ment passed legislation converting the appointive ceremonial post 
of president to a directly elected office with wide executive powers 
that appeared to some observers to be designed specifically with 
Lee in mind. Prime Minister Goh, at his swearing in ceremony, 
summed up the task that lay before him: "My mission is clear: 
to ensure that Singapore thrives and grows after Lee Kuan Yew; 
to find a new group of men and women to help me carry on where 
he and his colleagues left off; and to build a nation of character 
and grace where people live lives of dignity, fulfillment and care 
for one another." 



June 14, 1991 Barbara Leitch LePoer 



xxix 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Statue of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, founder of 
modern Singapore 



FAVORABLY LOCATED AT the southern end of the Strait of 
Malacca, the shortest sea route between China and India, the island 
of Singapore was known to mariners as early as the third century 
A.D. By the seventh century, the Srivijaya Empire, the first in a 
succession of maritime states to arise in the region of the Malay 
Archipelago, linked numerous ports and cities along the coasts of 
Sumatra, Java, and the Malay Peninsula. Singapore probably was 
one of many outposts of Srivijaya, serving as an entrepot and sup- 
ply point for Chinese, Thai, Javanese, Malay, Indian, and Arab 
traders. An early chronicle refers to the island as Temasek and 
recounts the founding there, in 1299, of the city of Singapura ("lion 
city"). In the following three centuries, Singapura came under the 
sway of successive Southeast Asian powers, including the empires 
of Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Ayutthaya and the Malacca and Johore 
sultanates. In 1613 the Portuguese, the newest power in the region, 
burned down a trading post at the mouth of the Singapore River, 
and the curtain came down on the tiny island for two centuries. 

In 1818 Singapore was settled by a Malay official of the Johore 
Sultanate and his followers, who shared the island with several 
hundred indigenous tribespeople and some Chinese planters. The 
following year, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, an official of the Brit- 
ish East India Company, arrived in Singapore and secured per- 
mission from its Malay rulers to establish a trading post on the 
island. Named by Raffles for its ancient predecessor, Singapore 
quickly became a successful port open to free trade and free im- 
migration. Before the trading post's founding, the Dutch had a 
monopoly on the lucrative three-way trade among China, India, 
and the East Indies. Now Indian, Arab, European, Chinese, Thai, 
Javanese, and Bugis traders alike stopped in their passage through 
the Strait of Malacca to anchor in the excellent harbor and exchange 
their wares. Malays, Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and Europeans 
flocked to the growing settlement to make their fortunes servicing 
the needs of the sea traders. 

The next half century brought increased prosperity, along with 
the growing pains of a rapidly expanding seaport with a widely 
diverse population. During this period Singapore, Penang, and 
Malacca were ruled together as the Straits Settlements (see Glos- 
sary) from the British East India Company headquarters in India. 
In 1867, when Singapore was a bustling seaport of 85,000 people, 
the Straits Settlements was made a crown colony ruled directly 



3 



Singapore: A Country Study 

from London. Singapore continued to grow and prosper as a crown 
colony. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the advent of steam- 
ships, the expansion of colonialism in Southeast Asia, and the con- 
tinuing spread of British influence in Malaya combined to establish 
Singapore's position as an important trade and manufacturing 
center in the late nineteenth century. 

In the early twentieth century, financial institutions, transpor- 
tation, communications, and government infrastructure expand- 
ed rapidly to support the booming trade and industry. Social and 
educational services lagged far behind, however, and a large gulf 
separated the upper classes from the lower classes, whose lives were 
characterized by poverty, overcrowding, malnutrition, disease, and 
opium addiction. Singapore was largely unaffected by World War 
I. Following the war, the colony experienced both boom and depres- 
sion, but on the whole, expanded and prospered. 

During the period between the world wars, Singapore's Chinese 
took increasing interest in events in China, and many supported 
either the Chinese Communist Party or the Guomindang (Kuomin- 
tang — Chinese Nationalist Party). The Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP — see Glossary) was organized in 1930 and competed with 
the local branch of the Guomindang. Beginning in the early 1930s, 
both groups strongly supported China against the rising tide of 
Japanese aggression. Japan's lightning attack on Malaya in De- 
cember 1941 took the British by surprise, and by mid-February 
the Japanese were in control of both Malaya and Singapore. 
Renamed Shonan ("Light of the South"), Singapore suffered great- 
ly during the Japanese occupation. 

Although Singaporeans tumultuously welcomed the return of the 
British in 1945, their view of the colonial relationship had changed 
forever. Strikes and student demonstrations organized by the MCP 
increased throughout the 1950s. The yearning for independence 
was beginning to be felt in Singapore and Malaya as it was all over 
the colonial world. In 1953 a British commission recommended 
partial internal self-government for Singapore, which had been 
governed as a separate crown colony following the formation of 
the Federation of Malaya in 1948. Political parties began to form. 
In 1954 a group of anticolonialists led by David Marshall formed 
the Labour Front, a political party that campaigned for immedi- 
ate independence within a merged Singapore and Malaya. That 
same year saw the formation of the People's Action Party (PAP — see 
Glossary) under Lee Kuan Yew, which also campaigned for an end 
to colonialism and union with Malaya. The Labour Front formed 
a coalition government with David Marshall as chief minister 
following elections in 1955 for the newly established Legislative 



4 



Historical Setting 



Assembly. In 1956-58, Merdeka (freedom in Malay) talks were 
held in London to discuss the political future of Singapore. As a 
result of the discussions, Singapore was granted internal self- 
government, whereas defense and foreign affairs were left in the 
hands of the British. 

In the May 1959 election, the PAP swept the polls, and Lee 
became prime minister. Singapore's foreign and local business com- 
munities were greatly alarmed by the turn of events, fearing that 
the communist wing of the PAP would soon seize control of the 
government. The PAP moderates under Lee, however, favored in- 
dependence through merger with Malaya. Singaporean voters ap- 
proved the PAP merger plan in September 1962, and on September 
16, 1963, Singapore joined Malaya and the former British Borneo 
territories of Sabah and Sarawak to form an independent Malay- 
sia. After two years of communal strife, pressure from neighbor- 
ing Indonesia, and political wrangling between Singapore and 
Kuala Lumpur, however, Singapore was forced to separate from 
Malaysia and became an independent nation on August 9, 1965. 

Singaporeans and their leaders immediately accepted the 
challenge of forging a viable nation on a tiny island with few 
resources other than the determination and talent of its people. The 
leaders sought to establish a unique "Singaporean identity" and 
to strengthen economic and political ties with Malaysia, Indone- 
sia, and the other countries of the region. The government also 
began to reorient the economy toward more high-technology in- 
dustries that would enhance the skills of the labor force and attract 
increased foreign investment. By the 1970s, Singapore was among 
the world leaders in shipping, air transport, and oil refining. By 
the mid-1980s, the first generation of leaders under Lee Kuan Yew 
had successfully guided the nation for more than two decades, and 
a new generation was beginning to take charge. 

Precolonial Era 

Located astride the sea routes between China and India, from 
ancient times the Malay Archipelago served as an entrepot, sup- 
ply point, and rendezvous for the sea traders of the kingdoms and 
empires of the Asian mainland and the Indian subcontinent. The 
trade winds of the South China Sea brought Chinese junks laden 
with silks, damasks, porcelain, pottery, and iron to seaports that 
flourished on the Malay Peninsula and the islands of Sumatra and 
Java. There they met with Indian and Arab ships, brought by the 
monsoons of the Indian Ocean, carrying cotton textiles, Venetian 
glass, incense, and metalware. Fleets of swift prahu (interisland craft) 
supplied fish, fruit, and rice from Java and pepper and spices from 



5 



Singapore: A Country Study 



the Moluccas in the eastern part of the archipelago. All who came 
brought not only their trade goods but also their cultures, languages, 
religions, and technologies for exchange in the bazaars of this great 
crossroads. 

In time, the ports of the peninsula and archipelago formed the 
nucleus of a succession of seabased kingdoms, empires, and sul- 
tanates. By the late seventh century, the great maritime Srivijaya 
Empire, with its capital at Palembang in eastern Sumatra, had ex- 
tended its rule over much of the peninsula and archipelago. Histori- 
ans believe that the island of Singapore was probably the site of 
a minor port of Srivijaya. 

Temasek and Singapura 

Although legendary accounts shroud Singapore's earliest history, 
chroniclers as far back as the second century alluded to towns or 
cities that may have been situated at that favored location. Some 
of the earliest records of this region are the reports of Chinese offi- 
cials who served as envoys to the seaports and empires of the 
Nanyang (southern ocean — see Glossary), the Chinese term for 
Southeast Asia. The earliest first-hand account of Singapore appears 
in a geographical handbook written by the Chinese traveler Wang 
Dayuan in 1349. Wang noted that Singapore Island, which he called 
Tan-ma-hsi (Danmaxi), was a haven for several hundred boatloads 
of pirates who preyed on passing ships. He also described a settle- 
ment of Malay and Chinese living on a terraced hill known in Malay 
legend as Bukit Larangan (Forbidden Hill), the reported burial 
place of ancient kings. The fourteenth-century Javanese chroni- 
cle, the Nagarakertagama, also noted a settlement on Singapore Is- 
land, calling it Temasek. 

A Malay seventeenth-century chronicle, the Sejarah Melayu (Malay 
Annals), recounts the founding of a great trading city on the is- 
land in 1299 by a ruler from Palembang, Sri Tri Buana, who named 
the city Singapura ("lion city") after sighting a strange beast that 
he took to be a lion. The prosperous Singapura, according to the 
Sejarah Melayu, in the mid-fourteenth century suffered raids by the 
expanding Javanese Majapahit Empire to the south and the emerg- 
ing Thai kingdom of Ayutthaya to the north, both at various times 
claiming the island as a vassal state. 

The Sejarah Melayu, as well as contemporaneous Portuguese 
accounts, note the arrival around 1388 of King Paramesvara from 
Palembang, who was fleeing Majapahit control. Although grant- 
ed asylum by the ruler of Singapura, the king murdered his host 
and seized power. Within a few years, however, Majapahit or Thai 
forces again drove out Paramesvara, who fled northward to found 



6 



Historical Setting 



eventually the great seaport and kingdom of Malacca. In 1414 
Paramesvara converted to Islam and established the Malacca Sul- 
tanate, which in time controlled most of the Malay Peninsula, 
eastern Sumatra, and the islands between, including Singapura. 
Fighting ships for the sultanate were supplied by a senior Malac- 
can official based at Singapura. The city of Malacca served not 
only as the major seaport of the region in the fifteenth century, 
but also as the focal point for the dissemination of Islam through- 
out insular Southeast Asia. 

Johore Sultanate 

When the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511, the reigning 
Malaccan sultan fled to Johore in the southern part of the Malay 
Peninsula, where he established a new sultanate (see fig. 2). Sin- 
gapura became part of the new Johore Sultanate and was the base 
for one of its senior officials in the latter sixteenth century. In 1613, 
however, the Portuguese reported burning down a trading outpost 
at the mouth of the Temasek (Singapore) River, and Singapura 
passed into history. 

In the following two centuries, the island of Temasek was large- 
ly abandoned and forgotten as the fortunes of the Johore Sultanate 
rose and fell. By 1722 a vigorous seafaring people from the island 
of Celebes (modern Sulawesi, Indonesia) had become the power 
behind the throne of the Johore Sultanate. Under Bugis influence, 
the sultanate built up a lucrative entrepot trade, centered at Riau, 
south of Singapore, in present-day Sumatra. Riau also was the site 
of major plantations of pepper and gambier, a medicinal plant used 
in tanning. The Bugis used waste material from the gambier refin- 
ing process to fertilize pepper plants, a valuable crop, but one that 
quickly depletes soil nutrients. By 1784 an estimated 10,000 Chinese 
laborers had been brought from southern China to work the gam- 
bier plantations on Bintan Island in the Riau Archipelago (now 
part of Indonesia). In the early nineteenth century, gambier was 
in great demand in Java, Siam, and elsewhere, and cultivation of 
the crop had spread from Riau to the island of Singapore. 

The territory controlled by the Johore Sultanate in the late eigh- 
teenth century was somewhat reduced from that under its precur- 
sor, the Malacca Sultanate, but still included the southern part of 
the Malay Peninsula, the adjacent area of Sumatra, and the is- 
lands between, including Singapore. The sultanate had become 
increasingly weakened by division into a Malay faction, which con- 
trolled the peninsula and Singapore, and a Bugis faction, which 
controlled the Riau Archipelago and Sumatra. When the ruling 
sultan died without a royal heir, the Bugis had proclaimed as 



7 



Singapore: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Constance M. Turnbull, A Short History of Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Brunei, Stanmore, N.S.W., 1980, 61; and Tan Ding Eing, Portrait 
of Malaysia and Singapore, Singapore, 1975, 22. 

Figure 2. The Johore Sultanate, ca. 1700 

sultan the younger of his two sons by a commoner wife. The sul- 
tan's elder son, Hussein (or Tengku Long) resigned himself to living 
in obscurity in Riau. 

Although the sultan was the nominal ruler of his domain, senior 
officials actually governed the sultanate. In control of Singapore 
and the neighboring islands was Temenggong Abdu'r Rahman, 
Hussein's father-in-law. In 1818 the temenggong (a high Malay offi- 
cial) and some of his followers left Riau for Singapore shortly after 



8 



Historical Setting 



the Dutch signed a treaty with the Bugis-controlled sultan, allow- 
ing them to station a garrison at Riau . The temenggong 's settlement 
on the Singapore River included several hundred orang laut (sea 
gypsies in Malay) under Malay overlords who owed allegiance to 
the temenggong. For their livelihood the inhabitants depended on 
fishing, fruit growing, trading, and occasional piracy. Large pirate 
fleets also used the strait between Singapore and the Riau Archipela- 
go as a favorite rendezvous. Also living on the island in settlements 
along the rivers and creeks were several hundred indigenous 
tribespeople, who lived by fishing and gathering jungle produce. 
Some thirty Chinese, probably brought from Riau by the temeng- 
gong, had begun gambier and pepper production on the island. In 
all, perhaps a thousand people inhabited the island of Singapore 
at the dawn of the colonial era. 

Founding and Early Years, 1819-26 

By the early seventeenth century, both the Dutch and the English 
were sending regular expeditions to the East Indies. The English 
soon gave up the trade, however, and concentrated their efforts 
on India. In 1641 the Dutch captured Malacca and soon after re- 
placed the Portuguese as the preeminent European power in the Ma- 
lay Archipelago. From their capital at Batavia on Java, they sought 
to monopolize the spice trade. Their short-sighted policies and harsh 
treatment of offenders, however, impoverished their suppliers and 
encouraged smuggling and piracy by the Bugis and other peoples. 
By 1795, the Dutch enterprise in Asia was losing money, and in 
Europe the Netherlands was at war with France. The Dutch king 
fled to Britain where, in desperation, he issued the Kew Letters, 
by which all Dutch overseas territories were temporarily placed un- 
der British authority in order to keep them from falling to the French. 

Anglo-Dutch Competition 

In the late eighteenth century, the British began to expand their 
commerce with China from their bases in India through both pri- 
vate traders and the British East India Company. The company 
had occupied a small settlement at Bencoolen (Bengkulu) on the 
western coast of Sumatra since 1684; from there it had engaged 
in the pepper trade after being forced out of Java by the Dutch. 
Acutely aware of the need for a base somewhere midway between 
Calcutta and Guangzhou (Canton), the company leased the island 
of Penang, on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula, from the 
sultan of Kedah in 1791 . From these posts at Penang and Bencoo- 
len, the British began in 1795 to occupy the Dutch possessions 



9 



Singapore: A Country Study 

placed temporarily in their care by the Kew Letters, including 
Malacca and Java. After war in Europe ended in 1814, however, 
the British agreed to return Java and Malacca to the Dutch. By 
1818 the Dutch had returned to the East Indies and had reimposed 
their restrictive trade policies. In that same year, the Dutch negotiat- 
ed a treaty with the Bugis-controlled sultan of Johore granting them 
permission to station a garrison at Riau, thereby giving them con- 
trol over the main passage through the Strait of Malacca. British 
trading ships were heavily taxed at Dutch ports and suffered harass- 
ment by the Dutch navy. Meanwhile, the British government and 
the British East India Company officials in London, who were con- 
cerned with maintaining peace with the Dutch, consolidating British 
control in India, and reducing their commitments in the East In- 
dies, considered relinquishing Bencoolen and perhaps Penang to 
the Dutch in exchange for Dutch territories in India. 

Raffles' Dream 

Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, the lieutenant governor of Ben- 
coolen in 1818, vigorously opposed his government's plan to aban- 
don control of the China trade to the Dutch. Raffles, who had 
started his career as a clerk for the British East India Company 
in London, was promoted at the age of twenty-three to assistant 
secretary of the newly formed government in Penang in 1805. A 
serious student of the history and culture of the region and fluent 
in Malay, Raffles served as governor general of Java (1811-16). 
In 1818 Raffles sailed from Bencoolen to India, where he convinced 
Governor General Lord Hastings of the need for a British post on 
the southern end of the Strait of Malacca. Lord Hastings autho- 
rized Raffles to secure such a post for the British East India Com- 
pany, provided that it did not antagonize the Dutch. Arriving in 
Penang, Raffles found Governor General James Bannerman 
unwilling to cooperate. When he learned that the Dutch had 
occupied Riau and were claiming that all territories of the sultan 
of Johore were within their sphere of influence, Raffles dispatched 
Colonel William Farquhar, an old friend and Malayan expert, to 
survey the Carimon Islands (modern Karimun Islands near Riau). 
Disregarding Bannerman 's orders to him to await further instruc- 
tions from Calcutta, Raffles slipped out of Penang the following 
night aboard a private trading ship and caught up with Farquhar. 
Raffles knew of Singapore Island from his study of Malay texts 
and determined to go there. 

On January 28, 1819, Raffles and Farquhar anchored near the 
mouth of the Singapore River. The following day the two men 
went ashore to meet Temenggong Abdu'r Rahman, who granted 



10 



Singapore Malay fishing village, nineteenth century 
Courtesy Library of Congress 
Rattan harvesting in nineteenth- century Singapore 
Courtesy Library of Congress 

11 



Singapore: A Country Study 



provisional permission for the British East India Company to estab- 
lish a trading post on the island, subject to the approval of 
Hussein. Raffles, noting the protected harbor, the abundance of 
drinking water, and the absence of the Dutch, began immediately 
to unload troops, clear the land on the northeast side of the river, 
set up tents, and hoist the British flag. Meanwhile, the temenggong 
sent to Riau for Hussein, who arrived within a few days. Acknowl- 
edging Hussein as the rightful sultan of Johore, on February 6 Raf- 
fles signed a treaty with him and the temenggong confirming the right 
of the British East India Company to establish a trading post in 
return for an annual payment (in Spanish dollars, the common cur- 
rency of the region at the time) of Sp$5,000 to Hussein and 
Sp$3,000 to the temenggong. Raffles then departed for Bencoolen, 
leaving Farquhar in charge, with instructions to clear the land, con- 
struct a simple fortification, and inform all passing ships that there 
were no duties on trade at the new settlement. 

The immediate reaction to Raffles' new venture was mixed. Offi- 
cials of the British East India Company in London feared that their 
negotiations with the Dutch would be upset by Raffles' action. The 
Dutch were furious because they considered Singapore within their 
sphere of influence. Although they could easily have overcome Far- 
quhar 's tiny force, the Dutch did not attack the small settlement 
because the angry Bannerman assured them that the British offi- 
cials in Calcutta would disavow the whole scheme. In Calcutta, 
meanwhile, both the commercial community and the Calcutta Journal 
welcomed the news and urged full government support for the un- 
dertaking. Lord Hastings ordered the unhappy Bannerman to pro- 
vide Farquhar with troops and money. Britain's foreign minister 
Lord Casdereagh, reluctant to relinquish to the Dutch "all the mili- 
tary and naval keys of the Strait of Malacca," had the question 
of Singapore added to the list of topics to be negotiated with the 
Dutch, thus buying time for the new settlement. 

The opportunity to sell supplies at high prices to the new settle- 
ment quickly attracted many Malacca traders to the island. Word 
of Singapore's free trade policy also spread southeastward through 
the archipelago, and within six weeks more than 100 Indonesian 
interisland craft were anchored in the harbor, as well as one Sia- 
mese and two European ships. Raffles returned in late May to find 
that the population of the settlement had grown to nearly 5,000, 
including Malays, Chinese, Bugis, Arabs, Indians, and Europe- 
ans. During his four- week stay, he drew up a plan for the town 
and signed another agreement with Hussein and the temenggong es- 
tablishing the boundaries of the settlement. He wrote to a friend 
that Singapore "is by far the most important station in the East; and, 



12 



Historical Setting 



as far as naval superiority and commercial interests are concerned, 
of much higher value than whole continents of territory." 

Early Administration and Growth 

Although the India-China trade was partly responsible for the 
overnight success of Singapore, even more important was the well- 
established entrepot trade of the East Indies that the new port cap- 
tured from Riau and other trade centers. The news of the free port 
brought not only traders and merchants but also permanent set- 
tlers. Malays came from Penang, Malacca, Riau, and Sumatra. 
Several hundred boadoads of Hussein's followers came from Riau, 
and the new sultan had built for himself an istana (palace in Ma- 
lay), thus making Singapore his headquarters. The growing pow- 
er of the Dutch in Riau also spurred several hundred Bugis traders 
and their families to migrate to the new settlement. Singapore was 
also a magnet for the Nanyang Chinese who had lived in the region 
for generations as merchants, miners, or gambier farmers. They 
came from Penang, Malacca, Riau, Manila, Bangkok, and Bata- 
via to escape the tariffs and restrictions of those places and to seek 
their fortunes. Many intermarried with Malay women, giving rise 
to the group known as the Baba Chinese (see Glossary). The small 
Indian population included both soldiers and merchants. A few 
Armenian merchants from Brunei and Manila were also attracted 
to the setdement, as were some leading Arab families from Sumatra. 
Most Europeans in the early days of Singapore were officials of 
the British East India Company or retired merchant sea captains. 

Not wanting the British East India Company to view Singapore 
as an economic liability, Raffles left Farquhar a shoestring budget 
with which to administer the new setdement. Prevented from either 
imposing trade tariffs or selling land titles to raise revenue, Far- 
quhar legalized gambling and the sale of opium and arak, an alco- 
holic drink. The government auctioned off monopoly rights to sell 
opium and spirits and to run gambling dens under a system known 
as tax farming, and the revenue thus raised was used for public 
works projects. Maintenance of law and order in the wide-open 
seaport was among the most serious problems Farquhar faced. 
There was constant friction among the various immigrant groups, 
particularly between the more settled Malays and Chinese from 
Malacca and the rough and ready followers of the temenggong and 
the sultan. The settlement's merchants eventually funded night 
watchmen to augment the tiny police force. 

When Raffles returned to Singapore from Bencoolen in October 
1822, he immediately began drawing up plans for a new town (see 
fig. 3). An area along the coast about five kilometers long and one 



13 



Singapore: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Gerald Percy Dartford, A Short History of Malaya, Lon- 
don, 1957, 102; and Constance M. Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, 1826-67, Lon- 
don, 1972. 



Figure 3. The Straits Settlements, 1826 

kilometer deep was designated the government and commercial 
quarter. A hill was leveled and the dirt used to fill a nearby swamp 
in order to provide a place for the heart of the commercial area, 
now Raffles Place. An orderly and scientifically laid out town was 
the goal of Raffles, who believed that Singapore would one day 
be ' 'a place of considerable magnitude and importance." Under 
Raffles' plan, commercial buildings were to be constructed of brick 



14 



Historical Setting 



with tiled roofs, each with a two-meter covered walkway to pro- 
vide shelter from sun and rain. Spaces were set aside for shipyards, 
markets, churches, theaters, police stations, and a botanical garden. 
Raffles had a wooden bungalow built for himself on Government 
Hill. 

Each immigrant group was assigned an area of the settlement 
under the new plan. The Chinese, who were the fastest growing 
group, were given the whole area west of the Singapore River ad- 
joining the commercial district; Chinatown was further divided 
among the various dialect groups. The temenggong and his follow- 
ers were moved several kilometers west of the commercial district, 
mainly in an effort to curtail their influence in that area. The head- 
men or kapitans of the various groups were allotted larger plots, 
and affluent Asians and Europeans were encouraged to live together 
in a residential area adjacent to the government quarter. 

In the absence of any legal code, Raffles in early 1823 promul- 
gated a series of administrative regulations. The first required that 
land be conveyed on permanent lease at a public auction and that 
it must be registered. The second reiterated Singapore's status as 
a free port, a popular point with the merchants. In his farewell 
remarks, Raffles assured them that * ' Singapore will long and al- 
ways remain a free port and no taxes on trade or industry will be 
established to check its future rise and prosperity. " The third regu- 
lation made English common law the standard, although Muslim 
law was to be used in matters of religion, marriage, and inheritance 
involving Malays. 

Raffles was an enlightened administrator for his time. He believed 
in the prevention of crime and the reform, rather than the mere 
punishment, of criminals. Payment of compensation to the injured 
by the offender was to be considered as important as punishment. 
Only murder was to be considered a capital offense, and various 
work and training programs were used to turn prisoners into use- 
ful settlers. Raffles shut down all gambling dens and heavily taxed 
the sale of liquor and opium. He abolished outright slavery in 1823, 
but was unable to eradicate debt bondage, by which immigrants 
often were forced to work years at hard labor to pay for their 
passage. 

Raffles felt that under Farquhar the temenggong and the sultan 
had wielded too much power, receiving one- third of the proceeds 
from the opium, liquor, and gambling revenues, and demanding 
presents from the captains of the Asian ships that dropped anchor 
there. Hussein and the temenggong, however, viewed Singapore as 
a thriving entrepot in the mold of the great port cities of the Malay 
maritime empires of Srivijaya, Malacca, and Johore. As rulers 



15 



Singapore: A Country Study 

of the island, they considered themselves entitled to a share of the 
power and proceeds of the settlement. In June 1823, Raffles 
managed to persuade Hussein and the temenggong to give up their 
rights to port duties and their share in the other tax revenues in 
exchange for a pension of Sp$l ,500 and Sp$800 per month, respec- 
tively. Because the Dutch still contested the British presence in Sin- 
gapore, Raffles did not dare push the issue further. On March 17, 
1824, however, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London was signed, 
dividing the East Indies into two spheres of influence. The British 
would have hegemony north of a line drawn through the Strait of 
Malacca, and the Dutch would control the area south of the line. 
As a result, the Dutch recognized the British claim to Singapore 
and relinquished power over Malacca in exchange for the British 
post at Bencoolen. On August 3, with their claim to Singapore 
secure, the British negotiated a new treaty with the sultan and the 
temenggong, by which the Malay rulers were forced to cede Singa- 
pore and the neighboring islands to the British East India Compa- 
ny for cash payments and increased pensions. Under the treaty, 
the Malay chiefs also agreed to help suppress piracy, but the 
problem was not to be solved for several more decades. 

In October 1823, Raffles left Singapore for Britain, never to 
return. Before leaving, he replaced Farquhar with the Scotsman 
John Crawfurd, an efficient and frugal administrator who guided 
the settlement through three years of vigorous growth. Crawfurd 
continued Raffles' struggles against slavery and piracy, but he per- 
mitted the gambling houses to reopen, taxed them, and used the 
revenue for street widening, bridge building, and other civic 
projects. He failed to support, however, Raffles' dream of higher 
education for the settlement. As his last public act, Raffles had con- 
tributed Sp$2,000 toward the establishment of a Singapore Insti- 
tution, which he had envisioned as a training ground for Asian 
teachers and civil servants and a place where European officials 
could gain an appreciation of the rich cultural heritage of the region 
as Raffles himself had. He had hoped that the institution would 
attract the sons of rulers and chiefs of all the region. Crawfurd, 
however, advised the company officials in Calcutta that it would 
be preferable to support primary education. In fact, education at 
all levels was neglected until much later. 

A Flourishing Free Port, 1826-67 

In the first half-century after its founding, Singapore grew from 
a precarious trading post of the British East India Company popu- 
lated by a few thousand to a bustling, cosmopolitan seaport of 
85,000 (see fig. 4). Although the general trend of Singapore's 



16 



Historical Setting 



economic status was upward during this period, the setdement en- 
dured economic recessions as well as prosperity, fires and floods 
as well as building booms, and bureaucratic incompetence as well 
as able administration. In 1826 the British East India Company 
combined Singapore with Penang and Malacca to form the 
Presidency of the Straits Settlements, with its capital at Penang. 
The new bureaucratic apparatus proved to be expensive and cum- 
bersome, however, and in 1830 the Straits Setdements were reduced 
to a residency, or subdivision, of the Presidency of Bengal. Although 
Singapore soon overshadowed the other settlements, Penang re- 
mained the capital until 1832 and the judicial headquarters until 
1856. The overworked civil service that administered Singapore 
remained about the same size between 1830 and 1867, although 
the population quadrupled during that period. Saddled with the 
endless narrative and statistical reports required by Bengal, few 
civil servants had time to learn the languages or customs of the 
people they governed. 

Although the European and Asian commercial community was 
reasonably satisfied with the administration of the settlement under 
Bengal, an economic depression in the 1840s caused some to con- 
sider the merits of Singapore being administered direcdy as a crown 
colony. The advent of the steamship had made Singapore less 
dependent on Calcutta and more closely tied to the London com- 
mercial and political scene. By mid-century, the parent firms of 
most of Singapore's British-owned merchant houses were located 
in London rather than Calcutta. In 1851, following a visit to Sin- 
gapore, Lord Dalhousie, the governor general of India, separated 
the Straits Settlements from Bengal and placed them directly under 
his own charge. In the following sixteen years, a number of issues 
arose that caused increased agitation to remove the Straits Settle- 
ments completely from India's administration and place it direct- 
ly under the British Colonial Office. Among these issues were the 
need for protection against piracy and Calcutta's continuing at- 
tempts to levy port duties on Singapore. Mostly as a result of the 
need for a place other than fever-ridden Hong Kong to station Brit- 
ish troops in Asia, London designated the Straits Settlements a 
crown colony on April 1, 1867. 

Financial Success 

Trade at Singapore had eclipsed that of Penang by 1824, when 
it reached a total of Sp$l 1 million annually. By 1869 annual trade 
at Singapore had risen to Sp$89 million. The cornerstone of the 
settlement's commercial success was the entrepot trade, which was 
carried on with no taxation and a minimum of restriction. The 



17 



Singapore: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



main trading season began each year with the arrival of ships from 
China, Siam, and Cochinchina (as the southern part of Vietnam 
was then known). Driven by the northeast monsoon winds and 
arriving in January, February, and March, the ships brought 
immigrant laborers and cargoes of dried and salted foods, medi- 
cines, silk, tea, porcelain, and pottery. They left beginning in May 
with the onset of the southwest monsoons, laden with produce, 
spices, tin, and gold from the Malay Archipelago, opium from In- 
dia, and English cotton goods and arms. The second major trad- 
ing season began in September or October with the arrival of the 
Bugis traders in their small, swift prahu, bringing rice, pepper, 
spices, edible bird nests and shark fins, mother-of-pearl, gold dust, 
rattan, and camphor from the archipelago. They departed carry- 
ing British manufactures, cotton goods, iron, arms, opium, salt, 
silk, and porcelain. By mid-century, there were more than twenty 
British merchant houses in Singapore, as well as German, Swiss, 
Dutch, Portuguese, and French firms. The merchants would receive 
cargoes of European or Indian goods on consignment and sell them 
on commission. 

Most of the trade between the European and Asian merchants 
was handled by Chinese middlemen, who spoke the necessary lan- 
guages and knew the needs of their customers. Many of the mid- 
dlemen had trained as clerks in the European trading firms of 
Malacca. With their experience, contacts, business acumen, and 
willingness to take risks, the middlemen were indispensable to the 
merchants. For the Chinese middlemen, the opportunities for sub- 
stantial profit were great; but so were the risks. Lacking capital, 
the middlemen bought large quantities of European goods on credit 
with the hope of reselling them to the Chinese or Bugis ship cap- 
tains or themselves arranging to ship them to the markets of Siam 
or the eastern Malay Peninsula. If, however, buyers could not be 
found or ships were lost at sea, the middlemen faced bankruptcy 
or prison. Although the merchants also stood to lose under such 
circumstances, the advantages of the system and the profits to be 
made kept it flourishing. 

The main site for mercantile activity in mid-century Singapore 
was Commercial Square, renamed Raffles Place in 1858. Besides 
the European merchant houses located on the square, there were 
in 1846 six Jewish merchant houses, five Chinese, five Arab, two 
Armenian, one American, and one Indian. Each merchant house 
had its own pier for loading and unloading cargo; and ship chan- 
dlers, banks, auction houses, and other businesses serving the ship- 
ping trade also were located on the square. In the early years, 
merchants lived above their offices; but by mid-century most had 



19 



Singapore: A Country Study 



established themselves in beautiful houses and compounds in a 
fashionable section on the east bank of the Singapore River. 

Construction of government buildings lagged far behind com- 
mercial buildings in the early years because of the lack of tax- 
generated revenue. The merchants resisted any attempts by Cal- 
cutta to levy duties on trade, and the British East India Company 
had little interest in increasing the colony's budget. After 1833, 
however, many public works projects were constructed by the ex- 
tensive use of Indian convict labor. Irish architect George Drum- 
gold Coleman, who was appointed superintendent of public works 
in that year, used convicts to drain marshes, reclaim seafront, lay 
out roads, and build government buildings, churches, and homes 
in a graceful colonial style. 

Probably the most serious problem facing Singapore at mid- 
century was piracy, which was being engaged in by a number of 
groups who found easy pickings in the waters around the thriving 
port. Some of the followers of the temenggong's son and heir, Ibra- 
him, were still engaging in their "patrolling" activities in the late 
1830s. Most dangerous of the various pirate groups, however, were 
the Illanun (Lanun) of Mindanao in the Philippines and northern 
Borneo. These fierce sea raiders sent out annual fleets of 50 to 100 
well-armed prahu, which raided settlements, attacked ships, and car- 
ried off prisoners who were pressed into service as oarsmen. The 
Illanun attacked not only small craft from the archipelago but also 
Chinese and European sailing ships. Bugis trading captains threat- 
ened to quit trading at Singapore unless the piracy was stopped. 
In the 1850s, Chinese pirates, who boldly used Singapore as a place 
to buy arms and sell their booty, brought the trade between Singa- 
pore and Cochinchina to a standstill. The few patrol boats assigned 
by the British East India Company to protect the Straits Settiements 
were totally inadequate, and the Singapore merchants continually 
petitioned Calcutta and London for aid in stamping out the menace. 

By the late 1860s, a number of factors had finally led to the demise 
of piracy. In 1841, the governor of the Straits Settlements, George 
Bonham, recognized Ibrahim as temenggong of Johore, with the un- 
derstanding that he would help suppress piracy. By 1850 the Royal 
Navy was patrolling the area with steam-powered ships, which could 
navigate upwind and outmaneuver the pirate sailing ships. The 
expansion of European power in Asia also brought increased patrol- 
ling of the region by the Dutch in Sumatra, the Spanish in the Philip- 
pines, and the British from their newly established protectorates on 
the Malay Peninsula. China also agreed to cooperate in suppress- 
ing piracy under the provisions of treaties signed with the Western 
powers in 1860. 



20 



Historical Setting 



Singapore's development and prosperity at mid-century were 
largely confined to the coast within a few kilometers of the port 
area. The interior remained a dense jungle ringed by a coastline 
of mangrove swamps. Attempts to turn the island to plantation 
agriculture between 1830 and 1840 had met with litde success. Nut- 
meg, coffee, sugar, cotton, cinnamon, cloves, and indigo all fell 
victim to pests, plant diseases, or insufficient soil fertility. The only 
successful agricultural enterprises were the gambier and pepper 
plantations, numbering about 600 in the late 1840s and employ- 
ing some 6,000 Chinese laborers. When the firewood needed to 
extract the gambier became depleted, the plantation would be 
moved to a new area. As a result, the forests of much of the interi- 
or of the island had been destroyed and replaced by coarse grasses 
by the 1860s, and the gambier planters had moved their opera- 
tions north to Johore. This pressure on the land also affected the 
habitats of the wildlife, particularly tigers, which began increas- 
ingly to attack villagers and plantation workers. Tigers reportedly 
claimed an average of one victim per day in the late 1840s. When 
the government offered rewards for killing the animals, tiger hunting 
became a serious business and a favorite sport. The last year a per- 
son was reported killed by a tiger was 1890, and the last wild tiger 
was shot in 1904. 

A Cosmopolitan Community 

As Singapore prospered and grew, the size and diversity of its 
population kept pace. By 1827, the Chinese had become the most 
numerous of Singapore's various ethnic groups. Many of the 
Chinese came from Malacca, Penang, Riau, and other parts of 
the Malay Archipelago to which their forebears had migrated de- 
cades or even generations before. More recent Chinese immigrants 
were mainly from the southeastern provinces of Guangdong and 
Fujian and spoke either the Hokkien, Teochiu, Cantonese, or Hak- 
ka dialects. In an extension of the common Chinese practice of 
sojourning, in which men temporarily left their home communi- 
ties to seek work in nearby or distant cities, most migrants to Sin- 
gapore saw themselves as temporary residents intending to return 
to home and family after making a fortune or at least amassing 
enough capital to buy land in their home district. Many did return; 
more did not. Even those who never returned usually sent remit- 
tances to families back home. 

To help them face the dangers, hardships, and loneliness of the 
sojourner life, most men joined or were forced to join secret socie- 
ties organized by earlier immigrants from their home districts. The 
secret societies had their origin in southern China, where, in the 



21 



Singapore: A Country Study 

late seventeenth century, the Heaven, Earth, and Man (or Triad) 
Society was formed to oppose the Qing (1644-1911) dynasty. By 
the nineteenth century, secret societies in China acted as groups 
that organized urban unskilled labor and used coercion to win con- 
trol of economic niches, such as unloading ships, transporting cot- 
ton, or gambling and prostitution. The same pattern extended all 
over Southeast Asia, where immigrants joined secret societies whose 
membership was restricted to those coming from the same area and 
speaking the same dialect. Membership gave the immigrants some 
security, in the form of guaranteed employment and assistance in 
case of illness, but required loyalty to the leaders and payment of 
a portion of an already meager wage. Although the societies per- 
formed many useful social functions, they were also a major source 
of crime and violence. By 1860 there were at least twelve secret 
societies in Singapore, representing the various dialect and subdi- 
alect groups. Invariably friction arose as each society sought to con- 
trol a certain area or the right to a certain tax farm. Civil war in 
China in the 1850s brought a flood of new migrants from China, 
including many rebels and other violent elements. Serious fight- 
ing between the various secret societies broke out in 1854, but it 
remained a domestic dispute within the Chinese community. Al- 
though not directed at the government or the non-Chinese com- 
munities, such outbreaks disrupted commerce and created a tense 
atmosphere, which led to the banning of secret societies in 1889. 

Just as the European merchant community used Chinese mid- 
dlemen in conducting their business, the Straits government relied 
on prominent Chinese businessmen to act as go-betweens with the 
Chinese community. In the early years, the Baba Chinese, who 
usually spoke English, served in this capacity. By mid-century, 
however, immigrant Chinese from the various dialect groups had 
begun to act as intermediaries. Some, such as Seah Eu Chin, who 
was the go-between with the Teochiu community, were well edu- 
cated and from respected families. Seah, who made his fortune in 
gambier and pepper plantations, was an early member of the Sin- 
gapore Chamber of Commerce, established in 1837, and a justice 
of the peace. Probably the wealthiest and most prominent Chinese 
immigrant in the nineteenth century was Hoo Ah Kay, nicknamed 
"Whampoa" after his birthplace near Guangzhou, who served as 
a go-between with the Cantonese-speaking community. Hoo came 
as a penniless youth and made his fortune in provisioning ships, 
merchandising, and speculating in land. He later became the first 
Asian member of Singapore's Legislative Council and a member 
of the Executive Council. Despite their close connections to the 
European ruling class, Seah, Hoo, and other prominent Chinese 



22 



Historical Setting 



carefully retained their Chinese culture and values, as did the less 
prominent immigrants. 

Most Chinese immigrants fared far less well. If they survived 
the rigors of the voyage, they were forced to work at hard labor 
for a year or more to pay off their passage. Some were sent direct- 
ly to the gambier plantations or even to the tin mines of the Malay 
Peninsula. Others were sent to toil on the docks or become con- 
struction workers. After paying off their passage, they began earning 
a meager wage, which, unless diverted for opium or gambling debts, 
was sent as a remittance to families back in China. Wives were 
in short supply, since very few Chinese women came to Singapore 
in the first few decades of the settlement. Even by the mid- 1860s, 
the ratio of Chinese men to women was fifteen to one. 

Until about 1860, Malays were the second largest group. The 
followers of the temenggong mostly moved to Johore, where many 
of them died of smallpox. The orang laut by mid-century merged 
with other groups of Malay, who were drawn from Riau, Sumatra, 
and Malacca. Generally peaceful and industrious, the Malays usual- 
ly worked as fishermen, boatmen, woodcutters, or carpenters. 

Most of the Bugis sea traders migrated to Macassar after the 
Dutch made it a free port in 1847, and by 1860 the Bugis popula- 
tion of Singapore had declined to less than 1 ,000. Small numbers 
of Arabs, Jews, and Armenians, many of them already well-to- 
do, were drawn to Singapore, where they amassed even greater 
wealth. Another small group numbered among Singapore's upper 
class were the Parsis, Indians of Iranian descent who were adher- 
ents of Zoroastrianism. 

Indians had become Singapore's second largest community by 
1860, numbering more than 11,000. Some of these people were 
laborers or traders, who, like the Chinese, came with the hope of 
making their fortune and returning to their homeland. Some were 
troops garrisoned at Singapore by the government in Calcutta. 
Another group were convicts who were first brought to Singapore 
from the detention center in Bencoolen in 1825, after Bencoolen 
was handed over to the Dutch. Singapore then became a major 
detention center for Indian prisoners. Rehabilitation rather than 
punishment was emphasized, and prisoners were trained in such 
skills as brick making, carpentry, rope making, printing, weav- 
ing, and tailoring, which later would enable them to find employ- 
ment. Singapore's penal system was considered so enlightened that 
Dutch, Siamese, and Japanese prison administrators came to 
observe it. Convict labor was used to build roads, clear the jungle, 
hunt tigers, and construct public buildings, some of which were 
still in use in the late twentieth century. After completing their 



23 



Singapore: A Country Study 

sentences, most convicts settled down to a useful life in Singapore. 
As with Chinese and Europeans, Indian men far outnumbered 
women because few Indian women came to Singapore before the 
1860s. Some Indian Muslims married Malay women, however, 
and their descendants were known as Jawi-Peranakan (see 
Glossary). 

The highly unbalanced sex ratio in Singapore contributed to a 
rather lawless, frontier atmosphere that the government seemed 
helpless to combat. Little revenue was available to expand the tiny 
police force, which struggled to keep order amid a continuous in- 
flux of immigrants, often from the fringes of Asian society. This 
tide of immigration was totally uncontrolled because Singapore's 
businessmen, desperate for unskilled laborers, opposed restriction 
on free immigration as vehemently as they resisted any restraint 
on free trade. Public health services were almost nonexistent, and 
cholera, malnutrition, smallpox, and opium use took a heavy toll 
in the severely overcrowded working-class areas. 

Crown Colony, 1867-1918 

After years of campaigning by a small minority of the British 
merchants, who had chafed under the rule of the Calcutta govern- 
ment, the Straits Settlements became a crown colony on April 1, 
1867. Under the crown colony administration, the governor ruled 
with the assistance of executive and legislative councils. The 
Executive Council included the governor, the senior military offi- 
cial in the Straits Settlements, and six other senior officials. The 
Legislative Council included the members of the Executive Coun- 
cil, the chief justice, and four nonofficial members nominated by 
the governor. The numbers of nonofficial members and Asian coun- 
cil members gradually increased through the years. Singapore domi- 
nated the Legislative Council, to the annoyance of Malacca and 
Penang. 

By the 1870s, Singapore businessmen had considerable interest 
in the rubber, tin, gambier, and other products and resources of 
the Malay Peninsula. Conditions in the peninsula were highly 
unstable, however, marked by fighting between immigrants and 
traditional Malay authorities and rivalry among various Chinese 
secret societies. Singapore served as an entrepot for the resources 
of the Malay Peninsula and, at the same time, the port of debar- 
kation for thousands of immigrant Chinese, Indians, Indonesians, 
and Malays bound for the tin mines and rubber plantations to the 
north. Some 250,000 Chinese alone disembarked in Singapore in 
1912, most of them on their way to the Malay states or to the Dutch 
East Indies. 



24 




Singapore Malay family, nineteenth century 
Courtesy Library of Congress 
School for Singapore Chinese girls, nineteenth century 
Courtesy Library of Congress 



25 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Although most Chinese immigrants merely passed through Sin- 
gapore, the Chinese population of the island grew rapidly, from 
34,000 in 1878 to 103,000 in 1888. The colonial government 
established the Chinese Protectorate in 1877 to deal with the seri- 
ous abuses of the labor trade. William Pickering, the first appointed 
Protector of Chinese, was the first British official in Singapore who 
could speak and read Chinese. Pickering was given power to board 
incoming ships and did much to protect the newly arrived 
immigrants. In the early 1880s, he also extended his protection 
to Chinese women entering the colony by working to end forced 
prostitution. Because of his sympathetic approach and adminis- 
trative ability, the protector soon spread his influence and protec- 
tion over the whole Chinese community, providing arbitration of 
labor, financial, and domestic disagreements, thereby undermin- 
ing some of the powers of the secret societies. Although no longer 
able to engage in illegal immigration practices, the societies con- 
tinued to cause problems by running illegal gambling houses and 
supporting large-scale riots that often paralyzed the city. In 1889, 
Governor Sir Cecil Clementi-Smith sponsored a law to ban secret 
societies, which took effect the following year. The result was to 
drive the societies underground, where many of them degenerat- 
ed into general lawlessness, engaging in extortion, gambling oper- 
ations, gang fights, and robbery. The power of the secret societies, 
however, was broken. 

The largest Chinese dialect group in the late nineteenth century 
were the Hokkien, who were traditionally involved in trade, ship- 
ping, banking, and industry. The next largest group, the Teochiu, 
engaged in agricultural production and processing, including gam- 
bier, pepper, and rubber production, rice and lumber milling, 
pineapple canning, and fish processing. Cantonese served as arti- 
sans and laborers and a few made their fortunes in tin. The two 
smallest groups, the Hakka and Hainanese, were mostly servants, 
sailors, or unskilled laborers. Because wealth was the key to leader- 
ship and social standing within the Chinese community at that time, 
the Hokkien dominated organizations such as the Singapore 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce and supplied most of the Chinese 
members of the Legislative Council and the Chinese Advisory 
Board. The latter, established in 1889 to provide a formal link 
between the British government of the colony and the Chinese com- 
munity, served as a place to air grievances but had no power. 

The affluent among Singapore's Chinese community increas- 
ingly saw their prosperity and fortunes tied to those of the crown 
colony and the British Empire. Western education, customs, and 
pastimes were adopted, and the sons of Chinese businessmen were 



26 



Historical Setting 



often sent to Britain for university training. The Straits Chinese 
British Association was formed in 1900 by Baba Chinese leaders 
to promote loyalty to the British Empire as well as to advance the 
education and welfare of Singapore's Chinese. Visiting British 
royalty were warmly received and British causes and victories en- 
thusiastically supported. The Straits Chinese (see Glossary) con- 
tributed generously to the British war effort in World War I 
(1914-18). 

Although the Chinese upper class, particularly the Straits-born 
Chinese, grew increasingly Westernized, the homeland exerted a 
continuing pull on its loyalties that increased during this period. 
Visits to China by Singapore Chinese became more common with 
the advent of steamship travel. The relaxation by the 1870s of Chi- 
na's law forbidding emigration (repealed in 1893) and the protec- 
tion afforded Singaporeans by British citizenship made it relatively 
safe for prosperous businessmen to visit their homeland and return 
again to Singapore. Upper-class Singapore Chinese frequendy sent 
their sons to school in China and encouraged them to find brides 
there, although they themselves had often married local women. 

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, China's ruling Qing 
dynasty began to take an interest in the Nanyang Chinese and 
sought to attract their loyalty and wealth to the service of the 
homeland. Chinese consulates were established in Singapore, 
Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and other parts of the Nanyang. 
Hoo Ah Kay was appointed Singapore's first consul in 1877. He 
and his successors worked diligently to strengthen the cultural ties 
of the Singapore Chinese to China by establishing a cultural club, 
a debating society, Singapore's first Chinese-language newspaper 
{Lot Pau), and various Chinese-language schools, in which the medi- 
um of instruction was Chinese. One of the most important func- 
tions of the consul, however, was to raise money for flood and 
famine relief in China and for the general support of the Qing 
government. With the upheaval in China following the Hundred 
Days' Reform Movement in 1898, and its suppression by the Qing 
conservatives, the Singapore Chinese and their pocketbooks were 
wooed by reformists, royalists, and revolutionaries alike. Sun Yat- 
sen founded a Singapore branch of the Tongmeng Hui, the fore- 
runner of the Guomindang (Kuomintang — Chinese Nationalist 
Party), in 1906. Not until the successful Wuchang Uprising of Oc- 
tober 10, 1911, however, did Sun receive the enthusiastic support 
of Singapore Chinese. 

Much smaller than the Chinese community and less organized 
in the late nineteenth century was the Singapore Indian commu- 
nity. By 1880 there were only 12,000 Indians, including Hindus, 



27 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, each group with its own temple, 
mosque, or church. South Indians tended to be shopkeepers or 
laborers, particularly dockworkers, riverboatmen, and drivers of 
the ox carts that were the major transport for goods to and from 
the port area. North Indians were usually clerks, traders, and mer- 
chants. Both groups came to Singapore expecting to return to their 
homeland and were even more transient than the Chinese. 

Malays continued to be drawn to Singapore from all over the 
archipelago, reaching a population of 36,000 by 1901 . Malay traders 
and merchants lost out in the commercial competition with Chinese 
and Europeans, and most Malay immigrants became small shop- 
keepers, religious teachers, policemen, servants, or laborers. The 
leadership positions in the Malay-Muslim community went to the 
Jawi-Peranakan, because of their facility in English, and to wealthy 
Arabs. In 1876 the first Malay -language newspaper of the region, 
Jawi Peranakan, was published in Singapore. Several other Malay- 
language journals supporting religious reform were begun in the 
early twentieth century, and Singapore became a regional focal 
point for the Islamic revival movement that swept the Muslim world 
at that time. 

A number of events beginning in the late nineteenth century 
strengthened Singapore's position as a major port and industrial 
center. When the Suez Canal opened, the Strait of Malacca be- 
came the preferred route to East Asia. Steamships began replac- 
ing sailing ships, necessitating a chain of coaling stations, including 
Singapore. Most of the major European steamship companies had 
established offices in Singapore by the 1880s. The expansion of 
colonialism in Southeast Asia and the opening of Siam (as Thailand 
was known at that time) to trade under King Chulalongkorn (Rama 
V) brought even more trade to Singapore. The spread of British 
influence in Malaya increased the flow of rubber, tin, copra, and 
sugar through the island port, and Singapore moved into process- 
ing and light manufacturing, some of which was located on its off- 
shore islands. To serve the growing American canning industry 
a tin smelter was built in 1890 on Pulau Brani (pulau means is- 
land). Rubber processing expanded rapidly in response to the de- 
mands of the young automobile industry. Oil storage facilities 
established on Pulau Bukum made it the supply center for the region 
by 1902. 

In the early twentieth century, Singapore had expanded its finan- 
cial institutions, communications, and infrastructure in order to 
support its booming trade and industry. British banks predomi- 
nated, although by 1905 there were Indian, Australian, Ameri- 
can, Chinese, and French-owned banks as well. Telegraph service 



28 



Historical Setting 



from India and Europe reached Singapore in 1870, and telephone 
service within Singapore was installed in 1879 and extended to 
Johore in 1882 (see Telecommunications, ch. 3). The more than 
sixty European-owned companies in the Straits Settiements crown 
colony in the 1870s were largely confined to Singapore and Pe- 
nang. Far more prosperous were some of the Chinese firms in 
Singapore that were beginning to expand their business links 
throughout Asia. 

Singapore's port facilities failed to keep up with its commercial 
development until the publicly owned Tanjong Pagar Dock Board 
(renamed Singapore Harbour Board in 1913) set about replacing 
old wharves and warehouses and installing modern machinery and 
a new graving dock (dry dock). Trucks gradually replaced ox carts 
for transporting goods from the harbor to the town, and by 1909 
it was possible to travel from Singapore to Penang by train and 
railroad ferry. The Johore Causeway linked road and rail trans- 
portation between Singapore and the peninsula after 1923. 

At the turn of the century, social advancement lagged far behind 
economic development in Singapore. While the wealthy enjoyed 
their social clubs, sports facilities, mansions, and suburban estates, 
the lower classes endured a grim existence marked by poverty, over- 
crowding, malnutrition, and disease. Malaria, cholera, and opium 
addiction were chiefly responsible for Singapore's mortality rate, 
which in 1896 was higher than that of Hong Kong, Ceylon, or 
India. A 1907 government commission to investigate the opium 
problem found that the majority of opium deaths were among the 
poor, who were reduced to smoking the dregs of used opium. Cam- 
paigns by missionaries and European-educated Chinese to ban 
opium use were successfully opposed by tax farmers and business- 
men. By 1900 the opium tax provided one-half of the revenue of 
the colonial government, and both Asian and European business- 
men resisted its replacement with an income tax. As an alterna- 
tive, the government in 1910 took over all manufacture and sale 
of opium, setting up a factory at Pasir Panjang. Opium sales con- 
tinued to constitute half of the government's revenue, but the most 
dangerous use of the drug had been curtailed. 

Education was generally in a backward state. Most primary 
schools in which Malay, Chinese, or Tamil was the medium of 
instruction were of poor quality. English-language primary schools 
were mostly run by Christian missionaries, and the only secon- 
dary education was provided by Raffles Institution beginning in 
1884. In 1902 the government formulated an Education Code, 
under which it took responsibility for providing English-language 
primary schools; the following year it took over Raffles Institution. 



29 



Singapore: A Country Study 

With the support of the Chinese community, the government 
opened a medical school in 1905 that had a first class of twenty- 
three students. Upgraded to the King Edward Medical College in 
1920, the school formed the cornerstone of the future Singapore 
University. The affluent of Singapore sent their children to the 
English-language schools, which had steadily improved their stan- 
dards. The brightest students vied for the Queen's Scholarships, 
founded in 1889, which provided for university education in Brit- 
ain for Asian students. Many prosperous Asian families themselves 
sent their children to school in Britain. An English-language edu- 
cation at either the secondary or university level provided many 
Asians with the key to government, professional, or business 
employment. It also created a bond among the upper classes of 
all ethnic groups. 

Under the leadership of reformist Chinese, Singapore's Chinese- 
language schools were also expanded and modernized at this time. 
A scientific curriculum was added to the traditional education in 
Chinese classics and Confucian morality. Students from Chinese- 
language schools often continued their education in China, where 
a school for Nanyang students had been opened in Nanjing in 1907 
to prepare them for a role in Singapore's Chinese community. At 
the turn of the century, schools were even established in Singa- 
pore for Chinese women, who before that time had led severely 
sheltered lives under the domination of their husbands and mothers- 
in-law. By 1911 Chinese women were receiving instruction in 
Malay, English, Chinese, music, sewing, and cooking. Malay and 
Tamil-language primary schools continued to decline, and few stu- 
dents were able to progress from them to the English-language 
secondary level. 

Responsibility for Singapore's defense had been a contentious 
issue between London and Singapore almost since its founding. 
The Singapore merchants resisted any attempts to levy taxes for 
fortifications and even objected to paying the cost of maintaining 
a small garrison on the island. In 1886 troubles with Russia over 
Afghanistan and worry over the Russian navy in the Pacific, 
prompted the British to begin fortifying the port area and build- 
ing new barracks and other military facilities. The Singapore busi- 
ness community resisted strenuously London's proposal to double 
the colony's annual military contribution, insisting that the island 
was a critical link in the imperial chain. The colony, nonetheless, 
was required to pay a larger sum although slightly less than origi- 
nally demanded. The British signed a defensive treaty with Japan 
in 1902. The Japanese defeat of the Russian navy in 1905 removed 



30 



Singapore Indian family, nineteenth century 
Courtesy Library of Congress 

that threat to Britain's seapower in Asia, thus enabling Britain to 
concentrate its navy in its home waters in response to a German 
naval buildup. 

Singapore essentially sat out World War I. Fear that the island 
would be attacked by Germany's East Asiatic Squadron never 
materialized. Singapore's German business community, nonethe- 
less, was rounded up and interned comfortably at their Teutonia 
Club. The only incident of the war period was the mutiny of Sin- 
gapore's small garrison, the 800 troops of the Fifth Light Infantry 
Regiment. The regiment, composed entirely of Punjabi Muslims, 
was angered that Britain was at war with the Muslim Ottoman 
Empire. When the regiment was ordered to Hong Kong in Febru- 
ary 1915, rumors spread through the unit that the troops were ac- 
tually being sent to fight in France or Turkey. On the eve of its 
departure, the regiment mutinied, killed the officers, and terror- 
ized the town. Within ten days the rebellion had been put down 
by a combined force of the Singapore Volunteer Artillery (a unit 
of 450 volunteers formed in 1914), police, Malay troops from 
Johore, the crews of British, French, Japanese, and Russian war- 
ships in port, and several hundred civilians. After the mutineers 
were rounded up, thirty- six were shot in public executions and 
the others were imprisoned or sent on active duty elsewhere. 



31 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Subsequently, hard feelings were created in Singapore's Indian 
community by a requirement that its members register with the 
government. A small British detachment was brought in to garri- 
son the post for the rest of the war, with the aid of the Singapore 
Volunteer Artillery. 

Between the World Wars, 1919-41 

The Singapore economy experienced much the same roller- 
coaster effect that Western economies did in the period between 
the world wars. A postwar boom created by rising tin and rubber 
prices gave way to recession in late 1920 when prices for both 
dropped on the world market. By the mid- 1920s, rubber and tin 
prices had soared again and fortunes were made overnight. Tan 
Kah Kee, who had migrated from Xiamen (Amoy) at age seven- 
teen, reportedly made S$8 million (for value of the Singapore 
dollar — see Glossary) in 1925 in rubber, rice milling, and shipping; 
and Hakka businessman Aw Boon Haw earned the nickname 
" Tiger Balm King" for the multimillion-dollar fortune he made 
from the production and sale of patent medicines. Although they 
never amassed the great fortunes of Singapore's leading Asian 
businessmen, the prosperous European community increasingly 
lived in the style and comfort afforded by modern conveniences 
and an abundance of servants. 

The Baba Chinese leaders focused their attention on improving 
educational opportunities, which meant lobbying for free English- 
language primary schools and more scholarships for English- 
language secondary schools. Although English-language schools ex- 
panded rapidly, most educated Straits-born Chinese studied at 
Chinese-language schools. Of the 72,000 children in Singapore 
schools in 1939, 38,000 were in Chinese schools, 27,000 in English 
schools, 6,000 in Malay schools, and 1,000 in Tamil schools (See 
Education, ch. 2). 

The Straits-born Chinese increased their share of Singapore's 
Chinese population from 25 percent in 1921 to 36 percent in 1931. 
Chinese immigration was drastically cut by the Immigration Re- 
striction Ordinance of 1930, which limited immigration of unskilled 
male laborers. Put in force to combat unemployment resulting from 
the Great Depression, the ordinance dropped the quota of Chinese 
immigrants from 242,000 in 1930 to 28,000 in 1933. Immigration 
was further restricted by the Aliens Ordinance of 1933, which set 
quotas and charged landing fees for aliens. Executive Council mem- 
ber Tan Cheng Lock and others bitterly opposed the policy in the 
Legislative Council as anti-Chinese. 



32 



Historical Setting 



The administration of the colony continued to be carried out by 
the governor and top-level officials of the Malayan Civil Service, 
posts that could be held only by "natural-born British subjects of 
pure European descent on both sides." The governor continued 
to consult with the Legislative Council, which included a handful 
of wealthy Asian business and professional leaders, who served as 
nonofficial members of the council. The mid-level and technical 
civil service positions were open to British subjects of all races. Very 
few Asians opposed the system, which gave the official members 
the majority on the legislative and executive councils. In the 1930s, 
Tan agitated unsuccessfully for direct popular representation and 
a nonofficial majority for the legislative council, but most Chinese 
were satisfied to devote their attention to commercial and profes- 
sional affairs and the growing interest in nationalism in China. 

The sympathies of even the Straits-born Chinese lay with their 
homeland in the period between the wars. A Singapore branch of 
the Guomindang was active for a few years beginning in 1912, and 
China-oriented businessmen led boycotts in 1915 against Japanese 
goods in response to Japan's Twenty-One Demands against Chi- 
na. These demands were a set of political and economic ultima- 
tums, which if acceded to, would have made China a protectorate 
of Japan. Mass support for Chinese nationalism became more evi- 
dent in 1919 when demonstrations, which turned violent, were 
staged in Singapore. In the early 1920s, Sun Yat-sen was success- 
ful in convincing Singapore's China-born businessmen to invest 
heavily in Chinese industry and to donate large sums of money 
for education in China. Tan Kah Kee contributed more than S$4 
million for the founding of Amoy (Xiamen) University in 1924. 
The Guomindang also sent teachers and textbooks to Singapore 
and encouraged the use of Mandarin (or Guoyu) in Singapore's 
Chinese schools. 

Although Mandarin was not the language of any of Singapore's 
major dialect groups, it was considered a unifying factor by the 
various Chinese leadership factions of both Singapore and China. 
Singapore's first Chinese secondary school, established by Tan in 
1919, taught in Mandarin, as did a growing number of Chinese 
primary schools. In 1927 the Guomindang increased the number 
of promising students brought to China for university education 
and began a concerted effort to extend its control over Chinese 
schools in the Nanyang by supervising their curriculum and requir- 
ing the use of Mandarin. In the late 1920s, the colonial authori- 
ties had become increasingly aware of growing left-wing politics 
in the Chinese schools and sought to discourage the use of Manda- 
rin as required by the Guomindang. By 1935, however, Mandarin 



33 



Singapore: A Country Study 



had become the medium of instruction in all of Singapore's Chinese 
schools. 

Following the breakup of the short-lived collaboration between 
the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, the com- 
munists established a Nanyang Communist Party in 1928. Out- 
lawed and harassed by the Singapore police, the party was 
reorganized in 1930 as the Malayan Communist Party (MCP — 
see Glossary), centered in Singapore. For the remainder of that 
year, it had some success in infiltrating teacher and student organi- 
zations and staging student strikes. In early 1931, however, the 
seizure by the police of an address book containing information 
on the newly organized party and its connections with the Far 
Eastern Bureau of the Communist International (Comintern — 
see Glossary) in Shanghai, led to arrests and the near destruction 
of the MCP by the following year. The Guomindang also had its 
problems during this period. The party's membership in Singa- 
pore had expanded rapidly until 1929, when the colonial adminis- 
tration banned the Singapore branch of the Guomindang and 
fund-raising for the party in China. Concerned about the increase 
of anticolonial propaganda, the Singapore government censored 
the vernacular press, severely restricted immigration, and cut off 
aid to Chinese and Tamil schools. During the 1930s, attempts by 
the communists and the Guomindang to organize labor and lead 
strikes were also suppressed by the colonial government. 

Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment in Singapore 
increased throughout the 1930s. The fortunes of both the Guomin- 
dang and the MCP rose with invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 
1931 and the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The Chinese 
Communist Party and the Guomindang formed a united front in 
December 1936 to oppose Japanese aggression. The Guomindang 
called upon the Nanyang Chinese for volunteer and financial sup- 
port for the Republic of China, which had promulgated a Nation- 
ality Law in 1929, by which it claimed all persons of Chinese descent 
on the paternal side as Chinese nationals. Tan Kah Kee headed 
both the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement and the 
Singapore Chinese General Association for the Relief of Refugees, 
as well as the fund-raising efforts for the homeland among the 
Malayan Chinese. Chinese government agents used the Singapore 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other local organizations to 
organize highly effective boycotts against Japanese goods. Singa- 
pore's Chinese also boycotted Malay or Indian shops selling 
Japanese goods, and Chinese merchants who ignored the boycott 
were severely punished by extremist groups. 



34 



Historical Setting 



The British authorities struggled vainly to control the tide of anti- 
Japanese feeling by forbidding anti-Japanese demonstrations and 
by banning importation of anti-Japanese textbooks from China, 
which was at war with Japan, and the teaching of anti-Japanese 
slogans and songs in Chinese schools. They were alarmed at the 
communist infiltration of the Nanyang Chinese National Salva- 
tion Movement and other Chinese patriotic groups. The banned 
MCP claimed a membership of more than 50,000 by early 1940. 
Although nominally partners in a united front in opposition to the 
Japanese, the MCP and the Guomindang competed for control 
of such organizations as the Nanyang Chinese Relief General As- 
sociation. Nonetheless, Singapore's Chinese contributed generously 
to the support of the Chinese government. 

World War II, 1941-45 

The British had begun building a naval base at Singapore in 
1923, partly in response to Japan's increasing naval power. The 
project was costly and unpopular, and construction of the base 
proceeded slowly until the early 1930s when Japan began moving 
into Manchuria and northern China. A major component of the 
base was completed in March 1938, when the King George VI 
Graving Dock was opened; more than 300 meters in length, it was 
the largest dry dock in the world at the time. The base, completed 
in 1941 and defended by artillery, searchlights, and the newly built 
nearby Tengah Airfield, caused Singapore to be ballyhooed in the 
press as the "Gibralter of the East." The floating dock, 275 meters 
long, was the third largest in the world and could hold 60,000 work- 
ers. The base also contained dry docks, giant cranes, machine shops, 
and underground storage for water, fuel, and ammunition. A self- 
contained town on the base was built to house 12,000 Asian work- 
ers, with cinemas, hospitals, churches, and seventeen soccer fields. 
Above-ground tanks held enough fuel for the entire British navy for 
six months. The only thing the giant naval fortress lacked was ships. 

The Singapore naval base was built and supplied to sustain a siege 
long enough to enable Britain's European-based fleet to reach the 
area. By 1940, however, it was clear that the British fleet and armed 
forces were fully committed in Europe and the Middle East and could 
not be spared to deal with a potential threat in Asia. In the first half 
of 1941, most Singaporeans were unaffected by the war on the other 
side of the world, as they had been in World War I. The main pres- 
sure on the Straits Setdements was the need to produce more rubber 
and tin for the Allied war effort. Both the colonial government and 
British military command were for the most part convinced of Sin- 
gapore's impregnability. 



35 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Even by late autumn 1941, most Singaporeans and their lead- 
ers remained confident that their island fortress could withstand 
an attack, which they assumed would come from the south and 
from the sea. Heavy fifteen-inch guns defended the port and the 
city, and machine-gun bunkers lined the southern coast. The only 
local defense forces were the four battalions of Straits Settlements 
Volunteer Corps and a small civil defense organization with units 
trained as air raid wardens, fire fighters, medical personnel, and 
debris removers. Singapore's Asians were not, by and large, recruit- 
ed into these organizations, mainly because the colonial govern- 
ment doubted their loyalty and capability. The government also 
went to great lengths to maintain public calm by making highly 
optimistic pronouncements and heavily censoring the Singapore 
newspapers for negative or alarming news. Journalists' reports to 
the outside world were also carefully censored, and, in late 1941, 
reports to the British cabinet from colonial officials were still un- 
realistically optimistic. If Singaporeans were uneasy, they were reas- 
sured by the arrival at the naval base of the battieship Prince of Wales, 
the battle cruiser Repulse, and four destroyers on December 2 . The 
fast and modern Prince of Wales was the pride of the British navy, 
and the Repulse was a veteran cruiser. Their accompanying air- 
craft carrier had run aground en route, however, leaving the war- 
ships without benefit of air cover (See Historical Development, ch. 
5). 

The Japanese Malaya Campaign 

On December 8, 1941, the Japanese troops of two large con- 
voys, which had sailed from bases in Hainan and southern Indochi- 
na, landed at Singora (now Songkhla) and Patani in southern 
Thailand and Kota Baharu in northern Malaya. One of Japan's 
top generals and some of its best trained and most experienced 
troops were assigned to the Malaya campaign. By the evening of 
December 8, 27,000 Japanese troops under the command of Gener- 
al Yamashita Tomoyuki had established a foothold on the penin- 
sula and taken the British air base at Kota Baharu. Meanwhile, 
Japanese airplanes had begun bombing Singapore. Hoping to in- 
tercept any further landings by the Japanese fleet, the Prince of Wales 
and the Repulse headed north, unaware that all British air bases 
in northern Malaya were now in Japanese hands. Without air sup- 
port, the British ships were easy targets for the Japanese air force, 
which sunk them both on December 10. 

The main Japanese force moved quickly to the western side of 
the peninsula and began sweeping down the single north-south road. 
The Japanese divisions were equipped with about 18,000 bicycles. 



36 



Historical Setting 



Whenever the invaders encountered resistance, they detoured 
through the forests on bicycles or took to the sea in collapsible boats 
to outflank the British troops, encircle them, and cut their supply 
lines. Penang fell on December 18, Kuala Lumpur on January 11, 
1942, and Malacca on January 15. The Japanese occupied Johore 
Baharu on January 3 1 , and the last of the British troops crossed 
to Singapore, blowing a fifty-meter gap in the causeway behind 
them. 

Singapore faced Japanese air raids almost daily in the latter half 
of January 1942. Fleeing refugees from the peninsula had doubled 
the 550,000 population of the beleaguered city. More British and 
Commonwealth of Nations (see Glossary) ships and armed forces 
were brought to Singapore during January, but most were poorly 
trained raw recruits from Australia and India and inexperienced 
British troops diverted from the war in the Middle East. Singa- 
pore's Chinese population, which had heard rumors of the treat- 
ment of the Malayan Chinese by the invading Japanese, flocked 
to volunteer to help repel the impending invasion. Brought together 
by the common enemy, Guomindang and communist groups band- 
ed together to volunteer their services to Governor Shenton Thom- 
as. The governor authorized the formation of the Chung Kuo 
Council (China National Council), headed by Tan Kah Kee, un- 
der which thousands volunteered to construct defense works and 
to perform other essential services. The colonial government also 
reluctantly agreed to the formation of a Singapore Chinese Anti- 
Japanese Volunteer Battalion, known as Dalforce for its com- 
mander, Lieutenant Colonel John Dalley of the Federated Malay 
States police force. Dalley put his volunteers through a ten-day crash 
training course and armed them with basic weapons, including shot- 
guns, knives, and grenades. 

From February 1-8, 1942, the two armies faced each other across 
the Johore Strait. The Japanese stepped up their air raids, bomb- 
ing the airfields, naval base, and harbor area. Bombs also fell in 
the commercial and residential sections of the city, causing great 
destruction and killing and wounding many civilians. With their 
mastery of the skies, the Japanese could choose the time and place 
for invasion and maintain an element of surprise. Yamashita, 
however, had only 30,000 troops and limited ammunition availa- 
ble to launch against a British force of about 70,000 armed per- 
sonnel. Lieutenant General Arthur E. Percival, Commander of 
Commonwealth forces in Malaya, commanded the defense of Sin- 
gapore under the direction of General Archibald Wavell, the new- 
ly appointed commander in chief Far East, who was headquartered 
in Java. Percival' s orders from British prime minister Winston 



37 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Churchill through Wavell called for defending the city to the death, 
while executing a scorched-earth policy: ' 'No surrender can be con- 
templated .... every inch of ground . . . defended, every scrap of 
material or defences . . . blown to pieces to prevent capture by the 
enemy . . . ." Accordingly, the troops set about the task of destroy- 
ing the naval base, now useless without ships, and building defense 
works along the northern coast, which lay totally unprotected. 

On the night of February 8, using collapsible boats, the Japanese 
landed under cover of darkness on the northwest coast of Singa- 
pore. By dawn, despite determined fighting by Australian troops, 
they had two divisions with their artillery established on the island. 
By the next day the Japanese had seized Tengah Airfield and gained 
control of the causeway, which they repaired in four days. The Brit- 
ish forces were plagued by poor communication and coordination, 
and, despite strong resistance by Commonwealth troops aided by 
Dalforce and other Chinese irregulars, the Japanese took Bukit 
Timah — the highest point on the island — on February 1 1 . The Brit- 
ish forces fell back to a final perimeter around the city, stretching 
from Pasir Panjang to Kallang, as Yamashita issued an invitation 
to the British to surrender. On February 13, the Japanese broke 
through the final perimeter at Pasir Panjang, putting the whole 
city within range of their artillery. 

As many as 2,000 civilians were killed daily as the Japanese contin- 
ued to bomb the city by day and shell it at night. Governor Thom- 
as cabled London that "there are now one million people within 
radius of three miles. Many dead lying in the streets and burial 
impossible. We are faced with total deprivation of water, which 
must result in pestilence . . . ." On February 13, Percival cabled 
Wavell for permission to surrender, hoping to avoid the destruc- 
tion and carnage that would result from a house-to-house defense 
of the city. Churchill relented and on February 14 gave permis- 
sion to surrender. On the evening of February 15, at the Japanese 
headquarters at the Ford factory in Bukit Timah, Yamashita ac- 
cepted Percival' s unconditional surrender. 

Shonan: Light of the South 

The Japanese occupied Singapore from 1942 until 1945. They 
designated it the capital of Japan's southern region and renamed 
it Shonan, meaning "Light of the South" in Japanese. All Euro- 
pean and Australian prisoners were interned at Changi on the 
eastern end of the island — the 2,300 civilians at the prison and the 
more than 15,000 military personnel at nearby Selarang barracks. 
The 600 Malay and 45,000 Indian troops were assembled by the 
Japanese and urged to transfer their allegiance to the emperor of 



38 



Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander 
in Southeast Asia, reading the order of the day following 
the Japanese surrender in September 1945 
Courtesy National Archives 
Parade celebrating return of British to Singapore in 1945 

Courtesy National Archives 



39 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Japan. Many refused and were executed, tortured, imprisoned, 
or sent as forced laborers to Thailand, Sumatra, or New Guinea. 
Under pressure, about 20,000 Indian troops joined the Japanese- 
sponsored Indian National Army to fight for India's independence 
from the British. 

The Asian civilian population watched with shock as their colonial 
rulers and supposed protectors were marched off to prison and the 
Japanese set about establishing their administration and authori- 
ty. The Chinese were to bear the brunt of the occupation, in retri- 
bution for support given by Singapore Chinese to China in its 
struggle against Japan. All Chinese males from ages eighteen to 
fifty were required to report to registration camps for screening. 
The Japanese military police arrested those alleged to be anti- 
Japanese, meaning those who were singled out by informers or who 
were teachers, journalists, intellectuals, or even former servants 
of the British. Some were imprisoned, but most were executed, 
and estimates of their number range from 5,000 to 25,000. Many 
of the leaders of Singapore's anti-Japanese movement had already 
escaped, however, and the remnants of Dalforce and other Chinese 
irregular units had fled to the peninsula, where they formed the 
Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. 

The harsh treatment by the Japanese in the early days of the 
occupation undermined any later efforts to enlist the support of 
Singaporeans for the Japanese vision of a Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere, which was to comprise Japan, Korea, China, 
Manchukuo, and Southeast Asia. Singapore's prominent Chinese 
leaders and businessmen were further disaffected when the Japanese 
military command bullied them into raising a S$10 million "gift" 
to the Japanese as a symbol of their cooperation and as reparation 
for their support for the government of China in its war against 
Japan. The Chinese and English schools were pressured to use 
Japanese as the medium of instruction. The Malay schools were 
allowed to use Malay, which was considered the indigenous lan- 
guage. The Japanese-controlled schools concentrated on physical 
training and teaching Japanese patriotic songs and propaganda. 
Most parents kept their children at home, and total enrollment for 
all the schools was never more than 7,000. Although free Japanese 
language classes were given at night and bonuses and promotions 
awarded to those who learned the language, efforts to replace En- 
glish and Chinese with Japanese were generally unsuccessful. 

Serious disruption of not only the economy but the whole fabric 
of society marked the occupation years in Singapore. Food and 
essential materials were in short supply since the entrepot trade 
that Singapore depended on to provide most goods was severely 



40 



Historical Setting 



curtailed by the war. Chinese businessmen collaborated with cor- 
rupt Japanese officials to establish a flourishing black market for 
most items, which were sold at outrageous prices. Inflation grew 
even more rampant as Japanese military scrip flooded the econo- 
my. Speculation, profiteering, bribery, and corruption were the 
order of the day, and lawlessness against the occupation govern- 
ment almost a point of honor. 

As the war wound down and Japanese fortunes began to fade, 
life grew even more difficult in Shonan. Military prisoners, who 
suffered increasing hardship from reduced rations and brutal treat- 
ment, were set to work constructing an airfield at Changi, which 
was completed in May 1945. Not only prisoners of war but also 
Singapore's unemployed civilians were impressed into work gangs 
for labor on the Burma- Siam railroad, from which many never 
returned. As conditions worsened and news of Japanese defeats 
filtered in, Singaporeans anxiously awaited what they feared would 
be a bloody and protracted fight to reoccupy the island. Although 
Japan formally surrendered to the Allies on August 15, 1945, it 
was not announced in the Singapore press until a week later. The 
Japanese military quietiy retreated to an internment camp they had 
prepared at Jurong. On September 5, Commonwealth troops 
arrived aboard British warships, cheered by wildly enthusiastic Sin- 
gaporeans, who lined the five-kilometer parade route. A week later, 
on the steps of the municipal building, the Japanese military com- 
mand in Singapore surrendered to the supreme Allied commander 
in Southeast Asia, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. 

Aftermath of War, 1945-55 

The abrupt end of the war took the British by surprise. Although 
the Colonial Office had decided on the formation of a Malayan 
Union, which would include all the Malay states, Penang, and 
Malacca, no detailed plans had been worked out for the adminis- 
tration of Singapore, which was to be kept separate and serve as 
the headquarters of the British governor general for Southeast Asia. 
Many former colonial officials and businessmen opposed the sepa- 
ration of Singapore from peninsular Malaya, arguing that the two 
were economically interdependent and to exclude Singapore would 
"cut the heart out of Malaya." The Colonial Office maintained 
that the separation did not preclude union at some future date, 
but that union should not be forced on "communities with such 
widely different interests." In September 1945, Singapore became 
the headquarters for the British Military Administration under 
Mountbatten. Although Singaporeans were relieved and happy at 
the arrival of the Commonwealth troops, their first-hand witnessing 



41 



Singapore: A Country Study 

of the defeat of the British by an Asian power had changed forever 
the perspective from which they viewed their colonial overlords. 

Economic and Social Recovery 

The British returned to find their colonies in sad shape. Food 
and medical supplies were dangerously low, partly because ship- 
ping was in total disarray. Allied bombing had taken its toll on 
Singapore's harbor facilities, and numerous wrecks blocked the har- 
bor. Electricity, gas, water, and telephone services were in serious 
disrepair. Severe overcrowding had resulted in thousands of squat- 
ters living in shanties, and the death rate was twice the prewar level. 
Gambling and prostitution, both legalized under the Japanese, 
flourished, and for many opium or alcohol served as an escape from 
a bleak existence. The military administration was far from a 
panacea for all Singapore's ills. The British Military Administra- 
tion had its share of corrupt officials who helped the collaborators 
and profiteers of the Japanese occupation to continue to prosper. 
As a result of the inefficiency and mismanagement of the rice dis- 
tribution, the military administration was cynically known as the 
"Black Market Administration." However, by April 1946, when 
military rule was ended, the British Military Administation had 
managed to restore gas, water, and electric services to above their 
prewar capacity. The port was returned to civilian control, and 
seven private industrial, transportation, and mining companies were 
given priority in importing badly needed supplies and materials. 
Japanese prisoners were used to repair docks and airfields. The 
schools were reopened, and by March 62,000 children were 
enrolled. By late 1946, Raffles College and the King Edward Med- 
ical College both had reopened. 

Food shortages were the most persistent problem; the weekly per 
capita rice ration fell to an all-time low in May 1947, and other 
foods were in short supply and expensive. Malnutrition and dis- 
ease spawned outbreaks of crime and violence. Communist-led 
strikes caused long work stoppages in public transport, public ser- 
vices, at the docks, and at many private firms. The strikers were 
largely successful in gaining the higher wages needed by the work- 
ers to meet rising food prices. 

By late 1947, the economy had begun to recover as a result of 
a growing worldwide demand for tin and rubber. The following 
year, Singapore's rubber production reached an all-time high, and 
abundant harvests in neighboring rice-producing countries ended 
the most serious food shortages. By 1949 trade, productivity, and 
social services had been restored to their prewar levels. In that year 
a five-year social welfare plan was adopted, under which benefits 



42 



Historical Setting 



were paid to the aged, unfit, blind, crippled, and to widows with 
dependent children. Also in 1949, a ten-year plan was launched 
to expand hospital facilities and other health services. By 1951 
demand for tin and rubber for the Korean War (1950-53) had 
brought economic boom to Singapore. 

By the early post-World War II years, Singapore's population 
had become less transitory and better balanced by age and sex. 
The percentage of Chinese who were Straits-born rose from 36 per- 
cent in 1931 to 60 percent by 1947, and, of those born in China, 
more than half reported in 1947 that they had never revisited and 
did not send remittances there. Singapore's Indian population 
increased rapidly in the postwar years as a result of increased migra- 
tion from India, which was facing the upheavals of independence 
and partition, and from Malaya, where the violence and hardships 
of the anticommunist Emergency (see Glossary) caused many to 
leave. Although large numbers of Indian men continued to come 
to Singapore to work and then return to India, both Indians and 
Chinese increasingly saw Singapore as their permanent home. 

In 1947 the colonial government inaugurated a ten-year program 
to provide all children with six years of primary education in the 
language of the parents' choice, including English, Malay, Chinese, 
and Tamil. Seeing an English education as offering their children 
the best opportunity for advancement, parents increasingly opted 
to send their children to English-language schools, which received 
increased government funding while support for the vernacular 
schools declined. In 1949 the University of Malaya was formed 
through a merger of Raffles College and the King Edward Medi- 
cal College. 

Political Awakening 

The Colonial Office established an advisory council in Novem- 
ber 1945 to work with the British Military Administration on the 
reconstruction of Singapore. Among the seventeen members 
appointed to the council was Wu Tian Wang, a former guerrilla 
leader and chairman of the communist Singapore City Commit- 
tee. The MCP enjoyed great popularity in the early postwar days 
because of its association with the resistance and the Malayan Peo- 
ple' s Anti-Japanese Army, which also included many noncom- 
munists. In January 1946, the anti-Japanese army was formally 
disbanded following a final parade at which Mountbatten presented 
medals to the guerrilla commander, Chin Peng, and the other 
resistance leaders. All arms and ammunition, which the guerrillas 
had received in airdrops from the British during the war or cap- 
tured from the Japanese, were supposed to be surrendered at that 



43 



Singapore: A Country Study 

time. The MCP, however, secretly retained large stocks of its 
weapons. 

The British legally recognized the MCP in late 1945, largely be- 
cause of its resistance efforts and its popularity. The party by that 
time commanded about 70,000 supporters. The MCP at first con- 
centrated its efforts on organizing labor, establishing the General 
Labour Union, which covered more than sixty trade unions. It or- 
ganized numerous strikes in 1945 and early 1946, including a two- 
day general strike in January in which 173,000 workers struck and 
transport was brought to a halt. In February, after the formation 
of a Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions claiming 450,000 
members in Singapore and the peninsula, the British Military 
Administration arrested twenty- seven leading communists, banish- 
ing ten of them without trial. Thereafter, the MCP adopted a lower 
profile of quietly backing radical groups that were working for con- 
stitutional changes and increasing its control over the labor 
movement. 

In April 1946, the British Military Administation ended with 
the formation of the Malayan Union, at which time Singapore 
became a separate crown colony with a civil administration. The 
two entities continued to share a common currency, institutions 
of higher learning, and the administration of immigration, civil 
aviation, posts and telegraphs, and income tax. Opposition to the 
separation of Malaya and Singapore motivated the formation in 
December 1945 of Singapore's first indigenous political party, the 
Malayan Democratic Union. Although most leaders of the new 
party were not communist, there were several prominent com- 
munists among its founders, including Wu Tian Wang, who saw 
the Malayan Union as a threat to the vision of a communist, unit- 
ed Malayan republic. The Malayan Democratic Union proposed 
eventual inclusion of Singapore in an independent Malaya within 
the Commonwealth of Nations. Meanwhile, on the peninsula, con- 
servative Malay leaders, who were concerned about provisions in 
the Malayan Union scheme that conferred equal political status 
on immigrant communities, formed the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) in March 1946. After various mass ral- 
lies, movements and countermovements, proposals and counter- 
proposals, the British acceded to UMNO wishes. February 1948 
marked the formation of the Federation of Malaya, which provid- 
ed for the gradual assimilation of immigrants into a Malay state 
working toward independence under British guidance. Singapore 
remained a separate crown colony. 

Elections in Singapore were scheduled for March 1948, at which 
time a new constitution would go into effect. That document called 



44 



Historical Setting 

for an Executive Council of colonial officials and a Legislative Coun- 
cil comprising nine officials and thirteen nonofflcials, four nomi- 
nated by the governor, three chosen by the chambers of commerce, 
and six elected by adult British subjects who had been resident in 
Singapore for one year prior to the election. The appointed gover- 
nor retained power over certain items and veto power over the 
proceedings of the Legislative Council. The Malayan Democratic 
Union, by then a communist front organization, boycotted the elec- 
tions and organized mass rallies opposing the new constitution. The 
moderate Progressive Party was formed in August 1947 by British- 
educated business and professional men who advocated gradual 
constitutional reform aimed at eventual self-government. Of the 
six elected seats on the Legislative Council, three were won by in- 
dependents and three by Progressives, the only party to contest 
the elections. In the first municipal election in 1949, the Progres- 
sive Party won thirteen of the eighteen seats on the twenty- seven 
member municipal commission. Voter interest was very low in both 
elections, however, with only about 10 percent of those eligible 
registering to vote. 

Meanwhile, the MCP had abandoned the moderate stance ad- 
vocated by its secretary general Lai Teck, who was replaced in 
March 1947 by Chin Peng. Soon after, it was discovered that Lai 
Teck not only had disappeared with the party's funds but also had 
been a double agent, serving both the Japanese and the British. 
Following the establishment of the Federation of Malaya in Febru- 
ary 1948, Singapore's communist leaders moved to the peninsu- 
la, where they reactivated the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese 
Army and began fomenting acts of violence and terrorism. This 
led to the declaration of a state of emergency in Malaya on June 
18 and in Singapore a week later. Although the twelve-year strug- 
gle was largely confined to the peninsula, restrictions were placed 
on meetings and strikes, and the detention of individuals without 
trial was permitted under the Emergency regulations. The MCP 
was proscribed by the colonial government in Singapore, and the 
Malayan Democratic Union, fearing the same fate, voluntarily dis- 
solved itself. Left-wing political movements were thus stifled, and 
the only political party that arose to challenge the Progressives was 
the Singapore Labour Party formed in 1948. Like the Progressive 
Party, its positions were moderate and its leadership mostly Brit- 
ish educated. Nevertheless, as a result of personal squabbles and 
factions, the Singapore Labour Party had largely disintegrated by 
1952. 

The number of elected seats in the Legislative Council was in- 
creased to nine in 1951, and the Progressive Party won six of the 



45 



Singapore: A Country Study 

nine seats in the election that year. The membership of the party 
never numbered more than about 4,000, the majority of whom 
were upper or middle class and British educated. The interests of 
the members of the Legislative Council and the leadership of the 
Progressive Party were so closely aligned with those of the coloni- 
al government that they were out of touch with the masses. Partici- 
pation in politics was restricted to Straits-born or naturalized British 
subjects who were literate in English. This exclusion of immigrants 
and those not educated in English meant that, in the late 1940s, 
about one-half of Singapore's adult population was disenfranchised. 

Although the Chinese-educated took little interest in the affairs 
of the Legislative Council and the colonial government, they were 
stirred with pride by the success of the Chinese Communist Party 
in China. Fearful that support by Singapore's Chinese for the 
Chinese communists would translate to support for the MCP, the 
colonial government attempted to curtail contacts between the Sin- 
gapore Chinese and their homeland. When Tan Kah Kee returned 
from a trip to China in 1950, the colonial government refused to 
readmit him, and he lived out his days in his native Fujian Province. 

For graduates of Singapore's Chinese high schools, there were 
no opportunities for higher education in the colony. Many went to 
universities in China, despite the fact that immigration laws pro- 
hibited them from returning to Singapore. To alleviate this problem, 
wealthy rubber merchant and industrialist Tan Lark Sye proposed 
formation of a Chinese-language university for the Chinese-educated 
students of Singapore, Malaya, and other parts of Southeast Asia. 
Singaporean Chinese, rich and poor, donated funds to found 
Nanyang University, which was opened in Singapore in 1956. 

By the early 1950s, large numbers of young men whose educa- 
tion had been postponed by the Japanese occupation were studying 
at Chinese-language high schools. These older students were par- 
ticularly critical of the colonial government's restrictive policies 
toward Chinese and of its lack of support for Chinese-language 
schools. The teachers in these schools were poorly paid, the educa- 
tional standards were low, and graduates of the schools found they 
could not get jobs in the civil service or gain entrance to Singapore's 
English-language universities. While critical of the colonial govern- 
ment, the students were becoming increasingly proud of the suc- 
cess of the communist revolution in China, reading with interest 
the publications and propaganda put out by the new regime. 

As the Emergency on the peninsula began to go badly for the 
communists, the MCP took a renewed interest in Singapore and 
began organizing protest demonstrations among the disaffected stu- 
dents. Among the brightest and most capable of the older Chinese 



46 



Panoramic view of Singapore's waterfront in mid- 1940s 

Courtesy National Archives 

high school students were Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan, 
who both became involved in organizing class boycotts that resulted 
in a police raid on the Chinese High School in 1952. The two left 
the school, took low-paying jobs at bus companies, and began work- 
ing to build communist influence among workers and students. In 
May 1954, mass student protest demonstrations were organized 
to oppose a new National Service Ordinance requiring males 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty to register for part-time 
national service. Also in May, the Singapore Factory and Shop 
Workers' Union registered with the government, with Lim as its 
secretary general; Fong, who was by then general secretary of the 
Singapore Bus Workers' Union, and C.V. Devan Nair, of (at that 
time) the Singapore Teachers' Union, were members of the 
executive board. Dedicated and charismatic, Lim led several well- 
organized small strikes that were successful in gaining better con- 
ditions for the union's workers and in attracting thousands of 
recruits for the union. By late 1955, the Singapore Factory and 
Shop Workers' Union included thirty industrial unions and had 
a membership of about 30,000. 

Road to Independence, 1955-65 

In 1953 the colonial government appointed Sir George Rendel 
to head a commission to review the Singapore constitution and de- 
vise a "complete political and constitutional structure designed to 
enable Singapore to develop as a self-contained and autonomous 
unit in any larger organization with which it may ultimately be- 
come associated." The commission recommended partial internal 
self-government for Singapore, with Britain retaining control of 
internal security, law, finance, defense, and foreign affairs. It also 
proposed a single-chamber Legislative Assembly of thirty-two 



47 



Singapore: A Country Study 



members, twenty-five of whom would be elected, and a nine- 
member council of ministers that would act as a cabinet. The gover- 
nor retained his power to veto legislation. The British government 
accepted the commission's recommendations, and the Rendel con- 
stitution went into effect in February 1954, with elections sched- 
uled for the Legislative Assembly for April 1955. Voters were to 
be automatically registered, which was predicted to greatly enlarge 
the size of the turnout over previous elections. Although the new 
constitution was a long way from offering Singapore full indepen- 
dence, election fever gripped the country as new political alliances 
and parties were formed. 

Two former members of the Singapore Labour Party, Lim Yew 
Hock and Francis Thomas, and a prominent lawyer, David Mar- 
shall, formed a new political party, the Labour Front, in July 1954. 
Marshall, who was a member of Singapore's small Jewish com- 
munity, had studied law in Britain, fought with the Singapore 
Volunteer Corps during the Japanese invasion, and worked in the 
coal mines of Hokkaido as a prisoner of war. Under the leader- 
ship of Marshall, a staunch anticolonialist, the party campaigned 
for immediate independence within a merged Singapore and 
Malaya, abolishing the Emergency regulations, Malayanization of 
the civil service within four years (by which time local officials would 
take over from colonial officials), multilingualism, and Singapore 
citizenship for its 220,000 China-born inhabitants. Marshall, a 
powerful speaker, promised "dynamic socialism" to counter "the 
creeping paralysis of communism" as he denounced colonialism 
for its exploitation of the masses. 

People's Action Party 

In November 1954, the People's Action Party (PAP — see Glos- 
sary) was inaugurated at a gathering of 1,500 people in Victoria 
Memorial Hall. The party was formed by a group of British- 
educated, middle-class Chinese who had returned to Singapore in 
the early 1950s after studying in Britain. Led by twenty- five-year- 
old Lee Kuan Yew, as secretary general, Toh Chin Chye, Goh 
Keng Swee, and S. Rajaratnam, the party sought to attract a fol- 
lowing among the mostly poor and non-English-speaking masses. 
Lee had served as a legal adviser to a number of trade unions and, 
by 1952, had earned a reputation for his successful defense of the 
rights of workers. He also helped defend Chinese students arrested 
during the 1954 student demonstrations protesting national ser- 
vice. Lee, a fourth- generation Singaporean, was educated at Raffles 
Institution and Cambridge University, where he took a double first 
(first-class honors in two subjects) in law. Through his work with the 



48 



Historical Setting 



unions and student groups, Lee had made many contacts with 
anticolonialists, noncommunists and communists alike. 

Present at the inauguration of the PAP were a number of noted 
communists and procommunists, including Fong Swee Suan and 
Devan Nair, who both joined the new party. Also present were 
Malayan political leaders Tunku Abdul Rahman, president of 
UMNO, and Sir Tan Cheng Lock, president of the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA). The PAP proposed to campaign for 
repeal of the Emergency regulations, union with Malaya, a com- 
mon Malayan citizenship, Malayanization of the civil service, and 
free compulsory education. Ending colonialism, however, was the 
first priority of Lee and the PAP leadership, although they con- 
cluded this could be accomplished only with support from the 
Chinese-educated public and the communist-controlled trade un- 
ions. The PAP, calculating that a united front with the communists 
was necessary to end colonialism, declared itself noncommunist, 
neither pro- nor anticommunist, preferring to put off until after 
independence any showdown with the communists. 

Meanwhile, two other political parties prepared to contest the 
upcoming election. The Progressive Party, whose leaders had 
earned a reputation as the "Queen's Chinese" for their procolonial 
positions and conservative economic policies, had little appeal for 
the masses of working-class Chinese who were newly enfranchised 
to vote in the 1955 election. Automatic registration of voters had 
increased the electorate from 76,000 in 1951 to more than 300,000. 
Shortly before the elections, wealthy and influential members of 
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce formed the new Democratic 
Party, which championed the causes of improved Chinese educa- 
tion, establishment of Chinese as an official language, and liberal 
citizenship terms for the China-born. Although these issues appealed 
to Singapore's China-born lower classes, this same group was dis- 
enchanted with the party's conservative economic platform, which 
closely resembled that of the Progressive Party. 

Election fever gripped Singapore during the month-long cam- 
paign, and the results of the April 2 contest sent shock waves as 
far as Britain, where it had been expected that the Progressive Party 
would win handily. Surprising even itself, the Labour Front won 
ten of the twenty-five seats and formed a coalition government with 
the UMNO-MCA Alliance, which won three seats. Three ex-officio 
members and two nominated members joined with the coalition, 
forming a group of seventeen in the thirty- two-member assembly. 
The Progressives won only four seats and the Democratic Par- 
ty just two, in a clear rejection of colonial rule and procolonial 
politics. The PAP won three of the four seats it had contested, 



49 



Singapore: A Country Study 

including a seat in one of Singapore's poorest sections won by Lee 
Kuan Yew and one seat won by Lim Chin Siong. Lim had the 
backing of organized labor and led the procommunist wing of the 
party while Lee led the noncommunist wing. 

The Labour Front government, with David Marshall as Singa- 
pore's first chief minister, faced serious problems from the start. 
The communists launched a campaign of strikes and student un- 
rest in an attempt to destabilize the government. Only about one- 
third of the 275 strikes called in 1955 were for better wages and 
working conditions; the remainder were sympathy strikes or strikes 
to protest imprisonment of labor union officials. Riots broke out 
on May 12 when police attempted to break up an illegal picket line 
formed by striking bus workers and Chinese school students. Four 
people were killed and thirty-one injured in that single incident, 
which became known as "Black Thursday." Although the govern- 
ment arrested some students, Marshall eventually backed down 
and agreed to the registration of the Singapore Chinese Middle 
School Students' Union because he was in sympathy with the stu- 
dents' grievances against the colonial education system. In register- 
ing their union, the students agreed to the condition that the union 
keep out of politics; the communist leaders of the union, however, 
had no intention of keeping the agreement. 

Along with problems with labor and students, Marshall faced 
constant conflict with the colonial government over his determi- 
nation not to be a figurehead controlled by the governor. When 
the governor, Sir Robert Black, refused to allow Marshall to ap- 
point four assistant ministers, Marshall threatened to resign un- 
less Singapore was given immediate self-government under a new 
constitution. The Colonial Office agreed to hold constitutional talks, 
which came to be known as Merdeka (freedom in Malay) talks, in 
London in April 1956. Marshall led to the talks a thirteen-man 
delegation comprising members of all the legislative parties and 
including Lee and Lim Chin Siong. The British offered to grant 
Singapore full internal self-government but wanted to retain con- 
trol over foreign affairs and internal security. They proposed a 
Defence and Internal Security Council, with three delegates each 
from Britain and Singapore, to be chaired by the British high com- 
missioner in Singapore, who would have the casting ballot (the 
deciding vote in case of a tie). Marshall had promised he would 
resign if he failed to obtain internal self-government, and the talks 
broke down over the issue of the casting ballot. The delegation 
returned to Singapore, and Marshall resigned in June and was suc- 
ceeded by the deputy chief minister, Lim Yew Hock. 



50 



Historical Setting 



By July the Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students' Un- 
ion had begun planning a campaign of agitation against the govern- 
ment. The Lim Yew Hock government moved first, however, 
dissolving seven communist-front organizations, including the stu- 
dent union, and closing two Chinese middle schools. This touched 
off a protest sit-in at Chinese high schools organized by Lim Chin 
Siong that ended in five days of rioting in which thirteen people 
were killed. British troops were brought in from Johore to end the 
disturbance, and more than 900 people were arrested, including 
Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, and Devan Nair. The British 
approved of the Singapore government's tough action toward the 
agitators, and when Lim Yew Hock led a delegation to London 
for a second round of constitutional talks in March 1957, the 
Colonial Office proposed a compromise on the internal security 
issue. The Singapore delegation accepted a proposal whereby the 
Internal Security Council would comprise three Singaporeans, three 
Britons, and one delegate from what was soon to be the indepen- 
dent Federation of Malaya, who would hold the casting ballot. The 
Singapore delegation returned to a hero's welcome; the Legisla- 
tive Assembly accepted the proposals, and a delegation was sched- 
uled to go to London in 1958 for a third and final round of talks 
on the new constitution. 

Although the moderates led by Lee Kuan Yew retained control 
of the PAP Central Executive Committee, by 1956 the procom- 
munists held sway over the membership and many of the mass or- 
ganizations and PAP branches. At the annual general meeting in 
August 1957, the procommunists won six of the twelve seats on 
the committee. Lee Kuan Yew and the other moderates refused 
to take office in order to avoid becoming front men for the leftists. 
On August 21 , the Lim Yew Hock government reacted to the sit- 
uation by arresting thirty-five communists, including five of the 
new members of the PAP Central Executive Committee, some PAP 
branch officials, and labor and student leaders. Lee and the moder- 
ates were able to regain control of the party and, the following 
November, amended the party's constitution to consolidate moder- 
ate control by limiting voting for the Central Executive Commit- 
tee to the full cadres (full members), who were literate Singapore 
citizens over the age of twenty-one who had been approved as cadres 
by the Central Executive Committee. 

Meanwhile, the Lim Yew Hock government continued to make 
further progress on issues related to Singapore's self-government. 
The Citizenship Ordinance passed in 1957 provided Singapore 
citizenship for all born in Singapore or the Federation of Malaya 
and for British citizens of two years' residence; naturalization was 



51 



Singapore: A Country Study 

offered to those who had resided in Singapore for ten years and 
would swear loyalty to the government. The Legislative Assembly 
voted to complete Malayanization of the civil service within four 
years beginning in 1957. The Education Ordinance passed in 1957 
gave parity to the four main languages, English, Chinese, Malay, 
and Tamil. By 1958 the Ministry of Education had opened nearly 
100 new elementary schools, 1 1 new secondary schools, and a poly- 
technic school and set up training courses for Malay and Tamil 
teachers. 

Lim Yew Hock led the Singapore delegation to the third round 
of constitutional talks in April 1958. The talks resulted in an agree- 
ment on a constitution for a State of Singapore with full powers 
of internal government. Britain retained control over foreign affairs 
and external defense, with internal security left in the hands of the 
Internal Security Council. Only in the case of dire emergency could 
Britain suspend the constitution and assume power. In August 1958, 
the British Parliament changed the status of Singapore from a colony 
to a state, and elections for the fifty-one-member Legislative 
Assembly were scheduled for May 1959. Voting was made com- 
pulsory for all adult Singapore citizens, but the British refused to 
allow persons with records of subversive activity to stand for elec- 
tion. Ten parties contested the election, but none was as well 
organized as the PAP, which under Lee Kuan Yew ran a vigorous 
campaign with huge weekly rallies. Campaigning on a platform 
of honest efficient government, social and economic reform, and 
union with the Federation of Malaya, the PAP scored a stunning 
victory by winning forty-three of the fifty-one seats. The badly divid- 
ed and scandal-ridden Labour Front had reorganized as the Sin- 
gapore People's Alliance, which won four seats, including one for 
Lim Yew Hock. The remaining seats were won by three UMNO- 
MCA Alliance candidates and one independent. Marshall's Work- 
ers' Party failed to win any seats. 

Both foreign and local businesses feared that the PAP victory 
signaled Singapore's slide toward communism, and many moved 
their headquarters to Kuala Lumpur. Lee indeed refused to take 
office until the eight procommunist PAP detainees arrested in 1956 
and 1957 were released, and he appointed several of them, including 
Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, and Devan Nair, to govern- 
ment posts. Lee's closest advisors, however, were moderates Goh 
Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye, and S. Rajaratnam. 

The first task of the new PAP government was to instill a sense 
of unity and loyalty in Singapore's diverse ethnic populace. A new 
national flag, crest, and anthem were introduced, and the new 
Ministry of Culture organized open-air cultural concerts and other 



52 



Historical Setting 



events designed to bring the three main ethnic groups together. 
Malay, Chinese, Tamil, and English were all made official lan- 
guages, but, with its eye on a future merger with Malaya, the 
government made Malay the national language. Considered the 
indigenous people and yet the most disadvantaged, Malays were 
provided with free primary and secondary education. 

After national unity, the second most important task facing the 
new government was that of transforming Singapore from an 
entrepot economy dependent on the Malayan commodity trade with 
no tradition of manufacturing to an industrialized society. A four- 
year development plan, launched under Minister of Finance Goh 
Keng Swee in 1961 , provided foreign and local investors with such 
incentives as low taxation rates for export-oriented manufactures, 
tax holidays for pioneer industries, and temporary protective tariffs 
against imports. The plan set aside a large area of swamp wasteland 
as an industrial estate in the Jurong area and emphasized labor- 
intensive industries, such as textiles. The overhaul of Singapore's 
economy was urgently needed in order to combat unemployment 
and pay for badly needed social services. One of the most serious 
problems was the lack of adequate housing. In 1960 the Housing 
and Development Board was set up to deal with the problems of 
slum clearance and resetdement. Under the direction of the banker 
and industrialist Lim Kim San, the board constructed more than 
20,000 housing units in its first three years. By 1963 government 
expenditures on education had risen to S$10 million from S$600,000 
in 1960. 

Despite the signs of economic progress, the PAP leaders believed 
that Singapore's survival depended on merger with Malaysia. 
' 'Major changes in our economy are only possible if Singapore and 
the Federation are integrated as one economy," remarked Goh 
Keng Swee in 1960. "Nobody in his senses believes that Singa- 
pore alone, in isolation, can be independent," stated an official 
government publication that same year. The procommunists with- 
in the party, however, opposed merger because they saw little 
chance of establishing a procommunist government in Singapore 
as long as Kuala Lumpur controlled internal security in the new 
state. Meanwhile, the leaders of the conservative UMNO govern- 
ment in Kuala Lumpur, led by Tengku Abdul Rahman, were 
becoming increasingly resistant to any merger with Singapore under 
the PAP, which they considered to be extremely left wing. 

Moreover, Malayan leaders feared merger with Singapore 
because it would result in a Chinese majority in the new state. When 
a fiercely contested Singapore by-election in April 1961 threatened 
to bring down the Lee Kuan Yew government, however, Tengku 



53 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Abdul Rahman was forced to consider the possibility that the PAP 
might be replaced with a procommunist government, a "Cuba 
across the causeway." 

Accordingly, on May 27, 1961, in a speech in Kuala Lumpur 
to the Foreign Correspondents' Association, Tengku Abdul Rah- 
man made a surprise proposal of an association of states that would 
include the Federation of Malaya, the British Borneo territories, 
and Singapore. In this proposed Malaysia, the Malay population 
of Sarawak and North Borneo (now Sabah) would offset numeri- 
cally the Singapore Chinese, and the problem of a possible "Cuba 
across the causeway" would be solved. 

The proposal, however, led almost immediately to a split be- 
tween the moderate and procommunist forces within the PAP. In 
July Lee demanded and received a vote of confidence on the issue 
of merger from the Legislative Assembly. Following the vote, Lee 
expelled sixteen rebel PAP assembly members from the party along 
with more than twenty local officials of PAP. In August the rebel 
PAP assembly members formed a new opposition party, the Bari- 
san Sosialis (The Socialist Front — see Glossary) with Lim Chin 
Siong as secretary general. The new party had considerable sup- 
port among PAP local officials as well as at the grass-roots level. 
Of the fifty-one branch committees, thirty- five defected to Bari- 
san Sosialis, which also controlled two- thirds of organized labor. 

The battle lines were clearly drawn when Lee Kuan Yew an- 
nounced a referendum on the question of merger to be held in Sep- 
tember 1962. Lee launched a campaign of thirty-six radio broadcasts 
in three languages to gain support for the merger, which was op- 
posed by the Barisan Sosialis as a "sell-out." Of the three merger 
plans offered on the referendum, the PAP plan received 70 per- 
cent of the votes, the two other plans less than 2 percent each, and 
26 percent of the ballots were left blank. 

Having failed to stop the merger at home, the Barisan Sosialis 
turned its efforts abroad, joining with left-wing opposition parties 
in Malaya, Sarawak, Brunei, and Indonesia. These parties were 
opposed to the concept of Malaysia as a "neocolonialist plot," 
whereby the British would retain power in the region. President 
Sukarno of Indonesia, who had entertained dreams of the eventu- 
al establishment of an Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia) com- 
prising Indonesia, Borneo, and Malaya, also opposed the merger; 
and in January 1963 he announced a policy of Confrontation 
(Konfrontasi — see Glossary) against the proposed new state. The 
Philippines, having revived an old claim to Sabah, also opposed 
the formation of Malaysia. The foreign ministers of Malaya, In- 
donesia, and the Philippines met in June 1963 in an attempt to 



54 



Historical Setting 



work out some solution. Malaya agreed to allow the United Nations 
(UN) to survey the people of Sabah and Sarawak on the issue, 
although it refused to be bound by the outcome. Brunei opted not 
to join Malaysia because it was unable to reach agreement with 
Kuala Lumpur on the questions of federal taxation of Brunei's oil 
revenue and of the sultan of Brunei's relation to the other Malay 
sultans. 

Singapore as Part of Malaysia 

The leaders of Singapore, Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak signed 
the Malaysia Agreement on July 9, 1963, under which the Feder- 
ation of Malaysia was scheduled to come into being on August 31 . 
Tengku Abdul Rahman changed the date to September 16, 
however, to allow the UN time to complete its survey. On August 
3 1 , Lee declared Singapore to be independent with the PAP govern- 
ment to act as trustees for fifteen days until the formation of Malay- 
sia on September 16. On September 3, Lee dissolved the Legislative 
Assembly and called for a new election on September 2 1 , to ob- 
tain a new mandate for the PAP government. In a bitterly con- 
tested campaign, the Barisan Sosialis denounced the merger as a 
"sell-out" and pledged increased support for Chinese education 
and culture. About half of Barisan's Central Executive Commit- 
tee, including Lim Chin Siong, were in jail, however, following 
mass arrests the previous February by the Internal Security Council 
of political, labor, and student leaders who had supported a rebel- 
lion in Brunei. The mass arrests, although undertaken by the British 
and Malayans, benefited the PAP because there was less opposi- 
tion. The party campaigned on its economic and social achieve- 
ments and the achievement of merger. Lee visited every corner 
of the island in search of votes, and the PAP won thirty- seven of 
the fifty-one seats while the Barisan Sosialis won only thirteen. 

On September 14, the UN mission had reported that the majority 
of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak were in favor of joining Malay- 
sia. Sukarno immediately broke off diplomatic and trade relations 
between Indonesia and Malaysia, and Indonesia intensified its Con- 
frontation operations. Singapore was particularly hard hit by the 
loss of its Indonesian barter trade. Indonesian commandos con- 
ducted armed raids into Sabah and Sarawak, and Singaporean fish- 
ing boats were seized by Indonesian gunboats. Indonesian terrorists 
bombed the Ambassador Hotel on September 24, beginning a year 
of terrorism and propaganda aimed at creating communal unrest 
in Singapore. The propaganda campaign was effective among Sin- 
gapore Malays who had hoped that merger with Malaysia would 
bring them the same preferences in employment and obtaining 



55 



Singapore: A Country Study 

business licenses that were given Malays in the Federation. When 
the PAP government refused to grant any economic advantages 
other than financial aid for education, extremist UMNO leaders 
from Kuala Lumpur and the Malay press whipped up antigovern- 
ment sentiment and racial and religious tension. On July 21, 1964, 
fighting between Malay and Chinese youths during a Muslim 
procession celebrating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday erupt- 
ed into racial riots, in which twenty- three people were killed and 
hundreds injured. In September Indonesian agents provoked com- 
munal violence in which 12 people were killed and 100 were injured. 
In Singapore, which normally prided itself on the peace and har- 
mony among its various ethnic groups, shock and disbelief followed 
in the wake of the violence. Both Lee Kuan Yew and Tengku Abdul 
Rahman toured the island in an effort to restore calm, and they 
agreed to avoid wrangling over sensitive issues for two years. 

The first year of merger was also disappointing for Singapore 
in the financial arena. No progress was made toward establishing 
a common market, which the four parties had agreed would take 
place over a twelve-year period in return for Singapore's making 
a substantial development loan to Sabah and Sarawak. Each side 
accused the other of delaying on carrying out the terms of the agree- 
ment. In December 1964, Kuala Lumpur demanded a higher per- 
centage of Singapore's revenue in order to meet defense 
expenditures incurred fighting Confrontation and also threatened 
to close the Singapore branch of the Bank of China, which han- 
dled the financial arrangements for trade between Singapore and 
China as well as remittances. 

Political tensions between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur also 
escalated as each began getting involved in the politics of the other. 
UMNO ran candidates in Singapore's September 1963 elections, 
and PAP challenged MCA Alliance candidates in the Malaysian 
general election in April 1964. UMNO was unable to win any seats 
in the Singapore election, and PAP won only one seat on the penin- 
sula. The main result was increased suspicion and animosity be- 
tween UMNO and PAP and their respective leaders. In April 1965, 
the four Alliance parties of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak 
merged to form a Malaysian National Alliance Party. The follow- 
ing month, the PAP and four opposition parties from Malaya and 
Sarawak formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, most of 
whose members were ethnic Chinese. Although the Malaysian 
Solidarity Convention claimed to be noncommunal, right-wing 
UMNO leaders saw it as a Chinese plot to take over control of 
Malaysia. In the following months, the situation worsened increas- 
ingly, with abusive speeches and writings on both sides. Faced with 



56 



Historical Setting 



demands for the arrest of Lee Kuan Yew and other PAP leaders 
by UMNO extremists, and fearing further outbreaks of communal 
violence, Tengku Abdul Rahman decided to separate Singapore 
from Malaysia. Informed of his decision on August 6, Lee tried 
to work out some sort of compromise, without success. On Au- 
gust 9, with the Singapore delegates not attending, the Malaysian 
parliament passed a bill favoring separation 126 to 0. That after- 
noon, in a televised press conference, Lee declared Singapore a 
sovereign, democratic, and independent state. In tears he told his 
audience, "For me, it is a moment of anguish. All my life, my 
whole adult life, I have believed in merger and unity of the two 
territories." 

Two Decades of Independence, 1965-85 

Reaction to the sudden turn of events was mixed. Singapore's 
political leaders, most of whom were Malayan-born and still had 
ties there, had devoted their careers to winning independence for 
a united Singapore and Malaya. Although apprehensive about the 
future, most Singaporeans, however, were relieved that indepen- 
dence would probably bring an end to the communal strife and 
riots of the previous two years. Moreover, many Singaporean 
businessmen looked forward to being free of Kuala Lumpur's eco- 
nomic restrictions. Nonetheless, most continued to worry about 
the viability as a nation of a tiny island with no natural resources 
or adequate water supply, a population of nearly 2 million, and 
no defense capability of its own in the face of a military confronta- 
tion with a powerful neighboring country. Singaporeans and their 
leaders, however, rose to the occasion. 

Under Lee Kuan Yew 

The Lee Kuan Yew government announced two days after sepa- 
ration that Singapore would be a republic, with Malay as its national 
language and Malay, Chinese, English, and Tamil retained as offi- 
cial languages. The Legislative Assembly was renamed the Parlia- 
ment, and the prominent Malay leader, Yusof bin Ishak, was made 
president of the republic. The new nation, immediately recognized 
by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, was 
admitted to the UN in September and the Commonwealth the fol- 
lowing month. In the early months following separation, Singa- 
pore's leaders continued to talk of eventual reunion with Malaysia. 
Wrangling between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur over conflict- 
ing economic, defense, and foreign policies, however, soon put an 
end to this discussion, and Singapore's leaders turned their atten- 
tion to building an independent nation. 



57 



Singapore: A Country Study 



The government sought to build a multiracial and multilingual 
society that would be unified by a sense of a unique i ' Singaporean 
identity." The government established a Constitutional Commis- 
sion on Minority Rights in late 1965, and official policy encouraged 
ethnic and cultural diversity. Foreign Minister Rajaratnam told 
the UN General Assembly that year, "If we of the present gener- 
ation can steadfastly stick to this policy for the next thirty years, 
then we would have succeeded in creating a Singaporean of a unique 
kind. He would be a man rooted in the cultures of four great civili- 
zations but not belonging exclusively to any of them." Integrated 
schools and public housing were the principle means used by the 
government to ensure a mixing of the various ethnic groups. The 
government constructed modern high-rise housing estates and new 
towns, in which the residents of the city's crowded Chinatown slums 
and the rural Malay kampongs (villages in Malay) were thoroughly 
intermingled. An English-language education continued to be the 
preferred preparation for careers in business, industry, and govern- 
ment; English-language pupils outnumbered Chinese-language 
pupils 300,000 to 130,000 by 1968. Malay-language primary school 
enrollment declined from 5,000 in 1966 to about 2,000 in 1969. 
All students, however, were required to study their mother tongue 
at least as a second language. Many of the country's British- 
educated leaders, including Lee Kuan Yew, sent their children to 
Chinese-language schools because they believed that they provid- 
ed better character training. The government stressed discipline 
and the necessity of building a "rugged society" in order to face 
the challenges of nationhood. A government anticorruption cam- 
paign was highly effective in combating that problem at all levels 
of administration. 

At the same time that the government addressed the problem 
of establishing a national identity, it also tackled the serious eco- 
nomic problems facing the new nation. The hopes pinned on es- 
tablishing a common market with Malaysia were dead, and it was 
clear that Singapore would not only have to go it alone but also 
would face rising tariffs and other barriers to trade with Malaysia. 
Under Goh Keng Swee and other able finance ministers, the 
government worked hard to woo local and foreign capital. New 
financial inducements were provided to attract export industries, 
promote trade, and end the country's dependence on Britain as 
the major source of investment capital. The generally prosperous 
world economic situation in the mid-1960s favored Singapore's 
growth and development. Confrontation with Indonesia had end- 
ed by 1966 after Soeharto came to power, and trade between the 
two countries resumed. Trade with Japan and the United States 



58 



Historical Setting 



increased substantially, especially with the latter as Singapore be- 
came a supply center for the United States in its increasing involve- 
ment in Indochina. 

A serious problem the government had to deal with in order to at- 
tract large-scale investment was Singapore's reputation for labor dis- 
putes and strikes. ' 'The excesses of irresponsible trade unions . . . 
are luxuries which we can no longer afford," stated President Yusof 
bin Ishak in December 1965, speaking for the government. Two 
events in 1968 enabled the government to pass stricter labor legis- 
lation. In January Britain announced its intention to withdraw 
from its bases in Singapore within three years. Aside from the 
defense implications, the news was sobering because British spend- 
ing in Singapore accounted for about 25 percent of Singapore's 
gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) for a total of about 
S$450 million a year, and the bases employed some 21 ,000 Singa- 
pore citizens. The government called an election for April in or- 
der to gain a new mandate for facing the crisis. Unopposed in all 
but seven constituencies, the PAP made a clean sweep, winning 
all fifty-eight parliamentary seats. With the new mandate, the 
government passed in August new labor laws that were tough on 
workers and employers alike. The new legislation permitted longer 
working hours, reduced holidays, and gave employers more pow- 
er over hiring, firing, and promoting workers. Workers could 
appeal actions they considered unjust to the Ministry of Labour, 
and employers were obligated to increase their contributions to the 
Central Provident Fund. Workers also were given for the first time 
sick leave and unemployment compensation. As a result of the 
new legislation, productivity increased, and there were no strikes 
in 1969. 

With labor relations under control, the government set up the 
Jurong Town Corporation to develop Jurong and the other indus- 
trial estates (see Land Management and Development, ch. 3). By 
late 1970, 271 factories in Jurong employed 32,000 workers, and 
there were more than 100 factories under construction. Foreign 
investors were attracted by the improved labor situation and by 
such incentives as tax relief for up to five years and unrestricted 
repatriation of profits and capital in certain government-favored 
industries. United States firms flocked to invest in Singapore, ac- 
counting for 46 percent of new foreign capital invested in 1972. 
Companies from Western Europe, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, and Australia also invested capital, and by 1972 one 
quarter of Singapore's manufacturing firms were either foreign- 
owned or joint-venture companies. Another attraction of Singapore 
for foreign capital was the region's petroleum resources. Singapore 



59 



Singapore: A Country Setting 

was the natural base for dozens of exploration, engineering, div- 
ing, and other support companies for the petroleum industry in 
nearby Indonesia, as well as being the oil storage center for the 
region. By the mid-1970s, Singapore was the third largest oil- 
refining center in the world. 

The government turned to advantage the British pullout by con- 
verting some of the military facilities to commercial and industrial 
purposes and retraining laid-off workers for new jobs. The former 
King George VI Graving Dock was converted to the Sembawang 
Shipyard, employing 3,000 former naval base workers in ship build- 
ing and ship repair. Singapore also moved into shipping in 1968 
with its own Neptune Orient Line. A container complex built in 
1972 made the country the container transshipment center of 
Southeast Asia. By 1975 Singapore was the world's third busiest 
port behind Rotterdam and New York. 

By the early 1970s, Singapore not only had nearly full employ- 
ment but also faced labor shortages in some areas. As a result, im- 
migration laws and work permit requirements were relaxed 
somewhat, and by 1972 immigrant workers made up 12 percent 
of the labor force (see Manpower and Labor, ch. 3). In order to 
develop a more highly skilled work force that could command higher 
wages, the government successfully courted high-technology indus- 
tries, which provided training in the advanced skills required. Con- 
cerned that the country's economic success not be diluted by 
overpopulation, the government launched a family planning pro- 
gram in 1966 (see Population, ch. 2). 

The country's economic success and domestic tranquility, which 
contrasted so starkly with the impoverished strife-torn Singapore 
of the late 1940s, was not purchased without cost, however. 
Although not a one-party state, the government was virtually un- 
der the total control of the PAP, and the Lee Kuan Yew adminis- 
tration did not hesitate to block the rise of an effective opposition. 
Holding a monopoly on power and opportunity in a small state, 
the party could easily co-opt the willing and suppress dissenters. 
The traditional bases — student and labor organizations — used by 
opposition groups in the past were tightly circumscribed. Control 
of the broadcast media was in the hands of the government, and 
economic pressures were applied to any newspapers that became 
too critical. The government leadership had adopted a paternalis- 
tic viewpoint that only those who had brought the nation through 
the perilous years could be trusted to make the decisions that would 
keep Singapore on the narrow path of stability and prosperity. The 
majority of Singaporeans scarcely dissented from this view and left 
the planning and decision making to the political leadership. 



60 




A People's Action Party (PAP) rally during the 1984 election 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 



Although five opposition parties contested the 1972 elections and 
won nearly one-third of the popular vote, the PAP again won all 
of the seats. 

Although admired for its success, Lee's government increasing- 
ly attracted criticism from the international press for its less than 
democratic style. Singapore's neighbors also resented the survival- 
oriented nature of the country's foreign and economic policies. The 
aggressive defense policy recommended by Singapore's Israeli mili- 
tary advisers irritated and alarmed Muslim Indonesia and Malay- 
sia (see Historical Development, ch. 5). Resentful of the profits 
made by Singapore in handling their commodities, Malaysia and 
Indonesia began setting up their own rubber-milling and petroleum- 
servicing industries. In the early 1970s, Malaysia and Singapore 
separated their joint currency, stock exchange, and airlines. 

A regional political grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN — see Glossary), founded in 1967 by Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, had little 
impact by the early 1970s on the foreign and economic policies of 
the member nations. However, regional and world developments 
in the 1970s, including the fall of Indochina to communism and 



51 



Singapore: A Country Study 



the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, steered Singapore and its 
neighbors toward a new spirit of cooperation. 

Toward New Leadership 

Singapore successfully pursued its foreign policy goal of improved 
relations with Malaysia and Indonesia in the early 1980s as Lee 
Kuan Yew established cordial and productive personal relations 
with both Soeharto and Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mo- 
hamad. Cooperation agreements were reached between Singapore 
and Malaysia on joint civil service and military training programs. 
The economic interdependence of the two countries was reaffirmed 
as Singapore continued its role as the reexport center for the tin, 
rubber, lumber and other resources of the Malaysian hinterland, 
as well as becoming a major investor in that country's economy. 

Throughout the early 1980s, Singapore headed the ASEAN drive 
to find a solution to the Cambodia problem. Beginning in 1979, 
the ASEAN countries sponsored an annual resolution in the UN 
calling for a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and a political set- 
tlement on Cambodia. In 1981 Singapore hosted a successful meet- 
ing of the leaders of the three Khmer liberation factions, which 
led to the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea the following year. 

During the first half of the 1980s, the Singapore economy contin- 
ued to grow steadily, despite a worldwide recession. The economic 
growth rate of about 10 percent in 1980 and 1981 dipped to 6.3 
percent in 1982 but rebounded to 8.5 percent with only 2.7 per- 
cent inflation in 1984. In his 1984 New Year's message to the na- 
tion, Lee Kuan Yew attributed Singapore's high economic growth 
rate, low inflation, and full employment during the period to its 
hardworking work force, political stability and efficient adminis- 
tration, regional peace, and solidarity in ASEAN. Singapore's suc- 
cessful economic strategy included phasing out labor-intensive 
industries in favor of high-technology industries, which would 
enhance the skills of its labor force and thereby attract more inter- 
national investment. 

Although Lee Kuan Yew retained a firm grip on the reins of 
government during the second decade of the country's indepen- 
dence, the shift in leadership had been irrevocably set in motion. 
By the early 1980s, a second generation of leaders was beginning 
to occupy the important decision-making posts. The stars of the 
new team included Goh Chok Tong, Tony Tan, S. Dhanabalan, 
and Ong Teng Cheong, who were all full ministers in the govern- 
ment by 1980. In that year, the PAP won its fourth consecutive 
general election, capturing all the seats. Its 75.6 percent vote 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



margin was five points higher than that of the 1976 election. The 
PAP leadership was shaken out of its complacency the following 
year, however, when Workers' Party candidate J. B. Jeyaretnam 
won with 52 percent of the votes the by-election to fill a vacancy 
in Anson District. In the general election held in December 1984, 
Jeyaretnam retained his seat and was joined on the opposition 
benches by Chiam See Tong, the leader of the Singapore Demo- 
cratic Party, which was founded in 1980. 

In September 1984, power in the PAP Central Executive Com- 
mittee was transferred to the second- generation leaders, with only 
Lee Kuan Yew, as secretary general, remaining of the original com- 
mittee members. When Lee hinted in 1985 that he was consider- 
ing retirement, his most likely successor appeared to be Goh Chok 
Tong, serving then as first deputy prime minister and defence 
minister. Speculation also centered on the prime minister's son, 
Lee Hsien Loong, who had resigned his military career to win a 
seat in Parliament in the 1984 election. After two decades of the 
highly successful, but tighdy controlled, administration of Lee Kuan 
Yew, it was difficult to say whether the future would bring a more 
open and participatory government, yet one with the same knack 
for success exhibited by the old guard. The answer to that ques- 
tion would only come with the final passing of Lee Kuan Yew from 
the political scene. 

* * * 

The early history of Singapore is treated most extensively in works 
on the Malay peninsula, particularly in the various issues of the 
Journal of the Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society. Of special interest 
is a commemorative volume, 150th Anniversary of the Founding of Sin- 
gapore, which includes reprints of articles on Singapore from previous 
issues of the journal. Three monographs that treat Singapore with- 
in the Malayan context from prehistory to the modern period are 
Tan Ding Eing's A Portrait of Malaysia and Singapore, N.J. Ryan's 
The Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore, andK.G. Tregonning's 
A History of Modern Malaysia and Singapore. Prince of Pirates, by Carl 
A. Trocki, gives an interesting glimpse into the world of the early 
nineteenth-century Malay rulers of Singapore. The forty years dur- 
ing which Singapore was ruled from India as one of the Straits Set- 
tlements is well covered in The Straits Settlements, 1826-67 by 
Constance M. Turnbull. 

Turnbull is also the author of the standard work focusing solely 
on Singapore, A History of Singapore, 1819-1975. Another useful 
work covering the same period is F.J. George's, The Singapore Saga. 



63 



Singapore: A Country Setting 

Two interesting works, both written in the early twentieth centu- 
ry, view nineteenth- century Singapore from different perspectives. 
One Hundred Years of Singapore, edited by Walter Makepeace, et al., 
deals with the history of the colonial government, whereas Song 
Ong Siang's One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore 
covers the life and times of prominent Chinese Singaporeans. 

For works focused on postwar Singapore, see Conflict and Vio- 
lence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-1983 by Richard L. Clutter- 
buck and Singapore: Struggle for Success by John Drysdale. An 
interesting pictorial history is Singapore: An Illustrated History, 
1941-1984, published by the Singapore Ministry of Culture. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



64 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Vendor grilling satay, skewered pieces of meat dipped 
a spicy peanut sauce. 



MIRROR GLASS BANK TOWERS overshadowing Victorian- 
era government buildings symbolized Singapore's transformation 
from a colonial port to an independent city-state with the highest 
standard of living in Southeast Asia in 1989. Singapore's status 
as a newly industrializing economy (NIE — see Glossary) was sig- 
naled by its landscaped complexes of owner-occupied apartments 
and streets blocked by the private cars of affluent citizens. The 
citizens increasingly considered themselves Singaporeans rather 
than Chinese or Indians or Malays, and the multiethnic popula- 
tion increasingly used English as the common speech in schools, 
offices, and the armed forces. Singapore in the 1980s had become 
a byword for orderliness and effective administration, a place where 
stiff fines discouraged littering and citizens of all ethnic groups were 
subject to common, impartial standards of merit and achievement. 
Government efforts at social engineering extended beyond slum 
clearance and the creation of housing estates to such matters as 
men's hair length, the language families spoke at breakfast, and 
the number of children born to women with university degrees. 

Singapore's leaders reacted to the unanticipated 1965 separa- 
tion from Malaysia, which left a city without a hinterland, by decid- 
ing to ' 'go cosmopolitan. ' ' This meant seeking a place in the world 
rather than in the regional economy; it also meant maintaining 
a certain social and cultural distance from neighboring countries 
while deliberately fostering a new and distinctively Singaporean 
culture and social identity. By late 1989 Singapore was cosmopoli- 
tan, prosperous, modernized, and orderly. Its population was edu- 
cated in English, worked for multinational corporations, and 
consumed a worldwide popular culture of film, music, and leisure 
activities. English was, however, a second language for most, and 
many distinctively Chinese, Indian, and Malay customs, practices, 
and attitudes continued. In contrast to many countries of the region, 
Singapore's avowed social values were secular, democratic (within 
certain limits), and nondiscriminatory. 

The content of the distinctive "Singaporean identity" and the 
proper balance between cosmopolitan and traditional values were 
issues that both preoccupied the leadership and would continue to 
shape the society in the 1990s. There was much public discussion 
of social identity, ethnicity, and the proper relation of Singaporeans 
to worldwide popular culture. Such discussion, often initiated by 
political leaders, tended to dichotomize habits and behavior into 



67 



Singapore: A Country Study 

mutually exclusive ' 'Asian" or "Western" categories. The initial 
premise was that Singapore should be a modernized but not a 
Westernized society, and that it would be a mistake for Sin- 
gaporeans to become so thoroughly Westernized and cosmopoli- 
tan as to lose touch with their Asian roots and values. Such concepts 
as tradition and modernity, local and cosmopolitan, had a distinc- 
tively Singaporean meaning as was indicated by the widespread 
use of such terms as "Asian traditions" and "cultural ballast." 
The meaning of these concepts, however, remained to be defined 
more precisely by the discussions and day-to-day decisions of Sin- 
gapore's citizens. 

Physical Setting 

Singapore is located at the tip of the Malay Peninsula at the nar- 
rowest point of the Strait of Malacca, which is the shortest sea route 
between India and China. Its major natural resources are its loca- 
tion and its deep-water harbor. Singapore Island, though small, 
has a varied topography. The center of the island contains a num- 
ber of rounded granitic hills that include the highest point, the 
165-meter Bukit Timah Peak. The western and southwestern 
regions are composed of a series of northwest to southeast tending 
ridges, which are low but quite steep. To the east is a large region 
of generally flat alluvial soils where streams have cut steep- sided 
valleys and gullies. The island is drained by a large number of short 
streams, some of which flow into the sea through mangrove swamps, 
lagoons, or broad estuaries. 

The island originally was covered with tropical rain forest and 
fringed with mangrove swamps. Since the founding of the city in 
1819, the natural landscape has been altered by human hands, a 
process that was accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1988, Sin- 
gapore's land area was 49 percent built up, and forest covered only 
2.5 percent. Three water reservoirs and their reserve catchment 
area, which preserves a fragment of the original tropical forest, oc- 
cupy the center of the island. Extensive land reclamation between 
1965 and 1987 increased the size of Singapore Island from 586 
square kilometers to 636 square kilometers; further reclamation 
was planned for the 1990s. Hills have been leveled, swamps drained 
and filled, and many of the fifty-odd small islets and reefs have 
been enlarged or joined to form new larger islands suitable for 
industrial uses. In 1989 three of Singapore's five oil refineries were 
on offshore islands, and other small islands were used for military 
gunnery or as bombing ranges. Some of the larger streams were 
dammed at their mouths to form fresh- water reservoirs, and the ma- 
jor stream courses through built-up areas were lined with concrete 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



to promote rapid drainage. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the 
municipal authorities made great efforts to establish parks and 
gardens as land became available and to plant tens of thousands 
of ornamental trees and shrubs, thus completing the transforma- 
tion of the natural landscape. 

Singapore is two degrees north of the equator and has a tropical 
climate, with high temperatures moderated by the influence of the 
sea. Average daily temperature and humidity are high, with a mean 
maximum of 31°C and a relative humidity of 70 to 80 percent in 
the afternoon. Rain falls throughout the year, but is heaviest dur- 
ing the early northeast monsoon from November through Janu- 
ary. The driest month is July in the middle of the southeast 
monsoon. The intermonsoon months of April-May and October 
are marked by thunderstorms and violent line squalls locally known 
as Sumatras. The average annual rainfall is 2,370 millimeters, and 
much of the rain falls in sudden showers. Singapore is free from 
earthquakes and typhoons, and the greatest natural hazard is lo- 
cal flash flooding, the threat of which has increased as buildings 
and paved roads have replaced natural vegetation. 

In spite of the high rainfall, Singapore's small size and dense 
population make it necessary to import water from Malaysia. The 
water, from reservoirs in upland Johor, comes through an aqueduct 
under the causeway linking Singapore with the Malaysian city of 
Johor Baharu. Singapore also supplies treated water to Johor Ba- 
haru, which in 1987 took about 14 percent of the 1 million cubic 
meters treated by Singapore each day. Singapore has responded 
to this dependence on a foreign country for water by expanding 
its reservoir capacity and constantly urging household and indus- 
trial users to conserve water. 

Singapore's rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s was 
accompanied both by increased air and water pollution and by 
increasingly effective government efforts to limit environmental 
damage. The government established an Anti-Pollution Unit un- 
der the Prime Minister's Office in 1970, set up the Ministry of 
the Environment in 1972, and merged the Anti-Pollution Unit with 
that ministry in 1983 to ensure unified direction of environmental 
protection. The new unit, subsequently renamed the Pollution Con- 
trol Department, had responsibility for air and water pollution, 
hazardous materials, and toxic wastes (see Government Structure, 
ch. 4). Singapore first moved to limit air pollution, closely monitor- 
ing oil refineries and petrochemical complexes and limiting the sul- 
fur content of fuel oil for power plants, factories, and diesel motor 
vehicles. Because motor vehicles were the main source of air pol- 
lution, the government required emissions controls on engines and 



69 



Singapore: A Country Study 

reduced (but not eliminated) the lead content of gasoline. The 
government also acted, partly for environmental reasons, to re- 
strict private ownership of automobiles through very high (175 per- 
cent) import duties, high annual registration fees, and high charges 
for the entry of private automobiles to the central business district. 

Between 1977 and 1987, the Ministry of the Environment car- 
ried out a major program to clean up rivers and streams by ex- 
tending the sewer system, controlling discharges from small 
industries and workshops, and moving pig and duck farms to reset- 
tlement areas with facilities to handle animal wastes. The success 
of the program was demonstrated by the return of fish and aquat- 
ic life to the lower Singapore and Kallang rivers. Singapore, the 
world's third largest oil refiner, also acted to prevent the pollution 
of coastal waters by oil spills or discharges from the many large 
oil tankers that traversed the Strait of Malacca. The Port of Sin- 
gapore Authority maintained oil skimmers and other equipment 
to clean up oil spills, and a comprehensive plan assigned both the 
oil companies and Singapore's armed forces responsibilities for deal- 
ing with major oil spills. 

Singapore's environmental management program was intend- 
ed primarily to ensure public health and to eliminate immediate 
hazards to citizens from toxins. Protection of the environment for 
its own sake was a low priority, and the government did not respond 
to local conservation societies' calls to preserve tropical forests or 
mangrove swamps. The pollution control laws gave the authori- 
ties wide discretion in dealing with offenders, and throughout the 
1970s and 1980s penalties usually were light. Enforcement of the 
laws often reflected an appreciation of the economic benefits of pol- 
luting industries and provided time for industrial polluters to find 
ways to limit or eliminate their discharges. 

Population 

Population, Vital Statistics, and Migration 

Singapore had a population of 2,674,362 in July 1989 and the 
low birth and death rates common to developed economies with 
high per capita incomes. In 1987 the crude birth rate (births in 
proportion to the total population) was 17 per 1 ,000 and the death 
rate was 5 per 1,000 for an annual increase of 12 per 1,000. The 
infant mortality rate of 9. 1 per 1,000 in 1986 was quite low by in- 
ternational standards and contributed to a 1987 life expectancy at 
birth of 71 .4 years for males and 76.3 years for females. As in most 
developed countries, the major causes of death were heart disease, 
cancer, and strokes. As of 1986, 74 percent of married women of 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



childbearing age practiced contraception, and the total fertility rate 
(a measure of the number of children born to a woman over her 
entire reproductive career) was 1.6, which was below the replace- 
ment level but comparable to that of many countries in Western 
Europe (see fig. 5). 

Since the city's founding in 1819, the size and composition of 
Singapore's population has been determined by the interaction of 
migration and natural increase (see table 2, Appendix). Through- 
out the nineteenth century, migration was the primary factor in 
population growth. Natural increase became more important af- 
ter the 1920s, and by the 1980s immigration and emigration were 
of minor significance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies, Singapore's population was composed largely of immigrant 
adult males and grew primarily through immigration. By the 1920s, 
the proportion of women, the percentage of the population that 
was Singapore-born, and consequently the relative contribution of 
natural increase to the population, all were increasing. By the 1947 
census, 56 percent of the population had been born in Singapore, 
and there were 1,217 males for every 1,000 females. The 1980 cen- 
sus showed that 78 percent of the population had been born in Sin- 
gapore and that the sex ratio had reached 1,042 males for every 
1,000 females. 

Migration to Singapore dwindled during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, ceased during the war years of 1941 to 1945, and 
resumed on a minor scale in the decade between 1945 and 1955. 
Most nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century immigrants 
came from China, India, or Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. 
Between 1945 and 1965 immigrants came primarily from penin- 
sular Malaya, which shared British colonial status with Singapore 
and so permitted the free movement of people between Singapore 
and the rural areas and small cities of the peninsula. After indepen- 
dence in 1965, Singapore's government imposed strict controls on 
immigration, granting temporary residence permits only to those 
whose labor or skills were considered essential to the economy. Most 
such workers were expected to return to their homelands when their 
contracts expired or economic downturns made their labor redun- 
dant. Illegal immigrants and Singaporeans who employed them 
were subject to fines or imprisonment. The immigrants of the 1980s 
fell into two distinct categories. The first category, unskilled labor 
for factories and service positions, was composed largely of young 
unmarried people from Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, and India. Regulations prohibited their marrying without 
prior official permission and required women to be tested for preg- 
nancy every six months — measures intended to make it difficult 



71 



Singapore: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 




3 FEMALES 



150 100 50 50 100 150 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from United Nations, Department of International Economic 
and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, Demographic Yearbook, 1986, New York, 1988, 210-11. 

Figure 5. Age-Sex Distribution, 1986 

for them to attain Singaporean residence or citizenship by becom- 
ing the spouse or parent of a citizen. The second category com- 
prised skilled workers, professionals, and managers, often working 
for multinational corporations. They came from Japan, Western 
Europe, North America, and Australia. Predominately middle-aged 
and often accompanied by their families, they were immigrants 
only in the strict sense of the government's population registra- 
tion and had no intention of settling permanently in Singapore. 

The 1980 census reported that 9 percent of Singapore's popula- 
tion were not citizens. The aliens were divided into permanent resi- 
dents (3.6 percent of the population) and nonresidents (5.5 percent). 
The acquisition of Singapore citizenship was a complex and often 
protracted process that began with application to the Immigration 
Department for permanent resident status. After residing in Sin- 
gapore for two to ten years, depending on skills and professional 
qualifications, those with permanent resident status could apply 
to the Registry of Citizens for citizenship. In 1987 citizenship was 
granted to 4,607 applicants and denied to 1,603 applicants. The 
1980 census showed that 85.5 percent of citizens had been born 
in Singapore, 7.8 percent in China (including Hong Kong, Macao, 
and Taiwan), 4.7 percent in Malaysia, and 1 percent in the Indian 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



subcontinent (including Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka). Sin- 
gapore's government, keenly aware of the country's small size and 
the need to survive by selling the skills of its citizens in a competi- 
tive international marketplace, was determined not to permit the 
city-state to be overwhelmed by large numbers of unskilled rural 
migrants. In 1989 Singapore mounted a campaign to attract skilled 
professionals from Hong Kong, offering a Chinese cultural environ- 
ment with much lower living costs than Hong Kong's. At the same 
time, however, that the government was attempting to attract skilled 
professionals, Singaporeans themselves were emigrating. From July 
1987 to June 1988, records show that 2,700 Singaporeans emigrated 
to Australia, 1,000 to Canada, 400 to the United States, and 97 
to New Zealand. A large number of the emigrants were university- 
educated professionals, precisely the category that Singapore wished 
to keep and attract. In 1989 a special government committee was 
reported to be devising policies to discourage emigration by profes- 
sionals and managers. 

Population Control Policies 

Since the mid-1960s, Singapore's government has attempted to 
control the country's rate of population growth with a mixture of 
publicity, exhortation, and material incentives and disincentives. 
Falling death rates, continued high birth rates, and immigration 
from peninsular Malaya during the decade from 1947 to 1957 
produced an annual growth rate of 4.4 percent, of which 3.4 per- 
cent represented natural increase and 1 .0 percent immigration. The 
crude birth rate peaked in 1957 at 42.7 per thousand. Beginning 
in 1949, family planning services were offered by the private Sin- 
gapore Family Planning Association, which by 1960 was receiv- 
ing some government funds and assistance. By 1965 the crude birth 
rate was 29.5 per 1,000 and the annual rate of natural increase 
had been reduced to 2.5 percent. Singapore's government saw rapid 
population growth as a threat to living standards and political sta- 
bility, as large numbers of children and young people threatened 
to overwhelm the schools, the medical services, and the ability of 
the economy to generate employment for them all. In the atmo- 
sphere of crisis after the 1965 separation from Malaysia, the govern- 
ment in 1966 established the Family Planning and Population 
Board, which was responsible for providing clinical services and 
public education on family planning. 

Birth rates fell from 1957 to 1970, but then began to rise as wom- 
en of the postwar baby boom reached child-bearing years. The 
government responded with policies intended to further reduce the 
birth rate. Abortion and voluntary sterilization were legalized in 



73 



Singapore: A Country Study 

1970. Between 1969 and 1972, a set of policies known as ' 'popula- 
tion disincentives" were instituted to raise the costs of bearing third, 
fourth, and subsequent children. Civil servants received no paid 
maternity leave for third and subsequent children; maternity hospi- 
tals charged progressively higher fees for each additional birth; and 
income tax deductions for all but the first two children were elimi- 
nated. Large families received no extra consideration in public hous- 
ing assignments, and top priority in the competition for enrollment 
in the most desirable primary schools was given to only children 
and to children whose parents had been sterilized before the age 
of forty. Voluntary sterilization was rewarded by seven days of paid 
sick leave and by priority in the allocation of such public goods 
as housing and education. The policies were accompanied by pub- 
licity campaigns urging parents to "Stop at Two" and arguing 
that large families threatened parents' present livelihood and fu- 
ture security. The penalties weighed more heavily on the poor, and 
were justified by the authorities as a means of encouraging the poor 
to concentrate their limited resources on adequately nurturing a 
few children who would be equipped to rise from poverty and 
become productive citizens. 

Fertility declined throughout the 1970s, reaching the replace- 
ment level of 1.006 in 1975, and thereafter declining below that 
level. With fertility below the replacement level, the population 
would after some fifty years begin to decline unless supplemented 
by immigration. In a manner familiar to demographers, Singa- 
pore's demographic transition to low levels of population growth 
accompanied increases in income, education, women's participa- 
tion in paid employment, and control of infectious diseases. It was 
impossible to separate the effects of government policies from the 
broader socioeconomic forces promoting later marriage and smaller 
families, but it was clear that in Singapore all the factors affecting 
population growth worked in the same direction. The government's 
policies and publicity campaigns thus probably hastened or rein- 
forced fertility trends that stemmed from changes in economic and 
educational structures. By the 1980s, Singapore's vital statistics 
resembled those of other countries with comparable income levels 
but without Singapore's publicity campaigns and elaborate array 
of administrative incentives. 

By the 1980s, the government had become concerned with the 
low rate of population growth and with the relative failure of the 
most highly educated citizens to have children. The failure of female 
university graduates to marry and bear children, attributed in part 
to the apparent preference of male university graduates for less high- 
ly educated wives, was singled out by Prime Minister Lee Kuan 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



Yew in 1983 as a serious social problem. In 1984 the government 
acted to give preferential school admission to children whose 
mothers were university graduates, while offering grants of 
S$l 0,000 (for value of the Singapore dollar — see Glossary) to less 
educated women who agreed to be sterilized after the birth of their 
second child. The government also established a Social Develop- 
ment Unit to act as matchmaker for unmarried university gradu- 
ates. The policies, especially those affecting placement of children 
in the highly competitive Singapore schools, proved controversial 
and generally unpopular. In 1985 they were abandoned or modi- 
fied on the grounds that they had not been effective at increasing 
the fecundity of educated women. 

In 1 986 the government also decided to revamp its family plan- 
ning program to reflect its identification of the low birth rate as 
one of the country's most serious problems. The old family plan- 
ning slogan of "Stop at Two" was replaced by "Have Three or 
More, If You Can Afford It." A new package of incentives for 
large families reversed the earlier incentives for small families. It 
included tax rebates for third children, subsidies for daycare, pri- 
ority in school enrollment for children from large families, priori- 
ty in assignment of large families to Housing and Development 
Board apartments, extended sick leave for civil servants to look 
after sick children and up to four years' unpaid maternity leave 
for civil servants. Pregnant women were to be offered increased 
counseling to discourage "abortions of convenience" or steriliza- 
tion after the birth of one or two children. Despite these measures, 
the mid- 1986 to mid- 198 7 total fertility rate reached a historic low 
of 1.44 children per woman, far short of the replacement level of 
2.1. The government reacted in October 1987 by urging Sin- 
gaporeans not to "passively watch ourselves going extinct." The 
low birth rates reflected late marriages, and the Social Develop- 
ment Unit extended its matchmaking activities to those holding 
Advanced level (A-level) secondary educational qualifications as 
well as to university graduates (see The School System, this ch.). 
The government announced a public relations campaign to pro- 
mote the joys of marriage and parenthood. In March 1989, the 
government announced a S$20,000 tax rebate for fourth children 
born after January 1, 1988. The population policies demonstrated 
the government's assumption that its citizens were responsive to 
monetary incentives and to administrative allocation of the govern- 
ment's medical, educational, and housing services. 

Population Distribution and Housing Policies 

In the early 1950s, some 75 percent of the population lived in 



75 



Singapore: A Country Study 



very crowded tenements and neighborhoods; these were usually 
occupied by a single ethnic group in the built-up municipality on 
the island's southern shore. The remaining 25 percent lived in the 
northern "rural" areas in settlements strung along the roads or 
in compact villages, known by the Malay term kampong, and usually 
inhabited by members of a single ethnic group. Many kampongs 
were squatter settlements housing wage laborers and urban ped- 
dlers. Low-cost public housing was a major goal of the ruling Peo- 
ple's Action Party (PAP — see Glossary). Vigorous efforts at slum 
clearance and resettlement of squatters had begun with the estab- 
lishment in 1960 of the Housing and Development Board, which 
was granted wide powers of compulsory purchase and forced reset- 
tlement. By 1988, Housing and Development Board apartments 
were occupied by 88 percent of the population and 455,000 of these 
apartments (74 percent of all built) had been sold to tenants, who 
could use their pension savings from the compulsory Central Provi- 
dent Fund for the downpayment (see Forced Savings and Capital 
Formation, ch. 3). The balance was paid over twenty years with 
variable rate mortgage loans, the interest rate in 1987 being 3.4 
percent. The government envisaged a society of homeowners and 
throughout the 1980s introduced various measures such as reduced 
downpayments and extended loan periods to permit low-income 
families to purchase apartments. 

The massive rehousing program had many social effects. In 
almost every case, families regarded the move to a Housing and 
Development Board apartment as an improvement in their stan- 
dard of living. Although high-rise apartment complexes usually are 
regarded as examples of crowded, high-density housing, in Singa- 
pore the apartments were much less crowded than the subdivided 
shophouses (combined business and residence) or squatter shacks 
they had replaced. Between 1954 and 1970 the average number 
of rooms per household increased from 0.76 to 2. 15, and the aver- 
age number of persons per room decreased from 4.84 to 2.52. 
Movement to a public housing apartment was associated with 
(although not the cause of) a family structure in which husband 
and wife jointly made important decisions, as well as with a fami- 
ly's perception of itself as middle class rather than working class. 
The government used the resettlement program to break up the 
ethnically exclusive communities and sought to ensure that the eth- 
nic composition of every apartment block mirrored that of the coun- 
try as a whole. Malays, Indians, and Chinese of various speech 
groups lived next door to each other, shared stairwells, communi- 
ty centers, and swimming pools, patronized the same shops, and 
waited for buses together. 



76 



A Singaporean Malay family, at home in 
their Housing and Development Board apartment 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 

Although the earliest public housing complexes built in the 1960s 
were intended to shelter low-income families as quickly and cheap- 
ly as possible, the emphasis soon shifted to creating new commu- 
nities with a range of income levels and public services. The new 
complexes included schools, shops, and recreation centers, along 
with sites on which residents could use their own resources to con- 
struct mosques, temples, or churches. The revised master plan for 
land use called for the creation of housing estates at the junctions 
of the expressways and the mass transit railroad that were to channel 
urban expansion out from the old city center (see Land, ch. 3). 
New towns of up to 200,000 inhabitants were to be largely self- 
contained and thoroughly planned communities, subdivided into 
neighborhoods of 4,000 to 6,000 dwelling units. In theory, the new 
towns would be complete communities providing employment for 
most residents and containing a mixture of income levels. In prac- 
tice, they did not provide sufficient employment, and many resi- 
dents commuted to work either in the central business district or 
in the heavy industrial area of Jurong in the southwestern quadrant 
of the island. Public transportation made the journey to the cen- 
tral business district short enough that many residents preferred to 
shop and dine there rather than at the more limited establishments 



77 



Singapore: A Country Study 



in their housing estates. Thus, as in other countries that have at- 
tempted to build new towns, Singapore's new towns and hous- 
ing estates have served largely as suburban residences and commuter 
settiements, the center of life only for the very young and the very 
old. 

Throughout the 1980s, the government and the Housing and 
Development Board made great efforts to foster a sense of com- 
munity in the housing estate complexes by sponsoring education 
and recreation programs at community centers and setting up a 
range of residents' committees and town councils. The apartment 
complexes generally were peaceful and orderly, and the relations 
between residents were marked by civility and mutual tolerance. 
But social surveys found that few tenants regarded their apartment 
blocks as communities in any very meaningful sense. Residents' 
primary social ties were with relatives, old classmates, fellow- 
workers, and others of the same ethnic group, who often lived in 
housing complexes some distance away. In the late 1980s, fami- 
lies who had paid off their mortgages were free to sell their apart- 
ments, and a housing market began to develop. There were also 
administrative mechanisms for exchanging apartments of equiva- 
lent size and value. Residents used sales, purchases, and apart- 
ment exchanges to move closer to kin and friends who belonged 
to the same ethnic group. The result was a tendency toward the 
recreation of the ethnic communities that had been deliberately 
broken up in the initial resettlement. 

The government criticized the tendency toward ethnic cluster- 
ing as contrary to its policy of multiracialism and in March 1989 
announced measures to halt it. Although no family would be forced 
to move from its apartment, new rules prohibited the sale or ex- 
change of apartments to members of other ethnic groups. Although 
the tendency toward ethnic resegregation apparentiy stemmed more 
from personal and pragmatic motivations than from conscious an- 
tagonism toward other ethnic groups, the government effort to halt 
it and to enforce ethnic quotas for apartment blocks demonstrated 
the continued significance of ethnicity in Singapore's society. 

Ethnic and Linguistic Groups 

Ethnic Categories 

Since the city's foundation in 1819, Singapore's population has 
been polyglot and multiethnic. Chinese have been in the majority 
since 1830 but have themselves been divided into sometimes an- 
tagonistic segments speaking mutually unintelligible Chinese lan- 
guages. The colonial society was compartmented into ethnic and 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



linguistic groups, which were in turn associated with distinct po- 
litical and economic functions. Singapore has never had a dominant 
culture to which immigrants could assimilate nor a common lan- 
guage. This was the foundation upon which the efforts of the 
government and ruling party to create a common Singaporean iden- 
tity in the 1970s and 1980s rested. 

In July 1989 Singapore's 2,674,362 residents were divided into 
2,043,213 Chinese (76.4 percent), 398,480 Malays (14.9 percent), 
171,160 Indians (6.4 percent), and 61,511 others (2.3 percent) (see 
table 3, Appendix). The proportions of the ethnic components had 
remained substantially unchanged since the 1920s. Although the 
ethnic categories were meaningful in the Singaporean context, each 
subsumed much more internal variation than was suggested by the 
term "race." Chinese included people from mainland China, Tai- 
wan, and Hong Kong, as well as Chinese from all the countries 
of Southeast Asia, including some who spoke Malay or English 
as their first language. The Malays included not only those from 
peninsular Malaya, but also immigrants or their descendants from 
various parts of the Indonesian archipelago, such as Sumatra, the 
Riau Islands south of Singapore, Java, and Sulawesi. Those peo- 
ple who in Indonesia were members of such distinct ethnic groups 
as Acehnese, Minangkabau, Buginese, Javanese, or Sundanese 
were in Singapore all considered "Malays." Indians comprised 
people stemming from anywhere in pre- 1947 British India, the 
present states of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and from Sri 
Lanka and Burma. Singapore's Indian "race" thus contained 
Tamils, Malayans, Sikhs, Gujaratis, Punjabis, and others from the 
subcontinent who shared neither physical appearance, language, 
nor religion. 

The Chinese 

Singapore's Chinese residents were the descendants of im- 
migrants from coastal southeastern China, an area of much lin- 
guistic and subcultural variation. The migrants spoke at least five 
mutually unintelligible Chinese languages, each of which contained 
numerous regional dialects. Singaporean usage, however, follow- 
ing the common Chinese tendency to assert cultural unity, referred 
to mutually unintelligible speech systems as "dialects." All the 
Chinese languages and dialects shared common origins and gram- 
matical structures and could be written with the same Chinese ide- 
ograms, which represent meaning rather than sound. The primary 
divisions in the immigrant Chinese population therefore followed 
linguistic lines, dividing the populace into segments that were called 
dialect communities, speech groups, or even "tribes" (see table 4, 



79 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Appendix). In the nineteenth century, each speech group had its 
own set of associations, ranging from secret societies to commer- 
cial bodies to schools and temples. The groups communicated 
through leaders conversant with other Chinese languages or through 
a third language such as Malay or English. 

The nomenclature for Chinese speech groups common in Singa- 
pore and Southeast Asia is confusing, partly because each group 
can be referred to by several alternate names. Most of the names 
refer to places in China with characteristic regional speech or di- 
alects and include the names of provinces, counties, and major cities. 

The distribution of Singapore's Chinese speech groups has re- 
mained fairly stable since 1900. The largest group were the Hok- 
kien, who came from the area around the trading port of Xiamen 
(Amoy) in southern Fujian Province. Hokkien traders and merchants 
had been active in Southeast Asia for centuries before the founda- 
tion of Singapore. In 1980 they made up 43 percent of Singapore's 
Chinese population. The second largest group were the Teochiu 
(sometimes written Teochew), comprising 22 percent of the Chinese 
population. Their home area is Chaozhou, in Chao'an County in 
northeastern Guangdong Province, which has as its major port the 
city of Shantou (Swatow). Chaozhou is immediately south of the 
Hokkien- speaking area of Fujian, and both Teochiu and Hokkien 
are closely related languages of the Minnan group, mutually intel- 
ligible to native speakers after sufficient practice. Hainanese, from 
the island of Hainan south of Guangdong, made up 8 percent of 
the population. Hainan was settled by people from southern Fujian 
who arrived by sea, and Hainanese is a Minnan language whose 
native speakers can understand Hokkien or Teochiu with relatively 
little difficulty after practice. Speakers of Minnan languages thus 
made up 72 percent of the Chinese population, for whom Hokkien 
served as a lingua franca, the language of the marketplace. 

The third most numerous group were Cantonese, from the 
lowlands of central Guangdong Province around the port city of 
Guangzhou (Canton). They made up 16 percent of the Chinese 
population. Hakka, a group scattered through the interior hills of 
southern China and generally considered migrants from northern 
China, were 7 percent. Other Chinese call them "guest people," 
and the term Hakka {kejia in pinyin romanization) is Cantonese for 
"guest families." There also were small numbers of people from 
the coastal counties of northern Fujian, called Hokchia, Hokchiu, 
and Henghua, whose northern Fujian (Minbei) languages are quite 
distinct from those of southern Fujian and seldom spoken outside 
of Fujian. A final, residual category of Chinese were the "Three 
Rivers People," who came from the provinces north of Guangdong 



80 



Wife of Chinese millionaire, 
late nineteenth century 
Courtesy Library of Congress 



and Fujian. This group included people from northern and cen- 
tral China and more specifically those provinces sharing the word 
river (jiang) in their names — Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. They 
would have spoken southern Mandarin dialects or the Wu languages 
of Shanghai, Ningbo, and Hangzhou. In 1980 they were 1.7 per- 
cent of the Chinese population. 

A significant category of Chinese, although one not listed in the 
census reports, were the Baba Chinese (see Glossary) or Straits 
Chinese (see Glossary). They were Chinese who after long resi- 
dence in Southeast Asia spoke Malay or English as their first lan- 
guage and whose culture contained elements from China, Southeast 
Asia, and sometimes Europe as well. An indication of the size of 
the Baba Chinese community was provided by the 1980 census 
report that 9 percent of Chinese families spoke English at home. 
Stereotypically the Baba were the offspring of Chinese migrants 
and local women. In the nineteenth century, they tended to be 
wealthier and better educated than the mass of immigrants and 
to identify more with Singapore and Southeast Asia than with Chi- 
na. In spite of their language, the Baba considered themselves 
Chinese, retained Chinese kinship patterns and religion, and even 
when speaking Malay used a distinct Baba dialect of Malay with 
many loan words from Hokkien. Never a large proportion of Sin- 
gapore's Chinese population, in the late nineteenth century they 
took advantage of opportunities for education in English and 



81 



Singapore: A Country Study 



promoted themselves as loyal to Britain. In Singapore, many Baba 
families spoke English as a first language and produced many of 
the leaders of Singapore's independent political movements, in- 
cluding Lee Kuan Yew. Although the Baba, in a sense, provided 
the model for the current Singaporean who is fluent in English and 
considers Singapore as home, the community fragmented in the 
early twentieth century as Chinese nationalism spread. After the 
1920s its members gained no advantage, economic or political, from 
distinguishing themselves from the rest of the Chinese population 
and tended increasingly to become Chinese again, often learning 
to speak Chinese as adults. In the 1980s, Baba culture survived 
largely in the form of a well-known cuisine that mixed Chinese and 
Malay ingredients and in some families who continued to use En- 
glish as the language of the home. 

As the majority of the population and the ethnic group that domi- 
nated the political system and state administrative structure, Sin- 
gapore's Chinese exhibited the widest range of occupational, 
educational, and class status. Those with little or no formal educa- 
tion occupied the bottom rungs of the occupational hierarchy and 
led social lives restricted to fellow members of the same dialect group. 
The level of formal education and language of education — Chinese 
or English — divided the Chinese into broad categories. Status for 
those working in the internationally oriented private sector or in 
government service depended on command of English and educa- 
tional qualifications. In the still substantial Chinese private sector, 
status and security rested on a position in a bounded dialect com- 
munity and a network of personal relations established over a life- 
time. Although the latter exclusively Chinese category was shrinking, 
by the late 1980s it still contained some quite wealthy men who helped 
set the international price of rubber, controlled businesses with 
branches in Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and other countries 
of the region, and supported Singapore's array of Chinese chari- 
ties, hospitals, and education trusts. Members of Singapore's Chinese 
society had a high degree of social mobility and their status increas- 
ingly was determined by educational qualifications and command 
of English and Mandarin. 

The Malays 

The Malay made up 15 percent of Singapore's population and 
were, like the Chinese and the Indians, descendants of immigrants. 
They or their ancestors came from peninsular Malaya, Sumatra, 
Java, and the other islands of the Indonesian archipelago. Through- 
out the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Java was much more 
densely populated than peninsular Malaya, and its people had a 



82 



Chinese medicine shop in Chinatown 
Courtesy Ong Tien Kwan 



significantly lower standard of living. From the mid-nineteenth cen- 
tury to the period just after World War II, many Javanese migrated 
to Singapore, attracted both by urban wages offering a higher liv- 
ing standard and by freedom from the constraints of their native 
villages, where they often occupied the lower reaches of the eco- 
nomic and social order. Singapore Malay community leaders esti- 
mated that some 50 to 60 percent of the community traced their 
origins to Java and an additional 15 to 20 percent to Bawean Is- 
land, in the Java Sea north of the city of Surabaya. The 1931 cen- 
sus recorded the occupations of 18 percent of the Malays as 
fishermen and 12 percent as farmers; the remaining 70 percent held 
jobs in the urban cash economy, either in public service or as 
gardeners, drivers, or small-scale artisans and retailers. The Brit- 
ish colonialists had considered the Malays as simple farmers and 
fishermen with strong religious faith and a "racial" tendency toward 
loyalty and deference; they preferentially recruited the Malays to 
the police, the armed forces, and unskilled positions in the public 
service. In 1961 more than half of Singapore's Malays depended 
on employment in the public sector. Although the colonial stereo- 
type of the Malays as rural people with rural attitudes persisted, 
Singapore's Malay residents were for the most part no more rural 



83 



Singapore: A Country Study 

than any other residents. Malay identity was couched in religious 
terms, with Malay being taken almost as a synonym for Muslim 
and most Malay organizations taking a religious form. 

After independence, the government regarded the Malay prepon- 
derance in the police and armed forces as disproportionate and a 
potential threat to security and acted to make the security forces 
more representative of the society as a whole, which meant in prac- 
tice replacing Malays by Chinese (see Public Order and Internal 
Security, ch. 5). The government's drive to break up ethnic en- 
claves and resettie kampong dwellers in Housing and Development 
Board apartment complexes had a great effect on the Malays. Evi- 
dence of the convergence of Malay patterns of living with those 
of the rest of the population was provided by population statistics, 
which showed the Malay birth and death rates, originally quite high, 
to be declining. In the 1940s, Malay women had married early, 
had many children, and were divorced and remarried with great 
frequency. By the 1980s, Malays were marrying later, bearing fewer 
children (2.05 per woman for mid- 1986 to mid- 1987), and divorc- 
ing less frequendy. By the 1980s, a large proportion of Malay wom- 
en were working outside the home, which was a major social change. 
Many young women in their late teens and early to mid-twenties 
were employed in factories operated by multinational corporations, 
which, unlike the small-scale Chinese shops and workshops that 
had dominated the economy into the 1960s, paid no attention to 
ethnicity in hiring. Even Malay fishing communities on the off- 
shore islands, which appeared to preserve the traditional way of 
life, were in the 1980s losing population as young people moved 
to Singapore Island, attracted by urban life and unskilled jobs that 
offered higher and more reliable incomes than fishing. 

Although very much a part of Singapore's modernizing socie- 
ty, the Malays conspicuously occupied the bottom rungs of that 
society; their position illustrated a correlation between ethnicity 
and class that presented a major potential threat to social stability. 
With the lowest level of educational attainment of any ethnic group, 
the Malays were concentrated at the low end of the occupational 
hierarchy and had average earnings that were 70 percent of those 
of Chinese. Malays had a higher crime rate than other groups and 
in 1987 accounted for 47 percent of the heroin addicts arrested. 
The 1980 census showed that 86 percent of the Malay work force 
was in the clerical, service, and production sector; 45 percent of 
all employed Malays worked on assembly lines, largely in foreign- 
owned electronics factories. Only 8 percent of all professional and 
technical workers (including schoolteachers), and 2 percent of all 
administrative and managerial personnel were Malays. Malays 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



dropped out of the competitive school system in large numbers, 
and those who continued past primary school were concentrated 
in vocational education programs. In 1980 they made up only 1.5 
percent of all university graduates and 2 . 5 percent of students en- 
rolled in higher education. 

In sharp contrast to neighboring Malaysia with its policies of 
affirmative action for the Malay majority, Singapore's government 
insisted that no ethnic group would receive special treatment and 
that all citizens had equal rights and equal opportunities. The poten- 
tial threat, however, posed by the overlap between Malay ethnici- 
ty and low educational achievement and occupational status, was 
clear. Demonstrating the Singaporean propensity for discussing so- 
cial affairs in terms of "race," both government spokesmen and 
Malay intellectuals tended to attribute the Malays' economic po- 
sition and educational performance to something inherent in the 
Malay personality or culture, or to their supposed "rural" atti- 
tudes. The ways in which lower income and ill-educated Malays 
resembled or differed from the very many lower income and ill- 
educated Chinese, who had very different cultural backgrounds, 
were not addressed. 

In 1982 the prime minister defined Malays' educational difficul- 
ties as a national problem and so justified government action to 
improve their educational performance. The colonial government 
had provided free but minimal education, in the Malay language, 
to Malays but not to Chinese or Indians, on the grounds that the 
Chinese and Indian residents of Singapore, even those born there, 
were sojourners. In the colonial period most English-language 
schools were run by churches or missionaries, and many Malays 
avoided them for fear of Christian proselytization. Although after 
independence schooling in Singapore was not free (fees were gener- 
ally low, but the government felt that people would not value edu- 
cation if they did not pay something for it), Malays continued to 
receive free primary education. In 1960 that benefit was extended 
to secondary and higher education, although the free schooling was 
offered only to those the government defined as Malay, which ex- 
cluded immigrant Indonesians whom the Malays regarded as part 
of their community. Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, 
most Malay children continued to attend schools that taught only 
in Malay, or, if they taught English at all, did so quite poorly. Op- 
portunities for secondary and higher education in the Malay lan- 
guage were very limited. Although many Malays were employed 
in the public service or as drivers or servants for foreign employ- 
ers, in almost all cases the language used at work was the gram- 
matically and lexically simplified tongue called Bazaar Malay. 



85 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Throughout the 1970s, relatively few Malays knew English, a 
language that became progressively more necessary for high-paying 
professional and technical jobs. Substantial numbers of the Chinese 
knew no more English than the Malays, but they found employ- 
ment in the extensive sector of Chinese commerce and small-scale 
industry where hiring demanded command of a Chinese regional 
language and personal recommendation. The former Malay eco- 
nomic niche in the military and police forces was eliminated in the 
late 1960s and 1970s, and the large number of Malays who had 
been employed by the British armed forces at British naval and 
other military facilities lost those secure and well-paying positions 
when the British withdrew from Singapore from 1970 to 1975. Such 
factors as poor command of English, limited availability of second- 
ary and postsecondary education in Malay, and the loss of public- 
sector jobs accounted for much of the low economic position of the 
Malay community in 1980. 

In 1981 Malay community leaders, alarmed by the results of the 
1 980 census that demonstrated the concentration of Malays in the 
lower reaches of the occupational hierarchy, formed a foundation 
called Mendaki, an acronym for Majlis Pendidikan Anak-anak Is- 
lam (Council for the Education of Muslim Children). Mendaki (as- 
cent in Malay), devoted itself to providing remedial tuition classes 
for Malay children in primary and secondary school, offering 
scholarships for living expenses and loans for higher education, at- 
tempting to encourage parents to take a more active role in their 
children's education, and holding public ceremonies to honor Malay 
students who excelled in examinations or graduated from academic 
secondary schools or universities. Government support for Men- 
daki took the form of financing the organization through a special 
voluntary checkoff on the monthly contribution of Muslim work- 
ers to the Central Provident Fund, and through unspecified other 
public donations. 

Throughout the 1980s, both the number of Malay students in 
selective secondary schools and institutions of higher education and 
the proportion of Malays passing and scoring well on standardized 
examinations slowly increased. As with the changes in birth rates, 
it was difficult to separate the effects of such government- sponsored 
programs as those of Mendaki from other factors, including increased 
female participation in the work force, residence in apartment com- 
plexes rather than kampong housing, exposure to television and ra- 
dio, smaller family size, and better teaching in the schools. 

The use of a voluntary checkoff on the monthly Central Provi- 
dent Fund contribution as a means of raising Malay educational 
funds was characteristic of Singapore in the 1980s. Malays, like 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



other Singaporeans, were assumed to have regular employment 
and salaries, and their distinctive Malay and Muslim concerns were 
efficiendy and equitably addressed through a computerized govern- 
ment program. 

The Indians 

The Indians, although a component of Singapore's society since 
its founding, were in the 1980s its most immigrant-like communi- 
ty. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Indian men 
had worked in Singapore, sending money home to families and 
wives in India, whom they would visit every few years. Indian wom- 
en and complete Indian families were rare before World War II, 
and the Indian sex ratio in 1931 was 5,189 men for every 1,000 
women. The 1980 census showed 1,323 Indian men for every 1,000 
women; most of the surplus males were over age 60. In the 1980s, 
the 4 'Little India" off Serangoon Road contained many dormito- 
ries where elderly single men lived, as well as some shops and work- 
shops whose owners, in the traditional pattern, housed and fed a 
workforce of middle-aged and elderly men who might or might not 
have wives and children in India or Sri Lanka. Significant issues 
for the Indian community included securing residence status, 
citizenship, or entrance for the Indian families of men who had 
worked in Singapore for decades and for the Brahman priests who 
were necessary for Hindu religious life. 

Almost two-thirds (64 percent) of the Indian population were 
Tamils from southeastern India's Tamil Nadu state; some Tamils 
also came from Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka. The great diversity 
of the Indian populace was indicated by the census category "other 
Indians," who made up a substantial 19 percent of the group, fol- 
lowed by Malay alis (8 percent); Punjabis, mostly Sikh (8 percent); 
and Gujaratis (1 percent). Like the Straits Chinese, some of Sin- 
gapore's Indians adopted English as a first language, a change facili- 
tated by the widespread use of English in India, where it had become 
another Indian language. Indians were the most religiously diverse 
of Singapore's ethnic categories; an estimated 50 to 60 percent were 
Hindu, 20 to 30 percent Muslim, 12 percent Christian, 7 percent 
Sikh, and 1 percent Buddhist (see Religion, this ch.). Indian im- 
migrants, like those of other nationalities, had been primarily 
recruited from among poor farmers and laborers, which meant that 
they included a large proportion (perhaps one-third) of untoucha- 
bles. In Singapore untouchables were usually referred to by the 
more polite Tamil term Adi-Dravidas, meaning pre-Dravidians. 
Although Tamils made up nearly two-thirds of the Indian popula- 
tion and Tamil was one of the country's four official languages 



87 



Singapore: A Country Study 

(along with English, Malay, and Mandarin Chinese), by 1978 more 
Indians claimed to understand Malay (97 percent) than Tamil (79 
percent). The 20 to 30 percent of the Indian population who were 
Muslims tended to intermarry with Malays at a fairly high rate 
and to be absorbed into the Malay community, continuing a 
centuries-old process of assimilation of Indian males to Malay 
society. 

The linguistic and religious diversity of the Indian population 
was matched by their high degree of occupational differentiation. 
Indians were represented at all levels of the occupational hierar- 
chy in numbers roughly proportional to their share of the total popu- 
lation. Within the Indian category, occupational and education 
attainment was far from equitably distributed. The untouchables 
for the most part did unskilled or semiskilled labor, while the Jaff- 
na Tamils and the Chettia caste, who were traditionally money- 
lenders and merchants, were often professionals and wealthy 
businessmen. After World War II, caste received no public recog- 
nition in Singapore. Untouchables were free to enter Hindu tem- 
ples, and food was distributed at temple festivals without regard 
for relative degrees of purity and pollution. Members of the In- 
dian community were reluctant to discuss caste in public, but it 
continued to play a decisive role in marriage arrangements. The 
Indians were the most likely of all ethnic groups to attempt to 
arrange marriages for their children, or at least to restrict the choice 
of marriage partners to acceptable caste categories. Although the 
relatively small size of the Indian population and the disparate mix- 
ture of local caste groups from large areas of southern India made 
it difficult for most families to insist on strict caste endogamy (mar- 
rying only within the caste), Hindu marriages were made within 
a tripartite hierarchy. The highest level was occupied by Brahmans 
and Chettias, who attempted to maintain caste endogamy or at 
least to marry only members of other high castes. Mid-level caste 
Hindus intermarried with little difficulty, but the marriages of low- 
caste or outcaste category of former hereditary washermen, bar- 
bers, and untouchables were restricted to their own circle. 

Singaporean Identity 

The period after Singapore's withdrawal from Malaysia in 1965 
saw much public discussion of Singaporean identity. The discus- 
sion tended to use terms, categories, and basic assumptions provided 
by the government and ruling party. One basic assumption was 
that there was not, at least in the late 1960s and 1970s, a common 
Singaporean identity, but that there should be. A corollary was 
that Singaporean identity would not spontaneously emerge from 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



the country's ongoing social, political, and cultural life. Rather, 
it would have to be consciously created and ''built" by policies, 
directives, and educational campaigns. The content of the identi- 
ty remained somewhat ill-defined, and it often appeared easier to 
say what Singaporean identity was not than what it was. The ideal 
seemed to combine, somewhat uneasily, a self-consciously tough- 
minded meritocratic individualism, in which individual Sin- 
gaporeans cultivated their talents and successfully competed in the 
international economy, with an equally self-conscious identifica- 
tion with "Asian roots" and "traditional values," which referred 
to precolonial India, China, and the Malay world. Singaporeans 
were to be modern and cosmopolitan while retaining their distinc- 
tively Asian traditions. 

Singapore's leaders explicitly rejected the ideology of the melt- 
ing pot, offering rather the vision of a confidently multiethnic so- 
ciety whose component ethnic groups shared participation in such 
common institutions as electoral politics, public education, military 
service, public housing, and ceremonies of citizenship; at the same 
time they were to retain distinct languages, religions, and customs. 
Singaporeans were defined as composed of three fundamental 
types — Chinese, Malays, and Indians. These ethnic categories, lo- 
cally referred to as "races," were assumed to represent self-evident, 
"natural" groups that would continue to exist into the indefinite 
future. Singaporean identity thus implied being a Chinese, a Ma- 
lay, or an Indian, but self-consciously so in relation to the other 
two groups. The Singaporean model of ethnicity thus required both 
the denial of significant internal variation for each ethnic category 
and the highlighting of contrasts between the categories. 

Being Singaporean also meant being fluent in English, a lan- 
guage which served both as a neutral medium for all ethnic groups 
and as the medium of international business and of science and 
technology. The schools, the government, and the offices of inter- 
national corporations for the most part used English as their working 
language. The typical Singaporean was bilingual, speaking English 
as well as the language of one of the three component ethnic groups. 
Hence the former English-speaking Baba, Chinese or Indian, would 
seem to serve as the model of Singaporean identity. The resulting 
culture would be the type social scientists call "creolized," in which 
a foreign language such as English or French is adapted to local 
circumstances and the dominant culture reflects a unique blend- 
ing of local and "metropolitan" or international elements. In the 
1980s, there were signs of the emergence of such a culture in Singa- 
pore, with the growth among youth (of all "races") of a distinc- 
tive English-based patois called "Singlish" and the attraction of all 



89 



Singapore: A Country Study 

ethnic groups to international fashions and fads in leisure activities. 

Singapore's leaders resisted such trends toward cosmopolitan 
or Creole culture, however, reiterating that Singaporeans were 
Asians rather than Westerners and that abandoning their own tra- 
ditions and values for the tinsel of international popular culture 
would result in being neither truly Western nor properly Asian. 
The consequence would be loss of identity, which in turn would 
lead to the dissolution of the society. The recommended policy for 
the retention of Asian identity involved an ideal division of labor 
by language. English was to function as a language of utility. The 
Asian "mother tongues" — Mandarin Chinese, Malay, and Tamil — 
would be the languages of values, providing Singaporeans with what 
political leaders and local academics commonly called "cultural bal- 
last" or "moral compasses." Stabilized and oriented by traditional 
Asian values, the Singaporean would be able to select what was useful 
from the offerings of "Western" culture and to reject that which 
was harmful. This theory of culture and identity resulted in the ef- 
fort to teach the "mother tongues" in the schools and to use them 
as the vehicle for moral education (see Education, this ch.). 

In an extension of the effort to create a suitable national identi- 
ty, in 1989 Singapore's leaders called for a "national ideology" 
to prevent the harmful drift toward superficial Westernization. The 
national ideology, which remained to be worked out in detail, would 
help Singaporeans develop a national identity and bond them 
together by finding and encouraging core values common to all 
the country's diverse cultural traditions. Suggested core values in- 
cluded emphasizing community over self, valuing the family, resolv- 
ing issues through the search for consensus rather than contention, 
and promoting racial and religious tolerance. 

Language Planning 

In colonial Singapore, the nearest thing to a common language 
had been Bazaar Malay, a form of Malay with simplified grammar 
and a very restricted vocabulary that members of many ethnic groups 
used to communicate in the marketplace. The government used En- 
glish, with translators employed when necessary, as in the courts. 
Among the Chinese a simplified form of Hokkien served as the lan- 
guage of the marketplace. The Chinese schools, which were found- 
ed in large numbers in the early years of the twentieth century and 
associated with the rise of Chinese nationalism, attempted to teach 
in Mandarin or Guoyu, the use of which on such formal occasions 
as weddings and Chinese national holiday celebrations came to carry 
some prestige. In the terminology of sociolinguistics, Singapore's lan- 
guage system was multilingual and diglossiac, that is, characterized 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



by two languages or dialects, high and low, or classical and ver- 
nacular, each used in different social contexts and carrying differen- 
tial prestige. Bazaar Malay and market Hokkien were the low 
languages, employed in the streets and market places, and English 
and Mandarin were the high languages, used in education, govern- 
ment offices, and public celebrations. In addition, such native 
tongues as pure Malay, Teochiu, Tamil, or Punjabi were used in 
the home and in gatherings of members of the same speech group. 
In a 1972 survey asking which language people understood, Hok- 
kien came first, at 73 percent, followed by Malay, with 57 per- 
cent. Malay was the most important language for intergroup 
communication, with almost all the Indians and 45 percent of the 
Chinese claiming to understand it. English came third, understood 
by 47 percent of the total population. A follow-up survey in 1978 
showed that 67 percent claimed to understand Malay and 62 per- 
cent to comprehend English. As the 1990s approached, English was 
replacing Malay as the common language. It was used not only 
as the high language but also, in its Singlish variant, as a low lan- 
guage of the streets. Bazaar Malay was declining, and Malay in 
its full native complexity was increasingly used only by Malays. 
Even though it was one of the four official languages and the puta- 
tive "mother tongue" of the Indian community, Tamil was used 
less often, and literacy in Tamil was reported to be declining. 

The most ambitious aspect of Singapore's language planning and 
attempted social engineering was the campaign to replace the 
Chinese "dialects" with Mandarin, called the "mother tongue." 
The Speak Mandarin campaign began in 1979 as a PAP project 
and was subsequently institutionalized in the Mandarin Campaign 
Secretariat in the Ministry of Communications and Information. 
The promotion of Mandarin as a common Chinese language dates 
back to the early years of the century, when it was associated with 
the rise of Chinese nationalism and the foundation of Chinese 
schools. Learning Mandarin would, it was argued, permit all 
Chinese to communicate in their "mother tongue," be useful for 
doing business with China, and, perhaps most important, promote 
traditional Chinese values. All ethnic Chinese were required to study 
Mandarin through secondary school and to pass examinations in 
it for university admission. Chinese civil servants took a required 
162-hour conversational Mandarin course, and the Mandarin Cam- 
paign Secretariat coordinated the annual Speak Mandarin cam- 
paigns. Mandarin classes were offered by the Singapore Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and by some native-place 
and clan associations. All Chinese television broadcasting was in 
Mandarin, as was most radio broadcasting. Radio programs in 



91 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Chinese dialects were limited to 9:00 P.M. to midnight on the same 
station that broadcast Tamil from 5:00 A.M. to 9:00 P.M. In 1989 
members of Parliament complained that some residents were tun- 
ing in to Cantonese opera broadcast by television stations in neigh- 
boring Malaysia. By late 1988, some 87 percent of the Chinese 
population claimed to be able to speak Mandarin. People did not 
agree, however, on the appropriate social contexts for use of what 
was for everyone a school language. As a result, people tended to 
use English or their native tongue on most everyday occasions. Dur- 
ing the late 1980s, the Speak Mandarin campaign attempted to 
persuade people to use Mandarin when shopping and targeted taxi 
drivers, bus conductors, and operators of food stalls as workers who 
were to use Mandarin. 

The goals of the Speak Mandarin campaign included improv- 
ing communication between Chinese speech groups, teaching people 
to read Chinese, and promoting Confucianism. Some critics ar- 
gued that children were expected to learn two foreign languages 
in school (English and Mandarin) and that for some students the 
result was fluency in neither. The official response was that the 
problem would be avoided if people would speak Mandarin at 
home. Some educators questioned whether a sufficient level of 
Chinese literacy could be achieved with the amount of time the 
schools devoted to Chinese, a point that was indirectly supported 
in August 1988 when Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong, the 
minister for trade and industry and son of Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew, urged Chinese newspapers to use simpler language to attract 
younger readers. Some academics questioned the restriction of 
Chinese values to Confucianism and recalled that in the 1950s and 
early 1960s Chinese was the language of radicalism and revolt 
rather than of loyalty and conservatism. The necessity of learning 
Mandarin to conserve traditional Chinese culture was not obvi- 
ous to those Chinese who felt that Chinese culture had been trans- 
mitted for centuries through Hokkien, Teochiu, and Cantonese. 
They pointed out that the colloquial speech of modern Beijing (upon 
which Madarin is based) was as distant from the classical Chinese 
of the Confucian texts as was colloquial Cantonese. Giving up the 
dialects implied a major transformation of the social structure of 
the Chinese community, because the associational and commer- 
cial structure of Singapore's Chinese-oriented society rested on (and 
reinforced) dialect distinctions. 

The Social System 
Ethnicity and Associations 

Because Singapore was a small society open to influence from 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



the West through the English language and subject to the 
homogenizing effects of modernization and industrialization, the 
persistence of ethnicity as a fundamental element of its social struc- 
ture was by no means assured. By the late 1980s ethnic affiliations 
were in many ways less significant than they had been in 1970 or 
1940, and the lives of members of distinct ethnic groups had more 
and more common elements. In Singapore, as elsewhere, the forces 
of standardized education, impartial application of laws and regu- 
lations, common subordination to the impersonal discipline of the 
factory and the office, common pursuit of leisure activities, and 
exposure to international mass media resulted in many shared at- 
titudes among ethnic groups. Studies of factory workers in Malaysia 
and Singapore, for example, found no marked differences in the 
attitudes and performance of Chinese and Malays. Psychologi- 
cal profiles of a cohort of poorly educated young Chinese who had 
held a succession of unskilled jobs before induction into the armed 
forces resembled those of equally poorly educated and unskilled 
Malays. Foreign popular culture seemed equally tempting or equally 
threatening to young Singaporeans of all ethnic groups. Ethnic 
boundaries persisted, especially where they corresponded with re- 
ligious distinctions, and were evident in the continuing low rate 
of ethnic intermarriage. In daily life, however, the significance of 
ethnic affiliation had apparently diminished from the levels of previ- 
ous generations. 

Government policies were a major factor in the continuation of 
ethnicity as an organizing principle of Singapore's society. On the 
one hand, the government and the ruling party acted to break up 
ethnic enclaves, to provide public services to members of all eth- 
nic groups, and to reshape society with the network of People's 
Association Community Centers, Residents' Committees, and 
Members of Parliament Constituent Advisory Groups. On the other 
hand, the government's ideology defined Singaporeans as mem- 
bers of component ethnic groups, and its various ministries listed 
everyone's "race" on identity cards and all official records, and 
remained very concerned with such matters as the ethnic mix in 
apartment complexes. Official statistics usually included breakdowns 
by "race," indicating an assumption that such categorization was 
significant. National holidays featured displays of the distinctive 
traditional cultures of the major ethnic groups, represented by 
costumes, songs, and dances. Pupils in secondary schools took re- 
quired courses in the ethics and religion of their designated tradi- 
tional culture — Confucian ethics for the Chinese, Islamic studies 
for the Malays, Hindu or Sikh studies for the Indians, and Bud- 
dhism or Bible study as options open to all. 



93 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Although state policies reinforced ethnic boundaries and the habit 
of ethnic categorization, they had little effect on the content of the 
ethnic categories. Ethnic identity was acted out on a daily basis 
through an extensive network of ethnically exclusive associations. 
Many Malay and Indian associations took a religious form, such 
as mosque and endowment management committees, sharia (Mus- 
lim law — see Glossary) courts, Hindu temple committees and the 
high-level Hindu Advisory Board, which represented Hindus to 
the government. An example of the reinforcement of ethnic iden- 
tity was provided by the groups of Indian employees in one govern- 
ment department who distinguished themselves from their Malay 
and Chinese coworkers by jointly sponsoring festivals at a major 
Hindu temple. All ethnic groups had their own education and 
charitable associations as well as higher-order federations of such 
associations whose officers were the recognized community lead- 
ers. Singapore law required all associations of ten or more persons 
to be registered with the government, which supervised and could 
dissolve them. Trade unions, financial, education, and religious 
bodies were supervised by the appropriate government departments, 
and the catch-all Registry of Societies listed all associations that 
did not come under the authority of a specialized department. In 
1987 3,750 associations were under the Registry of Societies. 

The most elaborate set of ethnic associations was found among 
the Chinese, who in 1976 supported over 1,000 clan, locality, oc- 
cupational, religious, and recreational associations. The member- 
ship of each association usually was restricted to those speaking 
the same dialect or tracing ancestry to the same small region of 
China. The lowest level associations were clan or district associa- 
tions, which were in turn grouped into federations based on progres- 
sively larger administrative or linguistic regions of China. The 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, found- 
ed in 1906, was the overarching association that represented the 
entire Chinese community. A federation, its constituent units were 
not individuals or individual businesses but associations. Its basic 
structure consisted of representatives of seven regional associations 
(Fujian, Teochiu, Cantonese, Hakka 1, Hakka 2, Hainan, and 
"Three Rivers") and ninety- three trade associations, each one 
usually restricted to speakers of one dialect. 

The functions and activities of the associations were multiple, 
reflecting the concerns of members and leaders. Common activi- 
ties included mutual aid; insurance benefits; foundation and main- 
tenance of schools, hospitals, or cemeteries; contributions to the 
same sorts of public projects in the ancestral districts of China; 
settling disputes between members; acting as spokesman for the 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



community to the government; and promoting good fellowship and 
continuing identification with the clan or region. Associations were 
run by committees and met at least once a year for a formal ban- 
quet. Association leaders were prosperous businessmen who had 
played a major part in fundraising and the management of activi- 
ties. Success in business gave them both the free time to devote 
to association activities and the funds to contribute to the associa- 
tion and its charities. The associations conferred prestige and public 
recognition on those who took the burdens of office and commu- 
nity service, but the community so served was restricted to those 
from the same region and speaking the same dialect. The leader- 
ship of the lowest level associations was usually provided by those 
of moderate means, while the more wealthy belonged to several 
or many associations and worked for the higher level, more inclu- 
sive associations, which conferred more public recognition and pres- 
tige. The mechanisms of leadership and prestige and the channeling 
of much charity and assistance (schools, scholarship funds, hospi- 
tals, recommendations for employment or loans from Chinese 
banks, death benefits) through the associations thus reinforced eth- 
nic and subethnic identification for both poor and rich. 

In a pattern common to Chinese urban society in China and 
in Southeast Asia, groups defined by common place of origin or 
dialect also tended to specialize in certain trades or monopolies. 
Exactly which regional group dominated which trade varied from 
place to place and represented historical accidents and contingen- 
cies, but the principle of a regional group also acting as an occupa- 
tional group was common. As late as the 1980s, the Singapore 
Hokkien were dominant in banking, insurance, shipping, hard- 
ware, real estate, and other lucrative fields. Within the Hokkien 
community, smaller subgroups controlled particular trades. For 
example, 96 percent of the merchants dealing in China tea in the 
1980s traced their ancestry to Anxi County in southern Fujian. 
Teochiu dominated the fresh produce trade and the jewelry and 
antiques business; Cantonese predominated in furniture making, 
watch and clock repair, and operating drug stores and restaurants; 
and the Hakka were pawnbrokers, tailors, and dealers in Chinese 
herbs and medicines. The Henghua people from northern Fujian, 
a small component of the Chinese population, controlled the very 
important bicycle, motorcycle, and taxi businesses. Over the years 
the speech groups competed for the control of trades, and the pat- 
tern of dialect- specific occupations was a dynamic one, with, for 
example, strong competition for shares of the textile trade. In the 
1980s, four textile trade associations represented Teochiu, Hokkien, 
Hakka, and Cantonese traders. The competition between speech 



95 



Singapore: A Country Study 

groups reinforced both their internal solidarity and the social bound- 
aries between them. Regional associations were, to a certain ex- 
tent, also trade associations. For the large proportion of the Chinese 
population employed in regional commerce, service trades, or small- 
scale manufacturing, there remained a close relation between eth- 
nicity and occupation, each aspect reinforcing the other. 

For the proprietors and employees of many small and medium 
Chinese businesses, continued identification with dialect and subeth- 
nic communities provided many benefits and indeed was a precon- 
dition for engaging in many lines of trade. Although the dialect 
communities were not primarily occupational groups, the social 
solidarities created within the communities were economically use- 
ful. Much of the business activity in the extensive Chinese "tradi- 
tional" sector of the economy depended on credit, personal 
relations, and the reputation of individuals for trustworthiness. In 
the final analysis, individuals met their obligations because failure 
to do so would result in immediate loss of reputation and credit- 
worthiness with their fellows in restricted subethnic communities. 

For many members of the Chinese community, economic self- 
interest reinforced the identification with an ethnic or subethnic 
community and the continued use of a regional dialect. Such in- 
dividuals tended to be both more intensely and self-consciously 
"Chinese" and "Teochiu" or "Anxi Hokkien" than their fellows, 
who might well be their own brothers, sons, or daughters, who 
worked for the government or large multinational corporations. 
For the latter, formal educational certification, command of En- 
glish, and perhaps skill at golf rather than Chinese finger games 
and etiquette were associated with economic success. 

Social Stratification and Mobility 

During the 1970s and 1980s, economic development and indus- 
trial growth reduced poverty and income inequity and accelerated 
upward social mobility. Those with educational qualifications, com- 
mand of English, and high-level technical or professional skills 
profited the most from the process. 

In the late 1980s, the major indices of social stratification were 
education level, citizenship status, sector of the economy where 
employed, and number of employed persons in the household. Resi- 
dents were sharply differentiated by the amount of education they 
had completed. In 1980 about 44 percent of the population aged 
25 and above had no educational qualifications, 38 percent had 
completed primary school, 15 percent secondary school, and only 
3.4 percent higher education. Those people born after 1970 were 
on average much better educated than previous generations, but 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



throughout the 1990s the work force will contain many individu- 
als with limited education. Wages correlated fairly closely with 
educational attainment, although education in English brought 
higher salaries than Chinese education. Many benefits, such as 
access to a Housing and Development Board apartment, were avail- 
able only to Singapore citizens, and only citizens and permanent 
residents were enrolled in the Central Provident Fund. In 1985, 
a recession year when many foreign factory workers lost their jobs 
and residence permits, citizens made up 91 percent of the work 
force. Noncitizens were concentrated in the lower and in the highest 
wage levels, either as factory or service workers on short-term work 
permits, or as well-paid expatriate managers and professionals. 
Wages were relatively higher in government service and gov- 
ernment-owned corporations and in the capital intensive and largely 
foreign-owned export-oriented manufacturing sector. They were 
lower in the service, retail, and less highly capitalized light indus- 
trial, craft, and commercial sector, which was dominated by small 
Chinese firms (see Wage Policies, ch. 3). Wages for unskilled and 
semiskilled factory work and for unskilled service jobs were rela- 
tively low. Those who held such jobs, often young women in their 
teens and early twenties, were not entirely self-supporting but parts 
of households in which several members worked at low-paying jobs. 
Families of the poorly educated and unskilled improved their 
standard of living between 1970 and 1990 in part because full 
employment made it possible to pool the wages of several family 
members. 

Economic growth and the associated increase in the demand for 
labor from 1960 to 1989 raised living standards and sharply reduced 
the incidence of poverty. A survey of living costs and household 
incomes in 1953-54 found 19 percent of all households to be in ab- 
solute poverty, meaning that their members did not have enough 
to eat. Application of the same standard in 1982-83 found 0.3 per- 
cent of households in absolute poverty. A measure of moderate 
poverty, defined as adequate nutrition and shelter but little discre- 
tionary income and no savings, was devised by the Amalgamated 
Union of Public Employees in 1973. By that measure, 31 percent 
of households in 1972-73 were in moderate poverty, 15 percent in 
1977-78, and 7 percent in 1982-83. Compared with other coun- 
tries in the region, household incomes in Singapore were equita- 
bly distributed, with most households falling in the middle or lower 
middle ranges of the distribution. 

The lowest income levels were those of single-person households, 
representing the elderly, the disabled, and those without kin in Sin- 
gapore. Apart from the childless elderly and the disabled, those 



97 



Singapore: A Country Study 

in moderate poverty in the 1980s were overwhelmingly working 
poor, holding unskilled jobs with no prospects for advancement. 
Such households typically had only one wage-earner with either 
primary education or no education and lived in rented housing and 
often a one-room or two-room Housing and Development Board 
apartment. Households with two or more members working, even 
at relatively low-paying jobs, were able to contemplate purchas- 
ing a Housing and Development Board apartment, save money 
for emergencies, and devote more resources to the education of 
children. 

Much of the alleviation of poverty and decrease in income ine- 
quality that took place in the 1970s and 1980s resulted from the 
increased participation of women in the work force. In 1985, 46 
percent of all women above the age of fifteen held paid employ- 
ment; 68 percent of single women and 33 percent of married women 
worked outside the home. This trend was associated with women 
marrying later and having fewer children. One reason that more 
households attained an adequate standard of living in the 1980s 
was that there were more wives and unmarried daughters at work 
and fewer young children to be supported and looked after. 

Surveys in the 1980s showed that most Singaporeans described 
themselves as middle class, justifying that status by their owner- 
ship of a Housing and Development Board apartment and the sub- 
stantial and secure savings guaranteed by their Central Provident 
Fund Account. Families in the middle-income ranges usually oc- 
cupied two- or three-bedroom apartments that they were buying 
from the Housing and Development Board, participated in one 
or more formal associations, took an active part in planning and 
supervising their children's education, stocked their apartments with 
a range of consumer appliances, and had money to spend on hob- 
bies, sports, or vacations. Automobile ownership was not common, 
and most middle-income Singaporeans used public transportation. 
Their mode of life rested on occupational skills and educational 
qualifications, secure employment in large, bureaucratic govern- 
ment or private organizations, or ownership of their own small 
business. 

The upper levels of the society were occupied by a tripartite 
elite of high-level civil servants, local managers and professionals 
employed by foreign-owned multinational corporations, and 
wealthy Chinese businessmen who served as leaders in the associa- 
tional world of the Chinese-speaking communities. The first two 
categories were marked by fluency in English, university-level edu- 
cation, often in Britain or the United States, and a cosmopolitan 
outlook reinforced by foreign residence and travel. Many of the 



98 



The Society and Its Environoment 

Chinese businessmen were entrepreneurs who operated in an 
exclusively Chinese setting and often had minimal educational 
qualifications. Their sons, however, often were graduates of the 
best secondary schools and of local or foreign universities and 
worked either as English-speaking representatives of their fathers' 
businesses, as civil servants, or as professionals. Few of the elite 
had inherited their status, and all were aware that they could not 
directly pass it along to their children. Having themselves been 
upwardly mobile in a society more open to individual effort than 
most in the region, they valued that society's stress on competi- 
tion, individual mobility, and success through hard work. In the 
domestic sphere, they expressed those values by devoting much 
effort to the education of their children. 

Increased family incomes made possible by full employment and 
by such government programs as the construction and sale of apart- 
ments and the enrollment of nearly everyone in the Central Provi- 
dent Fund are to be distinguished from upward mobility, in which 
individuals moved into more highly skilled and highly paid jobs 
and hence into higher social classes. The expansion of industry, 
banking, and of the ranks of civil servants created many high and 
mid-level positions that Singaporeans could aspire to and compete 
for. Residents from every ethnic community regarded social mo- 
bility as a common and accepted goal. Education was regarded as 
the best channel for upward mobility, and most families tried to 
encourage their children to do well in school and to acquire educa- 
tional qualifications and certification. This fact put severe pres- 
sure on the school system and the children in it, although, as 
elsewhere, middle- and upper-income families had an advantage 
in maneuvering their offspring through the education system. 

Individuals approached jobs with a keen appreciation for their 
potential for further mobility. Most large organizations, whether 
government or private, provided some training. Some foreign- 
owned enterprises, such as those in the oil industry, employed large 
numbers of skilled workers and ran extensive in-house training pro- 
grams. The electronics assembly factories, in contrast, offered no 
prospects for advancement to their large numbers of unskilled or 
semiskilled assembly line workers. Small scale enterprises, which 
in the late 1980s often recruited along ethnic and subethnic lines, 
were associated with long working hours and low wages, but some- 
times offered the workers opportunity to learn a skill, such as 
automotive repair. Workers in such establishments commonly ad- 
vanced by quitting and opening their own small firms, often after 
years of saving. 



99 



Singapore: A Country Study 



In a system that reflected both the great differences in educa- 
tional attainment in the work force and the great significance 
attached to educational qualifications, most large organizations, 
public and private, made a sharp distinction between mental and 
manual labor, and movement from the lower to the higher was 
very difficult and rare. Lower level white-collar workers and skilled 
blue-collar workers often took advantage of opportunities to up- 
grade their occupational skills, either through training offered by 
the organization or through night school and short-term courses 
offered by educational or other government bodies. Unskilled work- 
ers in industry and service trades and employees in small Chinese 
firms saw few prospects for advancement and considered self- 
employment as their only hope for upward mobility. Vending food 
and consumer goods on the streets or operating a cooked-food 
stall, traditional entry points for entrepreneurs, had been practi- 
cally eliminated by government action to tidy up the environment 
and to limit the numbers of mobile hawkers who obstructed traffic. 
Many Singapore economists felt that the successful modernization 
of the economy and the increases both in government regulation 
and in rents for shops and small premises had made it more difficult 
for the ambitious poor to get a start. By the late 1980s, Singapore's 
academics and political leaders were discussing the perceived short- 
age of entrepreneurs and suggesting solutions to the problem, al- 
though most discussion focused on industrial innovation and growth 
rather than the commercial fields in which most Singapore en- 
trepreneurs had succeeded (see Policies for the Future, ch. 3). 

Family, Marriage, and Divorce 

Almost all Singaporeans lived in small nuclear families. Although 
both Chinese and Indian traditions favored large extended fami- 
lies, such families were always rare in immigrant Singapore where 
neither the occupational structure, based on wage labor, or the hous- 
ing pattern, characterized by small, rented quarters, favored such 
family forms. In the 1980s, families were important in that most 
individuals as a matter of course lived with their parents until mar- 
riage and after marriage maintained a high level of interaction with 
parents, brothers, and sisters. Probably the most common leisure 
activity in Singapore was the Sunday visit to the grandparents for 
a meal and relaxed conversation with brothers, sisters, in-laws, un- 
cles and aunts, cousins, and other assorted kin. Although the age 
of marriage increased in the 1970s and 1980s, reaching a mean 28.5 
years for grooms and 25.8 years for brides in 1987, Singapore re- 
mained a society in which it was assumed that everyone would marry, 
and marriage was a normal aspect of fully adult status. 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



Both ethnicity and class affected the form and functioning of fam- 
ilies. Chinese and Indian families rested on cultural assumptions 
of the permanence of marriage and of the household as an ongo- 
ing, corporate group whose members, bound by duty, obligation, 
and subordination, pooled and shared income. The continued ef- 
forts of Indian parents to arrange the marriages or at least to in- 
fluence the marital choices of their offspring and the Tamil 
obligation to provide daughters with large dowries reflected such 
cultural definitions of family and household. In a similar manner, 
some Chinese combined the household with the family enterprise, 
practicing a traditional entrepreneurial strategy that included 
mobilizing the savings of all household members and allocating them 
in accord with a long-term plan for family success. Such a strategy 
might take the form of a thriving business with branches in the 
major cities of Malaysia and Indonesia, or of sons and daughters 
employed in the Singapore civil service, a large foreign bank, or 
a university in Australia. 

Malay families, on the other hand, gave priority to the individual 
and to individual interests. They viewed relations between siblings 
as tenuous and saw the household as a possibly short-lived coali- 
tion of autonomous individuals linked by sentiments of mutual con- 
cern and affection. Malays had traditionally had much higher rates 
of divorce and adoption than other ethnic groups, and the distinc- 
tion continued in the 1980s although the divorce rate was lower 
than in the 1940s or through the 1960s. More significantly, for the 
Malays divorce was regarded as a realistic and normal, although 
unfortunate, possibility in all marriages. Because Malays did not 
define the household as a continuing body, they did not make long- 
range strategic plans to maximize family income and success. In 
Malay families, husbands, wives, and children with jobs held 
separate purses and sometimes separate savings accounts. It was 
thus difficult for Malays to establish family businesses as the Chinese 
and the Indians did. 

Class affected families in a manner generally similar to many 
other industrialized societies. In all ethnic groups, lower-class or 
working-class people tended to be dependent on kin outside the 
immediate household for a wide range of services, and to operate 
wide networks of mutual assistance and gift exchange. Through- 
out the 1980s, kin provided the bulk of child care for married women 
working in factories. Such relatives were paid for their services, 
but less than a stranger would have been paid. The possibility of 
such support often determined whether a woman took a job out- 
side the home, and thus demonstrated the relation between large 



101 



Singapore: A Country Study 

numbers of kin and material comfort and security. Substantial sums 
of money were passed back and forth on such occasions as the birth- 
days of aged parents, the birth of children, or the move into a new 
apartment. Family members were a major source of information 
on and referrals to jobs for many unskilled or semiskilled workers. 
Relations with the extended circle of relatives were not always har- 
monious or happy, but they were important and necessary to the 
welfare and comfort of most working-class families. 

Middle- and upper-class households were less dependent on kin 
networks for support. They maintained close ties with parents and 
siblings, but did not need to rely on them. Indeed their relations 
with their extended kin often were more amiable than those of the 
lower-class households, where mutual need often was accompanied 
by disputes over allocation of such resources as grandparents' child- 
care services, or of the costs of supporting elderly parents and other 
dependent kin. Middle- and upper-class households spent more 
leisure time with people who were not their relatives and gained 
much of their social support from networks based on common 
schooling, occupation, and associational memberships. In such 
families, the bond between husband and wife was close as they 
shared more interests and activities than most working-class cou- 
ples and made more decisions jointly. 

Marriages across ethnic lines occurred, but not often. Between 
1954 and 1984, intermarriage rates remained at a stable 5 to 6 per- 
cent of all marriages. None of the traditional cultures encouraged 
marriage outside the group. The Hindu traditions of caste endoga- 
my and the Malay insistence on conversion to Islam as a condi- 
tion of marriage were major barriers to intermarriage. Shared 
religion encouraged intermarriage, with marriages between Ma- 
lays and Indian Muslims the most common form of ethnic inter- 
marriage. Interethnic marriages included a disproportionate 
number of divorced or widowed individuals. 

Divorce rates in Singapore were low. Interethnic marriages were 
somewhat more likely to end in divorce than were marriages with- 
in an ethnic group. During the 1980s the divorce rate for Malays 
fell, while it rose for the other ethnic groups. In 1987 there were 
23,404 marriages in Singapore, and 2,708 divorces, or 115 divorces 
for every 1,000 marriages. The figures included 4,465 marriages 
under the Muslim Law Act, which regulated the marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance of Muslims, and 796 divorces under the same act, 
for a Muslim divorce rate of 178 divorces for every 1,000 marriages. 
Marriages under the Women's Charter (which regulated the mar- 
riage and divorce of non-Muslims) totaled 18,939, and divorces 
under that law were 1,912, for a non-Muslim divorce rate of 100 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



per 1,000 marriages. The differential rates of divorce for ethnic 
groups may have suggested greater differences than were in fact 
the case. Situations that for Malay families resulted in prompt, le- 
gal divorce were sometimes tolerated or handled informally by 
Chinese or Indian families for whom the social stigma of divorce 
was greater and the barriers to legal separation higher. For all ethnic 
groups, the most common source of marital breakdown was the 
inability or unwillingness of the husband to contribute to main- 
taining the household. This sometimes led to desertion, which was 
the most common ground for divorce. 

Religion 

Temples and Festivals 

Singapore's immigrants commonly made their religious congre- 
gations a form of social organization. From the foundation of the 
city, colonial authorities had avoided interfering with the religious 
affairs of the ethnic communities, fostering an atmosphere of reli- 
gious tolerance. It was characteristic of colonial Singapore that South 
Bridge Street, a major thoroughfare in the old Chinatown, should 
also be the site of the Sri Mariamman Temple, a south Indian Hin- 
du temple, and of the Jamae or Masjid Chulia Mosque, which 
served Chulia Muslims from India's Coromandel Coast. The major 
religions were Chinese popular religion, commonly although in- 
accurately referred to as Daoism or Buddhism; Hinduism; Islam; 
Buddhism; and Christianity. Other religions included smaller com- 
munities of Sikhs and of Jains from India; Parsis, Indians of Iran- 
ian descent who followed the ancient Iranian Zoroastrian religion; 
and Jews, originally from the Middle East, who supported two syn- 
agogues. 

The Chinese practiced Chinese popular religion, a distinctive 
and complex syncretic religion that incorporates some elements from 
canonical Buddhism and Daoism but focuses on the worship of gods, 
ghosts, and ancestors. It emphasizes ritual and practice over doc- 
trine and belief, has no commonly recognized name, and is so close- 
ly entwined with Chinese culture and social organization that it 
cannot proselytize. In Singapore its public manifestations includ- 
ed large temples housing images of deities believed to respond to 
human appeals for guidance or relief from affliction and use of the 
common Chinese cycle of calendrical festivals. These occasions in- 
cluded the lunar New Year (in January or February), a festival 
of renewal and family solidarity; Qing Ming (Ch'ing Ming in 
Wade-Giles romanization), celebrated by the solar calender on April 
5th (105 days after the winter solstice), to remember the ancestors 



103 



Singapore: A Country Study 

and worship their graves; the fifteenth of the fifth lunar month (April 
or May), in Singapore known as Vesak Day and celebrated as mark- 
ing the birth of the Buddah; the festival of the hungry ghosts in 
the seventh lunar month, a major Hokkien holiday, marked by 
domestic feasting and elaborate public rituals to feed and placate 
the potentially dangerous souls of those with no descendants to wor- 
ship them; and the mid-autumn festival on the fifteenth of the eighth 
lunar month, an occasion for exchanging gifts of sweet round moon- 
cakes and admiring the full moon. All Chinese temples held one 
or more annual festivals, marked by street processions, perfor- 
mances of Chinese traditional operas, and domestic banquets to 
which those who supported the temple, either because of residen- 
tial propinquity, subethnic affiliation with a particular temple and 
its deity, or personal devotion to the god, invited their friends and 
business associates. To prevent the disruption of traffic and preserve 
public order, the government limited the length and route of street 
processions and prohibited the use of the long strings of firecrack- 
ers that had previously been a component of all Chinese religious 
display. Some festivals or customs that had little religious sig- 
nificance or were not practiced by the southeastern Chinese 
migrants were promoted by the government's Singapore Tourist 
Promotion Board for their spectacular and innocuous content. These 
included the summer dragon boat races, originally held only in Chi- 
na's Chang Jiang (Yangtze) River Valley, and the lantern festival 
in which paper lanterns in the shape of animals or other objects are 
carried through the streets by children or, if especially impressive, 
displayed in parks and temples. In China the lantern festival is 
celebrated in the first lunar month at the end of the New Year sea- 
son, but in Singapore it is combined with the mid- autumn festival. 

Canonical Buddhism was represented in Singapore as Sinhalese 
Theravada Buddhism. This form of Buddhism prevails in Sri Lanka 
and mainland Southeast Asia and differs from the Mahayana Bud- 
dhism of China, Korea, and Japan in both doctrine and organiza- 
tion. Theravada Buddhism was brought by Sinhalese migrants from 
Ceylon (contemporary Sri Lanka), who also influenced the architec- 
tural style of Thai and Vietnamese Theravada temples. These lat- 
ter were staffed by Thai or Vietnamese monks, some of whom were 
originally members of the overseas Chinese communities of those 
countries and served a predominantly Chinese laity, using Hok- 
kien, Teochiu, Cantonese, or English. Singapore was also home 
to a number of Chinese sects and syncretic cults that called them- 
selves Buddhist but taught their own particular doctrines and lacked 
properly ordained Buddhist monks. 



104 



Sri Mariamman Hindu 
temple in Chinatown 
Courtesy Ong Tien Kwan 



Hindus have been part of Singapore's population since its foun- 
dation in 1819, and some of the old Hindu temples, such as the 
Sri Mariamman Temple, were declared national historical sites in 
the 1980s and so preserved from demolition. Singapore's Hindus 
adapted their religion to their minority status in two primary 
ways — compartmentalization and ritual reinterpretation. Compart- 
mentalization referred to the Hindus' tendency to distinguish be- 
tween the home, in which they maintained a nearly completely 
orthodox Hindu pattern of diet and ritual observance, and the secu- 
lar outer world of work, school, and public life, where they did 
not apply categories of purity and pollution. Singapore lacked the 
tightly organized caste groups of communities found in India but 
replaced them in large-scale temple festivals with groups represent- 
ing those of the same occupation or place of employment. The major 
Hindu holidays were the Hindu New Year, in April or May; Thai- 
pusam, a festival during which penitents fulfilled vows to the deity 
Lord Subramanya by participating in a procession while carrying 
kavadi, heavy decorated frameworks holding offerings of milk, fruit, 
and flowers; and Deepavali, the Festival of Lights. Deepavali, a 
celebration of the victory of light over darkness and hence of good 
over evil, was a national holiday. 

Seven of the ten national holidays were religious festivals; two 
of them were Chinese, two Muslim, two Christian, and one Hindu. 



105 



Singapore: A Country Study 

The festivals were the Chinese New Year; Vesak Day; Hari Raya 
Haji, the Muslim pilgrimage festival; Hari Raya Pusa, which 
marked the end of the fasting month of Ramadan and was a time 
of renewal; Christmas; Good Friday; and Deepavali. Citizens were 
encouraged to learn about the festivals of other religious and eth- 
nic groups and to invite members of other groups to their own 
celebrations and feasts. Public ceremonies such as National Day 
or the commissioning of military officers were marked by joint re- 
ligious services conducted by the Inter-Religious Organization, an 
ecumenical body founded in 1949 to promote understanding and 
goodwill among the followers of different religions. 

Religion and Ethnicity 

In the 1980s, members of all ethnic groups lived and worked 
together, dressed similarly, and shared equal access to all public 
institutions and services. Religion, therefore, provided one of the 
major markers of ethnic boundaries. Malays, for instance, would 
not eat at Chinese restaurants or food stalls for fear of contamina- 
tion by pork, and a Chinese, in this case, could not invite a Malay 
colleague to a festive banquet. Funerals of a traditional and ethni- 
cally distinctive style were usually held even by families that were 
not otherwise very religiously observant. The community associa- 
tions and the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board encouraged the 
public celebration of such ethnically distinctive and appropriately 
colorful and noncontroversial festivals as the Chinese lantern fes- 
tival and the dragon boat races. 

The marriages, divorces, and inheritances of members of reli- 
gious communities and the management of properties and endow- 
ments dedicated to religious purposes were of concern to the 
government, which interacted with some religious bodies through 
advisory boards dating back to the colonial period. The Hindu Ad- 
visory Board, established in 1917, advised the government on Hin- 
du religion and customs and on any matters concerning the general 
welfare of the Hindu community. It assisted the Hindu Endow- 
ments Board, which administered the four major Hindu temples 
and their property, in organizing the annual festivals at the tem- 
ples. The Sikh Advisory Board acted in the same way for the Sikhs. 

The Singapore Muslim Religious Council (Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura) played a very important role in the organization of 
Islamic affairs and therefore of the Malay community. Authorized 
by the 1966 Administration of Muslim Law Act, the council, com- 
posed of members nominated by Muslim societies but appointed 
by the president of Singapore, was formally a statutory board that 
advised the president on all matters relating to the Muslim religion. 



106 



It acted to centralize and standardize the practice of Islam. The 
council administered all Muslim trusts (wafs); organized a com- 
puterized and centralized collection of tithes and obligatory gifts 
(zakat harta and zakat fitrah); and managed all aspects of the pil- 
grimage to Mecca, including registering pilgrims, obtaining Sau- 
di Arabian visas, and making airline reservations. The council also 
helped the government reorganize the mosque system after 
redevelopment. Before the massive redevelopment and rehousing 
of the 1970s and 1980s, Singapore's Muslims were served by about 
ninety mosques, many of which had been built and were funded 
and managed by local, sometimes ethnically based, communities. 
Redevelopment destroyed both the mosques and the communities 
that had supported them, scattering the people through new hous- 
ing estates. The council, in consultation with the government, decid- 
ed not to rebuild the small mosques but to replace them with large 
central mosques. Construction funds came from a formally volun- 
tary contribution collected along with the Central Provident Fund 
deduction paid by all employed Muslims. The new central mosques 
could accommodate 1,000 to 2,000 persons and provided such 
services as kindergartens, religious classes, family counseling, 
leadership and community development classes, tuition and remedi- 
al instruction for school children, and Arabic language instruction. 

The government had regulated Muslim marriages and divor- 
ces since 1880, and the 1957 Muslim Ordinance authorized the 



107 



Singapore: A Country Study 



establishment of the centralized Sharia Court, with jurisdiction over 
divorce and inheritance cases. The court, under the Ministry of 
Community Development, replaced a set of government-licensed 
but otherwise unsupervised kathi (Islamic judges) who had previ- 
ously decided questions of divorce and inheritance, following either 
the traditions of particular ethnic groups or their own interpreta- 
tions of Muslim law. The court attempted to consistently enforce 
sharia law, standard Islamic law as set out in the Quran and the 
decisions of early Muslim rulers and jurists, and to reduce the high 
rate of divorce among Malays. In 1989 the Singapore Muslim Re- 
ligious Council took direct control of the subjects taught in Islam- 
ic schools and of the Friday sermons given at all mosques. 

Religious Change 

Modernization and improved education levels brought changes 
in religious practice. The inflexible work schedules of industrial- 
ism, which tended to restrict communal ritual to evenings and Sun- 
days, and the lack of opportunity or inclination to devote years 
to mastering ceremonial and esoteric knowledge, both contribut- 
ed to a general tendency toward ritual simplification and abbrevi- 
ation. At the same time, prosperous citizens contributed large sums 
to building funds, and in the 1980s a wave of rebuilding and refur- 
bishing renewed the city's mosques, churches, Chinese temples, 
Buddhist monasteries, and Hindu temples. Ethnic affiliation was 
demonstrated by public participation in such annual rituals as 
processions, which did not require elaborate training or study. 

Immigrants tended to drop or modify religious and ritual prac- 
tices characteristic of and peculiar to the villages they had come 
from. Hindu temples founded in the nineteenth century to serve 
migrants of specific castes and to house deities worshipped only 
in small regions of southeastern India became the temples 
patronized by all Hindu residents of nearby apartment complex- 
es. They offered a generic South Indian Hinduism focused on major 
deities and festivals. Many Chinese became more self-consciously 
Buddhist or joined syncretic cults that promoted ethics and were 
far removed from the exorcism and sacrificial rituals of the villages 
of Fujian and Guangdong. The movement away from village prac- 
tices was most clearly seen and most articulated among the Ma- 
lays, where Islamic reformers acted to replace the customary practices 
(adat) of the various Malay- speaking societies of Java, Sumatra, and 
Malaya with the precepts of classical Islamic law — sharia. 

In 1988 the Ministry of Community Development reported the 
religious distribution to be 28.3 percent Buddhist, 18.7 percent 



108 



Buddhist temple 
Courtesy Ong Tien Kwan 



Christian, 17.6 percent no religion, 16 percent Islam, 13.4 per- 
cent Daoist, 4.9 percent Hindu, and 1.1 percent other religions 
(Sikhs, Parsis, Jews). The Christian proportion of the population 
nearly doubled between 1980 and 1988, growing from 10 percent 
to nearly 19 percent. The growth of Christianity and of those 
professing no religion was greatest in the Chinese community, with 
most of the Christian converts being young, well-educated people 
in secure white-collar and professional jobs. Most converts joined 
evangelical and charismatic Protestant churches worshiping in En- 
glish. About one-third of the members of Parliament were Chris- 
tians, as were many cabinet ministers and members of the ruling 
party, which was dominated by well-educated, English-speaking 
Chinese. The association of Christianity with elite social and po- 
litical status may have helped attract some converts. 

By the late 1980s, some Buddhist organizations were winning 
converts by following the Protestant churches in offering services, 
hymnbooks, and counseling in English and Mandarin. A Bud- 
dhist Society at the National University of Singapore offered lec- 
tures and social activities similar to those of the popular Christian 
Fellowship. Some Chinese secondary students chose Buddhism as 
their compulsory religious studies subject, regarding Confucian- 
ism as too distant and abstract and Bible study as too Western and 



109 



Singapore: A Country Study 

too difficult. They then were likely to join Buddhist organizations, 
which offered congenial groups, use of English, and a link with 
Asian cultural traditions. In the late 1980s, other Chinese white- 
collar and skilled workers were joining the Japan-based Soka Gakkai 
(Value Creation Society, an organization based on Nichiren Bud- 
dhism), which provided a simple, direct style of worship featuring 
chanting of a few texts and formulas and a wide range of social 
activities. The more successful religious groups, Christian and 
Buddhist, offered directly accessible religious practice with no 
elaborate ritual or difficult doctrine and a supportive social group. 

In the 1980s, the government regarded religion in general as a 
positive social force that could serve as a bulwark against the per- 
ceived threat of Westernization and the associated trends of exces- 
sive individualism and lack of discipline. It made religious education 
a compulsory subject in all secondary schools in the 1980s. The 
government, although secular, was concerned, however, with the 
social consequences of religiously motivated social action and there- 
fore monitored and sometimes prohibited the activities of religious 
groups. The authorities feared that religion could sometimes lead 
to social and implicitly political action or to contention between 
ethnic groups. Islamic fundamentalism, for example, was a very 
sensitive topic that was seldom publicly discussed. Throughout the 
1980s, the authorities were reported to have made unpublicized 
arrests and expulsions of Islamic activists. The government re- 
stricted the activities of some Christian groups, such as the Jehovah's 
Witnesses who opposed military service, and in 1987 the govern- 
ment detained a group of Roman Catholic social activists, accus- 
ing them of using church organizations as cover for a Marxist plot. 
The charismatic and fundamentalist Protestant groups, though 
generally apolitical and focused on individuals, aroused official anxi- 
ety through their drive for more converts. Authorities feared that 
Christian proselytization directed at the Malays would generate 
resentment, tensions, and possible communal conflict. As early as 
1974 the government had "advised" the Bible Society of Singa- 
pore to stop publishing materials in Malay. In late 1988 and early 
1989, a series of leaders, including Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 
condemned "insensitive evangelization" as a serious threat to ra- 
cial harmony. Official restatements of the virtue of and necessity 
for religious tolerance were mixed with threats of detention without 
trial for religious extremists. 

Health and Welfare 

Medical Services and Public Health 

As indicated by their long life expectancy and low death rates, 
Singaporeans generally enjoyed good health. Standards of nutrition 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



and environmental sanitation were high. The Ministry of the 
Environment's Vector Control and Research Department was 
responsible for controlling mosquitoes, flies, rats, and other disease- 
bearing animals; the Food Control Department and the Hawkers 
Department inspected food producers and outlets for cleanliness 
and sanitation. The Ministry of the Environment's Public Affairs 
Department conducted educational campaigns on such topics as 
environmental sanitation, control of mosquito-breeding sites, proper 
disposal of refuse, and food handling. Educational efforts were 
backed up by sanctions, which included fines of up to S$500 for 
spitting or failing to flush public toilets. 

The population was served by nine government hospitals with 
7,717 beds and by twelve private hospitals with 2,076 beds. In 1987 
the Ministry of Health certified 2,941 physicians, 9,129 nurses, 
653 dentists, and 487 pharmacists. Five of the nine government 
hospitals were general hospitals, providing a complete range of med- 
ical services and twenty-four hour emergency rooms, and the other 
four each had a specialty: obstetrics and gynecology, dermatology 
and venereology, psychiatry, or infectious diseases. In 1987 the 
Ministry of Health's Community Health Service operated twenty- 
four clinics in major housing complexes, offering primary medical 
treatment for injuries and common diseases. The Maternal and 
Child Health Service provided preventive health care for mothers 
and preschool children at twenty-three clinics, while school chil- 
dren were served by the School Health Service. 

Government hospitals and clinics charged fees for their services, 
although the fees were generally low and the medical services were 
heavily subsidized. The fees were intended to discourage frivolous 
use of the medical system and to demonstrate that residents were 
responsible for their own health costs, as Singapore was not a wel- 
fare state. After 1984 Singaporeans could pay for their medical ex- 
penses through the Medisave Scheme, under which 6 percent of 
the monthly income of every contributor to the Central Provident 
Fund could be set aside for the medical expenses of the contribu- 
tor and the contributor's spouse, parents, grandparents, and chil- 
dren in all government or private hospitals. 

Mortality and Morbidity 

The major causes of death in 1986 were heart disease, account- 
ing for 24 percent of all deaths; cancer, 23 percent; cerebrovascu- 
lar disease (stroke), 11 percent; and pneumonia, 8 percent. In 1988 
two minor outbreaks of dengue fever took place but were halted 
through prompt control of arthropod-borne microorganisms, and 
a minor cholera epidemic broke out among the inmates of a mental 



111 



Singapore: A Country Study 

institution. In 1982 the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared Singapore malaria-free, and 161 of the 165 cases of malaria 
reported in 1987 were determined to be imported. In 1987 the most 
serious epidemic disease was hepatitis; 752 cases of acute viral hepa- 
titis and 11 deaths were reported. Noise-induced deafness and 
industrial-related skin disease were the major occupational diseases; 
there was also some concern over exposure of workers to toxic and 
carcinogenic substances and to asbestos. The health authorities paid 
special attention to patients with kidney failure, a condition that 
killed some 200 people a year. The number of deaths reflected in- 
adequate dialysis facilities and a shortage of organ donors. The 
1987 Human Organ Transplant Law gave doctors the right to re- 
move the kidneys of those killed in accidents unless the victim had 
objected in writing or was a Muslim. 

AIDS Policy 

At the end of 1988, the Ministry of Health reported thirty-four 
cases of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) among Sin- 
gaporeans; four of these cases resulted in death. The first two cases 
were identified in 1985. Thereafter the incidence increased; five 
new cases were reported in December 1988 alone. In 1987 the 
Ministry of Health established an AIDS Task Force to inform health 
professionals of research on and treatment programs for the dis- 
ease. A National Advisory Committee, also formed in 1987, with 
representatives from the Ministry of Health, other ministries, the 
public media, hotels, and travel agencies concentrated on educat- 
ing the public about the disease. The Ministry of Health worked 
with WHO, adapting its information and strategies to local cir- 
cumstances. All blood donors were routinely screened for AIDS, 
and blood screening could be done at designated government clinics. 
In 1989 the Ministry of Health was sponsoring education programs 
on AIDS and offering confidential counseling to people worried 
that they might be infected. The ministry was trying to reach mem- 
bers of high-risk groups, but many of them refused counseling from 
fear of being identified and stigmatized. 

Education 

The School System 

The government frequently referred to Singapore's population 
as its only natural resource and described education in the vocabu- 
lary of resource development. The goal of the education system 
was to develop the talents of every individual so that each could 
contribute to the economy and to the ongoing struggle to make 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



Singapore productive and competitive in the international mar- 
ketplace. The result was an education system that stressed the as- 
sessment, tracking, and sorting of students into appropriate 
programs. Educators forthrighdy described some students and some 
categories of students as better "material" and of more value to 
the country than others. In the 1960s and 1970s the education sys- 
tem, burdened with large numbers of children resulting from the 
high birth rates of the previous decades and reflecting the customary 
practices of the British colonial period, produced a small number 
of highly trained university graduates and a much larger number 
of young people who had been selected out of the education sys- 
tems following secondary schooling by the rigorous application of 
standards. The latter entered the work force with no particular skills 
(see table 5, Appendix). Major reforms in 1979 produced an 
elaborate tracking system, intended to reduce the dropout rate and 
to see that those with low academic performance left school with 
some marketable skills. During the 1980s, more resources were put 
into vocational education and efforts were made to match the 
"products" of the school system with the manpower needs of in- 
dustry and commerce. The combination of a school system em- 
phasizing testing and tracking with the popular perception of 
education as the key to social mobility and to the source of the cer- 
tifications needed for desirable jobs led to high levels of competi- 
tion, parental pressure for achievement, and public attention and 
concern. 

In 1987 some 4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP — 
see Glossary) was devoted to education. The government's goal 
for the 1990s was to increase spending to 6 percent of GDP, which 
would match the levels of Japan and the United States. Educa- 
tion was not compulsory, but attendance was nearly universal. 
Primary education was free, and Malays received free education 
through university. Students' families had to purchase textbooks 
and school uniforms, but special funds were available to ensure 
that no student dropped out because of financial need. Secondary 
schools charged nominal fees of S$9.50 per month. Tuition at the 
National University of Singapore for the 1989-90 academic year 
ranged from S$2,600 per year for students in the undergraduate 
arts and social sciences, business administration, and law courses 
to S$7,200 per year for the medical course. The university-level 
tuitions were intended to induce prosperous families to bear a share 
of the cost of training that would lead to a well-paying job, but 
a system of loans, need-based awards (bursaries), and scholarships 
for superior academic performance meant that no able students 
were denied higher education because of inability to pay. 



113 



Singapore: A Country Study 



The schools operated a modified British-style system in which 
the main qualifications were the Cambridge University- 
administered General Common Entrance (GCE) Ordinary level 
(O level) and Advanced level (A level) examinations. Singapore 
secondary students took the same examinations as their counter- 
parts in Britain or in British system schools throughout the world. 
All instruction was in English, with supplementary teaching of the 
students' appropriate "mother tongue" — Malay, Tamil, or Man- 
darin. The basic structure was a six-year primary school, a four- 
year secondary school, and a two-year junior college for those 
preparing to enter higher education. As part of the effort to reduce 
the dropout rate, some students progressed through the system more 
slowly than others, spending more time in primary and secondary 
school but achieving similar standards. The goal was that every 
student achieve some success and leave school with some certifica- 
tion. Both primary and secondary schools operated on double ses- 
sions. Plans for the 1990s called for converting secondary schools 
to single- session, all-day schools, a measure that would require con- 
struction of fifty new schools. 

As of June 1987, there were 229 government and government- 
aided primary schools enrolling 266,501 students. Government- 
aided schools originally were private schools that, in return for 
government subsidies, taught the standard curriculum and em- 
ployed teachers assigned by the Ministry of Education. There were 
157 secondary schools and junior colleges, enrolling 201,125 stu- 
dents, and 18 vocational training schools, enrolling 27,000 students. 
The 15 junior colleges operating by late 1989 enrolled the "most 
promising" 25 percent of their age cohort and were equipped with 
computers, laboratories, and well-stocked libraries. Some represent- 
ed the elite private schools of the colonial period, with their an- 
cient names, traditions, and networks of active alumni, and others 
were founded only in the 1980s, often in the centers of the housing 
estates (see Land Management and Development, ch. 3). In 1989 
the government was discussing the possibility of permitting some 
of the junior colleges to revert to private status, in the interest of 
encouraging educational excellence and diversity. 

Singapore had six institutions of higher education: National Uni- 
versity of Singapore (the result of the 1980 merger of Singapore 
University and Nanyang University); Nanyang Technological In- 
stitute; Singapore Polytechnic Institute; Ngee Ann Polytechnic; 
the Institute of Education; and the College of Physical Education. 
In 1987 these six institutions enrolled 44,746 students, 62 percent 
male and 38 percent female. Enrollment in universities and col- 
leges increased from 15,000 in 1972 to nearly 45,000 in 1987, 



114 



Raffles Junior College chemistry laboratory 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 

tripling in fifteen years. The largest and most prestigious institu- 
tion was the National University of Singapore, enrolling 13,238 
undergraduates in 1987. Only half of those who applied to the Na- 
tional University were admitted, a degree of selectivity that in 1986 
brought parliamentary complaints that the admission rate was in- 
consistent with the government's objective of developing every 
citizen to the fullest potential. 

The Ministry of Education tried to coordinate enrollments in 
universities and polytechnic institutes and specific degree and di- 
ploma courses with estimates of national manpower requirements. 
At the university level, the majority of the students were enrolled 
in engineering, science, and vocationally oriented courses. The 
Ministry of Education and the government clearly preferred an 
education system that turned out people with vocational qualifica- 
tions to one producing large numbers of general liberal arts gradu- 
ates. The ministry attempted to persuade students and their parents 
that enrollment in the three polytechnic institutes, which offered 
diplomas rather than the more prestigious degrees (a common dis- 
tinction in the British system of higher education), was not neces- 
sarily a second choice. In promoting this choice, the ministry 
pointed to the good salaries and excellent career prospects of 



115 



Singapore: A Country Study 



polytechnic graduates who were employed by large multinational 
corporations. Similar arguments were used to persuade those who 
left secondary school with respectable O level scores to enroll in 
short courses at vocational and technical training institutes and to 
qualify for such positions as electronics technicians or word proces- 
sors that were beyond the capabilities of those who had been directed 
into vocational schools after the primary grades. Almost all of the 
graduates of the demanding four-year Honors Degree Liberal Arts 
and Social Science program at the National University of Singa- 
pore were recruited into the upper levels of the civil service. Many 
graduates of the ordinary three-year arts, social science, and science 
programs were steered into teaching in secondary schools. 

Education and Singaporean Identity 

More clearly than any other social institution, the school sys- 
tem expressed the distinctive vision of Singapore's leadership, with 
its stress on merit, competition, technology, and international stan- 
dards, and its rejection of special privileges for any group. Sin- 
gaporeans of all ethnic groups and classes came together in the 
schools, and the education system affected almost every family in 
significant and profound ways. Most of the domestic political is- 
sues of the country, such as the relations between ethnic groups, 
the competition for elite status, the plans for the future security 
of the nation and its people, and the distribution of scarce resources 
were reflected in the schools and in education policy. Many of the 
settled education policies of the 1980s, such as the use of English 
as the medium of instruction, the conversion of formerly Malay 
or Chinese or Anglican missionary schools to standard government 
schools, or the attempted combination of open access with strict 
examinations, were the result of long-standing political disputes 
and controversy. In the determination of families and parents that 
their children should succeed in school, and in the universally ac- 
knowledged ranking of primary and secondary schools and the 
struggle to enroll children in those schools that achieved the best 
examination results, families expressed their distinctive values and 
goals. The struggle for achievement in the schools, which often in- 
cluded tutoring by parents or enrollment of young children in special 
private supplementary schools to prepare for crucial examinations, 
also demonstrated the system of social stratification and the strug- 
gle for mobility that characterized the modern society. It was in 
the schools, more than in any other institution, that the abstract 
values of multiracialism and of Singaporean identity were given 
concrete form. 

* * * 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Information Division of the Ministry of Communications 
and Information produces useful and informative annual volumes 
and monthly journals, such as Singapore 1988, Singapore Facts and 
Pictures 1988, Mirror, and the Singapore Bulletin. The Department 
of Sociology of the National University of Singapore and the In- 
stitute of Southeast Asian Studies both publish social science and 
historical research on Singapore's society. Maurice Freedman's 
Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore and Judith Dj amour's Ma- 
lay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore, both based on field research 
conducted in 1949-50, provide a baseline for assessing subsequent 
social change. Cheng Lim-Keak's Social Change and the Chinese in 
Singapore analyzes the associations and economic organization of 
the Chinese-speaking community, a topic not covered in govern- 
ment reports. Janet W. Salaff s State and Family in Singapore, which 
concentrates on Chinese families, and Tania Li's Malays in Singa- 
pore both analyze family structure in the context of economic growth 
and modernization. Although somewhat dated, the essays in Sin- 
gapore: Society in Transition, edited by Riaz Hassan, provide a good 
introduction to major aspects of Singapore society. Some of the 
flavor of life in Singapore is conveyed in Tan Kok Seng's autobi- 
ographical Son of Singapore and in the fiction of Philip Jeyaretnam, 
such as First Loves and Raffles Place Ragtime. The Far Eastern Eco- 
nomic Review regularly covers events and trends in Singapore, some- 
times illuminating topics such as religious change that are not treated 
in official publications. (For further information and complete ci- 
tations, see Bibliography.) 



117 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Harbor workboats at mooring 



A FORMER COLONIAL TRADING PORT serving the region- 
al economies of maritime Southeast Asia, Singapore in the 1990s 
aspired to be a "global city" serving world markets and major multi- 
national corporations. A quarter century after independence in 
1965, the city-state had become a manufacturing center with one 
of the highest incomes in the region and a persistent labor short- 
age. As one of Asia's four "little dragons" or newly industrializ- 
ing economies (NIEs — see Glossary), Singapore along with the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea), Taiwan, and Hong Kong was 
characterized by an export-oriented economy, relatively equitable 
income distribution, trade surpluses with the United States and 
other developed countries, and a common heritage of Chinese civili- 
zation and Confucian values. The small island had no resources 
other than its strategic location and the skills of its nearly 2 . 7 mil- 
lion people. In 1988 it claimed a set of economic superlatives, in- 
cluding the world's busiest port, the world's highest rate of annual 
economic growth (11 percent), and the world's highest savings rate 
(42 percent of income). 

Singapore lived by international trade, as it had since its found- 
ing in 1819, and operated as a free port with free markets. Its small 
population and dependence on international markets meant that 
regional and world markets were larger than domestic markets, 
which presented both business managers and government policy- 
makers with distinctive economic challenges and opportunities. In 
1988 the value of Singapore's international trade was more than 
three times its gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary). The 
country's year-to-year economic performance fluctuated unpredic- 
tably with the cycles of world markets, which were beyond the con- 
trol or even the influence of Singapore's leaders. In periods of 
growing international trade, such as the 1970s, Singapore could 
reap great gains, but even relatively minor downturns in world trade 
could produce deep recession in the Singapore economy, as hap- 
pened in 1985-86. The country's dependence on and vulnera- 
bility to international markets shaped the economic strategies of 
Singapore's leaders. 

The economy in the 1980s rested on five major sectors: the regional 
entrepot trade; export-oriented manufacturing; petroleum refining 
and shipping; production of goods and services for the domestic econ- 
omy; and the provision of specialized services for the international 
market, such as banking and finance, telecommunications, and 



121 



Singapore: A Country Study 

tourism. The spectacular growth of manufacturing in the 1970s 
and 1980s had a major impact on the economy and the society, 
but tended to obscure what carried over from the economic struc- 
ture of the past. Singapore's economy always depended on inter- 
national trade and on the sale of services. An entrepot was essentially 
a provider of services such as wholesaling, warehousing, sorting 
and processing, credit, currency exchange, risk management, ship 
repair and provisioning, business information, and the adjudica- 
tion of commercial disputes. In this perspective, which focused on 
exchange and processing, the 1980s assembly of electronic com- 
ponents and manufacture of precision optical instruments were 
evolutionary steps from the nineteenth-century sorting and grad- 
ing of pepper and rubber. Both processes used the skills of Sin- 
gaporeans to add value to commodities that were produced 
elsewhere and destined for consumption outside the city-state. 

The dependence on external markets and suppliers pushed Sin- 
gapore toward economic openness, free trade, and free markets. 
In the 1980s, Singapore was a free port with only a few revenue 
tariffs and a small set of protective tariffs scheduled for abolition 
in the 1990s. It had no foreign exchange controls or domestic price 
controls. There were no controls on private enterprise or invest- 
ment, nor any limitations on profit remittance or repatriation of 
capital. Foreign corporations were welcome, foreign investment 
was solicited, and fully 70 percent of the investment in manufac- 
turing was foreign. The government provided foreign and domes- 
tic enterprises with a high-quality infrastructure, efficient and 
graft-free administration, and a sympathetic concern for the 
problems of businesses. 

The vulnerability inherent in heavy dependence on outside mar- 
kets impelled Singapore's leaders to buffer their country's response 
to perturbations in world markets and to take advantage of their 
country's ability to respond to changing economic conditions. Un- 
able to control so much that affected their nation's prosperity, they 
concentrated on those domestic institutions that could be controlled. 
The consequence was an economy characterized by a seemingly 
paradoxical adherence to free trade and free markets in combina- 
tion with a dominant government role in macroeconomic manage- 
ment and government control of major factors of production such 
as land, labor, and capital. The extraordinarily high domestic sav- 
ings rate provided reserves to weather such economic storms as 
trade recessions and generated a pool of domestically controlled 
capital that could be invested to serve the long-term interests of 
Singapore rather than of foreign corporations. The high savings 
rate, however, was the result of carefully formulated government 



122 




Singapore River in the mid-1960s 
Courtesy Daniel Regan 

I 



programs, which included a compulsory contribution of up to 25 
percent of all salaries to a government-controlled pension fund. The 
government held about 75 percent of the country's land, was the 
largest single employer, controlled the level of wages, and housed 
about 88 percent of the population in largely self-owned apartments. 
It also operated a set of wholly-owned government enterprises and 
held stock in additional domestic and foreign firms. Government 
leaders, deeply aware of Singapore's need to sell its services in a 
competitive international market, continually stressed the neces- 
sity for the citizens to master high levels of skills and to subordinate 
their personal wishes to the good of the community. The combi- 
nation of devotion to free-market principles and the need for in- 
ternal control and discipline in order to adapt to the demands of 
markets reminded observers of many family firms, and residents 
of the country commonly referred to it as Singapore Inc. 

Patterns of Development 

Modern Singapore, founded as a trading post of the British East 
India Company in 1819, achieved its initial economic success as 
an entrepot because of the island's location, harbor, and free port 
status (see Founding and Early Years, 1819-26, ch. 1). Although 



123 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Singapore at first served only as a center for trade and transship- 
ment, by the early twentieth century, primary goods, mainly rub- 
ber and tin from the neighboring Malay Peninsula, were being 
imported for processing. Singapore also became a regional center 
for the distribution of European manufactured goods. After World 
War I, when the British established a naval base on the island, 
Singapore became a key element of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations (see Glossary) military defense east of India, thus adding 
the naval support industry to the island's economy. 

In the period immediately after World War II, Singapore faced 
enormous problems, including labor and social unrest, a decay- 
ing, war-ravaged infrastructure, inadequate housing and commu- 
nity facilities, a slow economic growth rate, low wages, and high 
unemployment made worse by a rapidly expanding population (see 
Aftermath of War, 1945-55, ch. 1). As late as 1959, the unem- 
ployment rate was estimated at 13.5 percent. The struggle for sur- 
vival in the postwar period deeply affected the economic decision 
making of Singapore's first generation leaders. 

Mounting political pressure for independence from Britain cul- 
minated in 1963 in the merger of Malaya, Singapore, and the Brit- 
ish northern Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak into the new 
nation of Malaysia. A combination of political and ethnic differ- 
ences between Singapore and the national government, however, 
led in 1965 to Singapore's separation from Malaysia and estab- 
lishment as an independent nation. The economic prospects of the 
new city-state at first appeared bleak. Upon separation from Malay- 
sia, Singapore lost its economic hinterland and jeopardized its hopes 
for an enlarged domestic market to absorb the goods produced by 
a small but growing manufacturing sector. Moreover, Indonesia's 
policy of Confrontation (Konfrontasi — see Glossary) with Malay- 
sia between 1963 and 1966 had substantially reduced Singapore's 
entrepot trade (see Road to Independence, 1955-65, ch. 1). 

Britain's announcement in 1968 of its intention to withdraw mili- 
tary forces from Singapore by the early 1970s marked the begin- 
ning of a greatly expanded, more intrusive role for the government 
in the economy. From then on, the government no longer con- 
fined itself to such traditional economic pursuits as improving the 
infrastructure, but instead began to engage in activities that were 
or could have been the domain of private enterprise (see fig. 6). 
Britain's departure meant the loss, directly or indirectly, of 38,000 
jobs (20 percent of the work force) at a time of already rising un- 
employment and rapid population growth; a consequent reduction 
in the GDP; and an increase in Singapore's own budgetary defense 
allocation to compensate for the British withdrawal. Even so, the 



124 



The Economy 



S$l ,616 (for value of the Singapore dollar — see Glossary) per cap- 
ita income of Singapore in 1965 already was quite high by develop- 
ing country standards, an indication that subsequent high growth 
rates were not merely a result of beginning at a low base. 

The period from 1965 to 1973 witnessed unprecedented economic 
growth for the island nation, during which the average annual 
growth of real GDP was 12.7 percent. Major credit for this de- 
velopment must be given to the effective implementation of soundly 
conceived government policies, which from the outset took full ac- 
count of Singapore's strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, the 
time was right for structural change in the economy. Enough cap- 
ital had been accumulated to permit the domestic production of 
goods that were more capital intensive. The government's economic 
response to separation from Malaysia and the withdrawal of Brit- 
ish military forces included efforts to increase industrial growth and 
solve the domestic problems of unemployment, population growth, 
and housing. Growth was achieved because workers were added 
to the payroll and provided with better machinery with which to 
work. Even more remarkable, this growth was accomplished with 
an outstanding record of price stability. Inflation was kept low by 
the government's conservative fiscal policies, which included the 
maintenance of strict control over the money supply. 

Industrialization promised the most economic progress. The stra- 
tegic question was whether to rely principally on domestic en- 
trepreneurs or to make a conscious effort to attract foreign direct 
investment. The decision to encourage the latter resulted both in 
a large share of Singaporean manufacturing being foreign-owned 
and a high degree of export-led growth. Singapore's reliance on 
multinational corporations of the world to provide the necessary 
investment meant less dependence on the Southeast Asian region 
generally and neighboring countries particularly. 

The 1973 oil shock with the collapse of prices and the world- 
wide recession it triggered brought the end of the super growth 
period. Even so, Singapore's growth rate averaged 8.7 percent from 
1973 to 1979, which was high compared with other countries dur- 
ing that same period. Manufacturing continued to grow as did 
transportation and communications. Although the second world- 
wide oil crisis, beginning in 1979, set off the longest and deepest 
recession in the industrialized countries since the Great Depres- 
sion of the 1930s, Singapore was seemingly untouched. If anything, 
its economy grew in 1980-81 while the world economy was con- 
tracting. The real average GDP growth rate between 1979 and 1981 
was 8.5 percent. Financial and business services joined manufactur- 
ing as the major economic engines. During this period, Singapore's 



125 



Singapore: A Country Study 



FY 1988 Sources of Government Revenue 




Source: Based on information from "Country Watch: Singapore," Asian Finance, Hong Kong, 
15, No. 9, September 15, 1989, 83. 

Figure 6. Sources of Government Revenue, Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 

function as a petroleum- servicing entrepot made it more like an 
oil producer than an oil consumer. 

For the first two decades of its independence, Singapore enjoyed 
continuous high economic growth, largely outperforming the world 
economy. Its GDP growth rate never fell below 5 percent and rose 
as high as 15 percent. At the same time, Singapore managed to 
maintain an inflation rate below world averages. 

Given Singapore's dependence on the world economy, however, 
the consequences of declining foreign demand were inevitable. The 
1985 recession was the worst in the nation's history. Singapore stag- 
gered under a year of negative growth ( - 1.5 percent), then re- 
covered slightly in 1986 ( + 1.9 percent). The causes lay both out- 
side and within the country. Externally, worldwide slumps in 
petroleum-related and marine-related sectors were reflected in 
reduced demand for Singapore's goods and services and raised the 
specter of worldwide overcapacity in shipbuilding and ship- 
repairing. Furthermore, the slowdown in demand for semiconduc- 
tors and electronics in the United States sharply reduced demand 
for Singaporean components and parts. 

Internally, the construction boom — which had produced a glut 
of hotels, shopping centers, and apartments — began to be reversed. 



126 



The Economy 



Domestic demand also weakened as a result of a rise in domestic 
savings, which was not matched by a rise in productive domestic 
investment. The situation was complicated by a loss of interna- 
tional competitiveness and a profit squeeze attributed to labor costs 
rising faster than productivity. 

The government responded promptly and firmly by lowering 
employer contributions to the Central Provident Fund, freezing 
overall wage levels for 1986 and 1987, reducing corporate income 
taxes from 40 to 30 percent, reducing personal income taxes in line 
with corporate taxes, and introducing an across-the-board invest- 
ment allowance of 30 percent to encourage greater investment in 
equipment and machinery (see Forced Savings and Capital For- 
mation; Finance, this ch.). These measures were highly success- 
ful; costs dropped 30 percent and productivity climbed. By 1988 
Singapore's economy had rebounded. 

Economic Roles of the Government 
Budgeting and Planning 

Although Singapore billed itself as a free-enterprise economy, 
the economic role of government was pervasive. As governing body 
for both the nation and the city, the government was responsible 
for planning and budgeting for everything from international 
finance to trash collection. The government owned, controlled, 
regulated, or allocated land, labor, and capital resources. It set or 
influenced many of the prices on which private investors based 
business calculations and investment decisions. 

State intervention in the economy had a positive impact not only 
on private business profitability but also on the general welfare of 
the population. Beyond the jobs created in the private and public 
sectors, the government provided subsidized housing, education, 
and health and recreational services, as well as public transporta- 
tion. The government also managed the bulk of savings for retire- 
ment through the Central Provident Fund and Post Office Savings 
Bank. It also decided annual wage increments and set minimum 
fringe benefits in the public and private sectors. State responsibil- 
ity for workers' welfare won the government the support of the 
population, thus guaranteeing the political stability that encouraged 
private investment. In general, state intervention in the economy 
managed to be probusiness without being antilabor, at least regard- 
ing material welfare. 

Budgeting and taxation were frequently used for attaining economic 
goals. In the postrecession period, budgetary changes primarily bene- 
fited business. For example, the fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 



127 



Singapore: A Country Study 



FY 1988 Government Expenditures 




Social and 
Community 
Services 
32% 



Debt/ 
Servicing 
24% 




Recurrent 
Expenditure 



Development 

, Surplus Expenditure 

100% General 
Defense, Justice, /^"v^i^ Services 

ll 3 " flH ^Bk Services |\XA^^ra| Defense, 

W General H H 550/o taXX^j' " 



and Community Services 



Source: Based on information from "Country Watch: Singapore," Asian Finance, Hong 
Kong, 15, No. 9, September 15, 1989, 83; and Singapore, Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Economic Survey of Singapore, Second Quarter 1989, Singapore, 1989, 53. 

Figure 7. Government Expenditures, Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 

1988 budget included an overseas investment incentive program, 
administered by the Economic Development Board, allowing tax 
write-offs for losses from approved overseas investments (see fig. 
7). Other concessions such as suspension of taxes on utilities and 
a 50 percent rebate on property taxes were in effect between 1985 
and 1988 to counteract the economic slump. 

Budgeting and taxation also were often used to achieve or rein- 
force social goals such as population control. Until 1984 the govern- 
ment encouraged limiting of families to two children by levying 
higher medical and education costs for additional children. In 1986, 
however, tax rebates were introduced to encourage college-educated 
women to have third and fourth children. 

Economic Boards 

Under the appropriate government ministries, statutory boards — a 
concept carried over from colonial days — were established to manage 
specific parts of the economy and foster overall and sectoral develop- 
ment. Each worked somewhat autonomously, using a hands-on ap- 
proach to the problems in the areas in which it operated. 



128 



The Economy 



Economic Development Board 

The Economic Development Board was established in 1961 to 
spearhead Singapore's industrialization. Initially its function was 
to promote industrial investment, develop and manage industrial 
estates, and provide medium- and long-term industrial financing. 
The latter function was taken over in 1968 by the newly created 
Development Bank of Singapore (see Financial Center Develop- 
ment, this ch.). When the limits of import substitution became evi- 
dent, given the small domestic market, policy was redirected toward 
promoting an export-oriented, labor-intensive industrialization pro- 
gram. After 1986 the board's portfolio was enlarged to include the 
promotion of services in partnership with other government agen- 
cies responsible for the various service sectors and the development 
of local small- and medium-sized enterprises. In the first two de- 
cades following independence, the board evolved industrial strate- 
gies in response to changes in the international and domestic 
business environments, and negotiated the public-private consen- 
sus necessary for implementing them. The board was not an eco- 
nomic czardom but, rather, a consensus maker among agencies 
and corporations that commanded larger financing. In 1989 the 
Economic Development Board focused its attention on attracting 
investments in manufacturing and other high value-added ser- 
vices, which met the technological skills and employment needs 
of Singapore's future economic development. 

Small Enterprise Bureau 

The Small Enterprise Bureau was established in 1986, following 
the economic slump, when the government realized the importance 
of developing and upgrading local small- and medium-sized enter- 
prises. The bureau worked closely with the Economic Development 
Board and managed a number of assistance programs, some of which 
predated the bureau. Emphasis was placed on helping local firms 
to improve and modernize their plants and technology, product de- 
sign, management skills, and marketing capabilities. Launched in 
1976, the Small Industry Finance Scheme provided low-cost financ- 
ing to local small- and medium- sized enterprises in manufacturing 
and related support services. In 1985 this program was extended 
to the nonmanufacturing sector, and in 1987 some 1,125 loans 
amounting to S$297 million were approved by the Economic De- 
velopment Board under the plan. The Small Industry Technical As- 
sistance Scheme, introduced in 1982, provided grants to defray part 
of the cost of engaging short-term consultants and increasing or 
establishing in-service training for employees. 



129 



Singapore: A Country Study 

National Productivity Board 

The National Productivity Board was established in 1972 to im- 
prove productivity in all sectors of the economy. Increasing in- 
dividual and company productivity at all levels was a government 
priority, given Singapore's full employment picture and relatively 
high wages. Greater worker productivity than the country's neigh- 
bors and competitors was viewed by the government as a necessi- 
ty as well as one of Singapore's major advantages. 

The National Productivity Board followed a "total produc- 
tivity" approach, which emphasized productivity measurement, 
product quality, a flexible wage system, worker training, and as- 
sistance to small- and medium-sized enterprises. In order to pro- 
mote productivity in both the public and private sectors, the board 
used mass media publicity, seminars, conventions, and publica- 
tions to remind Singaporeans that productivity must be a perma- 
nent pillar of the economy. The board sponsored a productivity 
campaign each year with such slogans as the one for 1988, "Train 
Up— Be the Best You Can Be." 

The National Productivity Board offered management guidance 
services to small- and medium-sized enterprises to assist them in 
improving their productivity and efficiency, as well as referring 
companies to private management consultancy services available 
in Singapore. Beginning in the early 1980s, the board also spear- 
headed campaigns to introduce productivity management tech- 
niques used extensively by Japanese business and industry, such 
as quality control circles. 

Trade Development Board 

Changes in world trade patterns and in what the government 
viewed as an increasingly protectionist international trade environ- 
ment prompted the establishment of the Trade Development Board 
in 1983 as a national trade promotion agency. Based on the recom- 
mendations of specialists, the board formulated policies reflecting 
the needs of traders in general, as well as the specific needs of par- 
ticular trade sectors. Initial areas of focus were trade facilitation 
of electronics, printing and publishing, textiles, and timber 
products. The Trade Development Board reviewed existing mar- 
keting policies, strategies, and techniques and explored new op- 
portunities in both traditional and nontraditional markets. The 
board assisted both local and foreign companies interested in us- 
ing Singapore as a base for such trading activities as warehous- 
ing and distribution. The Trade Development Board also helped 



130 



The Economy 



Singapore companies market their products by assisting them in 
improving their product designs. 

Land Management and Development 

One of the government's most important roles was the oversight 
of land use and development. This was a particularly critical issue 
given the country's minute size and dense population; a total land 
area of 636 square kilometers and a population density of 4,166 
per square kilometer made Singapore one of the most densely popu- 
lated countries in the world (see Population, ch. 2). As pressure 
for economic growth increased, optimization of land use became 
more critical. 

Housing and Development Board 

Central to the issue of land management was another statutory 
board, the Housing and Development Board, established in 1960. 
Between 1960 and 1985, the government-owned board completed 
more than 500,000 high-rise, high-density public housing apart- 
ments — known as housing estates — along with their related facili- 
ties. By comparison, the British colonial government's Singapore 
Improvement Trust had completed only 23,000 apartments in its 
thirty-two years of existence (1927-59). From 1974 to 1982, the 
Housing and Development Board built and marketed middle- 
income apartments, an activity that became a function of the board 
after 1982. 

By 1988 the Housing and Development Board was providing 
housing and related facilities for 88 percent of Singaporeans, or 
some 2.3 million people — a feat that has been called urban Singa- 
pore's equivalent of "land reform." Government encouragement 
of apartment ownership was both an economic and a "nation build- 
ing" goal because individual ownership would ultimately pay for 
the program while giving citizens a "stake in Singapore." The 
board also provided estate management services and played an ac- 
tive role in promoting the advancement of construction technolo- 
gy. As one of the country's major domestic industries, housing 
construction served as an important economic pump primer. 

Home owners were encouraged to use their Central Provident 
Fund savings to pay for the apartments. The factors determining 
the selling prices of apartments included location, construction cost, 
ability of the applicants to pay, and the practical limits to govern- 
ment subsidies. Resettlement policies aimed at equitable payments, 
minimal readjustment, and real improvement in housing condi- 
tions. In social terms, attention was paid to providing an environ- 
ment conducive to community living, integrating the population, 



131 



Singapore: A Country Study 

preserving the traditional Asian family structure, and encourag- 
ing upward social mobility by providing opportunities for home 
upgrading. 

Starting with a capital expenditure of S$10 million in 1960, the 
Housing and Development Board's annual capital expenditures rose 
to about S$4 billion by 1985. The board's capital budget, with funds 
obtained in the form of low-interest government loans, represent- 
ed 40 percent of the government's capital budget. Selling prices, 
rent rates, and maintenance charges were determined by the 
government, and the board received an annual subsidy of 1 to 2 
percent of the government's main operating expenditure. 

Urban Renewal Authority 

In 1974 the Housing and Development Board's Urban Renew- 
al Department was made a statutory board and named the Urban 
Renewal Authority. Responsible for slum clearance and compre- 
hensive development of the city's Central Area, the authority was 
to plan, guide, and implement urban renewal. The Urban Renewal 
Authority drew up long-term land-use plans, which it implement- 
ed through its own development projects as well as the Sale of Sites 
Programme. The latter, a key instrument in the government's com- 
prehensive redevelopment plans, represented a partnership between 
the public and private sectors. The public sector provided initia- 
tive, expertise, and infrastructural services; the private sector con- 
tributed financial resources and entrepreneurship to facilitate the 
completion of projects. Between 1967 and 1983, some 166 parcels 
of land were turned into 143 projects for residential, office, shop- 
ping, hotel, entertainment, and industrial developments. 

Jurong Town Corporation 

The primary responsibility for acquiring, developing, and 
managing industrial sites, however, belonged to the Jurong Town 
Corporation, established in 1968. The corporation provided 
manufacturers with their choice of industrial land sites on which 
to build their own factories or ready-built factories for the immediate 
start-up of manufacturing operations. In the 1950s, when the idea 
of establishing an industrial estate was first conceived, Jurong was 
an area of dense tropical forests and mangrove swamps on the south- 
western quadrant of the island, and it was not until 1960 that the 
government decided to undertake the project. During the first few 
years, entrepreneurial response was disappointing, but after in- 
dependence the pace of development accelerated. By 1989 Jurong 
had quadrupled its original size, and the corporation also managed 



132 



The Economy 



twenty- three other industrial estates, including the Singapore 
Science Park, a research and development park adjacent to the Na- 
tional University of Singapore. Although the emphasis in the 1970s 
had been on the development of labor-intensive industries, in the 
1980s priority was given to upgrading facilities to make them more 
attractive for the establishment of high value-added and high tech- 
nology industries. 

The industrial estates were designed to be self-contained urban 
centers and included such facilities as golf courses, banks, shop- 
ping centers, restaurants, child-care centers, and parks. As of 1988, 
they contained some 3,600 factories employing a total of 216,000 
workers. The Jurong Town Corporation also provided infrastruc- 
ture and support facilities, including the Jurong Industrial Port, 
which was the country's main bulk cargo gateway, and the Jurong 
Marine Base, which serviced offshore petroleum operations. 

The Jurong Town Corporation shared responsibility for coastal 
planning and development control with the Housing and Develop- 
ment Board, the Urban Renewal Authority, and the Port of Sin- 
gapore Authority. The coastal zone, dominated by its entrepot 
facilities, was the traditional foundation on which Singapore's econ- 
omy was built. Between 1965 and 1987, the coastal zone was en- 
larged by about fifty square kilometers through reclamation of tidal 
flats, shallow lagoons, and wetlands. The two largest landfill oper- 
ations were the East and the West Coast Reclamation schemes ad- 
joining the Central Business District. The former was the Housing 
and Development Board's largest project, in which a "sea city" 
almost the size of the present-day downtown area had been de- 
veloped by both the private and public sector. Experts estimated 
that in the 1980s Singapore, including the offshore islands, had 
the potential of increasing its existing land resources by about 10 
percent. 

Forced Savings and Capital Formation 

Singapore's much- vaunted savings rate — and much of the fund- 
ing for development, particularly public housing — resulted in large 
measure from mandatory contributions to the Central Provident 
Fund, as well as voluntary deposits in the Post Office Savings Bank. 
The Central Provident Fund was set up in 1955 as a compulsory 
national social security savings plan to ensure the financial securi- 
ty of all workers either retired or no longer able to work. Both work- 
er and employer contributed to the employee's account with the 
fund. The rate of contribution, which had gradually risen to 50 
percent of the employee's gross wage (coming equally from em- 
ployer and employee), was lowered to 35 percent in 1986. In 1987 



133 



Singapore: A Country Study 

new long-term contribution rates were set calling for 40 percent 
for employees below fifty-five years of age, 25 percent for those 
fifty-five to fifty-nine, 15 percent for those sixty to sixty-four, and 
10 percent for those over sixty-five, with equal contributions com- 
ing from employee and employer. A series of transition rates lead- 
ing to the new long-term rates were first applied in 1988. The 
contributions were tax-exempt and subject to maximum limits based 
on a salary ceiling. Beginning in 1986, the government paid a 
market-based interest rate on Central Provident Fund savings (3.19 
percent per year in June 1988). 

Every employed Singaporean or permanent resident was auto- 
matically a member of the Central Provident Fund, although some 
self-employed people were not. Membership grew from 180,000 
in 1955 to 2.08 million in 1989. At the end of 1988, the 2.06 mil- 
lion members of the fund had S$32.5 billion to their credit. That 
same year, a total of S$2,776 million was withdrawn to purchase 
residential properties; S$9.8 million was paid under the Home Pro- 
tection Insurance Scheme; S$l ,059 million was paid under the Ap- 
proved Investments Scheme; and S$13.7 million was withdrawn 
for the purchase of nonresidential properties. 

Each member actually held three accounts with the Central Provi- 
dent Fund: Ordinary, Special, and, since the mid-1980s, Medi- 
save Accounts. The first two were primarily for old age and 
contingencies such as permanent disability. The Ordinary Account, 
in addition, could be used at any time to buy residential proper- 
ties, under various Housing and Development Board programs, 
and for home protection and dependents' protection insurance. Two 
further programs were established in 1987: a Minimum Sum 
Scheme, which established a base amount to be retained in the ac- 
count against retirement, and a Topping-up Extension under which, 
as well as adding to their own, members could demonstrate "filial 
piety" by adding to their parents' accounts. Since the late 1980s, 
members could use their accounts to buy approved shares, loan 
stocks, unit trusts, and gold for investment. Part of the rationale 
for the latter was to allow Singaporeans to diversify their savings 
and to gain experience in financial decision making. 

Although comparable to social security programs in some 
Western countries, the Central Provident Fund's concept and ad- 
ministration differed. Rather than having the younger generation 
pay in while the older generation withdrew, whatever was put into 
the Central Provident Fund by or for a member was guaranteed 
returnable to that person with interest. 

Thus, at the individual level, Central Provident Fund savings 
promoted personal and familial self-reliance and financial protection, 



134 



The Economy 



an economic attitude constantly encouraged by government lead- 
ers. Collectively, the Central Provident Fund savings assured the 
government of an enormous, relatively cheap "piggy bank" for 
funding public-sector development; the savings also served as a 
mechanism for curtailing private consumption, thereby limiting 
inflation. The result, according to some critics, was that the city- 
state had become overendowed with buildings, with too few pro- 
ductive businesses to put in them. They also noted that the bloated 
size of the Central Provident Fund (S$32.5 billion in 1988, equiva- 
lent to 82 percent of the GDP) was the most important factor be- 
hind the unwieldiness of public savings. Some analysts advised that 
the fund was beginning to outlive its usefulness and should be dis- 
mantled and replaced by private pension funds and health insur- 
ance plans. As a result, they stated, savings would be channeled 
to private businessmen rather than to bureaucrats. 

State-Owned Enterprises 

Over time, the statutory boards not only became major actors 
in the economy but also formed subsidiary companies to add flex- 
ibility to their own operations. For example, in 1986 the Singa- 
pore Broadcasting Corporation formed a subsidiary to produce 
commercials on a fee-for-service basis. The government entered 
other areas of the economy that it considered appropriate, exert- 
ing leadership, assuming risk, and not hesitating to withdraw its 
support or close down unprofitable companies. 

Numerous state and quasi-state companies were created either 
directly by ministries or, more often, organized under three whol- 
ly owned government holding companies (Temasek Holdings 
(Private) Limited, MND Holdings, and Sheng-Li Holding Com- 
pany), which provided a wide range of goods and services. Joint 
ventures between the government and both domestic and foreign 
partners produced several industrial products, including steel and 
refined sugar. In addition, the National Trades Union Congress 
(NTUC), which was closely tied to the government, ran many 
cooperative businesses, including supermarkets, taxis, and a trav- 
el agency. 

Although these companies collectively contributed significant- 
ly to the growth of the economy, neither their total amount of 
profits nor their rate of return on investment could be document- 
ed. In 1983 some 450 such companies, excluding subsidiaries of 
the statutory boards, employed 58,000 workers, or 5 percent of 
the labor force. In 1986 there were approximately 500 such com- 
panies still active. These different institutional forms permitted ver- 
satility. 



135 



Singapore: A Country Study 
Public Utilities 

The Public Utilities Board, established in May 1963, was respon- 
sible for providing the country's utility services. At the turn of a 
faucet, potable water was available throughout the country. All parts 
of the main island and several offshore islands were supplied with 
electricity. About one in three households used piped gas. 

In its early years, Singapore depended on wells for its water sup- 
ply. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, wells were inade- 
quate to supply the needs of a booming seaport and the ships that 
called there, and a series of reservoir and waterworks projects were 
undertaken. By the late 1980s, the water supply system consisted 
of eighteen raw water reservoirs, twelve service reservoirs, eleven 
waterworks, and about 4,000 kilometers of pipeline. Although some 
water came from rainfall trapped in catchment basins, much of 
the country's supply was imported from Malaysia and piped into 
the reservoir system. Consequently, water was a precious resource, 
and domestic and commercial consumers were constantly advised 
to use it efficiently. 

Electricity was made available to the public for the first time in 
1906. It was purchased from Singapore Tramway Company and 
distributed to consumers in the main town areas. The demand es- 
calated from 39,613 kilowatt-hours in 1906 to about 13 billion 
kilowatt-hours in 1988. The first power station, commissioned in 
1926, had a generating capacity of two megawatts. In 1988 elec- 
tricity was generated at four power stations with a total installed 
generating capacity of 3,371 megawatts. From these stations, 
electricity was distributed to consumers through more than 4,900 
substations and a network of more than 23,000 kilometers of main 
cables. To meet the increasing demand, a second stage was required 
for the Pulau Seraya Power Station, the first power station to 
be sited on an offshore island. Its Stage II, having a generating 
capacity of 750 megawatts, was scheduled to have its first 250- 
megawatt generating unit operational in early 1992 and to be 
completed in 1993. Because all fuel oil used for electricity gen- 
eration had to be imported, energy conservation was encouraged. 

The first gasworks started in Kallang in 1862 using coal as feed- 
stock. In the late 1980s, gas was manufactured from naphtha, 
a pollution-free fuel, by six gas-making plants at the Kallang 
Gasworks. To meet the increasing demand, a S$4.3 million plant 
was scheduled for completion in 1989 to replace an older, smaller 
plant. Gas was piped to consumers through about 1,800 kilome- 
ters of gas main extending over major areas of Singapore. Of the 
total gas production in 1988 of 681 million units, about 46 percent 



136 



Singapore coffee plantation, late nineteenth century 
Courtesy Library of Congress 



of gas sales went for domestic and 54 percent for commercial con- 
sumption. 

Policies for the Future 

Although the Singapore government took a long-range economic 
view, it steadfastly refused to draft five-year economic plans of fixed 
targets and objectives. Rather, its leaders preferred the freedom 
to change and adapt — coping with unforeseen crises or reacting 
to sudden global opportunities — a system that worked more often 
than it failed. As needed, detailed plans were formulated, policies 
reorganized, and programs implemented. According to the 1986 
Report of the Economic Committee, however, economic planning 
for the 1990s and beyond would require new strategies. Certain 
fundamental goals, including "good government, efficient in- 
frastructure, education, free enterprise, and flexibility," would 
remain, but long-term competitiveness would depend on new ini- 
tiatives. As a result of the report, Singapore announced plans to 
become an "international total business center for manufacturing 
and services" and a major exporter of services, focused on infor- 
mation technology (see Information Technology, this ch.). 



137 



Singapore: A Country Study 

To lay further groundwork for the next century, the National 
Productivity Board in 1989 instituted Productivity 2000, a plan 
for adjusting management styles and work attitudes to deal with 
a variety of factors expected to exert pressure on the economy 
in the coming decades. These anticipated factors included slower 
economic growth resulting from stiffening trade barriers and in- 
creasing world competition for foreign investors and markets, slower 
productivity growth and pressure to tie wage increases to pro- 
ductivity increases, the need to increase capital investments for 
technology and machinery, the changing labor force profile, and 
increased standards of living resulting in higher expectations for 
improvement in the quality of work-life (see Manpower and Labor, 
this ch.). 

In planning for the economic future, the government placed the 
ultimate burden for continued sacrifice on all Singaporeans: "It 
is true," an article published in the national magazine Mirror in 
1988 informed citizens, "that in the past few decades we have all 
been too easy in choosing the soft options. We gave in to demands 
without insisting on responsibilities... specifically responsibilities 
of productivity. This is true both domestically and international- 
ly. It is not possible anymore." 

Privatization 

Privatization was the long-term government policy that ultimately 
could have the most effect on the structure of the economy and 
the lives of Singaporeans. At one level, privatization represented 
the government's decision, articulated in the 1986 Report of the 
Economic Committee, that the economy had sufficiently matured 
for the private sector to become the primary engine. Since 
government-owned enterprises had "been successful in their respec- 
tive areas of endeavor and should continue to be so," the govern- 
ment no longer needed to continue running them. In 1987 a 
government-appointed committee, the Private Sector Investment 
Committee, issued a report recommending the sale of shares in 
41 of the approximately 500 state-backed firms, ranging from Sin- 
gapore Airlines (SIA) to the national lottery, while retaining more 
than half the value of the share. SIA shares subsequently went pub- 
lic, although the government retained control. Sale of four statu- 
tory boards, including the telecommunications monopoly, was also 
recommended in the proposed ten-year divestment plan. 

At another level, privatization meant that, over time, Singapore 
intended to divest itself of the loss-making functions of government — 
chiefly the responsibility for subsidizing housing and health care — 
the burden of which would increasingly be shifted to private 



138 



The Economy 



employers and the workers themselves. Examples of the likely trend 
were the addition of Medisave and the topping-up plans to the Cen- 
tral Provident Fund package. The government was increasingly 
unable, given escalating costs, to provide subsidized social ser- 
vices to match the ever-rising demands and expectations of the 
population. The result might be called a shift from ' 'state wel- 
farism" to "company welfarism." 

Singapore's younger leaders seemed particularly in favor of 
privatization. Although they approved of the near-monopoly on 
political life maintained by the People's Action Party (PAP), they 
expressed fear that Singaporeans were growing far too dependent 
on the government and expected it to solve their problems. 

Through privatization the state was changing its role from that 
of direct provider of social and business amenities to that of direc- 
tor and overseer of a much wider range of private, social, and 
business institutions. The strategy was not without problems, 
however. One of the most difficult questions was what effect privati- 
zation would have on the management of the divested companies 
and on the statutory boards. Since the government had absorbed 
the "best and brightest" into the civil service, there was a critical 
shortage of private- sector top-level entrepreneurial talent. More- 
over, even if the plan were carried out fully, the government would 
still maintain control in many areas of industry and services be- 
cause more than half the value of shares of state firms would re- 
main under government control, a partial divestment at best. 

Economist Linda Y.C. Lim had suggested in 1983 that, despite 
the success of its state development policies, the government it- 
self had succumbed to the free-market ideology and believed that 
its so-called Second Industrial Revolution in the mid-1970s — 
upgrading technology and moving upmarket — required dismantling 
much of the state apparatus rather than divesting itself of its profit- 
making functions. She also warned that the shift would likely also 
mean more interference by the government in companies' inter- 
nal production and employment decisions. The new policy, Lim 
contended, could also inhibit rather than enhance free-market ad- 
justments in the labor market: labor and management would be 
locked into benefits derived from a particular company, which in 
turn could adversely affect productivity. Singapore's spectacular 
economic success, Lim asserted, was the result more of state in- 
tervention than of the free market. "Privatization — the reduction 
of the state's responsibility for social welfare — will further limit free 
market adjustments and personal freedoms, and possibly pose a 
threat to continued economic success while undermining the govern- 
ment 's political support on which both political stability and labor 



139 



Singapore: A Country Study 

peace — the strongest investment attractions of Singapore — were 
based." 

Economist Lawrence B. Krause suggested in 1987 that Singa- 
pore needed less government control of the economy, which could 
come about through the government's restraining itself from ab- 
sorbing new investment opportunities and encouraging local pri- 
vate entrepreneurs to undertake the new investing. In time, this 
would likely produce a more vibrant economy. 

Manpower and Labor 

Singaporeans themselves were universally viewed as the nation's 
best natural resource. In 1989, however, the work force was a 
shrinking resource (see table 6, Appendix). The high rate of eco- 
nomic growth combined with an increasing number of Singaporeans 
over the retirement age of fifty-five (nearly 12 percent) and a lower- 
than-replacement birth rate had resulted in a significant labor short- 
age. By the end of the century, the labor market was projected to 
be even tighter. According to the Ministry of Health, the fifteen 
to twenty-nine age- group would decline 25 percent, from 816,000 
in 1985 to 619,000 in the year 2000. 

In 1987 and 1988, slightly more than six Singaporeans out of 
ten were working or looking for work. Men's rate of participation, 
79 percent, remained steady. Women, however, responding to job 
opportunities in the manufacturing and commercial sectors, were 
increasingly entering the labor market (48 percent in 1988, up from 
47 percent in 1987, 40 percent in 1978, and 24.6 percent in 1970). 
Job-switching was rampant, particularly in manufacturing, where 
a 1 988 survey showed that three out of four new workers quit with- 
in the month they were hired. Higher wage and input costs, as 
well as job-switching, resulted in a decline in the growth of manufac- 
turing productivity (2.4 percent in 1988 compared with 3.7 per- 
cent in 1987 and 13.6 in 1986). The labor market, then, was at 
the center of challenges facing the Singaporean economy. The na- 
ture of the concern about the labor market had been almost totally 
reversed since independence. The early 1960s were a time of labor 
unrest, and unemployment was still about 10 percent by 1965. By 
the late 1960s, however, there was substantial industrial peace, 
which had continued through the 1970s and 1980s. With unem- 
ployment at a very manageable 3.3 percent in 1988, the govern- 
ment's attention was focused on other aspects of the labor market. 

Industrial Relations and Labor Unions 

Industrial relations in Singapore reflected the symbiotic relation- 
ship between the labor movement and the dominant political party, 



140 



The Economy 



the People's Action Party (PAP), a relationship rooted in a po- 
litical history of confrontation that evolved into consensus build- 
ing. Trade unions were a principal instrument in the anticolonial 
struggle used by both the democratic socialist PAP and the com- 
munists with whom they cooperated uneasily. In 1961 the Singa- 
pore Trade Union Congress split into the left-wing Singapore 
Association of Trade Unions (SATU) and the noncommunist 
National Trades Union Congress (NTUC). The NTUC quickly 
became the leading trade union organization, largely because of 
its effectiveness and government support. Moreover, in 1963, when 
SATU led a general strike against the government, the pro- 
communist trade organization was banned and many of its lead- 
ers were arrested. 

Strong personal ties between leaders of the PAP and the NTUC 
formed the background of the symbiotic relationship, which was 
institutionalized by formal links. In 1980 NTUC Secretary General 
Ong Teng Cheong was made a minister- without-portfolio, and a 
NTUC-PAP Liaison Committee comprising top leaders of both 
organizations was established. As the "second generation" politi- 
cal leaders assumed more government leadership following the 1984 
election, Ong was named second deputy prime minister. Follow- 
ing the September 1988 general elections, the NTUC reaffirmed 
its close relationship with the PAP by expelling officers of NTUC- 
affiliated unions who had run for Parliament on opposition tickets. 
The NTUC and the PAP shared the same ideology, according to 
NTUC officials, so that active support of the opposition was in- 
consistent with membership in NTUC -related institutions. Work- 
ers who did not support the PAP were advised to form their own 
unions. 

The legal-institutional framework also exerted control over labor 
conditions. In mid- 1968, in an attempt to woo private foreign in- 
vestment, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew successfully pushed 
through Parliament a new employment bill and amendments to 
the 1960 Industrial Relations Act. In order to make factors such 
as working hours, conditions of service, and fringe benefits predic- 
table, and thus make businesses sufficiendy attractive for inves- 
tors, trade unions were barred from negotiating such matters as 
promotion, transfer, employment, dismissal, retrenchment, and 
reinstatement, issues that accounted for most earlier labor disputes. 
To spread work and help alleviate the effects of unemployment, 
overtime was limited and the compulsory retirement age was set 
at fifty-five. Lee's actions, which the militant unions opposed but 
could do little about, were part of the government's efforts to cre- 
ate in Singapore the conditions and laissez-faire atmosphere that 



141 



Singapore: A Country Study 

had enabled Hong Kong to prosper. Such measures, in the govern- 
ment's view, were necessary to draw business to the port. Lee 
stressed survival, saying: "No one owes Singapore a living." 

Rapid economic growth in the late 1960s and early 1970s reduced 
unemployment and resulted in the amendment of these laws. A 
National Wages Council was formed in 1972 and many of its recom- 
mendations adopted (see Wage Policies, this ch.). By 1984 a twelve- 
hour shift was permitted. In order to enlarge the limited labor pool, 
in 1988 changes were introduced in Central Provident Fund poli- 
cies reducing payment rates for those over fifty-five, thereby encour- 
aging employers to raise the retirement age to sixty. The discipline 
imposed on, and expected of, the labor force was accompanied by 
provisions for workers' welfare. The Industrial Arbitration Court 
existed to settle disputes through conciliation and arbitration. The 
court, established in 1960, played a major role in settling labor- 
management disputes through binding decisions based on formal 
hearings and through mediating voluntary agreements. Adjudi- 
cation of disputes between employers and nonunion workers came 
under the separate jurisdiction of the Labour Court. To help job 
seekers, the government maintained a free employment service serv- 
ing both job seekers and employers. A comprehensive code gov- 
erned the safety and health of workers and provided a system of 
workers' compensation. Under the Ministry of Labour, the Fac- 
tory Inspectorate enforced these provisions in factories, where more 
than 35 percent of Singapore's workers were employed in 1988. 

The trade unions' role and structure also had been modified. 
In the 1970s, the NTUC began establishing cooperatives in order 
to promote the welfare of its members. In the 1980s, omnibus 
unions were split along industry lines and further split into house 
unions to facilitate better labor-management relations and promote 
company loyalty. In the 1982 Amendment to the Trade Union Act, 
the role of trade unions was defined as promoting good industrial 
relations between workers and employers; improving working con- 
ditions; and improving productivity for the mutual benefit of work- 
ers, employers, and the country. 

Union membership declined steadily beginning in the late 1970s. 
In 1988 there were some 83 registered unions, with about 1,000 
branch locals, representing one-quarter of the organizable work 
force. This number was down from ninety unions in 1977. Increas- 
ing emphasis on developing white-collar, capital-intensive, and 
service-oriented industries was partly responsible for the union 
membership decline. The unions were countering the decline by 
offering attractive packages to bring in new members. 



142 



The Economy 



Wage Policies 

Following the rapid economic growth of the late 1 960s and ear- 
ly 1970s, signs of a tight labor market emerged along with a con- 
cern that wages might escalate. In response, the government in 
1972 established the National Wages Council, a tripartite forum 
with representation from the employers' federations, trade unions, 
and the government. As a government advisory body, the council 
recommended annual wage increases for the entire economy; en- 
sured orderly wage development so as to promote economic and 
social progress; and assisted in the development of incentive schemes 
to improve national productivity. 

The wage guidelines were not mandatory but were followed by 
the public sector (by far the largest employer) and widely implement- 
ed in the private sector. The influence of these recommendations 
generally was not applicable to private-sector professional and mana- 
gerial workers, whose wages were determined more by international 
forces, but was more important for non-professional white-collar 
workers. For blue-collar workers, who constituted about 40 percent 
of the labor force in both the public and private sector, union in- 
fluence was more crucial than the National Wages Council's recom- 
mendations, but market forces were even more important. 

Between 1973 and 1979, actual wage increases followed the council 
recommended wage increases closely. In 1979 the "wage correc- 
tion policy," in which there were three years of high- wage recom- 
mendations, was designed to force an increase of the productivity 
of higher value-added operations, to reduce the reliance on cheap 
unskilled foreign labor, and to rise labor productivity. From 1980 
to 1984, however, actual wage increases exceeded the recommen- 
dations by an average of 2.4 percentage points per year, as the in- 
creasingly heavy demands for labor apparently outstripped its 
supply. Additionally, collective agreements for unionized workers 
lasted for two or three years with built-in wage increases. Although 
starting pay was relatively low, large gaps in wages were institu- 
tionalized through longevity of employment and annual raises. 

The effect of wage increases, compounded by a further rise in 
the mandatory Central Provident Fund component of wages, was 
to price Singapore out of the market. High wages were a major 
contributor to Singapore's 1985 recession. Consequendy, in 1986 
and 1987 the government instituted a wage restraint policy: wages 
were frozen and the employer's contribution to the fund substan- 
tially reduced. The policy's relative success could be attributed to 
close government-labor ties and to the tripartite forum of the Na- 
tional Wages Council. 



143 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Proposals for wage reform — a "flexi-wage policy" — were an- 
nounced in mid-November 1986 and became effective with the 
enactment of the 1988 Employment (Amendment) Act. Under this 
plan, the basic wage remained relatively stable with adjustments 
for good or bad years made by increasing or reducing the annual 
bonus. Negotiating the size of the bonus — frozen to the equiva- 
lent of one month's salary since 1972 — was left to employers and 
unions, who would be able to bargain for its retention, abolition, 
or modification. Profit-sharing, productivity incentive, and em- 
ployee share plans were encouraged to ensure that high wage pay- 
ments awarded in fat years were not perpetuated in lean years and 
that individual as well as company productivity, growth, profita- 
bility, competitiveness, and prospects for the industry were taken 
into account. The government was anxious that wages not increase 
precipitously. This concern was shared by management, which wor- 
ried about shrinking profit margins resulting from higher operat- 
ing costs. Workers, on the other hand, wanted to share in the 
benefits of the economic boom after giving up wage increases to 
help cope with the 1985 recession. 

Foreign Labor 

Two groups comprised foreign nonresident labor in Singapore. 
The majority were unskilled work-permit holders who could only 
enter and work in the country if their prospective employers ap- 
plied for work permits for them. Skilled workers and professionals 
on employment passes comprised the other group. 

Work permits were for a short duration with no guarantee of 
automatic renewal. Malaysia, particularly the southernmost state 
of Johor, was the traditional source of such workers. Singapore's 
tight immigration policy was relaxed as early as 1968 to allow in 
these workers. At the peak of the economic boom in 1973, non- 
citizen work-permit holders reportedly accounted for about one- 
eighth of the total work force. Large numbers of these 4 'guest 
workers" were repatriated during the 1974-75 world recession be- 
cause of retrenchments, particularly in the labor-intensive manufac- 
turing industries. 

With the tightening of the labor market in 1978-79, it became 
more difficult to fill less desirable jobs with domestic labor or labor 
from Malaysia, which also had a tight job market. Foreign work- 
ers were then recruited from Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, In- 
dia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. By 1984 workers from South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan were being allowed in, 
on the basis that their Confucian cultural background might enable 
them to adapt more readily than immigrants from other cultures. 



144 















i 












Serving up roti canai (Indian pancakes) near Arab Street 

Courtesy Ong Tien Kwan 



The increase in foreign workers was remarkable; by 1980 they 
comprised 7 percent of the total labor force compared with 3 per- 
cent a decade earlier. No figures on foreign labor were published 
after 1980. According to the 1980 census, 46 percent of the for- 
eign workers were in manufacturing, 20 percent in construction, 
and 9 percent in personal and household services. The recession 
led to a repatriation of some 60,000 foreign workers in 1985, two- 
thirds of the total employment decline. The foreign worker levy 
was raised to S$250 per month in July 1989, and the maximum 
foreign worker dependency at the firm level was reduced from 50 
percent to 40 percent. Both measures were designed to encourage 
firms to speed up automation of labor-intensive operations in or- 
der to reduce reliance on foreign workers. 

Manpower Training 

The main goals of manpower training were to increase the aver- 
age skill level of the labor force and, at the same time, provide suffi- 
cient numbers of workers with the specialized skills necessary to 
meet future industrial needs. Beginning in the late 1970s, the 
government placed increased stress on education in order to achieve 
the objective of industrial restructuring. As of 1987, however, 



145 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Singapore's work force was less educated than that of some of the 
countries with which it competed. Five percent of the work force 
had university educations compared with 19 percent for the Unit- 
ed States and Japan and 6 percent for Taiwan. Some 11 percent 
had received post-secondary schooling other than in universities, 
compared with 46 percent for Japan, 23 percent for Taiwan, and 
16 percent for the United States. 

In the early 1980s, government studies showed that about half 
of the work force had primary-level education or less, and many 
older workers had low levels of English language skills. To reme- 
dy this situation, the Basic Education for Skills Training (BEST) 
program was introduced in 1984 to provide opportunities for 
workers who had not completed primary education to improve their 
English and math. By 1989 some 1 16,300 workers (half the target 
group) had had some BEST training. Time was also solving the 
problem as younger people received more education and the older, 
less-educated workers passed out of the work force; between 1979 
and 1984, entrants to the work force with only primary-level edu- 
cation or less declined from 43 percent to 26 percent. The govern- 
ment needed, however, to ensure that this better-educated work 
force was trained in the necessary skills to complete the transfor- 
mation of Singapore from a labor-intensive economy to a high- 
technology city-state— a "technopolis." 

A further problem in achieving this transition resulted from 
''government brain drain." Each year 50 to 60 percent of new 
university graduates were absorbed by the government, including 
government-owned companies and the statutory boards. A system 
of awarding undergraduate scholarships, which often tied the 
awardees to eight years of government service, assured that the 
public sector absorbed many of the top-ranking students. Some 
critics thought that this concentration of the country's valuable hu- 
man resources in the public sector might be to the long-run detri- 
ment of entrepreneurial and private- sector development. 

Industry 

Industrialization Policy 

The manufacturing sector was a mainstay of Singapore's eco- 
nomic growth despite the absence of natural resources or an agricul- 
tural base (see table 7, Appendix). By the mid-1970s, the country 
had undergone a quarter-century of rapid industrial advance based 
on low-cost labor, low- to middle-level technology, and a rapid 
increase in exports. At that time, Singapore's planners settled on 
a policy emphasizing high technology, particularly information 



146 



The Economy 



technology. In 1988 Singapore's 3,694 manufacturing establish- 
ments, employing 352,600 workers, were responsible for 29 per- 
cent of the GDP (see fig. 8). Industrial production, valued at 
S$ 14, 509. 7 million, was fractionally higher than earnings from 
financial and business services, double those from commerce, and 
nearly equal to the total of commerce and transport and commu- 
nications. This represented a 20-percent increase over 1987. The 
manufacturing sector's continuing success was largely a function 
of Singapore's ability to attract foreign investment through a favor- 
able business climate and then provide investors with an educat- 
ed, trained, and disciplined labor force. 

Singapore entered nationhood with a mixed legacy. The indus- 
trial sector was small, its productivity low. Manufacturing in 1960 
was a mere 11.4 percent of the GDP; commerce, far and away the 
largest sector, accounted for 32 percent. The industrial policy in 
1959 sought to promote industrialization as a way of diversifying 
from Singapore's traditional role as an entrepot. Reliance was 
placed on private enterprises whose basic decisions were determined 
on the expectation of a common market with the neighboring Fed- 
eration of Malaya. A system of import quotas was introduced for 
a limited number of goods, along with controls on how many en- 
terprises could enter a particular field. Circumstances altered strate- 
gies. After separation from Malaysia in 1965, quotas were mainly 
replaced by a low level (for developing countries) of protective im- 
port tariffs. A traditional import substitution strategy was im- 
plemented. 

In 1968, when the British announced their intention to withdraw 
from their Singapore bases, import substitution was succeeded by 
a strategy promoting export-oriented, labor-intensive industriali- 
zation. At that time, the government began its central role in for- 
mulating and implementing the industrialization program through 
the Economic Development Board. 

The new approach became official policy in 1967 with the govern- 
ment's proclamation of the Export Expansion Incentives (Relief 
from Income Tax) Act and was further enhanced by the 1 968 Em- 
ployment Act. Direct foreign investment was welcomed both to help 
Singapore penetrate export markets and to bring in advanced tech- 
nology. As early as 1970, when full employment was attained, there 
was some thought given to upgrading the industrial structure in 
order to provide more higher paying jobs. By 1979 efforts to up- 
grade the overall industrial structure and to accelerate the trend 
toward skill- and technology-intensive, higher value-added economic 
activity were intensified. The government implemented the large, 
three-year wage increases recommended by the National Wages 



147 



Singapore: A Country Study 



FY 1988 -GDP (Percent) 



Other Services 



Transport and 
Communications 
14% 



Commerce 
18% 




Financial and 
Business Services 
27% 



Manufacturing 
29% 



Source: Based on information from Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic 
Survey of Singapore, Second Quarter 1989, Singapore, 1989, 24. 

Figure 8. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by Sector, Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 

Council, which began the easing out of labor-intensive, low value- 
added activities in Singapore. 

The machinery industry was increasingly in the forefront of tech- 
nological innovation as a result of the Economic Development 
Board's promotion of computer-controlled production, industrial 
robots, and flexible manufacturing systems. The industry's out- 
put increased by 17 percent in 1987 and 20 percent in 1988. 

Domestic enterprises played a lesser role in industrialization. The 
government argued that the emphasis on large industry was a more 
effective stimulus to increased productivity and long-range economic 
development. Major promotional efforts sponsored by the govern- 
ment were focused on high-productivity projects, creating indus- 
tries that officials claimed would not otherwise have been established 
in Singapore. Although institutional assistance for small-scale lo- 
cal industry, the majority of enterprises, was provided through a 
subsidiary of the Economic Development Board, the effectiveness 
of this aid was limited until after the mid-1980s recession, when 
greater emphasis was placed on encouraging and upgrading small- 
scale local industry. 

Following a decline in the textile industry in the mid-1980s result- 
ing from increased international competition, automation and the 



148 



The Economy 



upgrading of product lines were encouraged. What had originally 
been a textile industry and then a mass-market clothing industry 
was encouraged to target high-fashion markets. A 10 percent growth 
in the fashion industry in 1987 reflected both the new trend and 
a strong market among Western trading partners. 

Information Technology 

After 1979 there was a single-minded emphasis among policy 
makers on escalating the level of technology in order to implement 
the succeeding phases of Singapore's industrial revolution. They 
relied on information technology as the strategy's principal instru- 
ment. The Telecommunications Authority of Singapore (Telecoms) 
was a key to the strategy because of the high caliber of its services 
and products and because Telecoms and the telecommunications 
industry had an important role in the progress of every industry 
in Singapore (see Telecommunications, this ch). 

A second key was computers and related electronics, which in 
the late 1980s constituted Singapore's largest industry, measured 
both in numbers of jobs and in value added by manufacturing. 
In 1981 the 65,000 to 70,000 electronics workers comprised about 
7 percent of the labor force; gross production of electronics at about 
S$5.9 billion was about 15 percent of total manufacturing output. 
By 1987 electronics accounted for 28 percent of manufacturing em- 
ployment and contributed 31 percent or S$ll billion in output. 
By 1989, Singapore had become the world's largest producer of 
disk drives and disk drive parts. Other related products included 
integrated circuits, data processing equipment, telecommunications 
equipment, and radio receivers. 

The electronics industry began a calculated transition away from 
labor-intensive products toward higher technological content and 
worker- skilled products in 1974. Potential investors were en- 
couraged to look elsewhere for low- wage, unskilled labor. Aside 
from producing high value-added exports, the computer and elec- 
tronics industries played a vital role in raising manpower produc- 
tivity in other technology-intensive industries through 
computerization and computer communications. The National 
Computer Board was formed in 1981 to establish Singapore as an 
international center for computer services, to reduce the shortage 
of trained computer professionals, and to assure standards of in- 
ternational caliber at all levels. 

Copyright and "intellectual property" issues served as an im- 
pediment to computer and other industrial development in the early 
1980s, when Singapore, as well as other Asian countries, was known 
for producing pirated versions of everything from computers and 



149 



Singapore: A Country Study 



computer software to designer handbags. Following threats by their 
major Western trading partners to impose trade sanctions and by 
international computer and software companies not to do business, 
Singapore passed its first copyright law in 1986. There was fairly 
rigorous enforcement in areas in which Western pressure was ap- 
plied (computer software, films, and cassette tapes), and nearly full 
compliance in the book trade, which had not been as serious a 
problem. The Asian "copyright revolution" (Singapore's was one 
of several such laws enacted in the region) was significant as a reali- 
zation by those countries that they had joined the international 
knowledge network as producers as well as consumers. 

By the mid-1980s, the small but growing printing and publish- 
ing industry had entered the high-technology world with computer- 
ized typesetting, color separation, and book binding. Its high-quality 
printing facilities and sophisticated satellite telecommunications net- 
work made Singapore a regional publishing and distribution center 
in 1989. 

Petroleum 

Petroleum and petrochemicals were another base of Singapore's 
industrial and economic life. In the late 1980s, Singapore was the 
world's third largest oil-trading center and also the third largest 
center for petroleum refining. It was the second largest builder of 
drilling rigs, and its facilities for repairing and maintaining rigs 
and tankers were the most competitive in East Asia. 

When oil prices began eroding in 1981 and collapsing toward 
the end of 1985, Singapore felt both negative and positive conse- 
quences. The collapse of oil prices dealt a severe blow to oil explo- 
ration. The impact was felt widely and immediately in everything 
from reduced orders for rig construction to lowered occupancy of 
luxury apartments as foreign petroleum workers returned home. 
With both of its immediate neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
heavily dependent on oil and gas exports for revenue, Singapore 
had a resulting loss of trade in both goods and services. 

Singapore benefited, however, from the availability of cheaper 
energy, which in 1986 amounted to a savings of about S$2.5 bil- 
lion (US$1.12 billion). Furthermore, Singaporean refineries invest- 
ed in the equipment and technology necessary to enable them to 
refine a wide variety of crude oils and obtain a greater proportion 
of high- valued products from the refining process. Petroleum refin- 
ing alone made up 28 percent of Singapore's manufacturing out- 
put in 1985, although by 1988 it had dropped by half as a result 
of a decline in petroleum production and growth in other indus- 
tries. Singapore also benefited indirectly when large oil importers 



150 



The Economy 



such as Japan and the United States obtained higher real incomes 
from lower oil prices, enabling them to increase their imports from 
Singapore and other countries. 

Trade, Tourism, and Telecommunications 
Foreign Trade 

Trade in goods and services was Singapore's life blood as truly 
in 1 989 as it was in the early twentieth century or a century earlier 
when the British East India Company first began business there. 
Trade, along with domestic savings and foreign investment, re- 
mained key to the country's growth. Singapore traditionally had 
a merchandise-trade balance deficit (in part at least because food 
was imported), which it customarily offset with a surplus on the 
services account (see table 8, Appendix). It was one of the world's 
few countries where total international trade (domestic exports and 
reexports plus imports) was greater than total GDP. In 1988 trade 
(S$167.3 billion) was more than three times GDP (S$48 billion), 
and two-thirds of the goods and services Singapore produced were 
exported. 

Singapore, however, was more than simply a trade and manufac- 
turing center in the late 1980s. Trade and manufacturing were close- 
ly tied to the country's expanding business services and international 
financial market; each enhanced the other. In addition to the more 
than 650 multinational companies that had set up manufacturing 
plants and technical support facilities, several thousand interna- 
tional financial institutions, service companies, and trading firms 
also maintained a presence in Singapore. The increasing interna- 
tionalization of the economy and the continuing centrality of ex- 
ternal trade meant that world trade fluctuations and the state of 
the global economy were significant factors — largely out of the coun- 
try 's direct control — in what happened to Singapore's trade and 
wider economy. 

As a British colony in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu- 
ries, Singapore was an entrepot for the exchange of raw materials 
from Southeast Asia — mainly present-day Indonesia and Malay- 
sia — for European merchandise. Newly independent Singapore's 
decision in 1965 to emphasize industrial development and the grow- 
ing success of that plan gradually resulted in a significant change 
in the nature of trade. By the mid-1970s, the proportion of reex- 
ports and domestic exports had been roughly reversed, with reex- 
ports accounting for less than 41 percent. 

In the 1980s, the somewhat diminished entrepot trade remained 
important, and Singapore continued to act as a regional processing 



151 



Singapore: A Country Study 

and distribution center. Reexports' share of total exports averaged 
35 percent from 1980 to 1987. Although primary commodities 
(crude rubber, nonferrous metals, and to a lesser extent palm and 
coconut oil) were still a factor in trading activities, machinery and 
transportation equipment dominated (see table 9, Appendix). Sin- 
gapore also served as a back door to trade with Asian communist 
countries for third countries, such as Indonesia. 

Between 1980 and 1984, total exports grew an average of 5.5 
percent per year. The strongest impetus came from the newer elec- 
trical and electronics industries. The trade deficit declined steadi- 
ly after 1982, reflecting lower commodity prices paid to foreign 
producers, greater levels of internal efficiency, and industrial up- 
grading. In 1985, however, total exports decreased by 2.26 per- 
cent. Higher value-added exports declined, both as a function of 
weaker demand and a worldwide saturation in many areas, such 
as computer peripherals. Petroleum exports, still a major sector, 
virtually stagnated. 

Trade, along with the rest of the economy, reasserted itself by 
1987, resulting partly from government economic decisions and 
partly as a reflection of rising world commodity prices. In 1988 
Singapore's total trade amounted to about SJ167.3 billion (US$80.8 
billion), with a global trade deficit of about S$8. 18 billion. Singa- 
pore's GDP grew by 10.8 percent in 1988, the best growth rate 
in fifteen years. Disk drives were the largest non-oil item export- 
ed, worth S$4.89 billion. Other major exports were integrated cir- 
cuits, data processing equipment and parts, telecommunications 
equipment, radio receivers, clothing, and plastics. 

By early 1989, signs of slowing down and leveling off had ap- 
peared with the first export declines in eighteen months. Analysts 
agreed the weak external demand for electronics and computer parts 
resulted, in part, from an oversupply on the world market of disk 
drives, semiconductors, and related items. Imports surged, however, 
widening the trade deficit sharply (see table 10, Appendix). 

Although their volume was not large, food products were a sig- 
nificant aspect of Singapore's trade. The urban nation produced 
only a small proportion of its own food (see Agriculture, this ch.), 
requiring it to import large quantities. Some food products, such 
as soy sauce and juices, were processed in Singapore for export, 
and Singapore continued its historical role as the regional center 
for the spice trade. 

Trading Partners 

Along with the changes in the composition of trade that had taken 
place since independence, there also were changes in direction. 



152 




The Keppel Wharves handled mainly noncontainerized general cargo. 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communication and Information 
Container handling facilities at the Tanjong Pagar Terminal 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communication and Information 



153 



Singapore: A Country Study 

The preeminence of Britain as supplier of manufactures declined 
after independence, and by the early 1970s the United States and 
Japan had become Singapore's two leading sources of industrial 
products. Malaysia and Indonesia remained the principal sources 
of such primary imports as crude rubber, vegetable oils, and spices 
and an important destination for manufactured exports, includ- 
ing both the products of Singapore and of the entrepot trade. 

Singapore did not report trade with Indonesia. The omission 
dated from the period of the Indonesian Confrontation in the 
mid-1960s and continued, according to some observers, because 
Singapore was afraid that if the Indonesian government knew the 
volume of the trade, it might try to curtail it. Estimates were difficult 
because a substantial part of the trade was viewed by Indonesia 
as smuggling and was, therefore, unlisted, although in Singapore's 
open export market it was legal. Nevertheless, trade with Indone- 
sia could be presumed, based partly on Indonesian trade figures, 
to have assumed a gradually larger role starting in the mid-1970s. 

As Singapore became more export oriented, its trading patterns 
became increasingly complex and interdependent. By the late 1980s, 
Singapore's trade links were strongest with the countries of the Or- 
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD — 
see Glossary), especially the United States, Japan, and the coun- 
tries of the European Economic Community (EEC — see Glossary) 
or of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN — see 
Glossary; see table 11, Appendix). Singapore's drive to industri- 
alization had drawn it increasingly towards the OECD countries 
for foreign investment, technology, and markets. To a large ex- 
tent, this shift had meant decreasing reliance on its ASEAN neigh- 
bors, particularly for markets and supplies (see table 12, Appendix). 
The other Asian NIEs, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan, were 
sometimes viewed as Singapore's competitors. On the other hand, 
Singapore engaged in considerable and growing trade with them, 
particularly with Taiwan, and all three were a source of skilled labor. 

United States 

By the 1980s, the United States had become Singapore's most 
important trading partner and, as such, crucial to the country's 
welfare. Singaporean officials often stated that a 1 percent drop 
in the United States economy had a 1.4 percent effect on Singa- 
pore's gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). Consequendy, 
in the 1980s Singapore was critically concerned about protectionist 
policies and budget deficits in the United States. In 1988 Singa- 
pore's total exports to the United States amounted to S$18.8 bil- 
lion, up 28 percent over the previous year, and accounted for 24 



154 



The Economy 



percent of the nation's total exports. Of that total, about 80 per- 
cent were Singaporean manufactures, including disk drives, inte- 
grated circuits, semiconductors, parts for data processing machines, 
television sets, radios and radio cassette players, and clothing. Reex- 
ports to the United States also were an important part of the trade. 
Singapore's exports to the United States outstripped its imports 
from there, although the United States was, after Japan, Singa- 
pore's second largest supplier. 

Until 1989 Singapore and the three other NIEs enjoyed trade 
preferences with the United States under the United States Gener- 
alized System of Preferences (GSP — see Glossary). This system was 
originally instituted to aid developing economies, but in 1989, the 
four Asian NIEs were removed from the program because of what 
some observers have seen as their major advances in economic de- 
velopment and improvements in trade competitiveness. The United 
States had been trying for some time to wrest trade and currency 
concessions from all four countries (but primarily South Korea), 
which had not been forthcoming. Although Washington present- 
ed the decision more as an economic graduation ceremony, ob- 
servers noted that the move reflected United States frustration over 
its continuing trade deficit despite considerable devaluation in the 
United States dollar. 

The removal of the GSP affected less than 1 5 percent of Singa- 
pore 's exports to the United States, among them telephones, office 
machines, wood furniture, and medical instruments, which faced 
duties of 5 to 10 percent. Ironically, United States firms based in 
Singapore were among the hardest hit. More than 50 percent of 
Singapore's exports to the United States came from American firms 
with operations there, such as AT&T, Digital Equipment, Hewlett- 
Packard, Rockwell International, and Travenol Laboratories. Sin- 
gaporean companies, as well as Japanese and European firms with 
operations in Singapore, were also affected by the removal of the 
GSP. In early 1988, some 4,000 NTUG members gathered out- 
side the United States Embassy in Singapore to protest the deci- 
sion, and the Singaporean government expressed regret. 

Japan 

Japan's place in Singapore's business picture was underscored 
by the fact that, in the 1980s, Japanese were the largest resident 
expatriate community in the city. Japan was the country's single 
largest supplier, accounting in 1987 for 25.3 percent of total im- 
ports, and Singapore's largest trade deficit was with Japan. Buy- 
back arrangements for products manufactured by Japanese firms 
in Singapore also accounted for a significant part of the trade. Oil 



155 



Singapore: A Country Study 

accounted for 40 percent of Singapore's exports to Japan in 1988. 
Singaporean observers noted by 1989 a significant difference in 
the market orientation between Japanese firms and United States- 
owned multinationals. Japanese firms in Singapore were produc- 
ing primarily for the United States and other third-country mar- 
kets, rather than for the Japanese home market. The United 
States-controlled multinationals, on the other hand, produced main- 
ly for their own home market. Many of these same observers, both 
official and unofficial, also expressed the sentiment that the world 
export market in the 1990s, would "belong to Japan." 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was found- 
ed in 1967 primarily as a forum for discussing issues of mutual 
concern among neighboring Southeast Asian countries rather than 
as a trading union similar to the EEC. In part, this orientation 
was because, other than Singapore, most of the ASEAN coun- 
tries had similar products, tending to make them more competi- 
tive than cooperative. Although trade relations among the ASEAN 
countries remained largely bilateral, there was some informal 
economic cooperation, including joint representations to foreign 
governments on economic issues of common concern. In 1989 the 
possibility of a more formalized economic entity was at least being 
considered by the ASEAN members. 

In 1988 Malaysia was Singapore's largest ASEAN trading part- 
ner and third largest overall trading partner, after the United States 
and Japan. The Malaysian market was the single largest ASEAN 
destination for Singapore's exports and its second largest export 
market overall. In the late 1980s, Singapore established increas- 
ingly close economic and industrial ties with Malaysia's Johor state, 
which had served as Singapore's hinterland in colonial times. To 
alleviate its land shortage as well as its labor shortage and high labor 
costs, Singapore began to transfer labor-intensive industries to sites 
across the causeway connecting it to Malaysia's southernmost state. 
Johor, in turn, hoped "economic twinning" with Singapore would 
boost its long-term development. By early 1987, there were 217 
Singaporean companies or Singapore-based multinationals in 
Malaysia, having total investments of slightly more than S$200 
million. 

Singapore's much smaller markets with the other ASEAN coun- 
tries also were growing. In 1989 Singapore recorded its highest 
growth in bilateral ASEAN trade with Thailand, which replaced 
Taiwan as its fifth largest trading partner. Intra-ASEAN trade 
generally might have been underestimated, partly because of the 



156 



The Economy 



volume of informal trade, including smuggling, and partly because 
so much of it was controlled by the Chinese community in each 
country. Keeping business within the family, clan, or dialect group 
was a central Chinese business practice that persisted across na- 
tional boundaries. 

Other Trading Partners 

Beginning in the mid-1980s, Singapore — which for two decades 
had sharply curtailed many forms of contact with China — began 
promoting itself as an alternative to Hong Kong as a " Gateway 
to China. ' ' In 1989 Singapore was estimated to be the fourth-largest 
foreign investor in the special economic zones of southern China 
and that country's fifth-largest trading partner; Singapore's com- 
panies were estimated to have about S$l billion directiy invested 
in China. Since most such investments were made in conjunction 
with Hong Kong-based companies, the real extent of Singapore's 
exposure to China may have been considerably higher. 

Non-oil trade with the various EEC countries, which had been 
steady during the early 1980s, strengthened in 1987 and 1988. Near- 
ly three-quarters of this increase was in exports of disk drives and 
integrated circuits, particularly to the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany), Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Overall, 
however, Singapore had a small trade deficit with Western Europe 
in 1988. 

Tourism 

Tourism had been an important sector of Singapore's economy 
for more than a decade, averaging 16 percent of total foreign ex- 
change earnings and 6 percent of GDP between 1980 and 1985. 
Tourist arrivals had dropped sharply in 1983, however, the first 
decline in over twenty years. The decrease resulted both from the 
regional and world economic downturn at that time and from travel 
restrictions instituted by neighboring countries to preserve their 
own foreign exchange. Observers noted also that Singapore was 
losing its "oriental mystique and charm." In its effort to build a 
modern city, it had torn down old buildings and curtailed tradi- 
tional street activities, aspects considered by tourists to be part of 
Singapore's attraction. In 1984 the government established a 
Tourism Task Force to recommend ways to attract more visitors, 
and the following year the budget of the Singapore Tourist Pro- 
motion Board was increased by 60 percent. Steps were taken to 
preserve areas of special architectural, historical, or cultural in- 
terest. Sentosa Island, off the southern coast, was developed as a 
resort and recreation center, complete with museums, parks, golf 



157 



Singapore: A Country Study 

courses, lagoons, beaches, trails, and gardens, all connected by 
monorail. Singapore also began billing itself as the "hub of 
Southeast Asia' ' and marketing sidetrips to destinations in neigh- 
boring countries. As with other economic activities, tourism was 
viewed as a high value-added industry. Although increasing the 
absolute number of visitor arrivals was the main target, a further 
aim was to attract the high-spending, business visitors attending 
conventions and trade exhibitions, which Singapore hosted in large 
numbers. 

Tourist arrivals recovered quickly from the 1983 downturn, 
reaching 3 million in 1985. In 1987 tourist arrivals reached 3.7 
million, a 15 percent increase over the previous year. In 1988 ar- 
rivals rose another 14 percent to nearly 4.2 million. Singapore's 
top tourist-generating markets in 1987 were ASEAN (29 percent), 
Japan (15 percent), Australia (9 percent), India (7 percent), the 
United States (6 percent), and Britain (5 percent). Although a build- 
ing boom had caused a glut of hotel rooms in the mid-1980s, by 
early 1989 occupancy was running at about 80 percent. 

Telecommunications 

The Singaporean government, which had inherited a fairly good 
telecommunications system from the British at independence, as- 
signed telecommunications a high priority in economic planning. 
By the late 1980s, Singapore had one of the world's most advanced 
telecommunications infrastructures, developed under the guidance 
of Telecoms, a statutory board. Its mission was to provide high 
quality communications for domestic and international require- 
ments, and to serve the business community as well as the public. 
Telecoms offered a comprehensive range of products and services 
at rates among the lowest in the world. Information services ac- 
counted for an estimated 2 percent of Singapore's GDP in 1988. 

Chartered to function commercially, Telecoms received no sub- 
sidies. Aside from an initial loan, Telecoms paid for its capital needs 
out of its earnings. In lieu of taxes, it made an annual payment 
to the Treasury comparable to a business tax. This financial au- 
tonomy was a major factor in Telecom's ability to respond to user 
demand. During the early 1980s, as the drive for high technology 
got underway, Telecom's capital budget rose by 20 to 30 percent 
a year, the highest growth of any public agency in Singapore. 
Although the rate of increase dropped to about 15 to 20 percent 
in the late 1980s, the capital budget remained high and continued 
to increase. 

Telecoms offered a large and growing number of services, in- 
cluding radio paging, mobile phones, facsimile, electronic mail, 



158 



The Economy 



and telepac, a system for linking computers locally and interna- 
tionally. By 1987 Singapore's domestic telephone network was com- 
pletely push-button, and all twenty- six telephone exchanges were 
linked by an optical fiber network. The country had more than 
1.2 million telephones in 1988, or 48.5 telephones for every 100 
Singaporeans, providing virtually 100 percent coverage in homes 
and offices. 

Satellite links with the world were provided by satellite earth sta- 
tions at Bukit Timah and on Sentosa Island. Submarine cables con- 
nected Singapore to all of its ASEAN neighbors except Brunei, 
which was scheduled to be linked with Singapore by fiber-optic cable 
in 1991. In 1988 Singapore installed the region's first dedicated 
digital data network, providing up to two megabits per second 
(Mbps) high-speed data transmission and voice communications. 
Intelsat Business Service was available for a wide range of appli- 
cations, including corporate data communications, financial ser- 
vices, and remote printing via satellite. A video conferencing service 
also was offered by 1988. 

Finance 

The country's rapid development was closely linked to the 
government's efficient financial management. Conservative fiscal 
and monetary policies generated high savings, which, along with 
high levels of foreign investment, allowed growth without the ac- 
cumulation of external debt. In 1988 Singapore had foreign reserves 
worth about S$33 billion, which, per capita, put it ahead of Swit- 
zerland, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan. That same year, the domes- 
tic savings rate rose to one of the highest in the world (42 percent), 
as gross national savings, comprising public and private savings, 
totaled S$20.9 billion, 19 percent higher than in 1987. By the 
mid-1980s, however, domestic demand had been so stunted that 
it became increasingly difficult to find productive areas for invest- 
ment. In the recession year of 1986, for the first time, gross na- 
tional savings exceeded gross capital formation. This was in spite 
of a 15 percent cut in the employers' contribution to the Central 
Provident Fund. As a result, already depressed domestic demand 
was depressed even further, falling by 1 percent in 1986 after a 
decline of 3 percent the previous year. 

Singapore's foreign reserves were, in fact, the country's domes- 
tic savings held overseas. Since the source of the domestic savings 
was in large measure the compulsory savings held by the Central 
Provident Fund, Singapore had a huge domestic liability. The fund 
claims, standing in 1988 at S$32 billion, almost equalled Singa- 
pore's foreign reserves. But since they were fully funded and 



159 



Singapore: A Country Study 

denominated in Singapore dollars, the country was relieved of the 
problems of showing either a budget deficit or an external debt. 

Indeed, for many years, the government had pointed out that 
its foreign reserves, managed by the Government of Singapore In- 
vestment Corporation, were larger than that of wealthier, more 
populous countries. The reserves issue became politicized after 1987 
when Lee Kuan Yew proposed a change in the country's govern- 
ment to an executive presidency in which the president (presuma- 
bly Lee himself) would have veto power over Parliament's use of 
the reserves. In 1986 the government-sponsored Report of the Eco- 
nomic Committee admitted that "over saving" was a problem. 
Not until 1988, however, were some tentative steps taken to in- 
vest the surpluses directly in productive resources. This process 
included a one-time transfer to government revenue of S$ 1 . 5 bil- 
lion from the accumulated reserves of four statutory boards. 

The country's public sector financial system was structurally com- 
plex and difficult to follow owing to different accounting practices. 
Funds essentially were derived from three sources: tax revenue 
(directly on income, property, and inheritance; indirectly as ex- 
cise duties, motor vehicle taxes; stamp duties, and other taxes); 
nontax revenue (regulatory charges, sales of goods and services, 
and interest and dividends); and public sector borrowing (see fig. 
6). The statutory boards had separate budgets, although they played 
a major role in infrastructure creation. Government companies also 
were not included in public finance reporting. 

After 1975 the government consistently had substantial current 
as well as overall surpluses. From 1983 to 1985, total government 
expenditure averaged 59.8 percent of current revenue. In fact, the 
overall surplus exceeded even the net contributions to the Central 
Provident Fund. The seven major statutory boards also had con- 
sistent current surpluses. Economic theoretician and member of 
Parliament Augustine Tan suggested that Singapore's public spend- 
ing and public savings were much too large. According to Tan, 
the government tended to err on the side of financial surplus, despite 
frequent forecasts of deficit, because the government consistently 
underestimated tax revenues and overestimated expenditures. These 
surpluses then put upward pressure on the exchange rate and eroded 
manufacturers' competitiveness. 

Currency, Trade, and Investment Regulation 

Singapore had an exceptionally open economy. Fundamental- 
ly strong, the currency reflected a sound balance of payments po- 
sition, large reserves, and the authorities' conservative attitude. 
From 1967 until June 1973, the Singapore dollar was tied to the 



160 



The Economy 



United States dollar, and thereafter the currency was allowed to 
float. 

The Monetary Authority of Singapore, the country's quasi- 
central bank, pursued a policy of intervention both domestically 
and in foreign exchange markets to maintain a strong currency. 
This multifaceted strategy was designed to promote Singapore's 
development as a financial center by attracting funds, while in- 
ducing low inflation by preventing the erosion of the large Central 
Provident Fund balances. Furthermore, the strong currency com- 
plemented the high wage industrial strategy, forcing long-term 
quality rather than short-term prices to be the basis for export 
competition. 

Given Singapore's dependency on imports, however, setting an 
exchange rate always generated controversy. The 1986 Report of 
the Economic Committee did not clarify official thinking. It recom- 
mended that the exchange rate should ' ' continue to be set by mar- 
ket forces, but its impact on [Singapore's] export competitiveness 
and tourist costs should be taken into account. The [Singapore] 
dollar should, as far as possible, be allowed to find its own appropri- 
ate level, reflecting fundamental economic trends." 

After 1978, when the government abolished all currency exchange 
controls, Singaporean residents (individuals and corporations) were 
free to move funds, import capital, or repatriate profits without 
restriction. Likewise, trade regulations were minimal. Import duties 
applied only to a few items (automobiles, alcohol, petroleum, and 
tobacco), and licenses were required only for imports originating 
from a few Eastern bloc countries. There were no export duties. 
As the government played an active part in promoting exports, 
there was an extensive system of supports including an export in- 
surance plan. 

The government promoted investment vigorously through a 
whole range of tax and investment allowances and soft loans aimed 
at attracting new investment or at helping existing businesses 
upgrade or expand. There was no capital gains tax. Special incen- 
tives existed for foreigners, including concessionary tax arrange- 
ments for some nonresidents, relief from double taxation, and 
permission to buy commercial and certain residential property. In 
1985 extensive tax reductions were introduced to reduce business 
costs. 

Financial Center Development 

As a result of its strategic location and well-developed infrastruc- 
ture, Singapore traditionally had been the trade and financial ser- 
vices center for the region. In the 1970s, the government identified 



161 



Singapore: A Country Study 

financial services as a key source of growth and provided incen- 
tives for its development. By the 1980s, the focus was on further 
diversification, upgrading, and automation of financial services. 
Emphasis was placed on the development of investment portfolio 
management, securities trading, capital market activities, foreign 
exchange and futures trading, and promotion of more sophisticat- 
ed and specialized fee-based activities. 

Consequently, by the mid-1980s, Singapore was the third most 
important financial center in Asia after Tokyo and Hong Kong. 
The financial services sector, having sustained double digit growth 
over the previous decade, accounted for some 23 percent of GDP 
and employed approximately 9 percent of the labor force. In 1985, 
however, growth in the sector slowed to just 2.6 percent, and in 
December of that year the Stock Exchange of Singapore suffered 
a major crisis, which forced it to close for three days. In view of 
the troubled domestic economy, observers worried that Singapore's 
future as a financial center looked somewhat problematic. Further- 
more, international financial market deregulation threatened to cre- 
ate an environment in which it would be more difficult for Singapore 
to thrive, especially given its high cost structure and somewhat 
heavy-handed regulatory environment. The government took steps 
to correct some of the problems, and by 1989 Singapore's finan- 
cial service sector could again be described as "booming." 

The financial sector included three types of commercial banks 
(full license, restricted, and offshore), representative offices, mer- 
chant banks, discount houses, and finance companies. In 1988 there 
were 13 local, 64 merchant, and 134 commercial banks. All banks 
in Singapore were administered by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore and were required to hold a statutory minimum cash 
balance against their deposit and other specified liabilities with the 
authority. 

The Development Bank of Singapore was established in 1968 
to provide financial services supporting industrialization and general 
economic development. Owned joindy by the government (49 per- 
cent) and private sector shareholders, it had evolved from a long- 
term financing institution to a multiservice bank. The largest Sin- 
gaporean commercial bank in terms of assets in 1989, the Develop- 
ment Bank was listed on the stock exchanges of both Singapore 
and Malaysia. Through its subsidiaries, it also provided special- 
ized financial and insurance services, factoring, stockbroking, mer- 
chant banking, and venture capital investment management 
services. The Development Bank was the city-state's largest source 
of long-term finance, including equity and venture capital financ- 
ing, medium- and long-term loans, and guarantees. 



162 



The Economy 



The Singapore Foreign Exchange Market had grown remark- 
ably since the 1985 recession. As an international financial center, 
the country had benefited from the worldwide increase in business 
as well as from the related expansion in the financially liberated 
Japanese market. Major currencies — the United States dollar, the 
Japanese yen, the West German deutsche mark, and the British 
pound sterling — were actively traded. Volumes in such other cur- 
rencies as the Australian dollar had risen as well. Average daily 
turnover was US$45 billion in 1988 compared with US$12.5 bil- 
lion in 1985. 

Singapore established the Asian dollar market as the Asian 
equivalent of the Eurodollar market in 1968 when the local branch 
of the United States-based Bank of America secured government 
approval to borrow deposits of nonresidents, mainly in foreign cur- 
rencies, and use them to finance corporate activities in Asia. At 
the time, expanding economic development in Southeast Asia was 
rapidly increasing the demand for foreign investment funds, and 
the desirability of a regional center able to carry out the necessary 
middleman function was apparent. Singapore offered the ideal lo- 
cation. The Asian dollar market was essentially an international 
money and capital market for foreign currencies, and its assets grew 
from US$30 million in 1968 to US$273 billion in November 1988. 
To operate in the market, financial institutions were required to 
obtain approval from the Monetary Authority of Singapore and 
to set up separate bookkeeping entities called Asian currency units 
for transactions in the market. Funds were obtained mainly from 
external or nonresident sources — central banks, foreigners seek- 
ing a stable location such as Singapore to deposit cash, multina- 
tional corporations, and commercial banks outside Singapore. 

In 1973, to stimulate the expansion of the Asian dollar market, 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore established the so-called off- 
shore banking system, designed to concentrate on that market and 
its foreign exchange operations. Beginning in 1983, funds managed 
in Singapore on behalf of nonresidents and invested offshore or 
in the local stock market were exempt from tax. The fees earned 
for managing such offshore funds were taxed at a concessionary 
rate of 10 percent. 

Inaugurated in 1973, the Stock Exchange of Singapore was 
governed by a committee comprising four elected stockbroker mem- 
bers and five appointed nonbroker members. In late 1988, the 327 
companies listed on the main board of the exchange were classi- 
fied into six groups: industrial and commercial, finance, hotel, 
property, plantation (farming), and mining. The market under- 
went a major, prolonged reorganization following the December 



163 



Singapore: A Country Study 

1985 collapse of a Singaporean company, Pan Electric, which re- 
vealed a massive web of forward share dealings based on borrowed 
money. The collapse resulted in a tighter regulation of the finan- 
cial futures market and the securities industry. In 1986 the Secu- 
rities Industry Council was established to advise the minister for 
finance on all matters relating to the securities industry. 

In 1987 the government introduced tax incentives to encourage 
the trading of international securities in Singapore. The National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ) in the United States 
and the Stock Exchange of Singapore established a link to facili- 
tate the trading of NASDAQ stocks in Singapore by providing for 
the exchange of price and trading information on a selected list 
of NASDAQ stocks between the two exchanges. A move by the 
Singapore exchange to a new, spacious location in 1988 brought 
a transformation in trading methodology, including partial auto- 
mation of the trading system, which until then had adhered to the 
traditional outcry auction system. 

By 1987 Singapore's stock market, fuelled by bullish sentiments 
sent indices soaring to new highs— a recovery from the December 
1985 crisis. All gains, however, were wiped out by the crash of world 
stock markets in October 1987, a crash from which the Singapore 
exchange had made substantial recovery by mid- 1989. 

Singapore also expanded other international financial markets 
in the late 1980s. Trading in gold futures originally was under- 
taken in the Gold Exchange of Singapore, which was established 
in 1978 and reorganized in 1983. The scope of its activities was 
widened to include financial futures trading, and it was renamed 
the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Start- 
ing in 1984, the financial futures market featured a mutual offset 
arrangement between SIMEX and the Chicago Mercantile Ex- 
change, which allowed contracts executed on one exchange to be 
offset on the other without additional transactional cost for mar- 
ket participants. The linkage was the first of its kind in the world 
and greatly facilitated round-the-clock trading in futures contracts. 
In 1988 six forms of futures contracts were traded: international 
gold futures; the Eurodollar time deposit interest rate; the Nikkei 
Average Stock Index; and three currency exchange rates — US dol- 
lar/West German deutsche mark, US dollar/Japanese yen, and US 
dollar/British pound sterling. Trading volume on the SIMEX had 
grown steadily. 

The restructured Government Securities Market was launched 
in May 1987, auctioning at market rates taxable Singapore govern- 
ment securities ranging in maturity from three months to five years. 
Previously, long-term government stock was sold to a captive 



164 



The Economy 



market of banks, insurance companies, and a few individuals and 
nonprofit organizations. 

International Financial Organizations 

In 1966 Singapore became a member of the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), the World Bank (see Glossary), 
and the Asian Development Bank (see Glossary). Two years later, 
Singapore joined the International Finance Corporation, an affiliate 
of the World Bank. Singapore's loans from the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank had been used to finance develop- 
ment projects relating to water supply, electric power generation 
and distribution, sewerage, telephone services, educational ser- 
vices, and environmental control. A total of fourteen loans were 
secured from the World Bank between 1963 and 1975 and four- 
teen from the Asian Development Bank between 1969 and 1980. 
There were no further loans in the 1980s. Singapore's estimated 
outstanding borrowings from the World Bank and the Asian De- 
velopment Bank in late 1988 totalled US$35.1 billion and US$45.4 
million, respectively. Its 1988 quota of IMF special drawing rights 
(SDR) — related to its national income, monetary reserves, trade 
balance and other economic indicators — was SDR 92.4 million. 

Transportation 

Singapore as a modern city came into being because of its loca- 
tion and its harbor. Both assets remained major sources of its eco- 
nomic vitality as the island nation continued to serve as a major 
transportation and communications hub. 

Sea 

In 1988 the port of Singapore was the world's busiest in terms 
of shipping tonnage (396.4 million gross registered tons), just ahead 
of Rotterdam. Singapore was also a major transshipment hub and 
a global warehousing and central distribution center. In 1988 more 
than 36,000 vessels arrived in Singapore, up 6 percent from the 
previous year. The 150 million freight tons of cargo handled by 
the wharves and oil terminals represented an increase of 16 per- 
cent over the previous year. 

Ships of more than 700 lines linked Singapore and the region 
to some 600 ports worldwide. The port area was administered by 
the Port of Singapore Authority, a statutory board responsible for 
the provision and maintenance of facilities and services and for the 
control of navigational traffic in the port. Operations were con- 
tinuous, round the clock and year round. As a member of the In- 
ternational Maritime Organization since 1966, Singapore kept 



165 



Singapore: A Country Study 

abreast of international developments in shipping and adhered to 
international conventions adopted under the organization's 
auspices. The five port terminals operated by the port authority 
had about fifteen kilometers of wharf, which could accommodate 
vessels of all sizes. The Tanjong Pagar Terminal was the port's 
main gateway for containerized cargo. It had ten container berths, 
supported in 1988 by a fleet of twenty-six quay cranes, sixty-seven 
transtainers (straddle carrier cranes), seventeen van carriers, and 
other types of heavy moving equipment. The seven container freight 
stations were all equipped with closed-circuit television to enhance 
fire safety and cargo security. A new billion-dollar container ter- 
minal with five container berths, four multipurpose berths, sup- 
port facilities, and storage space for 8,500 twenty-foot equivalent 
units (TEUs) was being developed on a nearby island. The first 
berth was scheduled to be operational by 1992. 

Keppel Wharves, the oldest conventional gateway, handled main- 
ly containers and bulk cargo, such as cement, vegetable oil, and 
rubber. With four kilometers of sheltered deep-water berths, Keppel 
Wharves could accommodate twenty- two ocean-going vessels and 
three coasters at any one time. Pasir Panjang Wharves was also 
a conventional gateway with facilities for coasters, lighters, barges, 
and ocean-going vessels. It had three deep-water, ten coastal, and 
forty- six lighterage berths. Sembawang Wharves handled primar- 
ily high-volume homogeneous cargo such as timber and rubber. 
Equipped with five berths, Sembawang also handled containerized 
and bulk cargo. Jurong Port, developed principally to serve the 
industries in the Jurong Industrial Estate, had twelve berths. 

Singapore's merchant fleet ranked fifteenth among the principal 
merchant fleets of the world. In late 1988, its 1,243 vessels totaled 
7.33 million gross registered tons and included 156 general cargo 
ships, 150 oil tankers, 74 bulk carriers, 49 container ships, and 12 
passenger vessels. There were two vessels above 100,000 gross 
registered tons: a very -large crude carrier and an ultra-large crude 
carrier. 

Singapore also was noted for its ship-repair industry, the begin- 
nings of which dated to colonial times. In 1968 the government 
turned the former British dockyard into the Sembawang Shipyard 
and built it into a commercial success. 

Three major yards — Keppel, Sembawang, and Jurong — in which 
the government held a controlling stake dominated the industry, 
accounting for about 90 percent of the S$l . 1 billion business in 1988. 
Many privately owned yards, of which the largest was Hitachi Zo- 
sen, split the remaining 10 percent of the business. 



166 



The Economy 



In 1989 the four major shipyards employed some 70,000 work- 
ers, about 40 percent from overseas, mainly from Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Bangladesh. Despite the booming business of the 
late 1980s, the shipyards faced problems of rising labor costs and 
government restrictions on importation of labor. As a result, a joint 
venture between Keppel and a shipyard near Madras, India, was 
given government approval in 1989, and the industry was explor- 
ing the possibility of joint-venture projects in other neighboring 
countries. Government strategists reportedly favored an eventual 
merger between Sembawang and Jurong — which would overtake 
Keppel to become the largest ship-repairing group — as part of a 
move to consolidate the industry and begin directing it toward a 
less labor-intensive future. 

Land 

In line with its goal of providing fast, convenient, and afford- 
able transport for its population and visitors and a transportation 
infrastructure that supported its economic position, the government 
gave top priority to investments in public transport and the high- 
way system. Beginning in the early 1970s, Singapore engaged in 
a systematic program of road building that led to the development 
of a network that was considered to be one of the best among de- 
veloping countries. By late 1988, Singapore had 2,789 kilometers 
of roads occupying some 1 1 percent of the country's land area. In 
the previous decade, the government had spent some S$1.9 bil- 
lion on building and maintaining roads. 

In 1989 five expressways — the thirty-five-kilometer Pan Island 
Expressway (PIE), the nineteen-kilometer East Coast Parkway, the 
eleven-kilometer Bukit Timah Expressway, the fourteen-kilometer 
Ayer Rajah Expressway, and the sixteen-kilometer Central Ex- 
pressway — were complete, and work was underway on four more 
(see fig. 9). The highway building program called for a network 
of nine expressways, for a total of 141 kilometers, to be completed 
by 1991. Access to the Central Business District was limited dur- 
ing rush hour to holders of special passes sold on a day-to-day ba- 
sis, and a one-way street pattern further facilitated traffic movement. 
A computerized traffic control system, introduced in 1981, moni- 
tored some 200 major road junctions. The Public Works Depart- 
ment planned to put the remaining 800 signals on-line in the 1990s, 
making Singapore's one of the largest traffic control systems in the 
world. 

At the end of 1988, 491,808 motor vehicles were registered, an 
increase of 20,000 over the previous year. Nearly half of registered 
vehicles were automobiles. In order to implement a government 



167 



Singapore: A Country Study 




168 



The Economy 



policy of limiting the number of private automobiles, a number 
of monetary disincentives were employed, including heavy annu- 
al road taxes, fuel taxes, ad valorem registration fees, and other 
licenses and fees. 

Taxi fares also were kept reasonable in order to reduce traffic 
flow into and out of congested areas during rush hour. By late 1988, 
Singapore's 10,500 taxis were mostiy air-conditioned and equipped 
with electronic taximeters. Most taxis were driven twenty-four hours 
a day by a succession of drivers. The largest company, NTUC 
Comfort, was affiliated with the union. A fleet of nearly 2,800 buses 
also helped to alleviate the need for private automobiles. The Sin- 
gapore Bus Service and the Trans-Island Bus Service provided full- 
day service throughout the island. 

In 1987 land transportation was propelled into a new era with 
the opening of the S$5 billion Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) sys- 
tem, which formed the backbone of the country's public transport 
network (see fig. 10). The entire MRT system, spanning 67 kilo- 
meters, was expected to be fully operational by 1990 — two years 
ahead of schedule — when it would serve 800,000 passengers daily. 
The bus routes were being progressively redesigned to dovetail with 
the expanding system. Some 40 percent of all businesses and in- 
dustrial areas were located near stations, and some 50 percent of 
all Singaporeans lived within one kilometer of an MRT station. 
The infusion of MRT construction funds into the economy begin- 
ning in the early 1980s helped offset downturns in other sectors 
of the construction industry during the recession. 

Overland connections to the Malay Peninsula, across the cause- 
way spanning the Johore Strait, included a highway and a 
Malaysian-owned railroad. These, in turn, were connected with 
the Thai railroad system. 

Air 

Singapore's supermodern Singapore Changi Airport, a travel 
and shipping hub, had connections to all parts of the world in keep- 
ing with Singapore's "open skies" policy. In 1988 forty-eight sched- 
uled international airlines — twelve more than in 1983 — linked the 
country to 101 cities in fifty- three countries. These carriers offered 
a total of 1 ,500 scheduled flights per week to and from Singapore; 
a total of 12.6 million passengers used the airport in 1988 — a 12.4 
percent increase over the previous year and the highest passenger 
volume recorded in any one year since the airport opened in 1 98 1 . 
Nearly half of those passengers came from or went to other desti- 
nations in Southeast Asia. A second passenger terminal sched- 
uled for completion in 1990 would increase Changi' s passenger 



169 



Singapore: A Country Study 




170 



The Economy 



handling capability to 20 million annually. The Civil Aviation 
Authority of Singapore managed the facility, which was consistentiy 
rated by the travel industry as one of the best airports in the world. 

Changi also was noted for its air cargo facilities. The total volume 
of air cargo surged to 511,541 tons in 1988, an increase of 22.3 
percent over the previous year and more than double the volume 
handled in 1983. Seletar Airport was used for charter and train- 
ing flights. Additionally, Singapore was one of the most compre- 
hensive airline maintenance and overhaul centers in the Asia-Pacific 
region, having more than fifty approved airline organizations in 
1987. 

Singapore Airlines (SI A) emerged from its humble beginnings 
in 1972 to become one of Asia's, if not the world's, leading airlines 
with an unparalleled reputation for service and efficiency. Follow- 
ing the division of Malaysia-Singapore Airlines, the airline owned 
jointly by Malaysia and Singapore between 1965 and 1972, SIA 
inherited the company's limited international routes and an aging 
fleet of ten airplanes. By 1988 SIA operated with one of the youn- 
gest fleets in the airline industry — twenty-two Boeing 747s, four 
Boeing 757s, six Airbus 310s, and twenty Boeing 747-400s on order. 
SIA flew to fifty-seven cities in thirty-seven countries around the 
globe, carrying 5.6 million passengers in 1988 and filling 74.8 per- 
cent of its seats. The airline ranked fourteenth worldwide in the 
number of passenger-kilometers and twelfth in terms of air freight- 
kilometers in 1987. 

In economic terms, SIA's earnings accounted for 3.6 percent 
of the 1987 GNP. The airline was one of the country's major em- 
ployers, providing jobs for one out of every eighty-nine workers 
in the country in 1987. As part of the government's move toward 
privatization, shares of its stock were sold to the public in 1985, 
leaving the government holding 63 percent of the shares, foreign 
investors 20 percent, and the public, including SIA employees, 17 
percent. Another public sale of stock in 1987 brought the govern- 
ment-owned holdings down to 55 percent. 

Agriculture 

Orchard Road, now one of Singapore's most up-scale thorough- 
fares, got its name because it originally was lined with fruit or- 
chards and vegetable gardens. Although contemporary Singapore 
still maintained a tiny agricultural base, by 1988 urbanization had 
reduced the land area used for farming to only about 3 percent 
of the total. Nonetheless, with intensive production, the farming 
sector met part of the domestic demand for essential fresh farm 
produce: poultry, eggs, pork, some vegetables, and fish. In 1988 



171 



Singapore: A Country Study 

there were 2,075 licensed farms occupying only 2,037 hectares of 
land, with a total output of some S$362 million worth of farm 
produce. A decade earlier farm holdings had covered 10,280 
hectares. 

The Primary Production Department, under the Ministry of Na- 
tional Development, ensured an adequate and regular supply of 
fresh produce and provided support for agro-industries, including 
research and development aimed at improving commercial and 
high- technology farming. The department projected in 1988 that 
a total of 2,000 hectares of land in ten agro-technology parks would 
be developed and rented out for long-term farming over the next 
decade. 

The government began phasing out pig farming in 1984 because 
of odor and environmental pollution. Some 200 pig farms raising 
about 500,000 pigs in 1987 were scheduled to be reduced to 22 
farms with 300,000 pigs by 1990. Imports from Malaysia, Indone- 
sia, and Thailand would be increased to meet domestic needs. Some 
1,000 poultry farms kept a total of about 2.2 million layers, 1.6 
million broilers, 245,000 breeders, and 645,000 ducks. Singapore 
remained free of major animal diseases. 

Singapore grew 5.6 percent of its total supply of 180,000 tons 
of fresh vegetables in 1988 and imported the rest from Malaysia, 
Indonesia, China, and Australia. The main crops cultivated lo- 
cally included vegetables, mushrooms, fruit, orchids, and ornamen- 
tal plants. About 370 vegetable farms produced an estimated 10,000 
tons of vegetables, and mushroom cultivation expanded rapidly 
after the mid-1980s. The Mushroom Unit of the Primary Produc- 
tion Department conducted research on mushroom cultivation and 
advised commercial mushroom growers, who produced a variety 
of mushrooms for the local market. 

Noted for its orchids, Singapore exported flowers worth S$13.8 
million in 1988, mainly to Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and 
the United States. Singapore's 153 orchid farms produced another 
S$2.2 million worth of flowers for the domestic market. 

Local fishermen provided about 13 percent of the country's 
110,000-ton fresh fish supply in 1988, using three major fishing 
methods — trawling, gill-netting, and long-lining. There were about 
1,170 licensed fishermen operating nearly 400 fishing vessels, most 
of which were motorized. The Jurong Port and Market Complex 
was a major fish landing point for both domestic and foreign ves- 
sels and handled 84 percent of the total fresh fish supply in 1988. 
Many foreign vessels brought their catches there for processing and 
reexport. Fresh fish arrived also by truck from Malaysia and 
Thailand and by sea and air from other neighboring countries. 



172 



The Ayer Rajah Expressway 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of 
Communications and Information 



Mass Rapid Transit train 
passing a Housing and 
Development Board 
apartment complex 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of 
Communications and Information 




173 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Fish farming was a small but growing field. In 1988 seventy- 
four licensed marine fish farms raised mainly high-value fish such 
as grouper and sea bass in a total of forty hectares of coastal waters. 
Many of the farms had also introduced prawn farming in floating 
cages. Exports of ornamental fish for aquariums amounted to S$60 
million in 1988. Some 400 licensed aquarium fish farms operated 
in Singapore in 1988, including 36 commercial farms operating 
in the Tampines Aquarium Fish Farming Estate. 

* * * 

Lawrence B. Krause, et al. present an interesting and readable 
background analysis in The Singapore Economy Reconsidered. For a 
summary of Singaporean economic development between 1959 and 
1984, see Singapore: Twenty-Five Years of Development edited by You 
Poh Seng and Lim Chong Yah. The 1986 Report of the Econom- 
ic Committee The Singapore Economy: New Directions (Singaporean 
Ministry of Trade and Industry) is vital for understanding the 1985 
recession and the government's strategies for overcoming it and 
entering the 1990s. Analysis on this same subject is provided in 
Policy Options for the Singapore Economy by Lim Chong Yah, et al. 
Margaret W. Sullivan's e( Can Survive, La": Cottage Industries in High- 
rise Singapore presents a sidewalk-level view of Singapore's small- 
scale manufacturing and economic and social psychology. The 
weekly Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong] provides up-to- 
date information on economic events and developments. Statisti- 
cal information from the Singapore government abounds in the 
form of annual yearbooks from the various ministries — Culture, 
Trade and Industry, and the Department of Statistics — and the 
very useful, although promotional, Singapore 1989 and its annual 
equivalents. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



174 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of Singapore, 1959- 



AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, Sin- 
gapore enjoyed a reputation for political stability and honest, 
effective government. Probably the world's only ex-colony to have 
independence forced upon it, Singapore responded to its unantici- 
pated expulsion from Malaysia in August 1965 by concentrating 
on economic development and by fostering a sense of nationhood. 
Though the survival of the miniature state was in doubt for a time, 
it not only survived but also managed to achieve the highest stan- 
dard of living in Southeast Asia. The country also enjoyed a rare 
political continuity; its ruling party and prime minister triumphed 
in every election from 1959 to 1988. Singapore's government had 
an international reputation for effective administration and for in- 
genious and successful economic policies. It was also known for 
its authoritarian style of governance and limited tolerance for op- 
position or criticism, qualities the government deemed necessary 
to ensure survival in a hostile world and which its domestic and 
foreign critics claimed indicated a refusal to consider the opinions 
of its citizens or anyone outside the closed circle of the aging leader- 
ship. In the early 1990s, the leadership would face the issues of 
political succession and of modifying the relationship between the 
state and the increasingly prosperous and well-educated society it 
had created. 

Government Structure 

Form of Government 

The Republic of Singapore is a city-state with a governing struc- 
ture patterned on the British system of parliamentary government 
(see fig. 11). In 1989 legislative power was vested in a unicameral 
Parliament with eighty-one members who were elected for five-year 
terms (or less if the Parliament was dissolved prematurely). Mem- 
bers of Parliament were elected by universal adult suffrage from 
forty-two single-member constituencies and thirteen group represen- 
tation constituencies. Voting was compulsory for all citizens above 
the age of twenty-one. The group representation constituencies elect- 
ed a team of three members, at least one of whom had to be Ma- 
lay, Indian, or a member of one of Singapore's other minorities. 
The group representation constituencies, introduced in the 1988 
general election, were intended to ensure multiracial parliamentary 
representation to reflect Singapore's multiracial society. In another 



177 



Singapore: A Country Study 



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178 



Government and Politics 



departure from the British model, members of Parliament elected 
on a party ticket had to resign if they changed parties. A 1984 
amendment to the Parliamentary Elections Act provided for the 
appointment to Parliament of up to three nonconstituency mem- 
bers if the opposition parties failed to win at least three seats in 
the general election. The nonconstituency members were chosen 
from the opposition candidates who had polled the highest percen- 
tage of votes. The seventh Parliament, elected on September 3, 
1988, and meeting for the first time on January 9, 1989, included 
one elected opposition member and one nonconstituency member. 

Singapore had only one level of government — national govern- 
ment and local government were one and the same. The form of 
the government reflected the country's unusually small area and 
modest total population of 2.6 million. Below the national level, 
the only recognized territorial divisions were the fifty-five parliamen- 
tary constituencies. Members of Parliament thus performed some 
of the same functions as municipal aldermen in foreign cities and 
often won political support by helping to find jobs for constituents 
or doing other favors requiring intercession with the powerful civil 
bureaucracy. The single-member constituencies varied in popula- 
tion from 1 1 ,000 electors to as many as 55,000; some of the varia- 
bility reflected population movement away from the old urban core 
and out to new housing developments. 

As in all British-style polities, the government was headed by 
a prime minister who led a cabinet of ministers of state selected 
from the ranks of the members of Parliament. The cabinet was 
the policy-making body, and its members directed the work of the 
permanent civil servants in the ministries they headed. In 1989, 
the cabinet comprised fifteen members. Below the prime minister 
were a first deputy prime minister and a second deputy prime 
minister. They were followed by the ministers in charge of such 
functional departments as the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry 
of Defence and by two ministers without portfolio. The prime 
minister could reassign his cabinet members to new portfolios or 
drop them from the cabinet, and successful ministers headed several 
progressively more significant ministries in their careers. There were 
thirteen ministerial portfolios in 1989: defence, law, foreign affairs, 
national development, education, environment, communications 
and information, home affairs, finance, labour, community develop- 
ment, trade and industry, and health. Some portfolios were split 
between different ministers. The first deputy prime minister (Goh 
Chok Tong) was also first minister for defence. The minister for 
communications and information (Yeo Ning Hong) also served as 
second minister for defence (policy). The minister for trade and 



179 



Singapore: A Country Study 



industry (Brigadier General (Reserve) Lee Hsien Loong) was con- 
currently second minister for defence (services). The foreign affairs 
and law portfolios were similarly divided. 

The cabinet met once or twice a week; its meetings were private 
and confidential. Administrative and staff support to the prime 
minister and cabinet was provided by the Office of the Prime 
Minister, the officials of which included a senior minister of state, 
a political secretary, a secretary to the prime minister, and a secre- 
tary to the cabinet. The Office of the Prime Minister coordinated 
and monitored the activities of all ministries and government bodies 
and also directly supervised the Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau and the Elections Department. Each minister was assisted 
by two secretaries, one for parliamentary or political affairs and 
the other for administrative affairs. The latter, the permanent secre- 
tary, was the highest ranking career civil servant of the ministry. 

The constitutional head of state was the president, who occupied 
a largely powerless and ceremonial role. The president was elect- 
ed by the Parliament for a four-year term. He could be reelected 
without limit and removed from office by a two-thirds vote of Parlia- 
ment. In turn, the president formally appointed as prime minister 
the member of Parliament who had the support of the majority 
of Parliament. On the advice of the prime minister, the president 
then appointed the rest of the ministers from the ranks of the mem- 
bers of Parliament. The president, acting on the advice of the prime 
minister, also appointed a wide range of government officials, in- 
cluding judges and members of advisory boards and councils. 

In 1988 the government discussed amending the Constitution 
to increase the power of the president. A white paper introduced 
in Parliament in July 1 988 recommended that the president be 
directly elected by the people for a six-year term and have veto 
power over government spending as well as over key appointments. 
It also proposed an elected vice president with a six-year term of 
office. The proposed changes originated as a device intended to 
permit Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who had been prime 
minister since 1959, to retain some power should he retire, as he 
had hinted, and assume the presidency. No specific dates for the 
proposed constitutional change were given in the white paper. As 
of late 1989, no action had been taken. 

Constitutional Framework 

Singapore became an autonomous state within Malaysia, with 
its own constitution, on September 16, 1963. It separated from 
Malaysia on August 9, 1965. On December 22, 1965, the Leg- 
islative Assembly passed a Singapore Independence Bill and a 



180 



Government and Politics 



Constitutional Amendment. The Constitutional Amendment pro- 
vided for a parliamentary system of government, with a president, 
whose duties were largely ceremonial, elected every four years by 
the Parliament. 

The Constitution can be amended by a two- thirds vote of Parlia- 
ment. A 1966 amendment allowed appeal from the Court of Ap- 
peal in Singapore to the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy 
Council (see Glossary) in Britain. In 1968 an amendment created 
the office of vice president and liberalized the requirements of 
citizenship. A 1969 amendment established the Supreme Court in 
place of the High Court and Court of Appeal as the highest appeal 
tribunal. A 1972 amendment entitled "Protection of the Sovereignty 
of the Republic of Singapore' ' introduced a measure to ensure the 
sovereignty of the city-state. It prohibited any merger or incorpo- 
ration with another sovereign state, unless approved in a national 
referendum by a two- thirds majority. Under the same terms, it 
also prohibited the relinquishment of control over Singapore police 
forces and armed forces. In 1978 the Fundamental Liberties sec- 
tion of the Constitution (Part IV, Articles 9-16) was amended; the 
amendment extended government powers by establishing that ar- 
rests to preserve public safety and good order and laws on drug 
abuse would not be inconsistent with liberties set forth in that sec- 
tion of the Constitution. 

Major Governmental Bodies 

The President 

The Constitution states that the president shall be elected by 
Parliament for a term of four years. In consultation with the prime 
minister, the president appoints to his personal staff any public 
officers from a list provided by the Public Service Commission. 
In the exercise of his duties, the president acts in accordance with 
the advice of the cabinet or of a minister acting under the authori- 
ty of the cabinet. The president may use his discretion in the ap- 
pointment of the prime minister and in withholding consent to a 
request for the dissolution of Parliament. 

The Executive 

The Constitution stipulates that the executive authority of Sin- 
gapore is vested in the president and exercised by him or the cabi- 
net or any minister authorized by the cabinet, subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution. The cabinet directs and controls 
the government and is responsible to Parliament. The president 



181 



Singapore: A Country Study 

appoints a member of Parliament as prime minister and, in accor- 
dance with the advice of the prime minister, appoints an attorney 
general. The attorney general advises the government on legal mat- 
ters and has the discretionary power to initiate, conduct, or ter- 
minate any proceedings for any offense. 

The Legislature 

The legislature consists of the president and Parliament. Mem- 
bers must be citizens of Singapore, twenty-one years of age or older, 
on the current register of electors, able to communicate in either 
English, Malay, Mandarin Chinese, or Tamil, and of sound mind. 
Membership ceases with the dissolution of a Parliament, which takes 
place every five years or at the initiative of the president. A gener- 
al election must be held within three months of the dissolution of 
Parliament. Parliament convenes at least once a year, scheduling 
its meetings after the first session is summoned by the president. 
Members may speak in English, Malay, Mandarin Chinese, or 
Tamil, and simultaneous translation is provided. Parliamentary 
procedure follows the British pattern: all bills are deliberated in 
three readings and passed by a simple majority. Only the govern- 
ment may introduce money bills, those that allocate public funds 
and so provide for the ongoing operations of the state. Once passed, 
bills become laws with the assent of the president and publication 
in the official Gazette. 

The final step in the passage of laws is the examination of bills 
by the Presidential Council for Minority Rights. The council, es- 
tablished by the Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1969, must de- 
termine if bills or other proposed legislation discriminate against 
any religious or ethnic community or otherwise contravene the fun- 
damental liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. It also renders 
advisory opinions on matters affecting ethnic and religious com- 
munities that are referred to the council by the Parliament or 
government. The council is composed of ten members appointed 
for life and ten members and a chairman appointed for three-year 
terms by the president on the advice of the cabinet. Any bill on 
which the council renders an adverse opinion may not become law 
unless modified to its satisfaction or passed by two-thirds of the 
Parliament. The council has no jurisdiction over money bills or 
over any bill certified by the prime minister as affecting the defense 
or security of Singapore or the country's ' 'public safety, peace, 
or good order." In addition, bills certified by the prime minister 
as so urgent that it is not in the public interest to delay their enact- 
ment are also exempted from review by the council. 



182 




Singapore Supreme Court 
Courtesy Ong Tien Kwan 
Singapore Parliament House 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 



183 



Singapore: A Country Study 
Elections 

The electoral system is based on single-member constituencies. 
The law (amendments to the Constitution and to the Parliamen- 
tary Elections Act) providing for group representation constituen- 
cies also stipulated that the total number of members of Parliament 
from group representation constituencies had to total less than half 
the total number of members. Slightly more than half the consti- 
tuencies would remain single-member constituencies. The candi- 
date receiving the largest number of votes wins the election in that 
constituency. The consequence of this electoral rule, common to 
most British-style constitutions, is to eliminate parliamentary repre- 
sentation for minority parties and to encourage the organization 
of parties whose candidates can win pluralities in many constit- 
uencies. In theory it is possible for a party to win every seat in 
parliament by receiving a plurality in every constituency. 

The Judiciary 

Singapore's judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court, con- 
sisting of a chief justice and an unspecified number of other judges. 
All are appointed by the president, acting on the advice of the prime 
minister. The judiciary functions as the chief guardian of the Con- 
stitution through its judicial review of the constitutionality of laws. 
The Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1969, and various subse- 
quent acts ensured judicial independence and integrity by provid- 
ing for the inviolability of judges in the exercise of their duties and 
for safeguards on their tenure. 

The Constitution establishes two levels of courts — the Supreme 
Court and the subordinate courts. The subordinate courts are the 
magistrates' courts, trying civil and criminal offenses with maxi- 
mum penalties of three years' imprisonment or a fine of S$ 10,000 
(for value of the Singapore dollar — see Glossary); the district courts, 
trying cases with maximum penalties of ten years' imprisonment 
or a fine of S$50,000; the juvenile courts, for offenders below the 
age of sixteen; the coroners' courts; and the small claims courts, 
which hear civil and commercial claims for sums of less than S$2,000. 
The Supreme Court consisted of the High Court, which has un- 
limited original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases and which 
tries all cases involving capital punishment; the Court of Appeal, 
which hears appeals from any judgment of the High Court in civil 
matters; and the Court of Criminal Appeal, which hears appeals 
from decisions of the High Court in criminal cases. The final ap- 
pellate court is the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Coun- 
cil in London. According to Article 100 of the Constitution, the 



184 



Government and Politics 



president may make arrangements for appeals from the Supreme 
Court to be heard by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun- 
cil. In May 1989, Parliament abolished the right to appeal to the 
Privy Council except for criminal cases involving the death sen- 
tence and civil cases in which the parties had agreed in writing to 
such an appeal at the outset. The judicial system reflected British 
legal practice and traditions, except for trial by jury. Singapore 
abolished jury trials except for capital offenses in 1959; all jury trials 
were abolished by the 1969 amendment of the code of criminal 
procedure. 

The chief justice and other judges of the Supreme Court are ap- 
pointed by the president on the advice of the prime minister. The 
prime minister, however, is required to consult the chief justice 
on his recommendations for the Supreme Court. Judges of the 
subordinate courts are appointed by the president on the advice 
of the chief justice. Singapore's judges and superior courts repeat- 
edly demonstrated their independence from the government by rul- 
ing against the government in cases involving political opponents 
or civil liberties. The government response in such cases was to 
amend the law or to pass new laws, but it did not attempt to re- 
move or to intimidate judges. Although internal political struggle 
in Singapore from the 1950s through the 1980s was often intense, 
and the ruling government was quite willing to intimidate and im- 
prison its political opponents, it always followed legal forms and 
procedures. 

The attorney general is appointed by the president, on the ad- 
vice of the prime minister, from persons qualified to become judges 
of the Supreme Court. A judge may be removed from office only 
for misbehavior or incapacitation, which must be certified by an 
independent tribunal. The attorney general, who is assisted by the 
solicitor general, is the principal legal advisor to the government, 
serves as the public prosecutor, and is responsible for drafting all 
legislation. The office of the attorney general, the Attorney Gener- 
al's Chambers, is divided into the legislation, civil, and criminal 
divisions. 

The Public Service 

The public services included the Singapore Armed Forces, the 
Singapore Civil Service, the Singapore Legal Service, and the Sin- 
gapore Police Force. A Public Service Commission, consisting of 
a chairman and no less than five nor more than nine other mem- 
bers, was appointed by the president, with the advice of the prime 
minister. The Public Service Commission acted to appoint, con- 
firm, promote, transfer, dismiss, pension, and impose disciplinary 



185 



Singapore: A Country Study 

control over public officers. The Public Service Division, estab- 
lished within the Ministry of Finance in 1983, managed civil ser- 
vice personnel. It was headed by a permanent secretary who was 
responsible to the minister for finance. 

A Legal Service Commission, with jurisdiction over all officers 
in the Singapore Legal Service, was composed of the chief justice 
as president, the attorney general, the chairman of the Public Ser- 
vice Commission, a judge of the Supreme Court nominated by the 
chief justice, and not more than two members of the Public Ser- 
vice Commission nominated by that commission's chairman. The 
Legal Service Commission acted to appoint, confirm, promote, 
transfer, dismiss, pension, and exercise disciplinary control over 
officers in the Singapore Legal Service. 

The investigation of corruption in both the public and private 
sectors was under the sole authority of the Corrupt Practices In- 
vestigation Bureau, part of the prime minister's office. The Audi- 
tor General's Office, an independent agency functioning without 
interference from any ministry or department, monitored Parlia- 
ment to ensure its compliance with laws and regulations and to 
identify irregularities in its disbursement of government resources. 

The Public Bureaucracy 

The government played an active role in managing the soci- 
ety and developing the economy and was the country's largest sin- 
gle employer. Government bodies and their employees fell into 
two distinct categories. The regular ministries and their civil ser- 
vice employees concentrated on recurrent and routine administra- 
tive tasks. The three ministries of education, health, and home 
affairs (including police, fire, and immigration) employed 62 per- 
cent (43,000) of the 69,700 civil servants in 1988. Members of the 
civil service in the strict sense of the term were those public em- 
ployees who were appointed by the Public Service Commission and 
managed by the Ministry of Finance's Public Service Division. 
Active projects in economic development and social engineering 
were carried out by a large number of special-purpose statutory 
boards and public enterprises, which were free from bureaucratic 
procedures and to which Parliament delegated sweeping powers. 
As of 1984, there were eighty-three statutory boards employing 
56,000 persons. About 125,000 members (10 percent) of the 1987 
total work force were public employees (see Manpower and Labor, 
ch. 3). 

The two branches of the public service served different functions 
in the political system. The civil service proper represented institu- 
tional continuity and performed such fundamental tasks as the 



186 



Government and Politics 



collection of revenue, the delivery of such goods as potable water, 
and the provision of medical and educational services. The vari- 
ous quasigovernmental bodies, such as statutory boards, public en- 
terprises, commissions, and councils represented adaptability, 
innovation, and responsiveness to local conditions. The constitu- 
tional framework of Singapore's government, with its Parliament, 
cabinet, courts, and functional ministries, resembled that of its Brit- 
ish model and its peers in other countries of the British Common- 
wealth of Nations (see Glossary). The particular collection of boards 
and councils, which included everything from the Central Provi- 
dent Fund to the Sikh Advisory Board, reflected the successful adap- 
tation of the British model to its Southeast Asian environment. 

Public service employment carried high prestige, and there was 
considerable competition for positions with the civil service or the 
statutory boards. Civil servants were appointed without regard to 
race or religion, and selected primarily on their performance on 
competitive written examinations. The civil service had four hier- 
archical divisions and some highly ranked " super grade" officials. 
On January 1, 1988, there were 493 supergrade officers, who in- 
cluded ministerial permanent secretaries and departmental secre- 
taries and constituted less than 1 percent of the 69,700 civil servants. 
Division one consisted of senior administrative and professional 
posts and contained 14 percent of the civil servants. The mid-level 
divisions two and three contained educated and specialized work- 
ers who performed most routine government work and who made 
up the largest group of civil servants, 33 and 32 percent of all civil 
servants, respectively. Division four consisted of manual and semi- 
skilled workers who made up 20 percent of employees. In 1987, 
there were 3,153 appointments from the 9,249 applicants for posi- 
tions in divisions one through three; 2,200 (some 70 percent) of 
the appointees were women. 

The Singapore public service was regarded as almost entirely 
free from corruption, a fact that in large part reflected the strong 
emphasis the national leadership placed on probity and dedication 
to national values. The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau en- 
joyed sweeping powers of investigation and the unreserved support 
of the prime minister. Official honesty was also promoted by the 
relatively high salaries paid to public officials; the high salaries were 
justified by the need to remove temptations for corruption. In a sys- 
tem with clear echoes of the Chinese Confucian tradition, and the 
British administrative civil service, which recruited the top gradu- 
ates of the ejite universities, Singapore's public service attempted, 
generally successfully, to recruit the most academically talented 
youth. The Public Service Commission awarded scholarships to 



187 



Singapore: A Country Study 

promising young people for study both in Singapore and at for- 
eign universities on the condition that the recipients join the civil 
service after graduation. Young recruits to the development-oriented 
statutory boards were often given substantial responsibilities for 
ambitious projects in industrial development or the construction 
of housing estates. Officials had greater social prestige than their 
peers in business; power and official title outranked money in the 
local scale of esteem. 

Statutory Boards 

The eighty-three statutory boards were a distinctive feature of 
Singapore's government. In law, a statutory board was an autono- 
mous government agency established by an act of Parliament that 
specified the purpose, rights, and powers of the body. It was separate 
from the formal government structure, not staffed by civil servants, 
and it did not enjoy the legal privileges and immunities of govern- 
ment departments. It had much greater autonomy and flexibility 
in its operations than regular government departments. Its activi- 
ties were overseen by a cabinet minister who represented Parlia- 
ment to the board and the board to Parliament. Statutory boards 
were managed by a board of directors, whose members typically 
included senior civil servants, businessmen, professionals, and trade 
union officials. The chairman of the board of directors, who was 
often a member of Parliament, a senior civil servant, or a person 
distinguished in some relevant field, was appointed by the cabinet 
minister who had jurisdiction over the board. The employees of 
the board were not civil servants, as they were not appointed by 
the Public Service Commission. The salary scales and terms of ser- 
vice of employees differed from board to board. Statutory boards 
did not receive regular allocations of funds from the public trea- 
sury, but were usually expected to generate their own funds from 
their activities. Surplus funds were invested or used as develop- 
ment capital, and boards could borrow funds from the government 
or such bodies as the World Bank (see Glossary). Statutory boards 
included the Housing and Development Board, the Central Provi- 
dent Fund, the Port of Singapore Authority, the Industrial Train- 
ing Board, the Family Planning and Population Board, and the 
Singapore Muslim Religious Council (Majlis Ugama Islam Sin- 
gapura). 

The statutory boards played the major role in the government's 
postindependence development strategy, and their activities usually 
served multiple economic and political goals. The Housing and 
Development Board provided a good example. The board was es- 
tablished by the first People's Action Party (PAP) government on 



188 



Government and Politics 

February 1, 1960, to provide low-cost public housing. The Lands 
Acquisition Act of 1 966 granted the board the power of compulso- 
ry purchase of any private land required for housing development. 
The prices paid by the board were about 20 percent of the esti- 
mated market value of the land, which was, in fact if not in form, 
being nationalized. Between 1960 and 1979, the percentage of land 
owned by the government rose from 44 to 67 percent, increasing 
the government's control over that scarce resource and benefiting 
low-income voters, who supported the PAP, at the expense of the 
much smaller number of private landowners. Rents for Housing 
and Development Board apartments were subsidized, and selling 
prices for the apartments were set below construction costs and did 
not include land acquisition costs. Purchase prices for board apart- 
ments in the 1980s were 50 to 70 percent below those of privately 
owned apartments. By 1988 Housing and Development Board 
apartment complexes were home to 86 percent of the population, 
and construction of new apartments continued. 

The Housing and Development Board succeeded in its primary 
goal of building large numbers of high-quality apartments. Its suc- 
cess depended on several factors, among them: access to large 
amounts of government capital; sweeping powers of land acquisi- 
tion; the ability to train its own construction workers and engineers; 
the freedom to act as a building corporation and develop its own 
quarries and brick factory; the opportunity to enter into partner- 
ships and contracts with suppliers of construction materials; and 
the ability to prevent corruption in contracting and allocation of 
apartments to the public. The government raised the capital for 
housing construction from the Central Provident Fund, a compul- 
sory savings plan into which all Singapore workers contributed up 
to 25 percent of their monthly incomes, and from low-interest, long- 
term loans from such international development agencies as the 
World Bank. 

By providing adequate housing at low cost to low-paid workers 
in the 1960s, the PAP delivered a highly visible and concrete po- 
litical reward to the electorate and laid the foundations for its un- 
broken electoral success. In the 1960s and early 1970s, before the 
growth of export-oriented industry, housing construction provid- 
ed much employment and an opportunity for workers to learn new 
skills. By controlling the pace and scale of housing construction, 
the government was able to better regulate the economy and smooth 
out cycles of economic activity. The result of rehousing practically 
the entire population was to make the government either the land- 
lord or the mortgage holder for most families and so bring them 
into closer contact with the state. The government used resettiement 



189 



Singapore: A Country Study 

to break up the ethnic enclaves and communities that had charac- 
terized colonial Singapore. It put its policy of multiracialism into 
practice by seeing that all apartment buildings contained members 
of all ethnic groups in numbers that reflected their proportion of 
the national population (see Population Distribution and Hous- 
ing Policies, ch. 2). The program kept the cost of housing in Sin- 
gapore relatively low and helped to avert pressure to raise wages. 
Because access to subsidized housing was a benefit extended only 
to citizens, it served to promote identification with the new state. 
Providing most of the population with low-cost housing gave the 
government and ruling party much favorable publicity, won pub- 
lic support, and was used as evidence for the correctness of the 
government's policies of centralized planning and social engineering 
implemented by experts on behalf of a passive public. 

In a similar fashion, the Central Provident Fund (see Patterns 
of Development, ch. 3) benefited the citizens by providing them 
with secure savings for their old age and the satisfaction of having 
their own account, which could be used as security for the pur- 
chase of a Housing and Development Board apartment, for such 
expenses as medical bills, for college tuition, or to finance a pil- 
grimage to Mecca. The government benefited by gaining control 
of a very large pool of capital that it could invest or spend as it 
would and by removing enough purchasing power to limit infla- 
tionary tendencies. Furthermore, the proportion of the wage con- 
tributed to the fund by both workers and their employers could 
be adjusted at any time, enhancing the government's ability to con- 
trol the economy. In 1988 the fund took 36 percent of all wages 
up to S$6,000 per month; 24 percent was paid by the worker and 
12 percent by the employer. Among its other functions, the Cen- 
tral Provident Fund was one of the major instruments used by the 
government to control wages. 

Public Enterprises 

Apart from the statutory boards, which met general development 
and infrastructure goals, the government owned or held equity in 
many businesses that operated in the private sector. The govern- 
ment asserted that such businesses received no special subsidies 
and would be liquidated if they proved unprofitable. The wholly 
government-owned Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited was the 
country's largest corporation. Operated as an investment and hold- 
ing corporation, its offices were in the Ministry of Finance, which 
provided the corporation with free accounting and secretarial ser- 
vices. Some government enterprises included former government 
departments, such as the Government Printing Office, which in 



190 



Government and Politics 



1973 became the Singapore National Printers Limited and offered 
its services to the private sector at market rates. Most government 
enterprises either provided key and potentially monopolistic ser- 
vices, such as Singapore International Airline or Neptune Orient 
Line, an ocean shipping firm, or they met strategic and defense 
needs. The Ministry of Defence wholly owned or had large equity 
shares in a range of companies engaged in weapons production, 
electronics, computer software, and even food production. In some 
cases the government banks, holding companies, or corporations 
were partners or had shares in local operations of multinational 
corporations. In such cases, the goal was both to attract the corpo- 
rations to Singapore by offering investment funds and the promise 
of cooperation from government departments and to ensure that 
the corporations transferred proprietary technology and training 
to Singapore. The strategic nature of much government enterprise 
was acknowledged by the January 20, 1984, passage of the Statu- 
tory Bodies and Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) 
Act. The law barred the unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
information by anyone associated with a statutory board or govern- 
ment enterprise and was considered necessary because the Offi- 
cial Secrets Act did not cover those bodies. 

Parapolitical Institutions 

After independence, Singapore's rulers perceived the popula- 
tion as uncommitted to the new state and as lacking a common 
identity. Accordingly, the government devoted much effort to foster- 
ing popular identification with the nation and commitment to the 
government's goals. In 1985 the Ministry of Community Develop- 
ment was formed by combining the former Ministry of Social Af- 
fairs with activities previously administered by the Office of the 
Prime Minister and by the Ministry of Culture. The new minis- 
try coordinated a network of grassroots agencies intended to pro- 
mote community spirit and social cohesion. These were the People's 
Association, the Citizens' Consultative Committees, the Residents' 
Committees, and the Community Center Management Commit- 
tees. The People's Association was a statutory board established 
in 1960 and until 1985 a part of the Office of the Prime Minister. 
Its primary activity was to manage a system of 128 community 
centers, which offered recreational and cultural programs, along 
with such services as kindergartens and a limited number of day- 
care centers for children of working parents. The members of the 
various consultative and management committees were volunteers 
who received prestige but no salary. Each parliamentary consti- 
tuency had a Citizens' Consultative Committee, whose members 



191 



Singapore: A Country Study 

were in frequent contact with their member of Parliament. All 
Housing and Development Board apartment complexes had Resi- 
dents' Committees, headed by volunteers and intended to promote 
neighborliness and community cohesion. The committees' activi- 
ties included organization of neighborhood watch programs and 
tree-planting campaigns, in which the committees were assisted by 
the civil servants of the Residents' Committees Group Secretari- 
at. In 1986 the government began organizing Town Councils in 
the larger housing estates. Although not official government bod- 
ies, the councils' immediate purpose was to take over some respon- 
sibilities for management of the complexes from the Housing and 
Development Board. Their larger purpose was to promote a greater 
sense of community and public involvement in the residents of the 
clusters of high-rise apartment buildings. In March 1985, the 
government inaugurated a Feedback Unit, a body intended to col- 
lect public opinion on proposed government policies and to en- 
courage government departments to respond quickly to public 
suggestions or complaints. 

The various advisory committees and the Feedback Unit provided 
functions that in many countries are provided by political parties. 
In Singapore the parapolitical institutions, which had the clearly 
political goal of generating public support for government policies, 
were presented as apolitical, inclusive, community-oriented bod- 
ies, headed by people motivated by a selfless desire for public serv- 
ice. Such an approach reflected a decision made by the country's 
rulers in the 1960s to avoid trying to organize a mass political party, 
in part because many less-educated citizens tended to shy away 
from partisan and overtly political groups. Others habitually avoided 
government offices and officers but would participate in community- 
oriented and attractive programs. The ruling elite had had serious 
problems both with opposition parties and with left-wing opposi- 
tion factions within the PAP and apparently found the controlled 
mobilization offered by the parapolitical institutions more to its lik- 
ing. Members of all the advisory and consultative boards were ap- 
pointed by the government and were carefully checked by the 
security services before appointment. The government closely 
watched the performance of the leaders of the community organi- 
zations and considered the organizations a pool of talent from which 
promising individuals could be identified, promoted to more respon- 
sible positions, and perhaps recruited to the political leadership. 

Political Parties 

In 1989 the government of Singapore had been led since 1959 
by one political party, the PAP, and one man, Prime Minister Lee 



192 



Government and Politics 



Kuan Yew. In the 1988 parliamentary elections, opposition can- 
didates challenged the ruling party in an unprecedented seventy 
contests, but the PAP still won eighty of the eighty-one seats in 
Parliament with 61.8 percent of the popular vote, 1 percent less 
than in 1984, and 14 percent less than in 1980. 

The PAP was founded in 1954, and in the mid- and late 1950s 
acted as a left-wing party of trade unionists, whose leadership con- 
sisted of English-educated lawyers and journalists and Chinese- 
educated and pro-communist trade union leaders and educators. 
It won control of the government in the crucial 1959 election to 
the Legislative Assembly, which was the first election with a mass 
electorate and for an administration that had internal self-gov- 
ernment (defense and foreign relations remained under British 
control). The PAP mobilized mass support, ran candidates in all 
fifty-one constituencies, and won control of the government with 
forty- three of the fifty-one seats and 53 percent of the popular vote 
(see People's Action Party, ch. 1). After a bitter internal struggle 
the English-educated, more pragmatic wing of the party triumphed 
over the pro-communists in 1961 and went on to an unbroken string 
of electoral victories, winning all the seats in Parliament in the 1968, 
1972, 1976, and 1980 general elections. 

With a single party and set of leaders ruling the country for thirty 
years, Singapore had what political scientists called a dominant 
party system or a hegemonic party system, similar to that of Japan 
or Mexico. There were regular elections and opposition parties and 
independent candidates contested the elections, but after the early 
1960s the opposition had little chance of replacing the PAP, which 
regularly won 60 to 70 percent of the popular vote. The strongest 
opposition came from the left, with union-based parties appealing 
to unskilled and factory workers. In the early 1960s, the union 
movement split between the leftist Singapore Association of Trade 
Unions and the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), which 
was associated with Lee Kuan Yew's pragmatic wing of the PAP. 
In 1963 the Singapore Association of Trade Unions was banned 
and its leaders arrested as pro-communist subversives. The NTUC 
was controlled by the PAP and followed a government- sponsored 
program of ''modern unionism," under which strikes were un- 
known and wages were, in practice, set by the government through 
the National Wages Council. 

The dominance of the PAP rested on popular support won by 
economic growth and improved standards of living combined with 
unhesitating repression of opposition leaders, who were regularly 
arrested on charges of being communist agents or sympathizers. 
In the mid-1980s, eighteen other political parties were registered, 



193 



Singapore: A Country Study 

although many of them were defunct, existed only on paper, or 
were the vehicles of single leaders. Much of the electoral support 
for opposition parties represented protest votes. Those voting for 
opposition candidates did not necessarily expect them to win or 
even wish to replace the PAP government. They used their votes 
to express displeasure with some or all PAP policies. 

At the top of the PAP organization was the Central Executive 
Committee (CEC). In 1954 the PAP constitution provided for a 
CEC of twelve persons directly elected by party members at the 
annual general meeting. The CEC then elected its own chairman, 
vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, and assis- 
tant treasurer. This practice continued until August 1957, when 
six pro-communist members of the party succeeded in being elect- 
ed. In 1958 the party revised its constitution to avoid a recurrence. 
The document called for CEC members to be elected at biennial 
party conferences by party cadre members, who in turn were chosen 
by a majority vote of the committee. The CEC was the most im- 
portant party unit, with a membership overlapping the cabinet's. 
The two bodies were practically indistinguishable. Chairmanship 
of the CEC was a nominal post. Actual power rested in the hands 
of a secretary general, a post held by Lee Kuan Yew since the 
party's founding. He was assisted by a deputy secretary general 
who was charged with day-to-day party administration. 

Subordinate to the CEC were the branches, basic party units 
established in all electoral constituencies. The branches were con- 
trolled by individual executive committees, chaired in most cases 
by the local delegate to Parliament. As a precaution against leftist 
infiltration, the CEC approved all committee members before they 
assumed their posts. One-half of the committee members were elect- 
ed and one-half nominated by the local chairman. Branch activi- 
ties were monitored by the party's headquarters through monthly 
meetings between members of the party cadre and the local ex- 
ecutive committee. The meetings provided a forum for party leaders 
to communicate policy to branch members and a means to main- 
tain surveillance over local activities. 

The party's cadre system was the key to maintaining discipline 
and authority within the party. Individual cadres were selected by 
the CEC on the basis of loyalty, anticommunist indoctrination, edu- 
cation, and political performance. Cadre members were not easi- 
ly identified but were estimated to number no more than 2 percent 
of the party's membership. As of 1989 a list of cadres had never 
been published. 

Although clearly the dominant party, the PAP differed from the 
ruling parties of pure one-party states in two significant ways. 



194 



Government and Politics 



Unlike the leaders of communist parties, the leaders of the PAP 
made no effort to draw the mass of the population into the party 
or party-led organizations or to replace community organizations 
with party structures. Singapore's leaders emphasized their govern- 
ment roles rather than their party ones, and party organizations 
were largely dormant, activated only for elections. Compulsory vot- 
ing brought the electors to the polls, and the record of the govern- 
ment and the fragmented state of the opposition guaranteed victory 
to most if not all PAP candidates. In many general elections, more 
than half of the seats were uncontested, thus assuring the election 
of PAP candidates. The relatively weak party organization was the 
result of the decision of the leaders to use government structures 
and the network of ostensibly apolitical community organizations 
to achieve their ends. By the 1970s and 1980s, the leaders had con- 
fidence in the loyalty of the public service and had no need for a 
separate party organization to act as watchdog over the bureaucracy. 
The government was quite successful at co-opting traditional com- 
munity leaders into its system of advisory boards, committees, and 
councils, and felt no need to build a distinct organization of party 
activists to wrest power from community leaders. Second-echelon 
leaders were recruited through appointment and co-optation and 
were preferentially drawn from the bureaucracy, the professions, 
and private enterprises, typically joining the PAP only when nomi- 
nated for a parliamentary seat. The path to Parliament and the 
cabinet did not run through constituency party branches or the PAP 
secretariat. In the view of the leadership, political parties were in- 
struments used to win elections and could be dispensed with if there 
was little prospect of serious electoral competition. 

Political Dynamics 

Power Structure 

In 1989 political power in Singapore had largely passed from 
the hands of the small group of individuals who had been instrumen- 
tal in Singapore's gaining independence. The successors of the in- 
dependence generation tended to be technocrats, administrators, 
and managers rather than politicians or power brokers. The PAP 
leaders, convinced that a city-state without natural resources could 
not afford the luxury of partisan politics, acted after 1965 to 
"depoliticize" the power structure. Economic growth and politi- 
cal stability would be maintained instead by the paternal guidance 
of the PAP. Politics, as a result, was only exercised within very 
narrow limits determined by the PAP. Singapore was thus ad- 
ministered by bureaucrats, not politicians, in a meritocracy in 



195 



Singapore: A Country Study 

which power was gained through skill, performance, and demon- 
strated loyalty to the leaders and their policies. 

At the top of the hierarchy in 1989 were fifteen cabinet ministers, 
who were concurrently members of Parliament and the CEC, the 
PAP's highest policy-making body. Among these ministers was an 
inner core of perhaps five members. Below this group was a tier 
of senior civil servants who, in addition to their official duties, filled 
managerial and supervisory roles as directors of public corpora- 
tions and statutory bodies. PAP members of Parliament without 
cabinet or government portfolios also tended to function at this level 
of the power hierarchy, providing links between the government 
and the populace. 

Rifts within the leadership were rare. Although minor differ- 
ences over policy may have existed, the top leaders presented a 
united front once decisions were made. The mode of decision mak- 
ing was consensus, and the style of leadership was collective, but 
in 1989 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was by far the first among 
equals on both counts. The leaders identified themselves with the 
nation, were convinced that they knew what was best for the na- 
tion, and interpreted opposition to themselves or their policies as 
a threat to the country's survival. 

The overwhelming majority of the leadership were not proper- 
tied or part of the entrepreneurial class. They did not appear par- 
ticularly motivated by profit, gained lawfully or through corruption 
(which was almost nonexistent), or by the perquisites of their office 
(which although increasing, remained less than could be achieved 
in the private sector). Their reward, instead, derived from their 
access to power and their conviction that they were working for 
the nation and its long-term survival. Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew and his close associates were highly conscious of their roles 
as founders of the new city-state. 

The power structure was extremely centralized. It was charac- 
terized by a top-down style, featuring appointment rather than elec- 
tion to most offices; the absence of institutional restraints on the 
power of the prime minister and cabinet; and more effort devoted 
to communicating the government's decisions and policies to the 
public than to soliciting the public's opinion. The high degree of 
centralization was facilitated by the country's relatively small size 
and population. Although members of Parliament were elected by 
the public, the candidates were selected by the core leadership, often 
ran unopposed, and regarded their positions as due to the favor 
of the prime minister rather than the will of the voters. At the highest 
levels, the distinction between the bureaucracy and the political 
offices of Parliament was only nominal, and many members of 



196 



Government and Politics 



Parliament were selected from the upper ranks of the civil service 
and the public enterprises. Many high-level civil servants had direct 
access to the prime minister, who consulted them without going 
through their nominally superior cabinet minister. 

Political Culture 

Singapore possessed a distinct political culture, which fit into 
no simple category formulated by political scientists. It was cen- 
tralized, authoritarian, and statist. It was also pragmatic, ration- 
al, and legalistic. In spite of possessing the superficial trappings 
of British institutions such as parliamentary procedure and bewigged 
judges, Singapore was, as its leaders kept reiterating, not a Western 
country with a Western political system. Although elections were 
held regularly, the electoral process had never led to a change of 
leadership, and citizens did not expect that political parties would 
alternate in power. Nor was there a tradition of civil liberties or 
of limits to state power. The rulers of an ex-colony with a multi- 
ethnic population, and a country independent only by default, 
assumed no popular consensus on the rules of or limits to political 
action. Singapore was a city-state where a small group of guard- 
ians used their superior knowledge to advance the prosperity of 
the republic and to bring benefits to what they considered a large- 
ly ignorant and passive population. 

Singapore's leaders were highly articulate and expressed their 
principles and goals in speeches, books, and interviews. Their 
highest goal was the survival and prosperity of their small nation. 
They saw this as an extremely difficult and risk-filled endeavor. 
Conscious of the vulnerability of their state and aware of many 
threats to its survival, they justified their policy decisions on the 
grounds of national survival. They viewed government as an in- 
strument intended to promote national ends and recognized no in- 
herent limits on government concerns or activities. They prized 
intellectual analysis and rational decision making, and considered 
their own decisions the best and often the only responses to 
problems. The senior leadership prided itself on its ability to take 
the long view and to make hard, unpopular decisions that either 
responded to immediate dangers or avoided problems that would 
become apparent one or two decades into the future. They valued 
activism and will, and tried to devise policies, programs, or cam- 
paigns to deal with all problems. In a characteristic expression of 
Singapore's political culture, the rising young leader Brigadier 
General (Reserve) Lee Hsien Loong, when discussing the threat 
to national survival posed by declining birth rates, said, "I don't 
think we should . . . passively watch ourselves going extinct." 



197 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Passivity and extinction were linked and identified as trends the 
government's policies must counter. 

The leadership's conviction of the state's vulnerability to manifold 
dangers and of the self-evident correctness of its analysis of those 
dangers resulted in very limited tolerance for opposition and dis- 
sent. According to Singapore's leaders, their opponents were either 
too unintelligent to comprehend the problems, too selfish to sacrifice 
for the common good, or maliciously intent on destroying the na- 
tion. Although by the 1980s Singapore had the highest standard 
of living in Southeast Asia, its leaders often compared it with gener- 
alized Third World countries. They saw such countries suffering 
from widespread corruption and demagogic politics, both reflect- 
ing concentration on immediate payoffs at the expense of long-term 
prosperity and the common good. For Singapore's leaders, poli- 
tics connoted disruptive and completely negative activities, charac- 
terized by demagoguery, factionalism, and inflammatory appeals 
to communal, ethnic, or religious passions. When they spoke of 
"depoliticizing" Singapore's government, they had this view of 
politics in mind. 

Key Political Issues 

Succession 

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew marked his sixty-fifth birthday 
in October 1988 and celebrated thirty years as prime minister in 
May 1989, and the question of political succession received increas- 
ing attention. The prime minister and his long-time associates 
devoted a good deal of their attention to the issue during the mid- 
and late 1980s. They continued their efforts to identify promising 
younger leaders and bring them into the cabinet. The process of 
selection was an elaborate one, which began by identifying well- 
educated administrators from the public service or private sector. 
Those people selected would be promoted to managerial positions, 
often when in their thirties; those who succeeded would be consid- 
ered for appointment to a government position, often by being 
designated a parliamentary candidate. In addition to identifying 
good administrators, the older leaders tried to select persons of in- 
tegrity and good character who were able to work as members of 
a team. Second- generation leaders were then tested by being given 
ministerial portfolios and encouraged to go out and meet the com- 
mon people. The selection favored technocrats and administrators 
and rewarded those able to defer to senior leaders and get along 
smoothly with their peers. The senior leaders were aware that the 
process did not test the ability of the second-generation leaders to 



198 



Government and Politics 



cope with a severe political crisis, but apparently could find no way 
to select for that skill. 

The first-generation leaders were confident of their own recti- 
tude and ability to use their very extensive powers for the com- 
mon good, but they were not confident that their successors would 
be so self-restrained. Throughout the 1980s, they considered vari- 
ous limits on executive power that would minimize the possibility 
of arbitrary and corrupt rule. These included constitutional changes 
such as a popularly elected president with significant powers. The 
leaders claimed, perhaps with hindsight, that their refusal to build 
up the PAP as a central political institution and their efforts to bring 
a wide range of low-level community leaders into the system of 
government advisory bodies reflected a deliberate effort to disperse 
power and, in this sense, to "depoliticize" the society. The effort 
to encourage the circulation of elites between the government and 
the private sectors and between the military and the civilian struc- 
tures served the same end. In so centralized a system, much de- 
pended on the decisions of the prime minister and undisputed 
leader, who was reluctant to appoint a designated heir or to ap- 
prove any measure that would diminish his authority. The expec- 
tation clearly was that a much more collective leadership would 
replace the old guard. 

An important member of the next generation of leaders was Lee 
Kuan Yew's son, Lee Hsien Loong. A brigadier general in the 
army, he first attained prominence in mid- 1984 when he was cited 
as a possible candidate for the December 1988 general election. 
His prominence soared when, as minister for trade and industry 
and second ministor for defence (services), he was appointed head 
in 1986 of the critical Economic Committee assigned to redraft Sin- 
gapore's economic strategy. 

Lee Hsien Loong' s ascendancy and his consolidation of adminis- 
trative and political power assisted the political fortunes of 
bureaucrats who formerly had served in the Ministry of Defence 
(known as the "Min-def mafia") and ex-army officers who had 
served with Lee when he was a brigadier general. The ascendancy 
of the so-called "Min-def/ex-army officer group" under Lee ini- 
tially was suggested by some observers when Singapore's armed 
forces appeared to assume new importance in government policy 
decisions. In March 1989, when the government announced a sub- 
stantial pay raise for the civil service, the military received an even 
larger raise with guarantees that future raises would be consistentiy 
higher than those allotted for the civil service. The government 
also announced that the policy of assigning military officers to two- 
year rotations in civil service positions would continue. The policy 



199 



Singapore: A Country Study 



ensured that the Singapore armed forces would be represented in 
all branches of the government and that the distinction between 
the civilian and military bureaucracies would be less clear. 

The younger Lee's ascendancy to positions of greater power both 
in the PAP and the cabinet demonstrated his increased political 
stature. He was elected second assistant secretary general of the 
party in 1989, a post that had been vacant since 1984. This posi- 
tion placed him second in line in the party hierarchy behind his 
father and Goh Chok Tong, who was first assistant secretary general 
of the party and deputy prime minister and minister for defence 
in the cabinet. Lee enhanced his position in the cabinet when, as 
minister for trade and industry, he was named chairman of a spe- 
cial economic policy review committee. In this capacity, he gained 
the power to review the policies of all the ministries for their eco- 
nomic impact on Singapore. Previously such reviews were conduct- 
ed only by the Ministry of Finance. Some Singapore observers 
speculated in 1989 that Lee would one day be appointed minister 
for finance and add control of Singapore's purse to his influence 
over the armed forces. 

Generational ties supplemented the institutional links. Lee Hsien 
Loong and his associates were in their mid- to late thirties in 1989. 
Lee's nearest rival for power was Goh, who was forty- seven years 
old and for the past five years had been carefully groomed to serve 
as Lee Kuan Yew's immediate successor. For those with a mili- 
tary background, the military connection remained important even 
though they had resigned from the military before undertaking their 
civilian posts. The obligation of all males to periodically undergo 
reservist training assured that the military connection was not sev- 
ered. If the army became a source of future cabinet ministers, some 
political observers expected that ethnic Malays and Indians would 
find it even more difficult to gain access to senior government po- 
sitions. Ironically, the army in pre-independent Singapore was 
predominantly Malay and Indian. After independence, however, 
the government changed this bias by increasing Chinese represen- 
tation through universal conscription. 

Relations Between State and Society 

By the late 1980s, Singapore's leaders generally agreed that the 
extensive economic and social transformation achieved after in- 
dependence required a changed pattern of relations between the 
government and society. Government policies and practices de- 
vised to deal with the much simpler economy and less educated 
and prosperous citizenry of the 1960s were becoming increasingly 



200 



Goh Chok Tong, first 
deputy prime minister and 
minister for defence 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry for 
Communications and Information 



Brigadier General 
Lee Hsien Loong, 
minister for trade 
and industry 
and second minister 
for defence 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry for 
Communications and Information 



Singapore: A Country Study 

ineffective in the 1980s. The major issues were economic, involv- 
ing debate over the optimal form of government involvement in 
the economy, and political, centering around highly contentious 
questions of the limits of government efforts to regulate the lives 
of citizens and to suppress dissent and criticism. 

The Government's Economic Role 

Singapore had achieved economic success with an economy that 
was heavily managed by the government (see Budgeting and Plan- 
ning, ch. 3). The state owned, controlled, or regulated the alloca- 
tion of capital, labor, and land. It controlled many of the market 
prices on which investors based their investment decisions and was 
the exclusive provider of social services and infrastructure. The 
1985-86 recession, however, stimulated discussion of impediments 
to economic performance and of dysfunctional aspects of the govern- 
ment 's role in the economy. A 1987 report by the government- 
appointed Private Sector Divestment Committee recommended that 
the state dispose of most of its interest in private companies over 
a ten-year period. It recommended privatizing forty-one of ninety- 
nine government-controlled companies and investing the proceeds 
in high- technology companies. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the government controlled 
wages through the annual wage guidelines set by the National 
Wages Council, a body in which representatives of employers, trade 
unions (which were controlled by the PAP), and the government 
reached a consensus on wage levels for the coming year. The coun- 
cil's wage guidelines were in the form of macroeconomic projec- 
tions and were applied across the board in all sectors of the economy. 
In December 1986, the cabinet approved a National Wages Council 
report calling for a revised wage system that permitted greater flex- 
ibility (the flexi-wage policy), with more use of bonuses and wage 
increases linked to increases in productivity. It was, however, not 
clear how the productivity of white-collar workers and civil ser- 
vants, who constituted an increasing proportion of the work force, 
was to be measured. The call for wages to reflect the productivity 
and profitability of particular industries and firms implied more 
bargaining between workers and employers and a diminished role 
for the government, which could not impose a single rate on 
hundreds of distinct firms. 

Although there was general agreement on the need for changed 
economic policies and modes of administration, significant tensions 
remained between those who favored greater flexibility and liber- 
alization and those who wanted government direction of the econ- 
omy. For Singapore's leaders, the challenge was to devise more 



202 



Singapore courtesy campaign 
Courtesy Ong Tien Kwan 




sophisticated means of ensuring overall control while permitting 
greater autonomy and flexibility at lower levels. 

The Limits of Government Control 

The highly ordered quality of life in Singapore itself became a 
political issue. Many citizens felt that they were over- regulated, 
governed by too many laws that were too easy to break. Singa- 
pore's leaders attributed the cause of the assumed decline of Western 
societies to the excessive individualism fostered by Western cul- 
ture and warned that Singapore would suffer a similar fate unless 
saved by a national ideology (see Singaporean Identity, ch. 2). 

The perceived need for an ideology was a phenomenon of the 
1980s. Previously, Singapore's leaders had been concerned with 
physical survival more than cultural survival and had dismissed 
official ideologies as contrary to Singapore's status as an open port 
unfettered by conventional wisdom or fashionable orthodoxies. In 
the 1980s, as peace prevailed in the region, the government shift- 
ed its focus to the cultural sphere. Cultural preservation replaced 
physical survival as the major concern of leaders who feared being 
overrun by foreign cultures. 

Looking ahead, senior leaders identified two major dangers to 
the nation: the failure of the nation to reproduce itself and the loss 
of national identity. The first threat was manifested in steadily fall- 
ing birth rates, particularly among the nation's best educated 



203 



Singapore: A Country Study 

citizens, many of whom failed even to marry (see Population, Vi- 
tal Statistics, and Migration, ch. 2). The second threat, loss of iden- 
tity, it was feared, would lead to loss of cohesion and hence to the 
destruction of the nation. 

Singapore's leaders addressed these problems by proposing a se- 
ries of policies intended to encourage citizens to marry and repro- 
duce and to create a distinct Singaporean identity. The programs 
addressing the population problem included extensive publicity and 
exhortation, along with material incentives for giving birth to third 
and fourth children. Women university graduates were singled out 
for special attention because of their failure, in general, to marry 
and pass on their supposedly superior genes. The efforts to foster 
a Singaporean identity involved defending positive traditional Asian 
values against the perceived threat from Western culture. Both the 
schools and the society at large emphasized mastering Asian lan- 
guages, such as Mandarin Chinese, and promoting Confucianism. 
Such programs, which attempted to modify the personal and inti- 
mate behavior of citizens but did not clearly reflect the demands 
of economic development, aroused a good deal of opposition, es- 
pecially from younger and better educated citizens. The leader- 
ship's paternalistic style and its intolerance of criticism became 
political issues and were blamed by some observers for the increased 
vote for opposition candidates in the 1984 and 1988 elections. 

Opponents of programs relating to Singapore identity claimed 
that the leaders' purpose was to shift support for a national ide- 
ology into support for the government and the ruling PAP. Pro- 
moting Confucianism, for example, was a convenient means of 
convincing individuals to subordinate their interests to those of so- 
ciety. Others held that the government's real fear was not that Sin- 
gapore would lose its culture or values but that continued 
Westernization of the society would mean more pressure for real 
democracy, more opposition candidates, and the possibility of a 
change in government. 

The electoral vote for the PAP dropped considerably, going from 
75.6 percent in 1980 to 62.9 percent in 1984 and by a lesser amount 
to 61.8 percent in 1988. In 1988 the PAP campaign slogan was 
"More Good Years" and the opposition had no solid issues with 
which to attract support. The election resulted in another land- 
slide victory for the PAP and the winning of eighty out of eighty- 
one parliamentary seats. 

The PAP's style of leadership emphasized control by a strong 
bureaucratic leadership intolerant of political opposition. The PAP 
mind- set has been traced to its battle for political preeminence with 
its communist rivals in the 1950s and 1960s. In the late 1980s, 



204 



Government and Politics 



Singapore had one of Asia's highest standards of living and was 
not regarded as fertile ground for a communist insurrection. The 
PAP maintained that Singapore was too small for a two-party sys- 
tem to work effectively and did not anticipate sharing power. It 
stymied the development of a legitimate opposition by a range of 
political tactics, such as using the provision of public services to 
induce citizens to vote for PAP candidates. Critics also charged 
that the party controlled the press, preventing the free flow of ideas. 
Although there was no direct censorship of the press, newspapers 
were closely monitored and radio and television stations were owned 
by the government (see The Media, this ch.). 

Political Opposition 

In the elections of September 1988, the only opposition mem- 
ber to win election was Singapore Democratic Party candidate 
Chiam See Tong who repeated his 1984 victory. However, in the 
contest over eight additional seats — two representing single-seat 
constituencies, and six representing two newly formed three- 
member group representation constituencies — the PAP received 
less than 55 percent of the vote. Furthermore, under a constitu- 
tional amendment passed in 1984, the opposition was to be allot- 
ted three parliamentary seats, whether it won them or not. Thus, 
as a result of the 1988 election, in addition to Chiam, the opposi- 
tion was permitted to seat two additional, nonconstituency, non- 
voting members of Parliament in the new Parliament. 

In the 1988 elections, Lee Siew Choh, a candidate of the Wor- 
kers' Party and one of the two opposition members chosen to sit 
in Parliament as nonvoting members, was forced on the campaign's 
opening day to go to court and pay damages for comments he made 
about PAP during the 1984 election. The other opposition mem- 
ber, Francis Seow, faced trial for alleged tax evasion and, if con- 
victed, faced disqualification from Parliament. Shortly afterwards, 
Prime Minister Lee threatened to bring a defamation suit against 
Workers' Party leader J. B. Jeyaretnam. Another Workers' Party 
candidate, Seow Khee Leng, was threatened by the government 
with bankruptcy proceedings. All three had been successfully sued 
by Lee for slander in earlier elections. 

The state of the opposition was rooted in the PAP's drive, be- 
ginning in 1963, to suppress all communist and leftist influence 
in Singapore. The government discouraged opposition political ac- 
tivity through the use of open-ended laws such as the Internal Secu- 
rity Act, which was originally intended to deal with armed 
communist insurrection during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-60. 
This law permitted the indefinite detention by executive order of 



205 



Singapore: A Country Study 

any person suspected of leftist or procommunist activity. Amnesty 
International frequently cited Singapore for using the act to sup- 
press legitimate, nonviolent political opposition. That organiza- 
tion also cited Singapore's use of deprivation of citizenship and 
banishment as means of repression. The government often associat- 
ed opposition with foreign manipulation, which compounded its 
fear of dissent of any kind. 

There were few issues on which the PAP could be challenged. 
Under PAP rule, Singapore had achieved unprecedented economic 
prosperity as well as marked social progress in racial harmony, edu- 
cation, health care, housing, and employment. The PAP's achieve- 
ments had created a popular confidence in the party that was 
difficult to overcome. The opposition parties themselves were divid- 
ed along racial and ideological lines and unable to compete with 
the PAP as a common front. 

In May and June 1987, twenty-two people were detained without 
trial under the Internal Security Act for alleged involvement in a 
communist conspiracy. All detainees were released by the end of 
the year with the exception of Chia Thye Poh, who was held for 
more than two years. A virulent critic of the government and former 
member of Parliament representing the Barisan Sosialis (The So- 
cialist Front — see Glossary), he was finally released in May 1989 
after having been detained since October 1986. Although Chia was 
never charged, the government alleged that he was a member of 
the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya (CPM — see Glossary), 
assigned to infiltrate the Barisan Sosialis in order to destabilize the 
government. In 1987 amendments were made to the Parliament 
Privilege, Immunities, and Powers Act of 1962, giving Parliament 
the power to suspend any parliamentary member's immunity from 
civil proceedings for statements made in Parliament and to im- 
prison and fine a member if he or she were found guilty of dis- 
honorable conduct, abuse of privilege, or contempt. 

The Workers' Party, led by J.B. Jeyaretnam in 1989, was the 
principal opposition party. The Workers' Party stood for a less 
regimented society, constitutional reforms, less defense spending, 
and more government social services. It was supported by lower 
income wage earners, students, and intellectuals. Next was the Unit- 
ed People's Front, founded in December 1974 as a confederation 
of the Singapore Chinese Party, the Singapore Islamic Party, and 
the Indian-supported Justice Party. It campaigned for a more 
democratic political system. A third party, ideologically to the left 
of both the United People's Front and the Workers' Party, was 
the People's Front, established in 1971. In 1972 its campaign plat- 
form advocated a democratic socialist republic and no foreign 



206 



Government and Politics 



military ties. In 1973 the party's secretary general, Leong Mun 
Kwai, received a six-month prison sentence for inciting the peo- 
ple of Singapore to seize government leaders. Seventeen other op- 
position parties were registered in 1989, including the Barisan 
Sosialis, once the primary target of the government's political sur- 
veillance activities because of its former role in antigovernment street 
demonstrations, student protests, and industrial strikes. Lee Siew 
Choh, a nonvoting member of Parliament in 1989, was the leader 
of the party's moderate wing. 

Foreign Policy 

Governing Precepts and Goals 

Minister for Foreign Affairs Suppiah Dhanabalan described the 
governing precepts of the country's foreign policy in 1981 as a will- 
ingness to be friends with all who sought friendship, to trade with 
any state regardless of ideology, to remain nonaligned, and to con- 
tinue to cooperate closely with Association of Southeast Asian Na- 
tions (ASEAN — see Glossary) members (see fig. 12). These 
precepts, while consistent with the thrust of foreign policy from 
the 1960s to the mid-1980s, failed to account for the basic role that 
the survival of the nation played in determining foreign policy goals. 
A primary foreign policy consideration until the mid-1980s, sur- 
vival became an issue because of Singapore's size and location and 
Indonesia's Confrontation (Konfrontasi — see Glossary) campaign 
against Malaysia in the 1960s. It was further linked to the concept 
of the "global city" first proposed in 1972 by then Deputy Prime 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Sinnathamby Rajaratnam. This con- 
cept suggested that Singapore's survival depended on its ability 
to create a continuing demand for its services in the world mar- 
ket. By implementing a policy of international self-assertion, Sin- 
gapore would shift from a reliance on entrepot trade and shipping 
to export-oriented industries. 

The focus on survival was evidenced in Singapore's reaction to 
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Of the many issues sur- 
rounding the event, one of particular interest to Singapore was Viet- 
nam's blatant disregard for the sovereignty of a small nation. 
Singapore's decision to draw international attention to the situa- 
tion was based, in part, on the need for international recognition 
of its own sovereignty. Following the invasion, Singapore height- 
ened its international profile by expanding diplomatic representa- 
tion abroad and attending international forums. Singapore was a 
member of ASEAN, the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary), 
the Asian Development Bank (see Glossary), the Group of 77 (see 



207 



Singapore: A Country Study 




Figure 12. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 1989 

Glossary), the International Telecommunications Satellite Organi- 
zation (Intelsat — see Glossary), and the United Nations and its af- 
filiated organizations. 

With the passing of the first generation of leaders in the late 1980s, 
foreign policy was shaped less by the old fears produced by the 
events of the 1960s and 1970s and more by the experience of region- 
al stability that prevailed during the formative years of the new 
guard or second generation of leaders. The self-assertion of a de- 
cade earlier was no longer required, and Singapore could afford 
to be less abrasive in its foreign policy style. Foreign policy objec- 
tives in the late 1980s were far more subtle than simple survival. 

In March 1989, Singapore announced that it was charting a new 
course of "economic diplomacy" to meet future international 
challenges. It sought expanded economic ties with China, the Soviet 



208 



Government and Politics 



Union, several East European nations, and the three nations of 
Indochina: Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In a speech to Parlia- 
ment on March 17, 1989, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wong Kan 
Seng announced that Singapore was hoping to reverse its previ- 
ous staunchly anticommunist posture and normalize relations with 
several communist countries to promote more compatible relation- 
ships based on mutual economic interests. 

Foreign policy also had to accommodate the views of predom- 
inantly Islamic neighbors who were viewed by Singapore's lead- 
ers as possible threats to its existence. As a gesture toward its 
neighbors and in recognition of its own regional roots, Singapore 
maintained its membership in the Nonaligned Movement, although 
it consistently rejected neutrality as a foreign policy option. Sin- 
gapore's leaders had reasoned that avoiding entanglements with 
the great powers would leave Singapore far too vulnerable to threats 
from regional neighbors, as Indonesia's Confrontation campaign 
had demonstrated. Neutrality also was perceived to be inconsis- 
tent with the Total Defence (see Glossary) style of defensive vigilance 
that the PAP attempted to instill in the citizenry following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Cam- 
bodia. The guiding concept of Total Defence was known as na- 
tional integration and was meant to unify a population made up 
of immigrants and a mix of racial groups into a people with the 
"human will" to be "unconquerable." 

Foreign policy, therefore, stressed maintaining a balance of power 
in the region. Singapore promoted the regional involvement of all 
great powers because it feared aggravating a neighbor by relying 
on any one power. Although it would have preferred relying upon 
the United States to guarantee its security, such dependence would 
not have been tolerated by the other ASEAN states. Singapore also 
remained suspicious of the ability of the United States to pursue 
a consistent foreign policy following its withdrawal from Vietnam. 

Retaining its developing nation status was another foreign poli- 
cy goal of the 1980s. In 1989, however, Singapore lost the conces- 
sions enjoyed under the United States government's Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP — see Glossary) on imports from de- 
veloping countries and the ability to borrow from the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank at concessional rates (see Trade, 
Tourism, and Telecommunications, ch. 3). 

Regional 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

Cooperation with ASEAN, which included Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei, was the center of Singapore's 



209 



Singapore: A Country Study 

foreign policy after 1975. Before 1975, Singapore's interests were 
global rather than regional, and its policy toward ASEAN was 
characterized by detachment. As the wealthiest country in Southeast 
Asia, it was criticized for failing to help its neighbors. After 1975, 
however, Singapore was criticized for being too ASEAN oriented, 
too active, and too vocal in the organization for its size, particu- 
larly where matters of regional security were concerned. The shift 
in Singapore's stance toward ASEAN followed the communist vic- 
tory in Vietnam in 1975, the waning of a United States military 
presence in Asia, and new signs of Soviet interest in the region. 
Furthermore, the other ASEAN states permitted Singapore to as- 
sume a leading role in regard to the issue of Vietnam's invasion 
of Cambodia in 1978. The situation in Cambodia, in fact, became 
the unifying force for the diverse countries belonging to ASEAN. 
Singapore's minister for foreign affairs, Wong Kan Seng, com- 
mented in March 1989 that, if the situation were resolved, some 
other force would be required to unite the member nations. The 
resolution of the Cambodian conflict would also raise the possibil- 
ity of Vietnam being considered for membership, although in 1989 
Singapore was not prepared to support Vietnam's immediate entry. 

ASEAN provided Singapore with a means of improving its 
bilateral relations with Indonesia and Malaysia, two neighbors who 
were potential threats to Singapore's security. Singapore's leaders 
never identified the external enemy Singapore's armed forces were 
trained to deter (see Strategic Perspectives, ch. 5). When asked 
in 1984 who was Singapore's biggest threat, Prime Minister Lee 
responded only that "the biggest threat ... is that any threat will 
come from someone bigger than us." 

Malaysia 

The acrimony that once characterized Singapore's relationship 
with Malaysia began to change in the 1980s when the two coun- 
tries adopted a course of reconciliation. The improvement in rela- 
tions began when Mahathir Mohamad became prime minister of 
Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir achieved a personal rap- 
port that established the tone for a rapprochement, but Singapore's 
expulsion from Malaysia in August 1965 continued to color the 
relationship. Singapore's primary concern was that Malaysia main- 
tain a political system that tolerated multiracialism. In Singapore's 
view, the undermining of this political principle in Malaysia would 
have regional ramifications. Regional tolerance of multiracialism, 
for example, might be reduced if an Islamic revival in Malaysia 
led to the establishment of an Islamic state and the status of Malay- 
sia' s Chinese population were subsequently endangered. 



210 



Government and Politics 



Singapore was linked with Malaysia militarily through the 1971 
Five-Powers Defence Agreement (see Glossary), an arrangement 
under which the security of Singapore and Malaysia was guaran- 
teed by Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Singapore cooper- 
ated with both Malaysia and Indonesia in maintaining the security 
of the Malacca and Singapore straits. Another link with Malaysia 
was the Inter-Governmental Committee, a forum established in 
1980 for the informal discussion of bilateral issues by delegations 
headed by each country's minister for foreign affairs. 

Indonesia 

Singapore's relationship with Indonesia, like its relationship with 
Malaysia, was built on a foundation of past discord, specifically 
Indonesia's Confrontation campaign against Malaysia from 1963 
to 1966. After President Sukarno (1945-67) was deposed, relations 
were based to a large degree on Lee Kuan Yew's personal rela- 
tionship with President Soeharto. Because bilateral relations lacked 
an institutional foundation, they were vulnerable to the departure 
of either leader. 

Indochina 

Singapore's relationship with the countries of Indochina in 1989 
permitted the conduct of normal commercial transactions, but dis- 
couraged aid, training, infrastructural development, and trade in 
strategic goods. In April 1989, the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Singaporean companies 
that they could not invest in Vietnam until the Vietnamese had 
withdrawn their troops from Cambodia. The companies were al- 
lowed to conduct negotiations with Vietnam but could not com- 
mit any investments until the Vietnamese withdrawal was complete. 
A few Singaporean companies had invested in Vietnam while nor- 
mal commercial transactions were still going on, before the govern- 
ment had a clear policy concerning investments. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Wong Kan Seng indicated in 1989, however, that 
Singapore was looking beyond the Cambodian problem to its fu- 
ture relations with Indochina. 

Superpowers 

The United States 

Relations between Singapore and the United States became 
strained in 1988 after the United States was accused of meddling 
in Singapore's internal affairs and a United States diplomat was 
expelled as a result of the charge. The United States had objected 



211 



Singapore: A Country Study 



to the government's policy of restricting the circulation of several 
Hong Kong-based publications, including the Asian Wall Street Jour- 
nal and the Far Eastern Economic Review, and to the use of the Inter- 
nal Security Act to detain indefinitely dissidents or those deemed 
a threat to the existing order. The expelled diplomat was accused 
of instigating members of the opposition to contest the 1988 elec- 
tions. The essence of a speech on United States- Singapore rela- 
tions, given by Lee Hsien Loong before the Asia Society in 
Washington, D.C., on May 16, 1989, was that the relationship 
was strong but that the United States should refrain from interfer- 
ing in Singapore's internal affairs. 

The United States was Singapore's largest trading partner in 
the 1980s. It also was viewed as a benevolent power whose mili- 
tary presence in the region kept Soviet influence in check, balanced 
China's increasing military strength, and obviated Japan's rearm- 
ing. Singapore was concerned, however, that the United States 
eventually would tire of its role in the Asia-Pacific region. This 
concern was somewhat allayed in 1989 when President George 
Bush, demonstrating his commitment to maintain American in- 
terests in the area, both dispatched Vice President Dan Quayle 
on an Asian tour and visited the region himself in the first few 
months of his administration. 

China 

In 1989 Singapore had not yet established diplomatic relations 
with China, largely out of deference to Indonesia, the ASEAN state 
most concerned about China's intentions in the region. Indone- 
sia's move to initiate diplomatic relations with Beijing in Febru- 
ary 1989, however, was expected to clear the way for Singapore 
to follow. Regarding Indonesia's announced intentions, Singapore's 
First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong stated in February 
1989 that it was ' 'logical" for Singapore "to follow suit"; however, 
he saw no need to move hastily because Singapore already had a 
cordial trading relationship with China. Singapore's trade with Chi- 
na in 1988 amounted to US$2.98 billion, a 27 percent increase over 
1987. Reexports to China were up by 108 percent over the same 
period. 

The other side of improving relations with China was maintaining 
good relations with Taiwan. Although Singapore lacked diplomatic 
ties with Taiwan in 1989, the two enjoyed a flourishing economic 
exchange. Trade with Taiwan in 1988 reached SJ6.9 billion, ex- 
ceeding that with China (S$5.7 billion). Some analysts suspected, 
however, that once serious negotiations to establish diplomatic ties 
began with Beijing, China was likely to pressure Singapore to end its 



212 



Queen Elizabeth II visiting Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew in 1989 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 



relationship with Taiwan, particularly in matters of military cooper- 
ation such as the training in Taiwan of Singaporean troops. Others 
speculated that the relationship would not be affected. Lee Kuan 
Yew said in March 1989 that he did not expect Singapore's rela- 
tionship with Taiwan to change because both countries had been 
aware for some time of Singapore's intention to follow Indonesia 
in normalizing relations with China and both had taken such a de- 
velopment into consideration. A visit by Taiwan's President Li 
Teng-hui shortly after Indonesia's diplomatic initiative was inter- 
preted as a sign of continuing warm relations between Taiwan and 
Singapore. 

The Soviet Union 

In 1989 Singapore maintained both economic and diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union. From the mid-1960s until the 
mid-1970s, Singapore's leaders promoted trade relations with 
Moscow in the belief that a Soviet role in Southeast Asia would 
ensure the permanent interest of the United States in the region. 
The Soviet Union was viewed as a major power and as a counter- 
weight to China and, therefore, as a significant factor in maintaining 
the regional power balance. This view changed when the Soviets 



213 



Singapore: A Country Study 

established a military presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, fol- 
lowing the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation in November 1978, and actively supported the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia a month later. At that time, ac- 
cording to Singapore, Moscow became a threat to regional stability. 

Soviet diplomacy toward the region changed, however, in the 
mid-1980s under the leadership of new General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev. Beginning with a milestone foreign policy address in 
Vladivostok in July 1986, he initiated extended ties with the ASEAN 
states and committed the Soviet Union to playing a more construc- 
tive role in resolving the Cambodian issue. His interest in improving 
ties with the region and his new emphasis on Soviet economic de- 
velopment acted to modify regional perceptions. Singapore, as well 
as many of its ASEAN partners, became increasingly receptive to 
upgrading their bilateral relations with Moscow. 

Trade, banking, and shipping were the three critical areas of 
Singapore's economic ties with Moscow. Singapore's exports were 
mainly in the form of repairs to Soviet vessels in Singapore ship- 
yards. Other exports included rubber, coconut oil, and fuel oil. 
In return, the Soviets exported fish and fish products, cast iron, 
light machinery, and crude oil. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the 
Soviets encouraged Singaporean firms to invest in joint ventures 
in the Soviet Union. Singapore's shipyards were reported in 1988 
to be interested in reconstructing and developing the port of 
Nakhodka, the second largest port in the Soviet Far East after 
Vladivostok. 

The Media 

The government did not normally censor the press, but it owned 
the radio and television stations and closely supervised the news- 
papers. Under the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act, passed 
in 1974 and amended in 1986, the government could restrict — 
without actually banning — the circulation of any publication sold 
in the country, including foreign periodicals, that it deemed guilty 
of distorted reporting. These laws provided the legal justification 
for restrictions placed on the circulation of such foreign publica- 
tions as the Asian Wall Street Journal and Time magazine's Asian edi- 
tion in 1987. The government also restricted the circulation of Far 
Eastern Economic Review and Asiaweek in 1987 for " engaging in the 
domestic politics of Singapore." 

Singapore had seven daily newspapers at the end of 1987: two 
in English, The Straits Times and The Business Times; three in Chinese, 
Lianhe Wanbao, Shin Min Daily News, and Lianhe Zaobao; one in Ma- 
lay, Berita Harian; and one in Tamil, Tamil Murasu. With the 



214 



Government and Politics 



exception of the Tamil Murasu, all were published by Singapore 
Press Holdings Ltd, a group that comprised Singapore News and 
Publications Ltd, the Straits Times Press Ltd, and the Times Pub- 
lishing Company. Daily newspaper circulation in 1988 totaled 
743,334 copies, with Chinese language newspapers accounting for 
the highest number (354,840), followed by English (340,401) and 
Malay (42,458) newspapers. 

The Singapore Broadcasting Corporation operated five radio sta- 
tions and three television channels. Established in 1980, it provid- 
ed programming in Singapore's four official languages — Malay, 
Chinese, Tamil, and English — and was supported by revenue from 
radio and television licensing fees and commercial advertising. Each 
of four of the five radio stations broadcast in one of the four offi- 
cial languages, while the fifth alternated between English and 
Mandarin. The television stations, which provided a total of about 
163 hours of programming a week, also broadcast in separate lan- 
guages. Channel Five's programming was in Malay and English, 
Channel Eight's in Mandarin and Tamil, and Channel Twelve's in 
English. In many cases, programs also were subtitled in several 
languages. 

By 1989 Singapore's leadership had been in place for three de- 
cades, during which it guided an extraordinarily successful pro- 
gram of economic development and physical rebuilding. In the 
1990s, a new generation of leaders would take over, and the de- 
bate over the need to change the political system that had been 
so successful in the past would grow. Some elements of an increas- 
ingly prosperous and well-educated population, who took Singa- 
pore's national viability and survival for granted, questioned the 
elderly leaders' assertions that a host of pressing dangers justified 
their authoritarian and paternalistic style of governance. To the 
leaders, however, the country's prosperity and their continued elec- 
toral victories demonstrated the correctness of their policies and 
methods of rule. They envisioned a new generation of leaders who 
would continue the proven practices established by the country's 
founding fathers. The inherent tensions between generations and 
between the advocates of change and those of continuity were likely 
to mark the politics of the 1990s. 

* * * 

Basic information on Singapore's form of government is provided 
by the annual volumes published by the Information Division of 
the Ministry of Communications and Information, such as the an- 
nual editions of Singapore and Singapore Facts and Pictures. The same 



215 



Singapore: A Country Study 



division's monthly Singapore Bulletin provides brief coverage of a 
wide range of events in the country, and its sister publication, Mirror, 
publishes longer articles on selected topics, focusing on industry 
and education. Singapore's internal politics attracted little atten- 
tion from foreign scholars in the late 1980s; the basic sources were 
produced by local scholars affiliated with the National University 
of Singapore and the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies. The 
most comprehensive is Government and Politics of Singapore, edited 
by Jon S.T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee, and Seah Chee Meow. This 
is complemented by Peter SJ. Chen's Singapore: Development Poli- 
cies and Trends. Raj K. Vasil's Governing Singapore takes a more ana- 
lytical perspective and includes information based on interviews 
with senior leaders. The annual country summaries published in 
the February issue of Asian Survey and the Far Eastern Economic 
Review 's annual Asia Yearbook provide authoritative coverage of po- 
litics and foreign relations. The quarterly and annual Country Reports 
for Singapore, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, con- 
tain timely and succinct political reporting. The weekly Far Eastern 
Economic Review and Asiaweek regularly cover Singapore's politics 
and social trends. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



216 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Singaporean preparedness 



THE TOTAL DEFENCE CONCEPT, the cornerstone of Sin- 
gapore's national security policy in 1989, called for the deterrence 
of aggression through the maintenance of a small but well-trained 
and well-equipped military backed by a committed population profi- 
cient in civil defense. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Singapore government under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew laid 
the foundation for a national security system based on total pre- 
paredness, which involved more than 10 percent of the adult popu- 
lation in some type of national service. After 1967 all males were 
required to register at age sixteen for two years of national serv- 
ice. By 1989 almost all males under the age of fifty had received 
military training in the armed forces, or training in the police force 
or in a public service related to civil defense. 

Singapore's national security perceptions under Lee were in- 
fluenced by the country's size and geographic location and by 
changes in the regional military balance. The nation's military plan- 
ners acknowledged that if it were attacked by a larger power, Sin- 
gapore could not defend itself with its own resources for more than 
a few weeks. However, they believed that the total preparedness 
for war of the country's military and civilian populace would de- 
ter potential adversaries from regarding Singapore as an easy tar- 
get for aggression. Singapore's foreign policies were carefully 
planned to accommodate national security considerations. In 1989, 
for example, Lee stated that Singapore would consider normaliz- 
ing its relations with China only after Indonesia had completed 
its plan to do the same. This position was consistent with Singa- 
pore's national security policy of deferring to the foreign policy 
concerns of its larger neighbors. After the Republic of Vietnam 
(South Vietnam) fell to communist forces in 1975, Singapore viewed 
the growth of communist influence in the region, and the reduced 
American military presence in Southeast Asia, as a potential threat 
to its national security. Singapore's leaders feared that a militaris- 
tic Vietnam, supported by the Soviet Union, would promote 
communist movements in Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Lee government supported the Associ- 
ation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN — see Glossary) in op- 
posing Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia; the government also 
promoted the improvement of bilateral military cooperation with 
its ASEAN partners as part of its national security strategy. In 1989 
Singapore was continuing to strengthen its military relations with 



219 



Singapore: A Country Study 

its neighbors, although the threat of Soviet and Vietnamese- 
supported aggression against any one of the six ASEAN members 
appeared on the decline (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). 

From 1965 to 1989, subversive groups posed no threat to Sin- 
gapore's political system, and there was no recurrence of the eth- 
nic and communist-inspired riots of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
British statutes that had allowed the indefinite incarceration of per- 
sons accused of advocating the violent overthrow of the govern- 
ment were still in force in 1989 under the Internal Security Act 
of 1960. Although the government continued to use this statute 
to discourage radical political movements, by the late 1980s it had 
established a policy of releasing most persons detained under the 
Internal Security Act within a few months of their arrest unless 
they were referred to the court for trial. 

In the 1970s, while the numbers for most types of crime remained 
relatively stable, there was an increase in crime related to the sale 
and use of illegal drugs. Although drugs continued to be a factor 
in crime in 1989, the occasional use of capital punishment for drug 
trafficking and the introduction of new law enforcement and re- 
habilitation programs for addicts reportedly were proving effec- 
tive in controlling the problem. 

The Civil Defence Act of 1986 defined the mission and respon- 
sibilities of the Civil Defence Force, which had been established 
in 1982. By the early 1980s, the armed services had a surplus of 
conscripts, and the government decided to expand the national ser- 
vice system to include civil defense organizations. By 1989 Singa- 
pore had ten operational civil defense divisions and had organized 
civil defense programs in each of the country's fifty-five legislative 
districts. 

The Armed Forces 

In 1989 Singapore's armed forces comprised the army, navy, 
and air forces, their reserves, and the People's Defence Force, which 
was the country's national guard. There were 55,000 personnel 
in the regular armed services, 182,000 in the reserves, and 30,000 
in the national guard. All males were required to register for ser- 
vice at age sixteen and became eligible for conscription when they 
turned eighteen. Most conscripts served in one unit during their 
twenty-four to thirty months of active duty, and they continued 
with the same unit until they completed their duty in the reserves. 
The 1970 Enlistment Act required enlisted men to remain in the 
reserves until they turned forty and officers until the age of fifty. 

The Constitution was amended in 1972 to prohibit the armed 
forces from being subordinated to any foreign power without the 



220 



National Security 



approval of the voters in a national referendum. The amendment, 
Article Six of the Constitution, states that defense treaties and col- 
lective security agreements negotiated by the government are to 
be approved by a two-thirds majority of the electorate. This amend- 
ment did not preclude Singapore's participation in the 1971 Five- 
Powers Defence Agreement (see Glossary), which was primarily 
intended to provide support by Australia, Britain, and New Zealand 
for Malaysia and Singapore should either nation be attacked. In 
1989 the members of the Five-Powers Defence Agreement main- 
tained an air defense network for the protection of Singapore and 
Malaysia and organized military exercises to improve the interoper- 
ability of their armed forces. 

The Armed Forces Act of 1972 defines the organization and mis- 
sion of the armed forces. The Armed Forces Council in 1989 was 
chaired by the minister for defence and included as members the 
commanders of the army, navy, and air force; it was the top mili- 
tary policymaking body, subordinate only to the prime minister. 
In 1989 the minister for defence was a civilian, as had been his 
predecessors although military officers were not legally prohibited 
from holding a ministerial appointment. 

Historical Development 

Until Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965, 
responsibility for national security matters had always resided either 
in London or Kuala Lumpur. In the two decades following the 
end of World War II (1939-45), Britain spent billions of dollars 
to rebuild its military bases in Singapore in order to honor its defense 
commitments to Malaysia and Singapore. Between 1963 and 1966, 
several thousand British troops were deployed to protect the two 
countries during the Indonesian Confrontation (Konfrontasi — see 
Glossary). By 1967 the British Labour and Conservative parties 
had reached a consensus that Britain could no longer afford to pay 
the cost of maintaining a military presence in Southeast Asia. In 
January 1968, London informed the Singapore government that 
all British forces would be withdrawn by 1971, ending 152 years 
of responsibility for the defense of Singapore. 

After the 1963 merger of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sara- 
wak to form the Federation of Malaysia, Singapore ceded control 
over its armed forces to the federal government in Kuala Lum- 
pur. For a time, Malaysian army and air force units were stationed 
in Singapore, and Lee Kuan Yew's refusal to allow Malaysia to 
retain control over Singapore's military establishment after sepa- 
ration was one reason political relations between the two nations 
remained strained well into the 1970s. 



221 



Singapore: A Country Study 

British Military Involvement, 1819-1942 

In the years preceding the founding of Singapore in 1819, neither 
the British government nor the British East India Company was 
eager to risk the establishment of new settiements in Southeast Asia. 
From 1803 to 1815, London was preoccupied with war with France 
and, after Napoleon's abdication in October 1815, with establish- 
ing a stable peace in Europe. Britain administered the Dutch colo- 
nies in Malaya and Indonesia from 1795 to 1815 when the 
Netherlands was under French occupation. The British govern- 
ment returned control of these territories to the Dutch in 1816 over 
the objections of a small minority of British East India Company 
officials, including Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles. Raffles, in Lon- 
don from 1816 to 1818, failed to convince the company's directors 
to support a plan to challenge Dutch supremacy in the Malay Ar- 
chipelago and Malaya. Enroute from London to Malaya, however, 
Raffles stopped in India and gained the support of Lord Hastings, 
the British East India Company's governor general of India, for 
a less ambitious plan. They agreed to establish a trading post south 
of Britain's settlement in Penang, Malaya. 

From 1819 to 1867, when Singapore was administered by the 
British East India Company, Britain relied on its navy to protect 
its interests there and in Malaya. The Netherlands was the only 
European country to challenge the establishment of Singapore. In 
1824, however, the Dutch ceded Malacca on the Malay Peninsula 
to Britain and recognized the former's claim to Singapore in ex- 
change for British recognition of Amsterdam's sovereignty over 
territories south of the Singapore Strait. Two years later, the Brit- 
ish East India Company united Singapore with Malacca and 
Penang to form the Presidency of the Straits Settlements (see Glos- 
sary). With no threat to its interests, the British employed the policy 
of allowing Singapore to assume responsibility for its own defense, 
although British naval vessels called in Singapore to show the flag 
and to protect shipping in the Singapore Strait (see fig. 3). By the 
mid-nineteenth century, London was recognized as the supreme 
naval power in the region, despite the fact that it deployed only 
about twenty-four warships to patrol an area extending east from 
Singapore as far as Hong Kong and west from Singapore as far 
as India. 

Between 1867 and 1914, London contributed little to the estab- 
lishment of permanent armed forces in Singapore. Units of the Brit- 
ish Army's Fifth Light Infantry Regiment, which included infantry 
units brought from India, were stationed on the island. More often 



222 



National Security 



than not, however, these forces were deployed in the Malay states 
to protect British citizens there during periods of domestic violence. 
In 1867 when the strategic value of Singapore influenced London's 
decision to make the Straits Settlements a crown colony, the local 
governments were required to pay 90 percent of their own defense 
expenditures. The issue of collecting taxes from the residents of 
Singapore for defense remained controversial until 1933, when the 
Colonial Office finally agreed that the city should not be required 
to pay more than 20 percent of its revenue for defense costs. 

Following World War I (1914-18), London attempted to inte- 
grate Singapore into a unified defense plan for all of the Straits 
Settlements and Malay states under British control. London had 
replaced the Indian elements of the Fifth Light Infantry Regiment 
with regular British Army units following the mutiny of Singapore's 
Indian troops in February 1915 (see Crown Colony, 1867-1918, 
ch. 1). As late as 1937, London had not deployed more than a few 
hundred British army regulars in the Straits Settlements and Fed- 
erated Malay States. As there was no overt threat from neighbor- 
ing countries or Britain's European rivals, the War Office believed 
that these units, aided by local militias trained by the British army, 
could adequately protect British interests on the Malay Peninsu- 
la. Singapore's militia, known as the Volunteer Rifle Corps, com- 
prised infantry, artillery, and support units with a total personnel 
strength of about 1,000. The Volunteer Rifle Corps was integrat- 
ed into the newly established Straits Settlements Volunteer Force 
in 1922. London believed that in the unlikely event that the Straits 
Settlements were attacked, regular and militia forces could hold 
out until reinforcements arrived from Hong Kong, India, and other 
British outposts in Asia. 

In June 1937, Britain began to prepare for the possibility of war 
with Japan. Three British army battalions stationed in Singapore, 
one Indian battalion at Penang, and one Malay regiment at Port 
Dickson in the Malayan state of Negri Sembilan were the only regu- 
lar forces available at the time for the defense of Singapore and 
the Malay Peninsula. Although the British military leaders had 
warned London in 1937 that the defense of Singapore was tied to 
the defense of Malaya and that any Japanese attack on the island 
would likely be made from the Malay Peninsula, their assessment 
was rejected by the British War Office, which was convinced that 
the impenetrable rain forests of the peninsula would discourage 
any landward invasion. Air bases were established in northern 
Malaya but were never adequately fortified. A new naval base was 
constructed on the northern coast of the island, but few ships were 
deployed there. Military strategists in London believed that the 



223 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Singapore garrison could defend the island for about two months, 
or the time it would take for a relief naval force to arrive from 
Britain. 

In December 1941, British and Commonwealth of Nations (see 
Glossary) forces committed to the defense of the Malay Peninsula 
and Singapore comprised four army divisions supported by small 
numbers of aircraft and naval vessels that had been sent from other 
war zones to provide token support to the ground forces. Lieutenant 
General Arthur E. Percival, commander of these forces, deployed 
most units in the northern Malayan states of Kedah, Perak, Kelan- 
tan, and Terengganu. Fortified defensive positions were established 
to protect cities and the main roads leading south to Kuala Lum- 
pur, Malacca, and Singapore. The British had no armor and very 
little artillery, however, and air bases that had been constructed 
in the Malayan states of Kelantan, Pahang, and Johore and in Sin- 
gapore at Tengah, Sembawang, and Seletar were not well forti- 
fied. The attention of the War Office was focused on the fighting 
in Europe, and appeals to London for more aircraft went largely 
unanswered. 

A small fleet, comprising the aircraft carrier Unsinkable, the bat- 
tleship Prince of Wales, the battle cruiser Repulse, and four destroy- 
ers, represented the only naval force deployed to Singapore before 
the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The Unsinkable ran aground in 
the West Indies enroute to Singapore, leaving the fleet without any 
air protection. 

Japanese Invasion, December 1941 -February 1942 

By the summer of 1941 , Japan's relations with the Western pow- 
ers had deteriorated so much that Japanese leaders saw no point 
in delaying plans for military operations in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific. Japan's short-term goal was to secure the necessary sup- 
plies to complete its conquest of China by occupying the Southeast 
Asian territories controlled by France, Britain, the United States, 
and the Netherlands. Japan's long-term plans called for further 
expansion south to Australia and north from Manchuria into Mon- 
golia and the Soviet Union. 

Japanese air and naval attacks on British and United States 
bases in Malaya and the Philippines were coordinated with the 
December 7, 1941, assault on the United States Pacific Fleet Head- 
quarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Japan's Southern Army, head- 
quartered in Saigon, quickly moved from bases in southern 
Indochina and Hainan to attack southern Thailand and northern 
Malaya on December 8 and the Philippines on December 10. The 



224 



National Security 



Japanese easily captured British air bases in northern Malaya and 
soon controlled the air and sea-lanes in the South China Sea as 
far south as the Strait of Malacca. Naval landings were made on 
the Thai coast at Singora (present-day Songkhla) and Patani and 
on the Malayan coast at Kota Baharu. Also on December 10, the 
Japanese located and destroyed the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, 
thereby eliminating the only naval threat to their Malaya campaign. 
The Thai government capitulated to a Japanese ultimatum to al- 
low passage of Japanese troops through Thailand in return for 
Japanese assurances of respect for Thailand's independence. This 
agreement enabled the Japanese to establish land lines to supply 
their forces in Burma and Malaya through Thailand. 

The prediction that Japan would conquer the Malay Peninsula 
before attempting an invasion of Singapore proved to be correct. 
Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki was placed in command 
of the Twenty-fifth Army comprising three of the best Japanese 
divisions. The Japanese used tactics developed specifically for the 
operation in northern Malaya. Tanks were deployed in frontal as- 
saults while light infantry forces bypassed British defenses using 
bicycles or boats, thereby interdicting British efforts to deliver badly 
needed reinforcements, ammunition, food, and medical supplies 
(see fig. 13). Cut off from their supply bases in southern Malaya 
and Singapore, demoralized by the effectiveness of Japan's jungle 
warfare, and with no possibility that additional ground or air units 
would arrive in time to turn the tide of battle, the British with- 
drew to Singapore and prepared for the final siege. The Japanese 
captured Penang on December 18, 1941, and Kuala Lumpur on 
January 11, 1942. The last British forces reached Singapore on 
January 31 , 1942, and on the same day a fifty-five-meter gap was 
blown in the causeway linking Singapore and Johore. 

In January 1942, London had provided an additional infantry 
division and delivered the promised Hurricane fighter aircraft, 
although the latter arrived in crates and without the personnel to 
assemble them. In the battle for Singapore, the British had the larger 
ground force, with 70,000 Commonwealth forces in Singapore fac- 
ing 30,000 Japanese. The Japanese controlled the air, however, 
and intense bombing of military and civilian targets hampered Brit- 
ish efforts to establish defensive positions and created chaos in a 
city whose population had been swollen by more than a million 
refugees from the Malay Peninsula. Yamashita began the attack 
on February 8. Units of the Fifth and Eighteenth Japanese Divi- 
sions used collapsible boats to cross the Johore Strait, undetect- 
ed by the British, to Singapore's northwest coast. By February 



225 



Singapore: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Colin Jack-Hinton, A Sketch Map History of Malaya, 
Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore, London, 1966, 62; and N.J. Ryan, The Making of 
Modern Malaysia and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, 221. 

Figure 13. Japanese Campaign on Malay Peninsula, 1941-42 

13, the Japanese controlled all of the island except the heavily popu- 
lated southeastern sector. General Percival cabled Field Marshal 
Sir Archibald Wavell, British Supreme Commander in the Far 
East, informed him that the situation was hopeless, and received 
London's permission to surrender. On February 15, one week 
after the first Japanese troops had crossed the Johore Strait 
and landed in Singapore, Percival surrendered to Yamashita. 



226 



National Security 



Decline of British Military Influence, 1945-75 

British military influence in Singapore was reestablished at the 
end of World War II and declined at a slower pace than London's 
political influence. Singapore was made the headquarters for Brit- 
ish forces stationed in the East Asia. The local population's resent- 
ment of British rule was tempered by the magnitude of the social 
and economic problems remaining after the Japanese occupation. 
Britain's military expenditures provided jobs and promoted sup- 
port for its political objectives in the region. From 1948 to 1960, 
Malaya and Singapore were under Emergency rule as a result of 
the threat posed by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM — see 
Glossary). Throughout this period, the majority of Singapore's po- 
litical and business leaders were strong supporters of the British 
military presence. As Singapore moved from being a crown colo- 
ny, to becoming a state in the Federation of Malaysia, and finally 
to independence in 1965, the British armed forces continued to be 
viewed as the protector of Singapore's democratic system of govern- 
ment and an integral part of the island's economy. 

By 1962 the British were questioning the strategic necessity and 
political wisdom of stationing forces in Singapore and Malaya. At 
that time London was spending about US$450 million annually 
to maintain four infantry battalions, several squadrons of fighter 
aircraft, and the largest British naval base outside the British Isles, 
even though Southeast Asia accounted for less than 5 percent of 
Britain's foreign commerce. 

In January 1968, the British government informed Prime 
Minister Lee that all British forces would be withdrawn from the 
country within three years. By then Singapore already had begun 
to organize its army and to plan for the establishment of an air 
force and navy. The British left behind a large military infrastruc- 
ture and trained personnel of the newly formed Air Defence and 
Maritime commands. London formally ended all responsibility for 
Singapore's defense in 1972 when it turned over control of the Bukit 
Gombak radar station to Singapore. 

Growth of the Armed Forces 

Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965 forced 
government leaders to begin thinking about the new nation's 
defense strategy and what armed forces would be needed to make 
that strategy a viable deterrent to potential adversaries. The task 
was made all the more difficult because of Singapore's strained 
relations with Malaysia and Indonesia (see Two Decades of In- 
dependence, 1965-85, ch. 1). Lee appointed Goh Keng Swee to 



227 



Singapore: A Country Study 

head the newly established Ministry of the Interior and Defence. 
By June 1966, the government had decided that instituting com- 
pulsory conscription was the best way to build up the armed forces. 
Government leaders were impressed with Israel's successful use 
of a small regular army supported by a large citizen reserve and 
believed that the development of this type of armed forces would 
encourage national pride and self-reliance. 

Between 1967 and 1970, the army was expanded from two in- 
fantry battalions to two brigades comprising one tank regiment, 
six infantry battalions, and one artillery battalion. The first class- 
es of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) graduated from 
the Armed Forces Training Institute in June 1967. This group of 
about 500 men was trained by Israeli instructors and provided the 
army with a core of leaders for both regular and reserve battal- 
ions. Under the system developed by the army's general staff, 
officers and NCOs were assigned to stay with newly formed na- 
tional service battalions for the two-and-a-half years the conscripts 
remained on active duty. During this period, qualified enlisted men 
were selected for training as section and platoon leaders so that 
when a battalion was transferred to the reserves, a stable leader- 
ship would remain with the unit until its demobilization. In 1970 
the government divided the Ministry of Interior and Defence into 
two separate ministries responsible for home affairs and defense, 
respectively. By December of that year, the army's reserve brigade 
comprised three infantry battalions. 

The evolution of the air force and navy occurred at a slower pace 
than was the case with the army. In 1968 British air force com- 
manders and pilots began assisting the newly formed Air Defence 
Command to establish its own air units. The British helped to es- 
tablish an air force pilot training program at the Flying Training 
School located at Tengah Air Base. The first class of pilots received 
basic military training and general flying instruction in Singapore 
and then was sent to Britain for fighter aircraft training. These 
pilots returned to Singapore in 1971 and were assigned to the Air 
Defence Command's two fighter squadrons comprising one ground 
attack squadron with sixteen Strikemaster and four Hawker Hun- 
ter jet aircraft, and one interceptor squadron with sixteen Hawker 
Hunters. In 1969 the Maritime Command established temporary 
headquarters on Sentosa Island where it remained until a perma- 
nent base was completed on Pulau Brani (pulau means island). The 
government had negotiated agreements with two private com- 
panies — Lurssen Werft of the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) and Vosper Thornycroft of Britain — for the joint pro- 
duction of the navy's first naval vessels. Two gunboats produced 



228 



Japanese officer handing over maps to British 
officers and discussing troop positions, 1945 
Courtesy National Archives 

in Britain were delivered to Singapore in 1969 and were followed 
by Singapore-produced models of the same design, which entered 
service in 1970. 

In the 1970s, the army, air force, and navy were expanded, new 
weapon systems were acquired from abroad, local defense indus- 
tries were established, and military logistical systems were improved. 
In 1970 the army had 14,000 personnel on active duty and 6,000 
in the reserves. Infantry training and equipment were considered 
adequate. However, the army's newly formed armored regiment 
was not yet operational, and the single artillery battalion was 
underequipped. The engineer and signal branches also were in the 
early stages of development. In 1967 the government had es- 
tablished the Sheng-Li Holding Company under the Ministry of 
Defence to promote state-owned-and-operated defense industries. 
By the mid-1970s, Singapore was producing ammunition, small 
arms, mortars, and artillery for the army and for export. In most 
cases, a Singapore manufacturer purchased the design and mar- 
keting rights for a weapon from European and American firms and 
then built the necessary plant for assembling the weapon. Tanks, 
armored vehicles, aircraft, and some surplus United States Navy 
amphibious craft and minesweepers were purchased to fill critical 



229 



Singapore: A Country Study 

equipment shortages. Military logistical organizations established 
in the 1960s evolved into an efficient network of supply and main- 
tenance facilities. These concerns included both interservice ord- 
nance and transportation supply bases and intraservice facilities 
responsible for the procurement and repair of weapons and equip- 
ment used by only one of the service. 

By 1980, the armed forces had 42,000 personnel on active-duty, 
and the reserves had expanded to 50,000. The army had become 
a well-balanced force with regular units organized into one armored 
and three infantry divisions under the operational control of a sin- 
gle division commander. The navy's twelve patrol craft, which were 
equipped with guns and missiles, gave Singapore a coastal defense 
force, and its six landing ships provided a limited capability to sup- 
port the army in an amphibious operation. The air force, with 131 
fighter aircraft and 2 surface-to-air missile battalions, was now large 
enough to fulfill both its air defense and ground support missions. 
Additionally, the air force had one transport squadron capable of 
airlifting a fully equipped infantry battalion anywhere in Southeast 
Asia and one helicopter squadron available for counterinsurgency 
or search-and-rescue operations. 

In the 1980s, the number of army reservists more than tripled, 
although expansion of the regular armed services was constrained 
for budgetary reasons. By 1989 there were 170,000 army reserv- 
ists. Only about 70,000 reservists, however, served in combat or 
combat support units subject to immediate mobilization. These 
units comprised one armored brigade equipped with AMX-13 tanks 
and M-l 13 armored personnel carriers, six infantry brigades, ten 
artillery battalions, one commando battalion, and an unknown 
number of combat support battalions. Most of the remaining 
100,000 reservists probably either were assigned to units that would 
be used as fillers during wartime or served in the People's Defence 
and Civil Defence Forces. In the army, the number of engineer 
and signal battalions were increased by five and two, respectively, 
but the number of combat units remained basically the same 
throughout the decade. The air force added one squadron of F-5E 
interceptors, one early warning and reconnaissance squadron with 
four E-2Cs, and one transport helicopter squadron. Most growth 
in the navy occurred in combat support organizations. In 1989 the 
navy was in the process of establishing a new unit that would even- 
tually comprise six missile-equipped corvettes. 

Organization and Mission of the Armed Forces 

In 1989 Prime Minister Lee continued to make most policy de- 
cisions concerning defense strategy and to approve the military 



230 



National Security 



budget. However, Goh Chok Tong, who served concurrently as 
first deputy prime minister and minister for defence, no doubt had 
the authority to decide most policy questions relating to the armed 
forces. He was assisted by two deputy defence ministers, one respon- 
sible for policy and the other for the organization of combat and 
combat support organizations. According to the Armed Forces Act 
of 1972, the minister for defence was to serve as the chairman of 
the Armed Forces Council and, in this capacity, was to assume 
responsibility for organizing and administering the armed forces 
and those government agencies having jurisdiction over military 
installations and defense industries. 

In 1989, the Ministry of Defence was organized into a general 
staff for the army and six divisions responsible for the air force, 
navy, security and intelligence, logistics, manpower, and finance 
(see figure 14). The air force and navy were largely autonomous 
and were commanded by a brigadier general and commodore, 
respectively. In wartime, the air force and navy would come un- 
der the operational control of the chief of the general staff, an army 
lieutenant general. 

Army 

The combat units of the army were organized into infantry and 
armored brigades and antiaircraft artillery battalions. Although 
there was one division headquarters for the regular army and two 
division headquarters for the reserves, these arrangements undoubt- 
edly were established for administrative purposes. Because of the 
scarcity of open land in Singapore, most unit training was con- 
ducted at the battalion and lower levels. Combat support was 
provided by engineer, signal, transportation, maintenance, and 
medical units. 

In 1989 there were three infantry brigades in the regular army 
and six infantry brigades in the reserves comprising approximate- 
ly thirty infantry battalions. Three of these battalions were trained 
in airmobile operations for rapid deployment to trouble spots and 
two others for commando operations. The primary offensive mis- 
sion assigned to the infantry included moving into populated and 
rural areas occupied by an enemy force and retaking territory. 
Defensive missions included deployment to strategic points on the 
main island and surrounding islands to protect areas inaccessible 
to armored and artillery units; protection of tank and artillery units 
during enemy assaults; and movement behind enemy lines to harass 
combat units, interdict lines of communication and supply, and 
collect intelligence. Each infantry battalion was organized into 
a headquarters company, four rifle companies, and a support 



231 



Singapore: A Country Study 




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232 



National Security 



company. Most rifle companies were equipped with indigenously 
produced SAR-80 assault rifles and Ultimax-100 machine guns. 
The support company included a reconnaissance platoon, 81mm 
mortar platoon, 106mm recoilless gun platoon, engineer platoon, 
and a sniper section. Unit training emphasized conventional and 
unconventional tactics for urban and jungle warfare, marksman- 
ship, marching, concealment, and survival techniques. The three 
airmobile battalions and two commando battalions were given air- 
borne and ranger training in addition to their infantry training. 

The army had one active-duty armored brigade and an addi- 
tional armored brigade in the reserves. Each brigade comprised 
one tank battalion and two mechanized infantry battalions. The 
French-produced AMX-13 light tank was used by both tank 
brigades. Mechanized infantry units used either M-113, V-150, 
or V-200 armored personnel carriers. In wartime, armored units 
would have the mission of assaulting and defending against heavi- 
ly armed enemy units. Unit training focused on combined arms 
operations, assaults on fortified and soft targets, and tactics for coun- 
tering enemy antitank guns and missiles. 

There were seventeen field artillery, mortar, and antiaircraft ar- 
tillery battalions in the army. Two battalions were equipped with 
American-produced and Israeli-produced 155mm howitzers. Each 
howitzer was operated by a twelve-man crew and could be used 
in wartime for long-range (ten to twenty kilometers) artillery sup- 
port for infantry and armored units. The equivalent of twelve bat- 
talions of mortar-equipped troops provided direct support to 
infantry units during assaults on enemy positions. Most of these 
units were equipped with indigenously produced 120mm mortars 
that could be towed into combat on a light two-wheeled trailer at- 
tached to a jeep. Some mortar units also had M-113 armored per- 
sonnel carriers that were modified to serve as the firing platform 
for 120mm mortars. In offensive operations, these units would fol- 
low closely behind armored forces to provide counterfire against 
enemy artillery and tanks. There were also the equivalent of three 
battalions of antiaircraft artillery in the army. Most of these units 
were equipped with either the Swedish-produced single-barrelled 
40mm automatic gun or the Swiss-produced Oerlikon twin-barrelled 
35mm automatic gun. 

Responsibility for various types of combat support was delegat- 
ed to several army commands, which were responsible for provid- 
ing engineer, signal, transportation, and other services. The army 
had the equivalent of eleven battalions of combat engineers, five 
in the regular army and six reserve units. Engineer companies and 
platoons were attached to the combat units and during wartime 



233 



Singapore: A Country Study 

would be responsible for clearing minefields, breaching obstacles, 
building bridges, supporting amphibious operations, and prepar- 
ing defensive positions. There were the equivalent of four signal 
battalions. Signal units also were attached to the combat units, prob- 
ably down to company level. Most transportation units were 
deployed to army bases located throughout the country and sup- 
ported both regular and reserve units assigned to that base. In war- 
time, the army's Transportation Headquarters would quickly 
acquire civilian vehicles through its civil resources mobilization 
center. Weapons and military materiel that required maintenance 
usually were delivered to designated stations where they were ex- 
changed or repaired. Each army base had a hospital and medical 
units that were deployed with combat units during military exer- 
cises. During wartime, the medical units would establish field hospi- 
tals to accommodate personnel wounded in battle until they could 
be transported to military or civilian hospitals. 

Air Force 

Fighter aircraft were organized into intercept and ground-attack 
squadrons. There were additional aircraft squadrons for long- 
distance troop and equipment transport and early warning; surface- 
to-air missile and antiaircraft gun units for air defense; and helicop- 
ter squadrons for transporting airmobile infantry into battle or 
search-and-rescue operations. 

Air defense missions were controlled from the ground by the Air 
Defence Command at Bukit Gombak and from the air by Grum- 
man E-2C early warning and control aircraft. Ground control in- 
cluded a number of radar stations strategically deployed throughout 
the country. The first of the air force's four Grumman E-2Cs were 
acquired by Singapore in 1987. Sophisticated long-range radar and 
tracking equipment aboard these aircraft enabled air defense con- 
trollers to detect possible enemy aircraft long before they entered 
the range of Singapore's ground-based defense radar system. 
Together the two systems provided an effective air defense warn- 
ing system. 

Two squadrons with thirty-five Northrop F-5E and F-5F inter- 
ceptors based at Tengah Air Base provided the nation's first line 
of air defense. The first squadron of F-5s was formed in 1979 and 
the second in 1985. The F-5, equipped with AIM-9J air-to-air mis- 
siles, would perform well in combat against most other types of 
fighter and bomber aircraft. If necessary, aircraft assigned to the 
ground-attack squadrons could be used for air intercept missions. 

The air force operated four surface-to-air missile systems and 
deployed antiaircraft guns to protect air bases and radar stations. 



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One unit equipped with British-produced Bloodhound 2 missiles 
provided long-range and high-altitude protection within an eighty- 
kilometer range. Another unit equipped with United States- 
produced improved HAWK missiles provided defense against 
medium- to high-flying aircraft at distances up to forty kilometers. 
Two missile systems were intended for close-range air defense: the 
British-produced Rapier, with radar and optical tracking modes, 
had a twelve-kilometer range; and the Swedish-produced RBS-70, 
which usually was transported on domestically modified V-200 ar- 
mored personnel carriers, had a five-kilometer range. The air force 
was equipped with the same types of antiaircraft guns as the army. 

Two models of fighter aircraft were imported by the air force 
for ground-attack missions in the 1970s and continued to be uti- 
lized for that role in 1989. Three squadrons with sixty-three 
McDonnell Douglas A-4S/S1 Skyhawks comprised the largest com- 
ponent of the ground- attack force. The Skyhawks could be used 
for bombing missions and close air support. Some of these aircraft 
were modified by Singapore Aircraft Industries for antishipping 
and antisubmarine warfare. In 1989 one squadron of thirty British- 
produced Hawker Hunter fighter aircraft was still flying. However, 
these aircraft were scheduled to be replaced by twenty F-16 fighter- 
bombers in the early 1990s. 

Two models of helicopters were used by the air force for joint 
service operations with the army and for search-and-rescue mis- 
sions. Two squadrons of Bell UH-1H helicopters, each having a 
complement of twenty helicopters, were formed in the late 1970s 
to enable the air force to transport specially trained infantry any- 
where on the island during combat. If both squadrons were used, 
the air force could airlift a lightly armed battalion into battle 
within hours of receiving its orders. In 1986 the air force began 
to import French-produced AS-332B helicopters to augment its 
force of UH-1H helicopters for troop transport and to provide an 
improved search-and-rescue capability. The AS-332B had the ad- 
vantage of a larger troop capacity and a greater combat radius. 
In 1989 the air force had taken delivery of six AS-332Bs and 
deployed them for search-and-rescue operations. An additional six- 
teen AS-332Bs were scheduled to be delivered to the air force in 
the early 1990s and would be used primarily for troop transport. 

Navy 

The navy had one missile gunboat squadron, one patrol craft 
squadron, one amphibious transport squadron, and additional ships 
for minesweeping and support operations. The West German Liirs- 
sen Werft model and the indigenously produced missile gunboats 



235 



Singapore: A Country Study 

provided the navy with a limited, but effective, capability to patrol 
Singapore's international boundaries with Indonesia and Malay- 
sia as well as the seaplane approaches to the island, which were 
vital to the nation's shipping interests. The six Ltirssen-designed 
Sea Wolf fast-attack craft could, if necessary, conduct operations 
several hundred kilometers out to sea, and their Gabriel and Har- 
poon surface-to-surface missiles would be effective against enemy 
naval craft within a ninety kilometer range. They also were equipped 
with 57mm and 40mm guns. The six British Vosper Thorny croft, 
which were indigenously produced patrol craft, were effective for 
patrolling coastline and inlets. These vessels were equipped with 
40mm and 20mm guns. The six landing ships that comprised the 
amphibious transport squadron could transport up to two fully 
equipped army battalions to landing areas in Singapore and neigh- 
boring countries. The age and slowness of these craft, however, 
would make them easy targets for hostile aircraft and naval ves- 
sels during wartime. Similarly, Singapore's two obsolescent mine- 
sweepers would be inadequate to clear all of the sea-lanes around 
Singapore should a hostile foreign power attempt to control the 
Strait of Malacca and other strategic channels in the area. 

People's Defence Force and National Cadet Corps 

In the late 1980s, the People's Defence Force, with 30,000 mem- 
bers organized under two commands, and the National Cadet 
Corps, with an enrollment of 20,000 high school and university 
students, were Singapore's only paramilitary organizations. The 
People's Defence Force was established in 1965 to absorb former 
members of several paramilitary organizations that, prior to in- 
dependence, had been part of the Singapore Volunteer Corps. By 
1980, however, fewer than 200 volunteers remained in the volun- 
teer force, and most of its personnel were national servicemen who 
had completed their twenty-four to thirty months of active duty. 
These personnel were assigned to units of the People's Defence 
Force to complete their reserve obligation. The ministries of defence 
and education were jointly responsible for the administration of 
the voluntary National Cadet Corps, which had army, air force, 
and naval components. Approximately 10 percent of the nation's 
high school students participated in this extracurricular program. 
The legal framework for the People's Defence Force and National 
Cadet Corps was provided by parliamentary acts passed in 1965 
and 1971, respectively. 

The Army General Staff had operational responsibility for the 
People's Defence Force. The specific organization and missions 
of units of the two People's Defence Force commands undoubtedly 



236 



Jungle warfare military training 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 



were similar to those found in the army reserves. Guarding coastal 
areas and local administrative jurisdictions against possible sabotage 
and other military actions during wartime or a national emergen- 
cy were the most likely assignments for battalions. Unit training 
was said to have been limited to physical fitness, weapons familiar- 
ization, and infrequent mobilization exercises. 

Military Establishment 

The military system was designed to provide an effective fight- 
ing force that could be partially or fully mobilized in emergencies 
and yet would maintain a low profile during peacetime. Because 
the reserves were viewed as the backbone of the armed forces, par- 
ticular emphasis was placed on mobilization training. In a 1985 
mobilization exercise that involved four army reserve brigades, 97 
percent of 7,000 reservists reported to their assigned bases within 
a six-hour period. Selected units were equipped and deployed only 
twelve hours after the initial order to mobilize. By 1989 more than 
two decades of effective planning had promoted a well-trained and 
well-equipped military establishment that was adequately prepared 
for its defense mission. 



237 



Singapore: A Country Study 

The armed forces occasionally were asked to provide assistance 
to disaster relief efforts in Singapore and abroad. In 1986 several 
hundred reservists belonging to sixteen army and air force units 
assisted efforts to rescue 100 persons trapped when a six-story hotel 
collapsed in one of Singapore's commercial districts. In 1987 the 
Ministry of Defence had army reserve logistics units assemble food, 
clothing, and medical supplies from storage depots for Philippine 
typhoon victims. An air force transport unit delivered the supplies 
to the Philippines less than sixteen hours after the relief effort was 
organized. 

Defense Spending 

Defense expenditures, which accounted for between 25 and 38 
percent of the national budget in the 1960s and 1970s, gradually 
decreased to less than 10 percent in the 1980s. One of the reasons 
government leaders chose to establish a citizen's army in the 1960s 
was to enable the growth of the armed forces to keep pace with 
the growth of the economy. The pay-as-you-go principle worked 
well for Singapore. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the government 
raised taxes in order to pay for purchases of foreign military equip- 
ment. The largest increases occurred between 1968 and 1972. 
Defense budgets increased from US$100 million to US$249 mil- 
lion during this period, with the largest part of the budget allocat- 
ed for the acquisition of tanks and naval vessels. 

In 1971 defense was the largest component of the budget. Defense 
would have been a still larger portion of the budget if Britain had 
not provided US$94 million in grants and US$281 million in loans 
as part of a compensation package for the withdrawal of its armed 
forces. Singapore's takeover of British military installations ena- 
bled the government to focus most of its spending on materiel, oper- 
ations, and training. By 1973 when defense spending peaked at 
38.9 percent of the national budget, the army was adequately 
equipped, and military planners began to focus more attention on 
the long-term needs of the armed forces, particularly the air force. 
In that year, military expenditures were less than 17 percent of 
the budget. In 1988 an estimated US$1 billion was spent on defense, 
which amounted to 7.5 percent of that year's total budget. 

In response to the economic recession of 1985, the government 
instituted a five-year freeze on the size of the armed forces but con- 
tinued to acquire new types of weapons and training equipment 
that were part of its ongoing modernization program. In 1986 the 
defense budget was reduced by US$175 million from the record 
high US$1.2 billion figure spent in 1985, with the cuts being ap- 
portioned throughout the armed forces. The five-year freeze did 



238 



National Security 



not affect national service. As new army units were formed and 
began their active service, other units were transferred to the 
reserves, and the longest serving reserve units were deactivated. 
The remainder of the cuts was absorbed through reduced spend- 
ing on nonessential military supplies and certain types of training 
(see table 13, Appendix). 

In the 1970s, the government established a number of educa- 
tion programs and increased military pay to encourage officers and 
NCOs to remain in the service. Officers were required to serve 
three years on active duty, after which most left to pursue more 
lucrative professions. In 1971 the government began to offer scholar- 
ships to promising officers who agreed to reenlist for at least one 
additional tour of duty. The Overseas Training Awards, the first 
such program to be implemented, enabled qualified officers to earn 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in management and other 
disciplines needed by the armed forces at prestigious universities 
and colleges in Western Europe and the United States. Many of 
the officers trained through this program accepted managerial and 
technical positions in the civil service after they completed their 
military obligation. Other officers were given scholarships to the 
National University of Singapore, Singapore Polytechnic Institute, 
and other local schools. In the early 1980s, more officers and NCOs 
opted for longer service because of pay increases and the tighter 
labor market resulting from the economic downturn in the civil 
sector. In 1982 the salaries of 19,000 NCOs were raised an aver- 
age of 26 percent at a cost to the government of US$25 million 
annually. Officer salaries no doubt were increased proportionally, 
and the government continued to increase military pay, albeit at 
lower levels, in subsequent years. 

In 1987 the ruling People's Action Party agreed to the estab- 
lishment of a parliamentary committee to review military spend- 
ing and provide a forum for public debate on defense issues. Prior 
to that, the government had closely monitored the press and dis- 
couraged the publication of articles critical of the government's 
defense policies on the pretext that national security was the preroga- 
tive of the small number of government officials responsible for 
policy-making and budget decisions. In 1989 the committee's 
primary function was to review the decisions of the executive branch 
on defense issues and to advise the government concerning public 
opinion about military spending. However, the committee lacked 
the power to change the government's defense policy or to amend 
the defense budget. 

Role in Society 

Government efforts to enhance the status of the military profession, 



239 



Singapore: A Country Study 

particularly in the Chinese community, were only partially suc- 
cessful. During the colonial period, the Confucian tradition that 
valued scholarship over military service and parental influence dis- 
couraged young Singaporeans of Chinese descent from choosing 
a career in the military. In the 1960s and 1970s, the government 
attempted to overcome opposition to the conscription system 
through a media campaign that emphasized the important role of 
the armed forces. By the late 1970s, the draft and compulsory service 
no longer were controversial, but soldiers still were not held in high 
esteem by the general population. Although military service was 
generally viewed as acceptable within the Malay community, 
government concerns about ethnic and religious loyalties of Ma- 
lays in the armed forces made it difficult for them to become officers 
or to be assigned to sensitive positions. 

Uniforms and Insignia 

In 1 989 there were four categories of uniforms worn by all three 
services of the armed forces. The ceremonial uniform for officers 
consisted of a cap, white tunic, white shirt, trousers with service 
braids and color, black boots for the army and air force, and white 
shoes for the navy. The mess kit uniform was worn by sergeants 
and higher ranking NCOs for ceremonies. The basic work and pa- 
rade uniform was a white shirt worn with the appropriate trous- 
ers: olive drab for the army, light blue for the air force, and dark 
blue for the navy. Air Force, navy, and army personnel assigned 
to armored units were issued a one-piece jump suit as a second 
work uniform. The combat uniform for army officers and enlisted 
personnel included camouflage fatigues with a helmet and black 
boots. Uniforms for women included skirts for ceremonies and work 
but otherwise were similar to those provided for male personnel. 

Rank insignia were standardized for all three services, except 
that the air force used silver whereas the army and navy used gold. 
Generals in the army and air force and commodores in the navy 
wore one, two, or three stars. Field grade officers wore the appropri- 
ate number of crests on shoulder tabs. Enlisted personnel wore 
chevrons, in their service color, on both sleeves (see fig. 15). 

Recruitment and Training of Personnel 

All male citizens were eligible for the draft on their eighteenth 
birthday. Prospective draftees reported to the central manpower 
base operated by the Ministry of Defence with their birth certifi- 
cate, identity card, educational record, and medical records. In 
the 1970s, the Ministry of Defence computerized the registration 
process. The Integrated Manpower Information System maintained 



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National Security 



at the central manpower base enabled the government to match 
more efficiently the skills and educational capabilities of draftees 
to the staffing needs of the services. Exemptions were granted only 
if a person was medically unfit for service, had a criminal record, 
or could prove that his enlistment was a hardship for his family. 
Deferments were granted to students who were enrolled or had been 
accepted for admission at an accredited college or other education 
institution. 

Singapore's declining rate of population was partially responsi- 
ble for government efforts to recruit more women for noncombat- 
ant duties. In 1980 about 50 percent of all women in the armed 
forces served in clerical positions in which promotion and career 
opportunities were limited. By 1989, however, military regulations 
had been changed to allow women to be considered for assignment 
to a number of military occupation specialties previously reserved 
for men. Women with high school diplomas and those with special- 
ized skills, such as computer programming or office management, 
were offered professional and technical positions in support units. 
Many women found the medical and fringe benefits that came with 
a military career to be equivalent or better than those in the civilian 
job market. The recruitment of women for noncombatant duties 
enabled the Ministry of Defence to maintain manpower levels in 
combat units without changing length of service requirements or 
extending the length of reserve duty. 

Because of the scarcity of open land on the main island, Singa- 
pore established training bases and firing ranges on offshore islands 
and sometimes sent army units abroad for training that could not 
be provided in the country. The Military Maneuvers Act — passed 
in 1963 while Singapore was a part of Malaysia, and amended in 
1983 — strengthened restrictions on civilian access to several islands 
located northwest and south of the main island of Singapore. Each 
of the services conducted live firing exercises in the restricted areas, 
and the army used some of the islands for basic military training 
and various types of field training. Operational exercises, such as 
amphibious landings and training conducted with Brunei and other 
countries, took place on these islands. The use of unpopulated 
islands for military training enabled the armed forces to avoid 
endangering the city and other heavily populated areas on the main 
island. Large scale exercises involving several battalions, however, 
were considered too dangerous even on the deserted islands. Af- 
ter 1975 the army used bases in Taiwan for military training 
that included combined arms exercises involving infantry, artillery, 
and armored units. These exercises, engaging as many as 10,000 
troops at one time, provided officers a chance to simulate wartime 



241 



Singapore: A Country Study 




242 



National Security 



conditions more closely and gain experience in the command and 
control of operations involving several battalions. 

In each of the three services, male inductees were given three 
months and female inductees three weeks of basic military train- 
ing at the basic military training camp on Pulau Tekong. For the 
men, the program included daily physical exercise to build stami- 
na, classroom and field instruction in handling small arms, and 
day and night combat operations. Particular emphasis was placed 
on learning to function as members of a combat team. Infantry 
personnel usually remained with their basic training company 
throughout their military careers. In this way the army hoped to 
strengthen the efficiency of units during combat by encouraging 
the loyalty of the individual soldier to his unit. Basic training for 
female military personnel emphasized military discipline, physi- 
cal training, and an introduction to military skills, including han- 
dling small arms, marching, and survival techniques. 

Following basic training, conscripts selected for the army's com- 
bat units were given additional training that familiarized them with 
military procedures, weapons and equipment, tactics, and a unit's 
offensive and defensive missions during wartime. Infantry unit 
members were assigned specific duties. Those assigned to rifle pla- 
toons learned assault tactics at their home base, while those select- 
ed for the weapons platoon were sent to the School of Infantry 
Weapons at Pasir Laba Camp where they received instruction in 
how to fire and care for mortars and recoilless rifles. Artillery train- 
ing was provided first at the Artillery School at Khatib Camp, where 
recruits learned to locate and fire accurately at targets, and then 
at their home base, where the emphasis was on weapons deploy- 
ment in battle. The courses at the Artillery School lasted from eight 
to thirteen weeks. In the eight- week gunner course, artillery per- 
sonnel were trained to fire 155mm howitzers. There were addi- 
tional courses for those assigned to heavy mortar units and for 
artillery specialists such as the technical assistants responsible for 
computing target engagement data. Base training was conducted 
in two phases. During the first phase, field artillery and mortar 
units practiced what they had learned at the Artillery School and 
participated in cross-training, through which personnel were trained 
to perform the duties of other members of their unit. The second 
phase involved field deployment drills and battalion or brigade ex- 
ercises. Tank crews were given an eight- week course at the Armor 
School located at Sungai Gedong Camp. A three-man crew com- 
prised a commander, driver, and gunner. Training included 
familiarization with the tank, cross-training, and the use of com- 
puters and visual aids to simulate combat conditions. Most field 



243 



Singapore: A Country Study 



exercises involving tanks were limited to small units, usually at the 
company or platoon level, again because of the limited space avail- 
able for such training. 

Outstanding army recruits were selected for training as NCOs 
and sent to Pasir Laba Camp to attend the School of Infantry Sec- 
tion Leaders. This program emphasized toughness and endurance 
during combat. Trainees were taken to various parts of the main 
island and Pulau Tekong and given extensive instruction in lead- 
ing a small group and taking responsibility for its survival in com- 
bat. Additional training included conventional and unconventional 
unit tactics, discipline, and communication with the platoon and 
company headquarters. 

The Armed Forces Training Institute located at Jurong Camp 
provided officer training and instruction for army personnel en- 
rolled in advanced programs designed to improve leadership and 
military skills. Officer candidates, including university graduates 
and other recruits considered to have the aptitude and physical capa- 
bilities to command a platoon, took a nine-month course at the 
Officer Cadet School of the Armed Forces Training Institute. Class- 
room instruction included lectures on unit administration, tactics, 
planning operations, command and communications, and assess- 
ing unit capabilities in combat. During field exercises, cadets were 
presented with both urban and rural battle scenarios in which they 
took turns performing the duties of officers and enlisted men in 
order to improve their understanding of the role of subordinates. 
Graduates of the course were commissioned as second lieutenants 
and assigned to command active-duty or reserve units. The army's 
Advanced Training School and Command and Staff College also 
were located at the Armed Forces Training Institute. 

The air force provided pilot training at the Flying Training School 
at Paya Lebar Air Base. Pilot trainees were required to complete 
the army's basic training and nine-month officer cadet courses be- 
fore being accepted into the flight training program. The introduc- 
tion to flying began with a one-month orientation course in 
advanced aerodynamics and aircraft instruments. This course was 
followed by sixteen weeks of training in Italian-produced SF-260 
turboprop and S-211 jet trainer aircraft. Following this basic fly- 
ing course, cadets were assigned to fighter aircraft squadrons for 
forty weeks of advanced training that included sight and instru- 
ment control of flight, air-to-air and air-to-ground combat tactics, 
flying in formation, night flying, and other subjects. Those who 
failed to qualify were reassigned to transport or rotary aircraft units, 
or given ground assignments. 



244 




Urban warfare military training 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 



The air force also operated schools to train air traffic controllers, 
air defense controllers, and aircraft maintenance personnel. Air 
traffic controllers, trained at the Air Traffic Control School at Seletar 
Air Base, were taught how to distinguish commercial and military 
aircraft, to regulate military air traffic, and to provide emergency 
services. Air defense controllers learned to identify enemy aircraft 
on radar screens, to guide fighter aircraft to the enemy, and to oper- 
ate surface-to-air missiles. The Air Engineering Training Institute 
offered a wide range of courses to train mechanics and techni- 
cians in the maintenance of the various types of aircraft, engines, 
radar, and communications equipment used by the air force. 

Naval officer training was provided in the Midshipman School 
at Sembawang. This school had separate eighteen-month courses 
to train navigation, gunnery, communications, and logistics officers. 
Advanced officer training was not available, but most ship com- 
manders received additional training in Australia, Britain, or the 
United States. The navy also operated a Technical Training School 
for ship maintenance personnel at Pulau Brani and a school to train 
seamen for duties as gunners, radar operators, and communica- 
tions specialists. 



245 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Training for army reserves included weekend duty at army bases, 
field and mobilization exercises, and occasional assignments to 
schools and training bases. Reserve military personnel were required 
to spend a minimum of forty days a year with their military unit 
or in an individual training program. Regularly scheduled weekend 
duty usually included physical fitness exercises, instruction in in- 
dividual and unit military skills, and occasional travel for shoot- 
ing practice to one of the army's indoor firing ranges or to a training 
area for field exercises. Every few years, reserve units were sent 
to the Basic Combat Training Center at Pasir Laba Camp for a 
ten-day refresher course in unit tactics. During mobilization exer- 
cises, selected units were required to assemble at their home base 
and deploy to their assigned field positions to test the readiness of 
personnel to respond to an alert. Most branch schools had some 
on-site and correspondence courses that reservists could take in or- 
der to fulfill part of their annual service requirement. The Armed 
Forces Training Institute offered courses for reservists chosen for 
officer training. 

Defense Industries 

Singapore's defense industries were established in the late 1960s 
because the government believed that the country should not be- 
come too dependent on foreign countries to resupply the armed 
forces during wartime. By 1975 three government-owned corpo- 
rations were involved in assembling, rebuilding, overhauling, and 
designing small arms, artillery, armor, military aircraft, and naval 
vessels. In 1979 the government started a defense marketing ef- 
fort to promote the sale of Singapore-designed weapons to foreign 
countries. In addition to government-owned defense industries, a 
number of foreign-owned producers of military equipment oper- 
ated in Singapore. These firms were attracted by government in- 
centives designed to promote employment in high technology 
industries, to lower production costs, and to explore the possibili- 
ty of using Singapore as a base for promoting the sale of their 
products in Asia. 

In 1989 three divisions of the state-owned and -operated Singa- 
pore Technology Corporation were producing various types of am- 
munition, weapons, and vehicles used by the army. In addition, 
the divisions were responsible for rebuilding or adapting some types 
of foreign military materiel to army specifications. The first divi- 
sion, commonly known as Chartered Industries, was established 
in 1967 and produced various types of ammunition and small arms. 
Ammunition manufactured included 5.56-, 7.62- and 12.7-caliber 
shells used in pistols, rifles, and machine guns; 60-, 81- and 120mm 



246 



National Security 



mortars; 75mm armor-piercing rounds for the main gun of the 
AMX-13 tank; and 155mm high-explosive artillery ammunition. 
In 1970 Chartered Industries began licensed production of the M16 
assault rifle. More than 80,000 Ml 6s were manufactured for the 
army between 1970 and 1979. In 1976 Chartered Industries pur- 
chased the rights to the SAR-80 assault rifle from Britain's Ster- 
ling Armament Company. Engineers at Chartered Industries 
worked with a team of weapons experts at the Armed Forces Train- 
ing Institute to improve the Sterling design. An estimated 100,000 
indigenously designed SAR-80s were produced between 1980 and 
1989 for domestic use and for export. The second division of Sin- 
gapore Technology Corporation — Ordnance Development and 
Engineering — was established in 1973 to design and produce mor- 
tars and 155mm howitzers for the army. Three indigenously 
designed mortars based on designs provided to the division by a 
Finnish manufacturer were still in production in 1989 and fired 
60-, 81- and 120mm ammunition. The indigenously designed 
FH-88 155mm howitzer was based on the Israeli-produced M-68 
that was exported to Singapore in the 1970s. Soltam Limited of 
Israel no doubt assisted Ordnance Development and Engineering 
in the development and initial assembly of the FM-88. Automo- 
tive Engineering, the third division of Singapore Technology Cor- 
poration involved in military production, was established in 1971 . 
The division received a number of foreign-produced vehicles, in- 
cluding three-ton Mercedes transport trucks and the AMX-13 tank, 
and modified them to army specifications. Additionally, the divi- 
sion modified V-150, V-200, and M-l 13 armored personnel car- 
riers to serve as platforms for weapons such as the Bofors RBS-70 
surface-to-air missile system and indigenously produced 120mm 
mortars. 

Singapore Aerospace Corporation, established in 1981, com- 
prised four state-owned divisions that were involved in the assem- 
bly of foreign-produced trainer aircraft for the air force and the 
overhaul and maintenance of various types of military aircraft, air- 
craft engines, and avionics equipment. Between 1984 and 1987, 
the Maintenance Division assembled at least twenty-six Italian- 
produced SIAI-Marchetti S-211 trainer aircraft for the air force. 
The Maintenance Division also overhauled and refurbished A-4S 
Skyhawk fighter aircraft and performed depot-level maintenance 
on C-130 transport aircraft for both the Singapore and United 
States air forces. Singapore Aerospace Corporation could manufac- 
ture spare parts for the Skyhawks, handle routine maintenance on 
6,000 types of civil and military aircraft components, and over- 
haul various types of jet engines. 



247 



Singapore: A Country Study 

The state-owned Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering Com- 
pany produced naval vessels under technology transfer agreements 
negotiated with Liirssen Werft of West Germany. In 1974 and 1975, 
the company constructed four TNC-45 missile-equipped gunboats 
for the navy based on Liirssen-designed Zobel-class torpedo gun- 
boats. The West German design was modified to allow for the in- 
stallation of Israeli-produced Gabriel missiles and a larger gun. The 
agreement with Liirssen Werft included marketing rights, and Sin- 
gapore Shipbuilding and Engineering constructed lightly armed 
gunboats for at least two Asian countries. In 1976 and 1977, the 
company built three TNC-45s for the Thai navy. These vessels 
had the same armament as the TNC-45s produced for the Singa- 
pore navy. In 1986 Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering 
negotiated an agreement with the Indian government that provid- 
ed for joint construction of six TNC-45s for the Indian Coast 
Guard. Two of these craft were to be built in Singapore and four 
in India. In 1989 Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering con- 
structed the first of five corvettes for the navy. Again, Liirssen Werft 
provided the design and one prototype vessel, and Singapore Ship- 
building and Engineering modified the design to navy specifica- 
tions. The modification involved replacing surface-to-surface 
missiles with American-produced Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles. 
Both the Singapore and West German models of this craft were 
equipped with one 76mm gun (see table 14, Appendix). 

Between 1983 and 1987, Singapore exported US$311 million 
worth of weapons and military equipment to other countries. Ac- 
cording to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
Singapore was the fifteenth largest exporter of military hardware 
to Third World nations during the period. These weapons and 
equipment sales increased from only US$1 million in 1983 to 
US$125 million in 1987 and were believed to have been limited 
to the same types of ammunition, small arms, and mortars that 
were produced for the army. The government marketed its mili- 
tary equipment through its own brokerage firm, Unicorn Inter- 
national. 

Strategic Perspective 

From 1959 to 1989, Singapore developed a defensive security 
outlook that emphasized the maintenance of strong military and 
civil defense organizations, cooperative military relations with other 
members of ASEAN, the Five-Powers Defence Agreement; and 
other noncommunist states. In 1989 more than 90 percent of Sin- 
gapore's population was under the age of fifty and could not recall 
the Japanese invasion and occupation. Although Singapore had 



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National Security 



not had to combat an insurgency or defend itself against a hostile 
neighbor since the Indonesian Confrontation ended in 1966, the 
government frequently addressed such issues as Vietnam's 1978 
invasion of Cambodia in order to highlight the vulnerability of small 
countries. Public opinion polls taken in the 1980s indicated that, 
although most citizens supported having some form of national ser- 
vice, many questioned the need for their leaders' "siege mentali- 
ty." By 1989, as Lee Kuan Yew prepared for what he hoped would 
be a smooth transfer of power to a younger generation, Singapore's 
strategic perspective appeared to place increasing emphasis on 
regional developments that augured well for improved regional secu- 
rity rather than on any threat to the country posed by communist 
expansion in Southeast Asia (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). 

Total Defence Concept 

Singapore's leaders defined Total Defence (see Glossary) as the 
capability of the nation to deter or overcome aggression by main- 
taining small, well-equipped regular armed forces backed up by 
a large, well-trained military reserve and a civil sector that could 
be quickly mobilized to provide support to the armed forces. By 
1989 Singapore had each of these components in place. The air 
force was recognized as one of the best in the region, and the army 
continued to make steady progress in improving its capability to 
react, albeit on a limited scale, to repel an invasion. The addition 
of six corvettes strengthened the navy's ability to defend territori- 
al waters and conduct limited operations farther out to sea. More 
than 50 percent of Singapore males had received formal military 
training, and more than 10 percent of them belonged to a reserve 
unit. The Ministry of Defence monitored the combat capabilities 
of reserve units through frequent training and mobilization exer- 
cises. The country was believed to have adequate stockpiles of fuel 
and ammunition. Its military logistics and maintenance capabili- 
ties were excellent. Finally, the national Civil Defence Force, es- 
tablished in 1982, had gradually been expanded to coordinate 
military, police, and civilian organizations involved in efforts to 
maintain internal security and to restore vital services quickly during 
wartime and other emergencies. 

In 1989 the most apparent weakness in Singapore's Total Defence 
system was the friction between the government and business com- 
munity over the financial and social costs of sustaining the defense 
sector. As the birth rate declined after 1967, the percentage of males 
drafted for service increased each year. Concurrently, the num- 
ber of persons available to Singapore's expanding export indus- 
tries also decreased. Thus, some business leaders were critical of 



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Singapore: A Country Study 

government policies that perpetuated the national service system 
and argued that the armed forces had grown too large and that 
new weapons, increased army pay, and other military programs 
were unnecessary. The same business leaders were reluctant to grant 
workers leave for reserve training. Government- sponsored public 
opinion polls confirmed that a large segment of the general popu- 
lation questioned the need for national service. A poll taken in 1983 
indicated that 40 percent of Singaporeans thought that national 
service was a waste of time and money. Government officials 
defended the system by arguing that even small countries must 
maintain credible defenses or risk disaster. They also noted that 
a large percentage of personnel trained by the armed forces in var- 
ious technical and professional fields were well prepared to com- 
pete for skilled jobs in the private sector when they completed the 
active-duty portion of their national service. In the mid-1980s, the 
government began a variety of public relations programs to over- 
come opposition to its defense policies and, as of 1989, had no in- 
tention of reducing manpower levels or proposing cuts in military 
spending. 

Military Relations with Other Countries 

After Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, the govern- 
ment actively sought to establish a broad-based international net- 
work of military contacts as part of its overall strategic plan to 
strengthen recognition of its existence as a sovereign state. In the 
1960s, Britain, Israel, New Zealand, and France were among the 
nations that were approached for assistance as Singapore's mili- 
tary planners began to formulate doctrine and evaluate which air- 
craft, artillery, naval vessels, and tanks would be affordable and 
appropriate for the country's armed forces. In the 1970s, hundreds 
of officers, pilots, and technical specialists were sent to Australia, 
Britain, Japan, the United States, West Germany and other coun- 
tries for advanced training that could not be provided in Singa- 
pore. Programs in the United States included flight training and 
live-firing exercises for air force personnel selected to pilot F-5E 
and F-5F interceptors, special forces training for infantrymen from 
the army's commando battalions, and command training for officers 
who earned government scholarships offered through the Overseas 
Training Awards fund. 

In the 1980s, as the ASEAN countries became increasingly con- 
cerned about Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and the possi- 
bility of war between Vietnam and Thailand, Singapore began to 
participate in annual military exercises with Brunei, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. In 1979 the Singapore and Brunei navies conducted the 



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National Security 



first in a series of annual naval exercises (code-named Pelican), 
and in 1983 the two countries initiated annual infantry maneu- 
vers (code-named Termite) involving selected battalions from both 
armies. Singapore infantry units were frequently deployed to Brunei 
for commando and helicopter-borne training. In 1980 the Singa- 
pore and Indonesian air forces began annual exercises (code-named 
Indopura) that were gradually expanded to include joint air maneu- 
vers. Between 1987 and 1989, the two nations shared the costs of 
constructing the Siabu Air Weapons Range in northern Sumatra. 
Singapore's use of this range reduced the need for costly deploy- 
ment of interceptor and ground-attack squadrons to Taiwan or the 
United State for live-firing exercises. In 1989 Indonesia also agreed 
to allow the Singapore army to use its Baturaja training base in 
southern Sumatra. In 1984 the Singapore and Malaysian navies 
began annual joint exercises (code-named Malapura). These ex- 
ercises usually were held in the Strait of Malacca to improve the 
cooperation between the two nations in patrolling that important 
sea-lane. In 1989 Singapore and Malaysia also initiated joint train- 
ing for army units: the first exercise was held in Singapore in May; 
the second exercise was held in Malaysia in October. Although there 
were no indications that Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia were 
interested in negotiating a multilateral defense agreement, each 
country viewed increased bilateral cooperation as beneficial to its 
national security and to regional stability. 

Singapore has maintained good military relations with the United 
States and has supported the stationing of United States forces in 
Asia as necessary to counter both Vietnamese military expansion 
in the region and the establishment of the Soviet military presence 
in Indochina. The 1975 communist victory in Vietnam and the 
subsequent reevaluation of the United States' role in Asia and the 
Pacific worried Singapore's military leaders. In 1979 Prime Minister 
Lee expressed concern that Vietnam would become a Soviet proxy 
for the proliferation of a new wave of communist guerrilla move- 
ments in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Lee ad- 
mitted that American reluctance to become involved in another 
Southeast Asian war was understandable, but he observed that the 
ASEAN states lacked the military capability to reverse the trend 
alone. By 1988, however, the scenario of a domino-like progres- 
sion of communism south through Thailand and Malaysia and 
into Singapore had lost much of its credibility. Singapore viewed 
the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan 
and Vietnam's promise to follow Moscow's lead and withdraw 
its troops from Cambodia as actions that would enhance the secur- 
ity of ASEAN states, particularly Thailand. Although further 



251 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Vietnamese and Soviet- sponsored military incursions in the region 
were considered unlikely for the foreseeable future, Singapore 
viewed the stationing of United States forces in Asia and the Pa- 
cific as advantageous to ASEAN. 

By 1988 improved relations between Singapore and Malaysia 
had facilitated a revitalization of the Five-Powers Defence Agree- 
ment. Britain also began to demonstrate renewed interest in the 
pact. In 1970 approximately 12,000 British troops were sent to 
Malaysia for a joint military exercise that included contingents from 
the members of the Five-Powers Defence Agreement. Through- 
out the rest of the 1970s, however, the British limited their partic- 
ipation in military exercises conducted to promote the agreement. 
In 1971 Australia assumed primary responsibility for managing 
the Integrated Air Defence System, which was the only functional 
organization maintained under the pact for the protection of Sin- 
gapore and Malaysia. Air defense exercises were conducted annu- 
ally after 1971. During the 1970s and 1980s, New Zealand and 
Australia also deployed some army and air force units to Malaysia 
and Singapore. In 1981 the five states party to the agreement be- 
gan to hold annual ground and naval exercises, which gradually 
grew in size and importance. The 1988 joint naval maneuvers (code- 
named Lima Bersatu) were the largest and most complex military 
exercise organized by the five nations since 1970. They involved 
20 naval vessels, including a British aircraft carrier and a British 
submarine, and more than 100 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. 
Fighter aircraft from the five countries were assigned to multi- 
national flight teams, and Singapore's E-2C reconnaissance air- 
craft were used along with P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft 
belonging to the Australian and New Zealand air forces. Singa- 
pore air and naval units gained valuable combat experience from 
their participation in exercises with other members of the agree- 
ment. Britain, Australia, and New Zealand displayed their readi- 
ness to respond to any military contingency affecting Malaysia and 
Singapore. Thus, in 1989 the Five-Powers Defence Agreement con- 
tinued to contribute to Singapore's security and the overall stabil- 
ity of Southeast Asia. 

Public Order and Internal Security 

Between 1819 and 1867, the British East India Company worked 
closely with citizens' councils that represented the European, 
Chinese, Malay, and Indian communities to maintain law and order 
in Singapore. The British civil service comprised a small and over- 
worked staff that often tried unsuccessfully to enforce British laws 
in the Straits Settlements. The resident councillor for Singapore 



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National Security 



was responsible for adjudicating most criminal and civil cases. More 
serious cases were referred to the governor of the Straits Settle- 
ments in Penang, or, on rare occasions, to the governor general 
in India. Chinese secret societies flourished, and violent crime was 
a fact of life. Thomas Dunman, Singapore's first superintendent 
of police, was a young British merchant who was respected by lead- 
ers of the European community and supported by influential Ma- 
lays and Indians, who felt powerless to prevent Chinese gangs from 
roving into their districts, assaulting people, and robbing homes 
and businesses. In 1843 Dunman recruited a small group of itiner- 
ant workers and single-handedly trained and organized them into 
an effective police force. By 1856 gang robberies no longer were 
a major problem, but the secret societies continued to control lucra- 
tive gambling, drug, and prostitution operations. 

From 1867 to 1942, the Straits Settlements had unified law en- 
forcement and criminal justice systems. However, colonial authori- 
ties in Singapore continued to respect religious and cultural customs 
in the Chinese and Malay communities as long as local practices 
were peaceful and residents respected British authority. In 1868 
Governor Sir Harry Ord established a circuit court, and its juris- 
diction over criminal and civil matters gradually expanded in Sin- 
gapore during the period up to World War II. Leaders of the 
Chinese community appreciated the cooperative nature of British 
government officials and helped to promote respect for the law. 
By the 1880s, government efforts to reduce the criminal elements 
of the Chinese secret societies had succeeded in making the city 
a safer place to live. Europeans and Indians dominated the police 
force. Colonial authorities rarely hired Chinese for police work for 
fear the secret societies would infiltrate the force. After World War 
I , an increase in political violence was attributed to the growth of 
communist influence within the Chinese community. In 1919 a 
special branch was established in the police force to combat the 
communist-inspired anticolonial activities, which were increasing 
in Chinese schools and businesses. In 1931 a special branch oper- 
ation resulted in the arrest and deportation of leaders of the newly 
formed Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). By the end of the 
decade, however, communist influence and political subversion were 
once again a problem for law enforcement officials. 

During the period that Singapore was a crown colony, militia 
groups trained by the British army occasionally assisted the police 
force in maintaining civil order and promoted citizen involvement 
in protecting the city from foreign invasion. Even before Singa- 
pore became a crown colony, concerned citizens in the European 
community had formed a citizens' militia. In 1854 about sixty 



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Singapore: A Country Study 

European expatriates established the Volunteer Rifle Corps to pro- 
tect citizens from violent riots. Although most riots occurred be- 
cause of factional fighting between Chinese secret societies, some 
disturbances also disrupted the commercial activities of the city. 
By 1910 there were 700 volunteers in six organizations that were 
collectively called the Singapore Volunteer Corps. Europeans com- 
prised four groups, including two infantry companies, one artillery 
company and one engineer company. The Chinese and Malay com- 
munities each contributed one company. In February 1915, the 
Volunteer Corps was mobilized to help restore order following a 
rebellion by Singapore's Indian troops (see Crown Colony, 
1867-1918, ch. 1). Approximately 800 Punjabi Muslim soldiers, 
who comprised most of the British garrison in Singapore at that 
time, were deceived by German prisoners of war into believing that 
they were about to be redeployed to the front lines in Europe. The 
Punjabis killed their officers and went on a rampage through the 
city before dispersing in small groups to the northern section of 
the island. For a two-week period, the Singapore Volunteer Corps, 
along with the police and the crews from British, French, Japanese, 
and Russian warships, rounded up the Punjabis and protected the 
city while the colonial government restored order. In 1922 the Straits 
Settlements Volunteer Force was established, and the British army 
became more active in training the volunteers. Mobilized on De- 
cember 1, 1941, six days before the Japanese Malayan campaign 
began, Singapore's volunteers manned bunkers and artillery po- 
sitions along the south coast to defend the city from an invasion 
from the sea that never came. 

In response to communal riots in December 1950, the British 
reorganized the Singapore Police Force and established links be- 
tween the police and the British army that effectively prevented 
subsequent civil disturbances from getting out of hand. The 1950 
riots occurred when Malay police officers, who comprised 90 per- 
cent of the police force, failed to control a demonstration outside 
Singapore's Supreme Court. The demonstration occurred follow- 
ing a decision by the court to return to her natural parents a Dutch 
Eurasian girl who had been raised in a Malay foster home during 
the Japanese occupation. Incensed by the court's decision, large 
groups of Malays randomly attacked Europeans and Eurasians kill- 
ing 18 and wounding 173. The British army had to be called in 
to restore order. 

The British reorganization of the police force included the hir- 
ing of large numbers of Europeans, Chinese, and Indians to im- 
prove the ethnic balance; the establishment of riot control teams; 
and the modernization of police command and communication 



254 




Victory parade and demonstration, September 1945 
Courtesy National Archives 



channels. The riot control teams belonged to a new organization 
known as the Police Reserve Unit. Members of the unit had to 
be politically reliable and had to pass a rigorous training course. 
The first riot control teams were deployed in December 1952. In 
May 1955, these units were effective in containing communist- 
inspired rioters during a transportation workers' strike, although 
four people were killed and thirty-one injured over a three-day 
period. 

In July 1956 the Singapore government under Chief Minister 
Lim Yew Hock's administration prepared an internal security plan 
that simplified arrangements for cooperation between the police 
and the British army during serious civil disturbances. The new 
plan provided for a joint command post to be set up as quickly 
as possible after the police recognized the possibility of a riot. The 
Police Reserve Unit was to assume responsibility for riot control 
operations within clearly defined sectors while army units were 
deployed to control the movement of civilians in the immediate 
area. The plan was tested and proved effective during communist- 
inspired riots in October 1956, when five army battalions supported 
the police and five helicopters were used for aerial surveillance of 
the demonstrators. Police and army cooperation succeeded in 



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Singapore: A Country Study 



breaking up large groups of rioters into smaller groups and prevent- 
ing the spread of the violence to neighboring communities. Police 
and army restraint kept deaths and injuries to a minimum and im- 
proved the confidence of the public in the government's capabili- 
ty in handling incidents of domestic violence. The British role was 
a stabilizing factor that facilitated the demise of the CPM in Sin- 
gapore and a smooth transition of power to the People's Action 
Party (PAP). 

Subversive Threats 

Communist-inspired subversion and violence was a serious 
problem in Malaya and Singapore in the post-World War II peri- 
od. In June 1948, the British colonial government declared a state 
of emergency in Malaya and Singapore and passed tough security 
laws to cope with the threat. After Lee Kuan Yew led the PAP 
to victory in the 1959 election, the influence of the communists 
quickly declined and citizens known or alleged to have contacts 
with the CPM or other groups that advocated the overthrow of 
the government were closely monitored by the police. 

The Communist Threat, 1945-63 

The CPM was legal in Singapore during the first thirty months 
of post-war British colonial rule. The communist-controlled 
Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, formed during the Japanese 
occupation, had several hundred Chinese members, including the 
commander, Chin Peng. In 1945 and 1946, many poorly educat- 
ed Chinese Singaporeans sympathized with the communists be- 
cause they seemed to offer a program of labor reforms that would 
benefit the common person. Additionally, most of the better edu- 
cated Chinese resented British policies that limited participation 
in politics to Straits-born British subjects who were literate in En- 
glish. A large segment of the Chinese community also supported 
the Chinese Communist Party as it moved closer to gaining con- 
trol in China. Chin Peng was elected secretary general of the CPM 
in March 1947. At that time, the communists had an estimated 
300 members in Singapore who were committed to the party's goal 
of destabilizing the British regime by promoting civil unrest in the 
trade unions. In 1947 communist fronts were influential in organiz- 
ing over 300 strikes involving more than 70,000 workers. Economic 
concessions by the colonial government and business community 
reduced but did not destroy communist influence, and communist 
leaders gradually became more militant. They recruited former 
guerrillas of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army and mem- 
bers of various secret society gangs to form the underground 



256 



National Security 



Workers' Protection Corps. When the communists were unsuc- 
cessful in penetrating targeted trade unions, small groups belong- 
ing to the Workers' Protection Corps used various methods of 
intimidation in an effort to have moderate leaders replaced by com- 
munists or communist sympathizers. 

The party's chance to take over Singapore from the British 
through legal means ended in 1948 when the communist leaders 
decided to adopt a strategy of insurrection and terrorism in Malaya 
and Singapore, which led to the period known as the Emergency 
(see Glossary). The CPM was declared illegal and was subjected 
to countermeasures by the government; its membership in Singa- 
pore dropped precipitously, and all of the members of the Singa- 
pore Town Committee, which was the CPM's central committee 
for Singapore, were arrested in December 1950. The communist 
effort was crippled until the mid-1950s, when a new strategy of 
collaboration with legal political organizations was adopted by the 
government. The communist movement survived in Singapore 
largely in the Chinese-language middle schools, whose students were 
particularly susceptible to propaganda because their employment 
and political opportunities were much more limited than those of 
English-speaking Chinese. After 1949 the success of the communists 
in China also attracted students to the party. The organizing force 
behind student activity was the Singapore Chinese Middle School 
Students Union. Because of the unpopularity of the 1954 Nation- 
al Service Ordinance, which required males between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty to register for conscription or face jail or a 
fine, the communists had little difficulty in organizing violent stu- 
dent demonstrations. No popular uprising in support of the com- 
munists ever materialized, however. 

In 1956 when it had become clear that the British were going 
to leave Singapore, the communists moved to obtain control of an 
independent government by legal means while continuing to foster 
disorders. In October 1956, after more rioting by students and 
laborers, Singapore's police raided labor unions and schools and 
rounded up large numbers of communists and communist support- 
ers. The concurrent effort by the communists to find a legal route 
to power focused on the party's alliance with the PAP. Organizers 
of the PAP had deliberately collaborated with the communists in 
order to broaden the PAP's organizational base among the Chinese 
majority, and the communists saw in the leftist orientation of the 
PAP an ideologically acceptable basis for an alliance. When the 
communists attempted to seize control of the PAP Central Execu- 
tive Committee in 1957, however, they were defeated by support- 
ers of Lee Kuan Yew. Lee went on to lead the PAP to victory in 



257 



Singapore: A Country Study 

the 1959 election. As prime minister, Lee gradually eliminated com- 
munists from influential positions within the party and government 
and later used provisions of the Internal Security Act to prevent 
alleged communists from participating in politics. 

In February 1963, the Singapore and Malaysian police forces 
organized a joint operation that resulted in the arrest of 1 1 1 suspect- 
ed communists in the two countries. This large-scale police action 
targeted suspected CPM members in Singapore and successfully 
destroyed the party's underground political organization in Sin- 
gapore. In 1989 there were no reports of the CPM's having reestab- 
lished a base of operations in the country. 

Indonesia's Destabilization Attempts, 1963-66 

Indonesia's opposition to the 1963 establishment of the Federa- 
tion of Malaysia presented the only known external threat to Sin- 
gapore since Japanese occupation. The opposition of Indonesian 
President Sukarno to the incorporation of Sabah and Sarawak on 
the island of Borneo into the Federation of Malaysia set up the 
early stages of a low-intensity conflict called Confrontation, which 
lasted three years and contributed to Sukarno's political demise. 
In August 1963, Indonesia deployed several thousand army units 
to the Indonesian-Malaysian border on Borneo. Throughout the 
latter part of 1963 and all of 1964 the Indonesian army dispatched 
units, usually comprising no more than 100 troops, to conduct acts 
of sabotage and to incite disaffected groups to participate in an in- 
surrection that Djakarta hoped would lead to the dissolution of the 
Federation. In June and July 1964, Indonesian army units infiltrat- 
ed Singapore with instructions to destroy transportation and other 
links between the island and the state of Johor on the Malay Penin- 
sula. Indonesia's Kalimantan Army Command also may have been 
involved in the September 1964 communal riots in Singapore. These 
riots occurred at the same time Indonesian army units were 
deployed to areas in Johor in an attempt to locate and encourage 
inactive communists in the Chinese communities to reestablish guer- 
rilla bases destroyed by British and Malaysian military units dur- 
ing the Emergency. After September 1964, Indonesia discontinued 
military operations targeting Singapore. In March 1965, however, 
a Singapore infantry battalion deployed on the southern coast of 
Johor was involved in fighting against a small Indonesian force that 
was conducting guerrilla operations in the vicinity of Kota Ting- 
gi. Indonesia supported Singapore's separation from Malaysia 
in 1965 and used diplomatic and economic incentives in an unsuc- 
cessful effort to encourage the Lee administration to sever its defense 
ties with Malaysia and Britain. In March 1966, General Soeharto, 



258 



Collecting water during Civil Defence Force exercises 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 

who until October 1965 was deputy chief of the Kalimantan Army 
Command, supplanted President Sukarno as Indonesia's de facto 
political leader. Soeharto quickly moved to end the Confrontation 
and to reestablish normal relations with Malaysia and Singapore. 

Subversive Political Groups, 1965 to the Present 

From 1965 to 1989, the government occasionally reported police 
actions targeting small subversive organizations. However, at no 
time were any of these groups considered a significant threat to 
the Lee government. From 1968 to 1974, a group known as the 
Malayan National Liberation Front carried out occasional acts of 
terrorism in Singapore. In 1974 the Singapore Police Force's In- 
ternal Security Department arrested fifty persons thought to be the 
leading members of the organization. After police interrogation, 
twenty- three of the fifty persons arrested were released, ten were 
turned over to Malaysia's police for suspected involvement in ter- 
rorist activities there, and seventeen were detained without trial 
under the Internal Security Act. One leader subsequently was ex- 
ecuted in 1983 for soliciting a foreign government for weapons and 
financial support. The government alleged the Malayan National 
Liberation Front had been a front organization of the CPM, which 



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Singapore: A Country Study 

in the late 1980s was still operating in the border area of northern 
Malaysia and southern Thailand. 

In 1982 a former Worker' Party candidate for Parliament and 
fourteen of his associates were arrested for forming the Singapore 
People's Liberation Organization. Zinul Abiddin Mohammed 
Shah, who had run unsuccessfully for Parliament in the 1972, 1976, 
and 1980 elections, was accused of distributing subversive litera- 
ture calling for the overthrow of the government. Shah was tried 
and convicted on this charge in 1983 and was sentenced to two 
years in jail. His associates were not prosecuted. 

In 1987 twenty-two English-educated professionals were arrest- 
ed under the Internal Security Act for their alleged involvement 
in a Marxist group organized to subvert the government from 
within and promote the establishment of a communist government. 
For reasons unknown, the Marxist group had no name or organiza- 
tional structure. The government accused those arrested of join- 
ing student, religious, and political organizations in order to 
disseminate Marxist literature and promote antigovernment ac- 
tivities. Although twenty-one of the twenty- two persons arrested 
were released later that year after agreeing to refrain from politi- 
cal activities, eight were rearrested in 1988 for failing to keep this 
pledge. According to a 1989 Amnesty International report, two 
persons were being detained in prison without trial under Section 
8 of the 1960 Internal Security Act. This number represented a 
significant reduction from the estimated fifty political prisoners held 
in 1980 (see Political Opposition, Ch. 4). 

In January 1974, four terrorists belonging to the Japanese Red 
Army detonated a bomb at a Shell Oil Refinery on Singapore's 
Pulau Bukum and held the five-man crew of one of the company's 
ferry boats hostage for one week. The incident tested Singapore's 
capability to react to a terrorist attack by a group based outside 
the country and one having no direct connection with antigovern- 
ment activities. The counterterrorist force mobilized by the govern- 
ment after the bombing and hijacking comprised army commando 
and bomb disposal units and selected air force, navy, and marine 
police units. Negotiations with the terrorists focused on the release 
of the hostages in return for safe passage out of the country. Ap- 
parently the government's primary consideration was to end the 
incident without bloodshed if at all possible. The Japanese govern- 
ment became involved when five other members of the Japanese 
Red Army attacked the Japanese embassy in Kuwait and threat- 
ened to murder the embassy's staff unless they and the four ter- 
rorists in Singapore were allowed to travel to Aden in the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). Singapore refused 



260 



A neighborhood police post 
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information 



to provide transportation for the terrorists but allowed a Japanese 
commercial airliner to land in Singapore, pick them up, and fly 
from Singapore to Kuwait. The hostages were released unharmed, 
and no deaths or serious injuries resulted from the incident. 

Crime and Law Enforcement 

In 1984, the most recent year for which complete statistics were 
available on crime in Singapore, the country reported 35,728 ar- 
rests. The incidence of serious violent crime in that year was con- 
sidered low and included 69 murders, 677 assaults, and 1,620 armed 
robberies. In comparison to the eighty- two other countries that 
reported criminal statistics to the International Criminal Police Or- 
ganization (Interpol) in 1984, Singapore had a low rate of assaults 
and was close to the median for three other types of crime: mur- 
der, sexual offenses, and thefts. Although Singapore did not report 
figures on drug arrests to Interpol, the sale and use of illegal drugs 
was known to be one of the country's most serious criminal 
problems. 

In the 1980s, police instituted several new schemes designed to 
reduce the time required to dispatch officers to the scene of a crime 
and to improve the investigation capabilities of the force. In 1983 



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Singapore: A Country Study 

the Neighborhood Police Force System was introduced as an ex- 
perimental project in one of Singapore's police divisions. This sys- 
tem, based on a successful Japanese program, placed small police 
substations in residential neighborhoods. The police officers as- 
signed to those stations instituted crime prevention programs 
through their association with community organizations, and they 
assisted the criminal investigation department by soliciting resi- 
dents of the neighborhood for information on specific cases. By 
1989 the experimental project's success led to the establishment 
of neighborhood police posts in all ten police divisions. 

A new crime report computer network was completed in 1987 
enabling officers in their patrol cars to be notified minutes after 
a crime had been reported. The computer network maintained a 
record of the call and the status of the police units dispatched to 
the scene of the incident. During the 1980s, police routinely took 
blood and urine samples from all criminal suspects to determine 
if there was a possible link between the use of drugs and the sus- 
pect's behavior at the time of his arrest. This program enabled police 
and the courts to improve procedures for dealing with drug ad- 
dicts who resorted to crime to support their habit. 

Any citizen indicted for a crime had the right to obtain legal coun- 
sel and to be brought to trial expeditiously, unless the government 
determined that the person was involved in subversion, drug 
trafficking, or was a member of a criminal organization. Trials were 
conducted by magistrates or judges without a jury, and in most 
cases defendants could appeal their verdicts to a higher court. The 
death penalty could be imposed for individuals convicted of murder, 
kidnapping, trafficking in arms, or importing and selling drugs; 
between 1975 and 1989, twenty-four prisoners were executed for 
various drug offenses. Mandatory beating with a cane and imprison- 
ment were required for most serious crimes, including rape, rob- 
bery, and theft. Government interference in the judicial process 
was prohibited by the Constitution. The chief justice of the Supreme 
Court and the attorney general were responsible for guaranteeing 
the impartiality of the courts and the protection of the rights of 
the accused, respectively (see Major Governmental Bodies, ch. 4). 

Trends in Criminal Activities 

Singapore's criminal code included seven classes of offenses. Class 
one covered serious crimes against persons, including murder, rape, 
and assault with a deadly weapon. Classes two through four were 
concerned with arson, robbery, theft, and abuse of another's 
property. Class five crimes included forgery, counterfeiting, and 
fraud. Classes six and seven covered violations of the penal code 



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National Security 



in matters of public safety and violations of special criminal or- 
dinances, particularly those related to drugs, firearms, gambling, 
vagrancy, vandalism, and petty crime. 

A high percentage of murder cases were solved each year by 
police. In 1988 only ten of fifty-four murders had not been solved 
by police at the end of the year. The percentage of murder cases 
solved had steadily increased since the 1960s. In 1969 police solved 
44 percent of seventy-eight murders. This number improved to 
68 percent of fifty-seven murders in 1983, and in 1988 to 81 per- 
cent of the total. 

Police were less successful in solving other types of crimes. In 
1984, there were 677 incidents reported to police that included sex- 
ual and other types of assaults on persons, including robberies and 
beatings. Police solved approximately 50 percent of these crimes. 
In 1984 only 20 percent of the reported 1 ,620 armed robbery cases 
had been solved at the time statistics for that year were reported 
to the INTERPOL. Persons under the age of sixteen were classi- 
fied as juveniles and given special treatment under the law. In 1984, 
few juveniles were charged with committing serious crimes. 
Juveniles were involved in no murders, 8 percent of the sexual as- 
saults, and 10 percent of the armed robberies. 

Most of the crimes for which statistics were available in 1984 
involved various types of theft. Sixty percent of the crimes report- 
ed that year were classified as thefts that did not involve a danger- 
ous weapon. Police solved 18 percent of the almost 23,000 reported 
cases of theft, and juveniles were believed to be responsible for 12 
percent of these crimes. Between 1971 and 1983, police were suc- 
cessful in substantially reducing the number of car thefts. In 1971 
almost 9,000 vehicles were stolen, compared with only 470 in 1984. 
In 1983, juveniles were responsible for 77 percent of all car thefts. 

In the early 1970s, the government determined that the misuse 
of illegal drugs, particularly heroin, cannabis, and such psychotropic 
tablets as methaqualone, was a major problem. In 1973 Parliament 
passed the Misuse of Drugs Act, which mandated imprisonment 
for drug dealers and instituted new programs to rehabilitate users. 
The act also enabled the government to monitor the problem more 
accurately because most of the persons arrested each year on drug 
charges already had a criminal record. In the 1980s, more than 
5,000 persons were arrested annually on drug charges. Only 10 
percent of those arrested were newly identified users, however, and 
another 10 percent were found to be involved in selling illegal drugs. 

Organization, Recruitment, and Training of Police 

In 1989 Singapore's police force had 7,000 constables and inspectors, 



263 



Singapore: A Country Study 



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264 



National Security 



3,000 national service conscripts, and 2,000 volunteers. The com- 
missioner of police was responsible for law enforcement in all civil 
jurisdictions of the country. He was assisted by deputy commis- 
sioners for administration, civil defense, operations, and planning 
(see fig. 16). Two auxiliary police organizations employed an ad- 
ditional 2,300 persons trained to provide security for the Port of 
Singapore and private businesses. The Port of Singapore police, 
with 300 personnel in 1989, was delegated responsibility for main- 
taining law and order on the docks, checking cargo manifests, and 
inspecting vessels that were suspected of having contraband. The 
other auxiliary police force was the Commercial and Industrial Secu- 
rity Corporation, which was operated as a public service under the 
control of the minister for home affairs. The corporation was es- 
tablished in 1972 to relieve regular police from routine security and 
escort duties for private businesses. The 2,000 security personnel 
employed by the corporation were delegated the same powers and 
immunities as police officers in the course of their duties. The Com- 
mercial and Industrial Security Corporation was the only civilian 
security organization whose personnel were authorized to carry 
firearms. 

The deputy commissioner for operations of the police force was 
responsible for overseeing two commands and four departments. 
The main island was divided into ten police divisions, which, along 
with the airport police division, came under the Area Command. 
The one other command, known as the Detachments Command, 
comprised police units responsible for counterterrorism, crowd 
management, protection of government officials, and the marine 
police. Two police task forces, with probably fewer than 200 spe- 
cially trained officers, had replaced the police reserve units of the 
1960s. Counterterrorist operations most likely would be conduct- 
ed by elite units belonging to one of the task forces in coordination 
with army commandos and other units taken from the police and 
armed forces. A 700-member Gurkha unit was responsible for pris- 
on security and for supporting the police task force in the event 
that a civil disturbance got out of control. The British-trained Gurk- 
has, recruited in Nepal, had been employed by the police since 
1 949 . The four departments under the control of the deputy com- 
missioner for operations had jurisdiction over crime prevention, 
criminal investigation, traffic control, and the special constabulary, 
which included an estimated 2,000 volunteer constables who were 
trained to assist the regular police in patrolling residential neigh- 
borhoods. 

The three other deputy commissioners were responsible for ad- 
ministration, planning, and civil defense. The deputy commissioner 



265 



Singapore: A Country Study 

for administration managed recruitment, training, and logistics and 
was responsible for the National Police Cadet Corps, a student or- 
ganization that in the late 1980s had more than 20,000 members 
and units in 129 secondary schools located throughout Singapore. 
The deputy commissioner for planning was responsible for research 
and force development and proposed plans for the purchase of state- 
of-the-art equipment and the introduction of new law enforcement 
tactics to improve the efficiency of the police force. The deputy 
commissioner for civil defense was in charge of civil defense plan- 
ning and civil defense organizations (see Civil Defense, this ch.). 

Police personnel primarily were recruited from among high school 
graduates who were interested in law enforcement as a career. The 
professional force was augmented, as necessary, with national ser- 
vice conscripts and volunteers. In 1989 women comprised 15 per- 
cent of the force and were employed in all occupational fields. The 
high number of students interested in belonging to the National 
Police Cadet Corps provided the police with a large pool of poten- 
tial recruits. Police recruits were required to be high school gradu- 
ates without a criminal record and to be in excellent physical 
condition. Officers selected for promotion to senior grades had to 
be approved by the Public Service Commission. There were ten 
senior-grade levels: inspector, four grades of superintendents, and 
five grades of commissioners. 

Basic and advanced training for recruits and national service con- 
scripts was provided at the Police Academy. Selected officers were 
awarded scholarships to attend local universities and to take courses 
in other countries. The six-month basic course for recruits empha- 
sized legal procedures, police station and field operations, use of 
weapons, dealing with the public, and physical fitness. National 
service conscripts were given a three-month basic course, but with 
less emphasis on legal procedures. Most divisions of the areas and 
detachments commands selected from within to fill vacant billets 
for corporals, sergeants, and higher level positions. Officers were 
encouraged to enroll in career development courses that were devot- 
ed to such subjects as crisis management, community relations, 
crime investigation, and interrogation techniques. Exceptional 
junior officers received merit scholarships to the National Univer- 
sity of Singapore to study management and other disciplines needed 
by the force. Senior officers were required to travel overseas for 
training to broaden their understanding of law enforcement prac- 
tices in other countries. Some of the foreign schools attended were 
the Police Staff College in Britain, the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation Academy in the United States, and the Police Academy in 
Japan. 



266 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Judicial System 

Prosecution of criminal cases was the responsibility of the Office 
of the Attorney General. The attorney general was appointed by 
the president on the advice of the prime minister. Public prosecu- 
tors were attorneys appointed by the Public Service Commission 
to advise police on the law in criminal matters and to present the 
government's case against the defendant. Criminal cases in which 
the maximum sentence did not exceed three years were referred 
to magistrates' courts, while more serious offenses were assigned 
to the district courts. There also was one Juvenile Court, which 
handled cases that involved children under the age of sixteen. Crimi- 
nal cases appealed to the Supreme Court went through a three- 
stage process. Judges known as judicial commissioners eliminated 
cases that did not meet legal criteria for appeal. The High Court 
of the Supreme Court heard all cases appealed from a district court 
in which the convicted criminal received the death sentence and 
also selected cases approved by the judicial commissioners. The 
High Court also had unlimited original jurisdiction for cases deemed 
important to the state. The Court of Criminal Appeal was the fi- 
nal arbiter in criminal cases where the interpretation of law was 
subject to question. 

Prisons and Rehabilitation Centers 

In 1989 there were six types of correctional institutions: two max- 
imum security prisons for males; three medium security prisons 
for males; one prison for females; four day-release camps; one refor- 
mative training center for persons between the ages of sixteen and 
twenty-one; and seven drug treatment centers. Queenstown Re- 
mand Prison, a short-term, maximum- security facility, served two 
basic functions: receiving and classifying newly convicted male 
offenders and holding persons awaiting trial or sentence. Changi 
Prison, a maximum security prison for males, was used for hard- 
ened criminals considered to be unlikely candidates for rehabili- 
tation. Political prisoners detained under the Internal Security 
Act usually were also placed in the Moon Crescent Center within 
the Changi complex. Females convicted of crimes are thought to 
have been sent to separate maximum and medium security com- 
plexes. 

All adult prisoners spent the last six months of their sentence 
in day-release centers. These prisoners were allowed to spend days 
at work and to visit their families without supervision. The pur- 
pose of the reformative training center for young adults was to pro- 
vide rehabilitation. Sentences to this facility usually were for not 



267 



Singapore: A Country Study 




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268 



National Security 



less than eighteen months and not more than three years. Juveniles 
fifteen years old and under convicted of crimes were sent either 
to reform homes for girls or to reform schools for boys. Whereas 
persons convicted of importing and selling drugs were prosecuted 
as criminals and served time in prison, drug abusers usually did 
not go to jail. Singapore's Central Narcotics Bureau operated six 
rehabilitation centers and one anti-inhalant abuse center. Individu- 
als who tested positive for drugs were required to spend up to six 
months in a rehabilitation center and possible additional time in 
halfway houses operated by the Central Narcotics Bureau. 

In 1989 two privately operated programs attempted to assist 
prisoners and drug abusers find jobs and stay out of the correc- 
tional system. The Singapore Corporation of Rehabilitative En- 
terprises operated job training programs in the prisons and managed 
day-release programs for the prisons. The Singapore Anti-Narcotics 
Association provided counseling for drug abusers after their release 
from rehabilitation centers. Although it did not have job training 
or placement programs, the association worked closely with the Sin- 
gapore Corporation of Rehabilitative Enterprises to find employ- 
ment for drug abusers and monitored their progress after placement. 

Civil Defense 

In 1964, as a response to Confrontation, the government estab- 
lished the Vigilante Corps to assist police by patrolling communi- 
ties and reporting suspicious activities. The Corps gradually evolved 
into the nation's first civil defense force. Initially comprised en- 
tirely of volunteers, members were given some weapons training 
and instruction in general police procedures. The Police National 
Service Command was established in 1967 to train and organize 
conscripts assigned to perform police duties in either the Special 
Constabulary or the Vigilante Corps. At that time, the Corps had 
approximately 12,500 volunteers. In the 1970s, most new mem- 
bers of the Vigilante Corps were conscripts who assisted police in 
their home communities at nighttime, on weekends, and during 
emergencies. 

In 1981 the Vigilante Corps was disbanded, and its members 
were assigned to units of the newly established Civil Defence Force 
(see fig. 17). The force's division headquarters were set up in each 
of the police divisions under the Area Command. Numerous local 
civil defense units were organized and were assigned responsibili- 
ty for such specialized duties as blood collection, food and water 
distribution, and providing shelter to the homeless. In 1989 about 
40,000 national service reservists and 18,000 civilian volunteers 
served in the Civil Defence Force. 



269 



Singapore: A Country Study 

The deputy commissioner of police for civil defense was the 
government official responsible for all military and civilian civil 
defense units. In 1989 he controlled ten division-level organiza- 
tions, which were subdivided into districts and zones. Each divi- 
sion headquarters was assigned a small staff of regular army officers 
who were responsible for coordinating civilian and military cooper- 
ation within the district during an emergency and for training na- 
tional servicemen for civil defense assignments. Between 1981 and 
1989, more than 7,000 conscripts were trained in various construc- 
tion skills and assigned to construction brigades subordinate to the 
civil defense division headquarters. In emergencies, construction 
brigades would be deployed to damaged and destroyed buildings 
to clear debris and to construct temporary shelters for residents. 
Reservists also were assigned to rescue battalions, shelter battal- 
ions, and medical units subordinate to each division headquarters. 

In 1989 civil defense organizations below the division level were 
in various stages of development. Each of Singapore's fifty- five elec- 
toral districts had a Civil Defence Coordinating Committee. The 
government enlisted members of Parliament and other communi- 
ty leaders to serve on these committees in order to promote civil 
defense programs. Local civil defense units were established in 
residential neighborhoods and at some businesses. Nine under- 
ground Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) stations also served as blast- 
proof shelters for up to 100,000 people. The government frequendy 
organized civil defense exercises in selected jurisdictions, and in 
1 989 the installation of a sophisticated electronic blackout and civil 
defense warning system was under study. 

* * * 

Three books provide in-depth coverage of the evolution of the 
armed, police, and civil defense forces since 1965. The Singapore 
Armed Forces, published by the Ministry of Defence, covers all aspects 
of military life and includes useful information on the types of mili- 
tary equipment used by the army, navy, and air force. In the Ser- 
vice of the Nation by John Drysdale is a good reference on police 
organization and training. Civil Defence in Singapore, published by 
the Civil Defence Force, presents an overview of civil defense or- 
ganizations past and present and explains how military and civil 
defense units would function during wartime or a national emer- 
gency. Two books on the development of armed forces and defense 
spending in Asian countries include discussions on Singapore. The 
Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies, edited by Edward A. 
Olsen and Stephen Jurika, Jr., includes a chapter by Patrick M. 



270 



National Security 



Mayerchak on the evolution of the armed forces and strategic plan- 
ning, and Chih Kin Wah's Defence Spending in Southeast Asia discusses 
how changing perceptions of potential adversaries and domestic 
economic considerations affect the amount of money the govern- 
ment budgets for defense. A number of articles on Singapore's 
armed forces have been published in recent years in military jour- 
nals, and Singapore also publishes its own defense magazine. Asian 
Defence Journal probably provides the best overall reporting on cur- 
rent developments in the armed forces and Singapore's military 
relations with other countries. Pacific Defence Reporter and Far Eastern 
Economic Review are also good sources for current information on 
military subjects. Pioneer, a monthly news magazine on the armed 
forces, published by the Ministry of Defence, has useful articles 
on military organization, weapons, logistics, mobilization policies, 
civil defense, and other subjects. Human rights and internal secu- 
rity issues are covered yearly in reports to the United States Con- 
gress by the Department of State titled Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices and in Amnesty International Report, which is also pub- 
lished annually. Statistics on crime can be found in International Crime 
Statistics, which includes coverage of Singapore. Occasional arti- 
cles on crime and the criminal justice system in Singapore can be 
found in Far Eastern Economic Review and Asiaweek. (For further in- 
formation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



271 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population Growth, Selected Years, 1824-1988 

3 Population by Ethnic Group and Language, 1980 

4 Singapore Chinese Speech Groups and Their Alternate Names 

5 School Enrollment, Selected Years, 1972-88 

6 Employed Persons Aged Fifteen Years and Over by Sector, 

1984-88 

7 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Years, 1978-88 

8 Balance of Payments, 1984-88 

9 Exports by Commodity, 1984-88 

10 Imports by Commodity, 1984-88 

11 Trade with Selected Countries, 1984-88 

12 External Trade, 1984-88 

13 Defense Personnel and Expenditures, Selected Years, 1970-88 

14 Major Equipment of the Singapore Armed Forces, 1988 



273 



Appendix 



Table 1. 


Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 


When you know 


N^ultiply by 






0.04 


inches 




n on 


inches 




3.3 


feet 




0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 






square miles 




35.3 


cubic feet 




0.26 


gallons 




2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




9 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 






and add 32 





Table 2. Population Growth, Selected Years, 
1824-1988 





Chinese 


Malays 


Indians 


Others 


Total * 


Year 


(a 


s percentage of total population) 




Population 


1824 


31 


60 


7 


2 


10,683 


1840 


50 


37 


10 


3 


35,389 


1860 


61 


20 


16 


3 


81,734 


1891 


67 


20 


9 


4 


181,602 


1911 


72 


14 


9 


5 


303,321 


1931 


75 


12 


10 


4 


557,745 


1947 


78 


12 


8 


2 


938,144 


1957 


75 


14 


7 


2 


1,445,929 


1970 


.... 76 


15 


7 


2 


2,074,507 


1980 


77 


15 


6 


2 


2,413,945 


1987 


76 


15 


7 


2 


2,612,800 


1988 


76 


15 


6 


2 


2,670,000 



* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Cheng Lim-Keak, Social Change and the Chinese in Singa- 
pore, Singapore, 1985, 7; Singapore Facts and Pictures, 1988. Singapore, 1988, 3; and 
Singapore Bulletin [Singapore], April 1989, 15. 



275 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Table 3. Population by Ethnic Group and Language, 1980 



Ethnic Group and Percentage of Ethnic Percentage of Total 

Language Number Group Population 



Chinese 

Hokkien 799,202 43 33.0 

Teochiu 409,269 22 17.0 

Cantonese 305,956 16 13.0 

Hainanese 137,438 8 6.0 

Hakka 131,975 7 6.0 

Other Chinese 72,397 4 3.0 

Total 1,856,237 100 78.0 

Malays 

Malays 312,889 89 13.0 

Javanese 21,230 6 0.9 

Boyanese 14,292 4 0.6 

Other Malays 3,097 1 0.1 

Total 351,508 100 14.6 

Indians 

Tamil 98,772 64 4.0 

Malayali 12,451 8 0.5 

Punjabi 12,025 8 0.5 

Gujarati 1,619 1 0.1 

Other Indians 29,767 19 1.0 

Total 154,634 100 6.1 

Miscellaneous 

European 23,169 45 1.0 

Eurasian 10,172 20 0.4 

Japanese 7,590 15 0.3 

Arab 2,491 5 0.1 

Others 8,164 16 0.3 

Total 51,586 100 2.1 



TOTAL * 2,413,965 



* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Eddie C.Y. Kuo and Seen-kong Chiew, Ethnicity and 
Fertility in Singapore, Singapore, 1984, 9. 



276 



Appendix 



Table 4. Singapore Chinese Speech Groups 
and Their Alternate Names 



Singapore Group Alternate Names 



Hokkien Fujian, Fukien, Amoy, Xiamen, Hsia-men 

Teochiu Chaozhou, Chao-chou, Swatow, Shantou, Teochew, Chaochou 

Cantonese Guangzhou, Kuang-chou 

Hainanese Hailam, Qiongzhou, Ch'iung-chou 

Hakka Kejia, K'e-chia 

Hokchiu Fuzhou, Foochow 

Hokchia Fuqing, Fu-ch'ing 

Henghua Xinghua, Hsing-hua 

Sam Kiang Sanjiang, San-chiang, Shanghai 



Source: Based on information from Cheng Lim-Keak, Social Change and the Chinese in Singa- 
pore, Singapore, 1985, 15-23. 



Table 5. School Enrollment, Selected Years, 1972-88 



School 


1972 


1980 


1985 


1988 


Technical and vocational institutes . . . 


. , . 354,748 
161,371 
5,841 
. . . 15,206 


299,252 
173,693 
12,542 
22,511 


278,060 
190,328 
18,894 
39,693 


259,270 
201,755 
26,911 
46,904 


TOTAL 


537,166 


507,998 


526,975 


534,840 



Source: Based on information from Singapore, Ministry of Communications and Infor- 
mation, Singapore Facts and Pictures, 1989, Singapore, 1989, 73. 



277 



Singapore: A Country Study 



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278 



Appendix 



Table 7. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 
Selected Years, 1978-88 
(in millions of Singapore dollars) * 



Industry 


1978 


1980 


1982 


1984 




1986 




1988 


Agriculture and 




















237.7 


322.0 


349.1 


339 


7 


244 


5 


203.4 




37.5 


82.2 


128.1 


132 


2 


75 


6 


51.2 




4,575.9 


7,312.7 


8,153.5 


9,863 


4 


10,185 


5 


14,509.7 




351.5 


555.0 


600.9 


773 





1,056 


9 


1,135.2 




1,118.8 


1,613.2 


3,146.1 


4,943 


7 


3,149 


1 


2,755.9 


Commerce 


4,283.3 


5,435.1 


6,387.5 


6,885 


5 


6,516 


3 


8,826.8 


Transport and 


















communications . . . 


2,554.7 


3,522.2 


4,435.8 


5,222 


3 


5,297 





6,625.0 


Financial and business 


















services 


3,165.6 


4,906.1 


7,697.6 


9,879 


6 


10,573 


9 


13,111.4 




1,867.2 


2,326.3 


3,399.7 


4,321 


8 


4,594 


1 


5,221.0 


Less imported bank 




















-737.6 


-1,410.9 


-2,109.0 


2,827 


4 


-3,869 


5 


-4,990.0 




340.2 


426.8 


481.5 


514 


1 


393 


6 


596.3 


TOTAL 


17,794.8 


25,090.7 


32,670.8 


40,047 


9 


38,217 





48,045.9 



* For value of the Singapore dollar — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic 
Survey of Singapore, Singapore, Second Quarter 1989, 24. 



Table 8. Balance of Payments, 1984-88 
(in billions of United States dollars) 

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 



Exports 22.7 21.5 21.3 27.3 39.0 

Imports 26J ?AA 23^4 _29 1 8 41.8 

Trade balance -4.0 -2.9 -2.1 -2.5 . -2.8 

Services 3.9 3.2 3.0 3.7 4.5 

Transfers -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 

Current account balance * -0.4 -0.0 0.5 0.5 1.1 



• Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from WEFA Group, World Economic Historical Data, Bala 
Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, April 1989, 266. 



279 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Table 9. Exports by Commodity, 1984-88 
(in millions of Singapore dollars) * 



Commodity 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 




3,105 


2,434 


2,958 


3,104 


3,838 




. 3,410 


2,700 


2,459 


3,003 


4,046 




. 16,179 


16,452 


12,361 


12,198 


12,353 


Animal and vegetable oils 


1,541 


1,535 


880 


796 


885 


Chemicals and chemical products . 


. 2,464 


2,717 


2,840 


3,762 


5,199 




. 7,033 


6,976 


7,675 


10,079 


7,579 


Machinery and transport 














. 16,865 


16,567 


18,900 


26,274 


37,939 


Miscellaneous 


743 


798 


912 


1,050 


1,151 


TOTAL 


51,340 


50,179 


48,985 


60,266 


72,990 



* For value of the Singapore dollar — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic 
Survey of Singapore, Singapore, Second Quarter 1989, 32. 



Table 10. Imports by Commodity, 1984-88 
(in millions of Singapore dollars) * 



Commodity 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


Food, beverages, and tobacco . . . . 


4,618 


4,036 


4,407 


4,547 


5,397 




. 2,510 


1,988 


1,905 


2,267 


2,999 




. 16,961 


17,031 


10,994 


12,526 


12,422 




1,436 


1,380 


720 


792 


941 


Chemicals and chemical products . 


. 3,096 


2,890 


3,246 


4,082 


5,809 




. 12,242 


11,276 


12,501 


15,591 


20,993 


Machinery and transport 














19,420 


18,317 


20,781 


27,534 


38,299 




850 


898 


991 


1,078 


1,367 


TOTAL 


61,133 


57,816 


55,545 


68,417 


88,227 



* For value of the Singapore dollar — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic 
Survey of Singapore, Singapore, Second Quarter 1989, 31. 



280 



Appendix 



Table 11. Trade with Selected Countries, 1984-88 
(in millions of Singapore dollars) * 

Country 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
China 

Imports 2,881 4,972 3,110 2,926 3,386 

Exports 519 730 1,244 1,547 2,369 

Hong Kong 

Imports 1,281 1,082 1,310 1,802 2,432 

Exports 3,176 3,197 3,183 3,815 4,944 

Japan 

Imports 11,218 9,870 11,052 14,029 19,364 

Exports 4,807 4,722 4,204 5,449 6,828 

Malaysia 

Imports 9,180 8,301 7,403 9,477 12,929 

Exports 8,324 7,787 7,245 8,560 10,721 

Taiwan 

Imports 1,998 1,922 2,244 3,144 3,997 

Exports 830 855 1,097 1,637 2,235 

United States 

Imports 8,923 8,775 8,314 10,057 13,718 

Exports 10,292 10,619 11,436 14,674 18,826 

European Community 

Imports 6,140 6,546 6,468 8,238 10,613 

Exports 4,980 5,312 5,455 7,353 10,253 

Total World 

Imports 61,134 57,818 55,545 68,415 88,227 

Exports 51,340 50,179 48,986 60,266 79,051 

* For value of the Singapore dollar — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Singapore, Department of Statistics, Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, Singapore, July 1989, 36, 37. 



281 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Table 12. External Trade, 1984-88 
(in millions of Singapore dollars) * 





1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


Exports 


51,340 


50,179 


48,985 


60,266 


79,051 


Domestic exports . 


. 33,051 


32,576 


32,062 


39,071 


49,555 




. 18,289 


17,603 


16,923 


21,195 


29,496 


Imports 


61,134 


57,818 


55,545 


68,415 


88,227 


TOTAL TRADE .. 


. 112,474 


107,997 


104,530 


128,681 


167,278 



* For value of the Singapore dollar — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic 
Survey of Singapore, Singapore, Second Quarter 1989, 30. 



Table 13. Defense Personnel and Expenditures, 
Selected Years, 1970-88 



Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988 
Personnel 

Army 14,000 25,000 35,000 45,000 45,000 

Air force 300 3,000 4,000 6,000 6,000 

Navy 500 2,000 3,000 4,500 4,500 

Reserves 6,000 12,000 50,000 132,000 182,000 

Total personnel 20,800 42,000 92,000 187,500 237,500 

Expenditures 

Defense spending 

(in millions of United States 

dollars) 106.4 269 574 1,046 1,003 

Defense as percentage of 

gross national product * .... 7.4 5.0 6.7 6.0 6.0 

* Gross national product — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance (annuals 1970-71 through 1988-89), 
London, 1971-89. 



282 



Appendix 



Table 14. Major Equipment of the Singapore 
Armed Forces, 1988 



Type and Description 



Origin 



In Inventory 



Aircraft 

A-4S/S1 (ground-attack fighter) . . United States 

TA-4S/S1 (ground-attack fighter) . -do- 

F-74 (ground-attack fighter) Britain 

T-75 (ground-attack fighter) . . . . , Unknown 

F-16 (ground-attack fighter) United States 

F-5E (interceptor) -do- 

F-5F (interceptor) -do- 

E-2C (early warning) -do- 

C-130 (transport) -do- 

Skyvan 3m (transport) Britain 

S-211 (training) Italy 

SF-260(training) -do- 
Helicopters 

UH-1B United States 

UH-1H -do- 

AS-332B France 

AS-332M -do- 

AS-350 -do- 

AB-205 Italy/United States 

Air-to-air missiles 

AIM-9J Sidewinder United States 

Surface-to-air missiles 

Bloodhound 2 Britain 

Rapier -do- 

HAWK United States 

Naval vessels 

Corvette (MCV) West Germany and Singapore 

Fast-attack craft (with Gabriel 
and Harpoon surface-to-surface 

missiles) West Germany 

Patrol craft Britain and Singapore 

Landing craft, tank (LCT) United States 

Minesweeper (MSC) -do- 
Tanks and armored personnel carriers 

AMX-13 (light tank) France 

V- 150/200 (armored personnel 

carrier) United States 

M-113 (armored personnel carrier) -do- 

V-100 (armored personnel carrier) -do- 
Towed Artillery 

M-71 (155mm) Israel 

M-114A1 (155mm) Singapore 

M-68 (155mm) Israel 

FH-88 (155mm) Singapore 



63 + 
13 + 
29 
4 

On order 
35 

9 

4 
10 

6 
30 
26 



24 
16 
3 
19 
6 
4 



Unknown 



28 

Unknown 
6 



350 

250 
750 
30 



38 
16 

Unknown 
Unknown 



283 



Singapore: A Country Study 
Table 14. — Continued 



Type and Description Origin In Inventory 



Rocket Launchers 

89mm Unknown Unknown 

Recoilless, guns 

106mm Unknown 90 

84mm Sweden Unknown 

Antiaircraft artillery 

20mm Unknown 30 

35mm Switzerland 34 

40mm Swedish 16 

Surface-to-air missiles 

RBS-70 Sweden Unknown 

Mortars 

120mm Unknown 50 

160mm Unknown 12 



Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance (annuals 1970-71 through 1988-89), London, 1971-89. 



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301 



Glossary 



Asian Development Bank (ADB) — Established in 1967, the bank 
assists in economic development and promotes growth and 
cooperation in developing member countries. The bank is 
owned by its forty-seven member governments, which include 
both developed and developing countries in Asia and developed 
countries in the West. 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Founded in 
1967 for the purpose of promoting regional stability, econom- 
ic development, and cultural exchange. ASEAN 's membership 
includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa- 
pore, and Thailand. 

Baba Chinese — Descendants of marriages between Chinese men 
and Malay women, many of whom moved to Singapore from 
Malacca in the early nineteenth century. Although mixed 
parentage gradually disappeared through marriage with 
Chinese immigrants, the Babas usually spoke Malay or En- 
glish as their first language and identified more closely with 
Singapore and Malaya than with China. After establishment 
of Straits Settlements (q.v.) in 1826, their descendants also came 
to be known as Straits Chinese (q.v.). 

Barisan Sosialis — The Socialist Front, a left-wing political party 
that was the primary challenger to the People's Action Party 
(q.v.) in the 1960s and early 1970s. 

Commonwealth of Nations — Often referred to as the British Com- 
monwealth, the Commonwealth is formally an association of 
forty-nine sovereign, independent states that acknowledge the 
British monarch as symbolic head of the association. Common- 
wealth membership is expressed in cooperation, consultation, 
mutual assistance, and periodic conferences of national leaders. 

Communist International (Comintern)— Founded in Moscow in 
1919 to coordinate the world communist movement, the Comin- 
tern was officially disbanded in 1943. 

Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) — Known as the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) until the 1960s. Founded in Singa- 
pore in 1930 with a predominantly Chinese membership, the 
party carried out armed resistance to the Japanese during World 
War II. From 1948 to 1960, its military arm, the Malayan Peo- 
ples Liberation Army, practiced guerrilla warfare in the rural 
areas of peninsular Malaya with the support of underground 
organizations in Malaya and Singapore. In the late 1980s, an 



303 



Singapoare: A Country Study 

estimated 500 guerrillas and the party leadership maintained 
themselves in the jungles of the Malaysian-Thai frontier. 
Confrontation (Konfrontasi) — Indonesia's 1963-66 effort to dis- 
rupt the new state of Malaysia, which Indonesian leaders regard- 
ed as a front for a continued British colonial presence in Southeast 
Asia. 

Emergency — The 1948-60 communist insurgency in peninsular 
Malaya and Singapore; most active between 1948 and 1951. 

European Economic Community (EEC) — Originally established by 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome and sometimes referred to as the Com- 
mon Market, an association of twelve West European nations 
with common economic institutions and policies toward trade with 
non-Community nations. One of three communities; besides the 
EEC, there are the European Coal and Steel Community and 
the European Atomic Energy Community, collectively known 
as the European Community. 

fiscal year (FY) — April 1 to March 31. 

Five-Powers Defence Agreement — A 1971 agreement (not a treaty) 
in which Australia, Britain, and New Zealand promised mili- 
tary support for Malaysia and Singapore if they were attacked 
by a foreign power. 

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) — A policy promoted by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development under 
which developed countries grant tariff exemptions to imports from 
developing countries. The United States GSP program was autho- 
rized by the International Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 and was 
extended by the International Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Sin- 
gapore ' 'graduated" from the United States GSP program as 
of January 1, 1989, as it was no longer considered a developing 
country. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The value of domestic goods and 
services produced by an economy in a given period, usually a 
year. Only output of goods for final consumption and investment 
is included, as the value added by primary or intermediate 
processing is assumed to be represented in the final prices. 

gross national product (GNP) — Gross domestic product (q.v.) plus 
income from overseas investments and wages minus earnings of 
foreign investors and foreign workers in the domestic economy. 

Group of 77 — Founded in 1964 as a forum for developing countries 
to negotiate with developed countries for economic aid, by the 
1980s its membership had expanded from the original 77 nations 
to include the 127 members of the Nonaligned Movement (q.v.). 

Her Majesty's Privy Council — As the final court of appeal for cer- 
tain Commonwealth (q.v) countries, the Judicial Committee of 



304 



Glossary 



Her Majesty's Privy Council includes privy counsellors who 
hold or have held high judicial offices in Britain and present 
or former chief justices of Commonwealth countries. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliat- 
ed with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing 
international exchange loans to its members when they ex- 
perience balance of payments difficulties. 

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel- 
sat) — Established by two international agreements effective in 
February 1973, Intelsat promotes the development of the global 
telecommunications satellite system. In the late 1980s, there 
were 109 signatory member nations and 30 nonsignatory user 
nations. 

Jawi-Peranakan — Malay term for the descendants of marriages be- 
tween Indian Muslim men and Malay women. 

Malayan Communist Party (MCP) — See Communist Party of 
Malaya. 

Nanyang — Chinese term meaning southern ocean and used to refer 
to Southeast Asia. 

newly industrializing economies (NIEs) — A category of economies 
of nations or other political entities that experienced rapid in- 
dustrial expansion and concomitant growth in their per capita 
GNP in the 1980s. 

Nonaligned Movement (NAM) — Formed at a conference in Bel- 
grade, Yugoslavia, in 1961, the NAM promotes the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of nonaligned nations. By the late 1980s, 
there were 127 member nations. 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)— Organized in Paris in 1961, the OECD represents 
developed nations. Its twenty-four-nation membership, origi- 
nally confined to Western Europe, includes the United States, 
Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 

People's Action Party (PAP) — Singapore's dominant political party, 
which has controlled the government by winning every gener- 
al election since 1959. 

sharia — Muslim law, based on the Quran and precedents estab- 
lished by early Muslim jurists. 

Singapore dollar (S$) — Singapore's monetary unit, which in late 
1989 had an exchange rate of US$1 to SJ1.94. 

Straits Chinese — Chinese born in the Straits Settlements (q.v.) in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and more orient- 
ed to Southeast Asia than to China. They often spoke Malay 
or English as their first language. 



305 



Singapore: A Country Study 

Straits Settlements — Trading ports along the Strait of Malacca that 
were under direct British rule during the colonial period in con- 
trast to the Malay States, which retained their native rulers. 
Governed from 1826 as part of British India, the Straits Set- 
tlements became a crown colony in 1867. Although the major 
settlements were Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, the Straits 
Settlements also included Dindings, south of Penang, and La- 
buan Island, off the northern coast of Borneo. 

Total Defence — Singaporean national defense strategy calling for 
a small but well-equipped military force backed by trained 
reserves and an extensive civil defense organization. 

World Bank — The informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, provides 
loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, 
a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the 
IBRD, was established in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest 
countries on much easier terms than those of conventional 
IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the ac- 
tivities of the IBRD through loans and assistance intended to 
encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in de- 
veloping countries. The three institutions share a common presi- 
dent and senior officers and are owned by the governments of 
the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the 
World Bank group, member states must first belong to the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (q. v.). 



306 



Index 



Abdul Rahman, Tengku, 49, 53-54, 55, 
56, 57 

Abdu'r Rahman, Temenggong, 13; set- 
tlement in Singapore of, 8-9, 15; 
treaties signed by, with Raffles, 10-12, 
16 

abortion, 73-74 

acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 

(AIDS). See AIDS 
Aden, 260 
adoption, 101 

Afghanistan, 30; Soviet invasion of, 209; 
Soviet withdrawal from, 251 

agriculture, 171-74; agro-technology 
parks, 172; farms, 172; fish farming, 
174; flower farming, 172; main crops, 
171, 172; pig farming, 172 

AIDS: policy, 112; National Advisory 
Committee, 112; Task Force, 112 

Air Defence Command, 227, 228, 234 

Air Engineering Training Institute, 245 

air force, 234-35, 249; air defense, 
234-35; basic training, 243; combat 
support training, 245; control units, 
234; evolution of, 228; expansion of, 
229; ground attack, 235; helicopters, 
235; interceptors, 234; pilot training, 
244; structure of, 234 

Air Traffic Control School, 245 

alcoholic beverages, 13, 42 

A level exams, 114 

Aliens Ordinance of 1933, 32 

Amalgamated Union of Public Em- 
ployees, 97 

Ambassador Hotel, 55 

Amnesty International, 206, 260 

Amoy University, 33 

Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London, 16 

anticorruption campaign, 58 

Anti-Pollution Unit {see also environmen- 
tal protection; Pollution Control De- 
partment), 69 

Approved Investments Scheme, 134 

Arab residents, xxi, 3, 13, 23 

Arab traders, 3 

Arabic-language education, 107 
arak, 1 3 

armed forces (see also air force; army; na- 



tional service; navy; reserves), 185; ad- 
vanced training, 243-44; basic training, 
243; combat support training, 245; con- 
scription, 220, 240, 250, 257; disaster 
relief, 238; history of, 221; Israeli sys- 
tem as model for, 228; joint interna- 
tional training, xxvii, 213, 241, 250-51; 
Malays in, 83, 240; mobilization of, 
237; NCO training, 244; officer train- 
ing, 244, 245, 250; pilot training, 244; 
role of, in society, 239-40; salaries, 
199-200, 239; tour of duty in, 239; 
training in Singapore, 241, 250; train- 
ing in Taiwan, 213, 241; training in 
United States, 239; training in Western 
Europe, 239; uniforms and insignia of, 
240; women in, 241 
Armed Forces Act (1972), 221, 231 
Armed Forces Council, 221, 231 
Armed Forces Training Institute, 228, 
244, 246; Officer Cadet School, 244 
Armenian residents of Singapore, 13, 23 
army, 231, 233-34; advanced training, 
243-44; Advanced Training School, 
244; armor, 233; Armor School, 243; 
artillery, 233; Artillery School, 243; 
Basic Combat Training Center, 246; 
basic training, 243; capability, 249; 
combat support, 233-34; Command 
and General Staff College, 244; evolu- 
tion of, 228; expansion of, 229; General 
Staff, 236; infantry, 231-33, 243; NCO 
training, 244; number of personnel, 
229, 230; officer training, 244; School 
of Infantry Section Leaders, 244; 
School of Infantry Weapons, 243; struc- 
ture of, 231 
Asia Society, 212 

Asia, Southeast, xxvi; demand for foreign 
investment in, 163; Japanese military 
operations in, 224; as participant 
in Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, 40; Soviet role in, 213 

Asian Development Bank, 165, 207, 209 

Asian dollar market, 163 

Asian values, 68, 90 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) (see also under names of 



307 



Singapore: A Country Study 



members), xxvii, 61-62; cooperation 
with, 209-10; members of, 209, 219; 
members' reaction to Singapore, 210; 
military relations with members of, 
248; opposition of, to Vietnamese oc- 
cupation of Cambodia, 62, 210, 
219-20, 250, 251-52; relations with, 
207, 209-10; telecommunications with, 
159; trade with, 154, 156-57 

associations, 98; Chinese, 94-96; Indian, 
94; Malay, 94; networks of, 94 

attorney general, 182, 185, 262, 267; 
office of, 267 

Attorney General's Chambers, 185 

Auditor General's Office, 186 

Australia: emigration to, 73; flowers ex- 
ported to, 172; food imported from, 
172; foreign workers from, 72; military 
support by, 252; recognition of in- 
dependent Singapore by, 57; security 
of Singapore guaranteed by, 211, 221 ; 
training for Singaporean military 
officers in, 245, 250 

Australian troops, 37, 38 

Automotive Engineering, 247 

Aw Boon Haw, 32 

Ayer Rajah Expressway, 167 

Ayutthaya Empire, 3, 6 

Baba Chinese: attraction of homeland for, 
33; cuisine of, 82; culture of, 81-82; de- 
fined, 13; education of, 32, 81; educa- 
tion concerns of, 32; as go-betweens, 
22; inter- war population increase, 32, 
43; language of, 81-82, 89; loyalty to 
British, 27; origins of, 13, 81; popula- 
tion size, 81; political participation re- 
stricted to, 46, 256 

Bangkok, 13 

Bangladesh: foreign workers from, 144, 

167; immigrants from, 73, 79 
Bank of America, 163 
Bank of China, 56 

banking, 162-63; foreign, 28; offshore, 
163 

Bannerman, James, 10, 12 

Barisan Sosialis, 206, 207; opposition to 

Malaysia, 54, 55; origins of, 54 
Basic Education for Skills Training, 146 
Batam, xxvii 
Batavia, 9, 13 
Baturaja, 251 



Bazaar Malay, 85, 90, 91 
Bawean Island, 83 

Bencoolen, 12, 13; convicts brought to, 
23; exchanged with Dutch for Malacca, 
16; occupied by British, 9-10, 12 

Bengal, 17 

Bengkulu. See Bencoolen 
Bible Society of Singapore, 110 
Bible study, 93, 109 
Bintan Island, 7 

birth control. See Family planning pro- 
gram 

Black, Robert, 50 

Black Thursday, 50 

Bonham, George, 20 

Borneo. See Sabah, Sarawak 

Britain: as caretaker of Dutch territories, 
9-10, 222; defense of Singapore by, 37; 
East Indian trade of, 9; in Five-Powers 
Defence Agreement, xxviii, 252; im- 
portance of influence in Malaya to Sin- 
gapore as trading center, 4; military 
advice of, 250; military bases in Sin- 
gapore of, 221; military training in, for 
Singaporean officers, 245, 250; recog- 
nition of independent Singapore by, 57; 
security of Singapore guaranteed by, 
211, 224; trade harassment by Dutch, 
10; trade with, 154, 157; withdrawal 
from Singapore of, 124, 238, 257 

British armed forces, 258; decline of in- 
fluence of, 227; in emergency, 227; em- 
ployment of Malay Singaporeans by, 
86; in Singapore, 222-24; withdrawal 
of, 124, 221, 227, 238; in World War 
II, 223-24 

British Borneo, 5 

British Colonial Office, 17, 41, 43, 50, 
223 

British East India Company, 3, 9, 10, 17, 
20, 151, 222; law and order maintained 
by, 252; Singapore taken over by, 16; 
trading post established at Singapore 
by, 12, 16, 123 

British Military Administration, 41, 
42-43, 44 

British War Office, 223 

Brunei, 54; decision not to join Malay- 
sia, 55; joint military training with, 
241, 250-51; as member of ASEAN, 
209; telecommunications hookup of, 
with Singapore, 159 

Buddha, 104 



308 



Index 



Buddhism, 103; percent of population 
practicing, xxiii, 108; popularity of, 
109-10; as secondary school course, 93; 
schools of, 104 

Buddhist Society, 109 

Bugis, xxi; conflict of, with Malays, 7-8; 
control of Riau Archipelago and 
Sumatra by, 7; control of Johore Sul- 
tan by, 7-9, 10; as residents of Singa- 
pore, 12; traders, 3, 13, 19, 20, 23 

Bukit Gombak, 227, 234 

Bukit Larangan, 6 

Bukit Timah, 38, 68, 159 

Bukit Timah Expressway, 167 

Burma, 79 

Burma-Siam railroad, 41 
Bush, George, 212 

Cabinet: meetings of, 180; ministers 
chosen for, 179 

Calcutta, 9, 16, 20, 24; reaction to Raf- 
fles' takeover of Singapore, 12 

Cambodia: Singapore's economic ties 
with, 209; Vietnam's invasion of, 62, 
210, 211, 219-20, 250, 251-52; Viet- 
nam's promise to withdraw from, 251 

Cambridge University, 48, 114 

Canada: emigration to, 73 

Canton. See Guangzhou 

Cantonese Chinese dialect, 21, 92, 104; 
distribution of speakers of, 80; occupa- 
tions of speakers of, 95 

Carimon Islands, 10 

Castlereagh, Lord, 12 

Celebes, 7 

censorship, 36 

Central Expressway, 167 

Central Narcotics Bureau, 269 

Central Provident Fund, xxiii, 97, 98, 99, 
127, 188; administration of, 134-35; 
benefits of, 190; effect of, 135; em- 
ployee contributions to, 143, 159, 160, 
190; employer contributions to, 59, 
127; funds in, 134; funds used for con- 
struction of mosques, 107; interest rate 
on, 134; mandatory contributions to, 
133; Medisave Scheme, xxiii, 111, 139; 
Mendaki contribution to, 86-87; retire- 
ment plans, changes to, 142; savings 
used to pay for apartments, 76, 131; 
size of, 135; topping-up scheme, 139; 
types of accounts in, 134; used as capi- 



tal to build housing, xxvi, 189 

Ceylon (see also Sri Lanka), 29 

Changi, 38, 41 

Chartered Industries, 246-47 

Chia Thye Poh, 206 

Chiam See Tong, 63, 205 

Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 164 

Child care, 101-2 

Chin Peng, 43, 45, 256 

China (see also Taiwan), 3, 4, 5, 43, 
212-13; British trade with, 9; civil war 
in, 22; diplomatic relations with In- 
donesia, 213; diplomatic relations with 
Singapore, xxix, 212, 219; economic 
ties with, 208; food imported from, 172; 
immigrants from, 71, 79; Japanese war 
against, 35, 40; as participant in Great- 
er East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 40; 
potential for diplomatic relations with 
Indonesia, 212, 219; trade with India, 
13; trade with Singapore, 157, 212; 
traders from, 19 

China, Republic of (see also Taiwan), 34 

Chinatown, 15, 58 

Chinese Advisory Board, 26 

Chinese associations (see also secret socie- 
ties), 94-96; functions and activities of, 
94-95; leaders of, 95; structure of, 94 

Chinese, Baba. See Baba Chinese 

Chinese businesses, 100, 157 

Chinese Communist Party: Chinese Sin- 
gaporeans' support for, 4, 46, 256; col- 
laboration of, with Guomindang, 34 

Chinese consulate, 27 

Chinese culture, retention of, 22-23 

Chinese dialects (see also Cantonese; 
Hainanese; Hakka; Hokkien; Manda- 
rin; Teochiu), xxii 

Chinese dialect groups: employment pat- 
terns of, 26 

Chinese High School, 47 

Chinese immigrants, 24 

Chinese-language education, 33, 52; of 
Baba Chinese, 32; for Chinese women, 
30; decline in support for, 43; under 
Japanese occupation, 40; quality of 
primary education, 29; reform of, 30 

Chinese-language schools, 30, 46, 257 

Chinese Malaysians, 210 

Chinese Middle School Students Union, 
257 

Chinese middlemen, 19 

Chinese, Nanyang. See Nanyang Chinese 



309 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Chinese nationalism, 34 

Chinese New Year, 103, 106 

Chinese popular religion, 103-104, 108; 
festivals of, 103 

Chinese Protectorate, 26 

Chinese Singaporeans {see also Baba 
Chinese; Nanyang Chinese) xxi, xxii, 
78-82, 252; attraction of homeland for, 
4, 27; anti-Japanese boycott by, 34; as- 
sociations of, 94-96; communist in- 
fluence among, 253, 256; composition 
of, 26; criticism of colonial policy, 46; 
culture of, 93; defense of Singapore by, 
against Japanese invasion, 38, 40; dia- 
lect groups, 79-81; employment of, 26, 
95-96, 97; ethnicity and, 67, 96; growth 
in population of, 26; as imported labor 
in Johore Sultanate, 7; languages spoken 
by, 80-82, 86, 91; maltreatment of, by 
Japanese during occupation, 40; in mul- 
tiracial communities, 76; origins of, 21; 
population of, 79; precolonial Singa- 
porean settlements of, 3, 6; recruitment 
of, for army, 200, 240; recruitment of, 
for police force, 254; status for, 82 

cholera, 24 

Christian Fellowship, 109 
Christianity, xxiii, 103; popularity of, 
109, 110 

Chulalongkorn (King) (Rama V), 28 
Chung Kuo Council, 37 
Churchill, Winston, 37-38 
citizenship, process for, 72 
Citizenship Ordinance, 51-52 
Citizens' Consultative Committees, 191- 
92 

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, 
171 

Civil Defence Act (1986), 220 
Civil Defence Coordinating Committee, 
270 

Civil Defence Force, 220, 269; duties of, 
249; reservists in, 230 

civil defense, 269-70 

civil service, 185; hierarchy in, 187, 196; 
lack of corruption in, 187, 199; recruit- 
ment, 187-88; salaries, 187 

Clementi-Smith, Cecil, 26 

Cochinchina, 19, 20 

Coleman, George Drumgold, 20 

College of Physical Education, 114 

Commercial and Industrial Security Cor- 
poration, 265 



Commercial Square, 19 

Commonwealth of Nations, 44, 187; ad- 
mission of Singapore to, 57; defense of 
Singapore by, 37, 38, 224, 225 

communist movement, 253, 260 

Communist International (Comintern): 
Far Eastern Bureau of, 34 

Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), 206 
256, 259; breakup of, 253; as cause of 
Emergency, 227 

communist threat, 256-58 

community associations, 106 

Community Center Management Com- 
mittees, 191 

Community Health Service, 111 

computer industry, 149 

Confrontation, 56, 124, 207, 209, 211, 
221, 249; defined, 54, 258; effect of, 55, 
154; end of, 58, 259; entrepot trade cur- 
tailed by, xxv, 124; example of, 56; and 
Malaysia, 258; response to, 269 

Confucian values: in civil service, 187; as 
deterrent to military service, 240; and 
relations with other Asian countries, 
121, 144 

Confucianism, 92, 93, 204 

constituency, group, 177, 184; single- 
member, 177, 184, 205 

Constitution, 180, 181, 221, 262 

Constitutional Commission on Minority 
Rights, 58 

convict labor, 23-24 

copyright, law, 150; piracy, 149-50 

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, 
180, 186, 187 

Court of Appeal, 181 

Court of Criminal Appeal, 267 

Crawfurd, John, 16 

crime: classes of, 262-63; death penalty, 
262; drug-related, 220, 261, 262, 269; 
incidence of, 261 ; juvenile, 263; rates 
of solving, 263; report computer net- 
work, 262; trends in, 262-263; trials, 
262 

criminal justice system, 253 
cultural preservation, 203, 204 
currency, 160-61; exchange controls on 

abolished, 161; exchange market in, 

163 



Dalforce. See Singapore Chinese Anti- 
Japanese Volunteer Battalion 



310 



Index 



Dalhousie, Lord, 17 

Dalley, John, 37 

Daoism, xxiii, 109 

Deepavali, 105, 106 

Defence and Internal Security Council, 50 

defense, in colonial Singapore, 30-32, 35 

defense industries, 228-29, 246-48; ex- 
port production of, 248; foreign-owned, 
246; government-owned, 246-48 

defense spending, 238-39; parliamentary 
committee to review, 239; percent of 
national budget, 238; in recession of 
1985, 238-39; on salaries, 239 

Democratic Party, 49 

Devan Nair, C.V., 47, 51, 52 

Development Bank of Singapore, 129, 
162; services of, 162 

Dhanabalan, Suppiah, 207 

divorce: causes of, 103; in Chinese com- 
munity, 103; in Indian community, 
103; in Malay community, 101; Mus- 
lim, 102; rates, 102 

drug use: among Malays, 84; of opium, 
13, 24, 29, 42 

Dunman, Thomas, 253 

Dutch East Indies, 24, 27 



East Asiatic Squadron (Germany), 31 
East Coast Parkway, 167 
East Indies, 10 

Europe, Eastern, 161; economic ties with, 
209 

Europe, Western, 172, 239 

economic boards, 128-33; Economic De- 
velopment Board, 129; National Pro- 
ductivity Board, 130; Small Enterprise 
Bureau, 129; Trade Development 
Board, 130-31 

Economic Committee, 199; Report of, 
137, 138, 160, 161 

Economic Development Board, 128, 129, 
147, 148 

economic diplomacy, 208-9 

economic growth, xxix, 97, 121; in 1970s, 
125; of real GDP, 125; reasons for, 125 

economy: between world wars, 32; devel- 
opment of, after independence, 53; 
domestic market as sector of, 121; inter- 
nationalization of, 151; problems with, 
after independence, 58; sectors of, 121- 
22 

education (see also Arabic-language educa- 



tion; Chinese-language education; 
English-language education; Malay- 
language education; Mandarin-lan- 
guage education; Tamil-language 
education), 53, 112-16; British- style, 
114, 115; career prospects, 115-16; en- 
rollment, 114-15; goal of, 112-13; 
higher, 114; junior colleges, 114; oper- 
ation, 114; reforms in, 113; secondary 
schools, 114; and Singaporean identity, 
116; and social mobility, 113; and so- 
cial stratification, 96-97, 98, 99; spend- 
ing, 113; tracking system, 113; tuition, 
113; vocational, 114, 116 
Education Code (1902), 29 
Education Ordinance (1957), 52 
elections, 45-46, 61-63, 184, 193, 197; 
election of 1955, 49-50; election of 1959, 
52; election of 1988, 204 
Elections Department, 180 
Electricity, 136 

Emergency of 1948-60, 43, 46, 48, 205, 
258; British military presence under, 
227; described, 45, 257 

Employment Act (1968), 147; 1988 
amendment, 144 

employment patterns of Singaporeans, 
140, 171 

English common law, 15 

English language, xxii, 67, 88, 92, 182; 
Chinese speakers of, 79, 80, 81, 82, 96, 
104, 109; as key to upward mobility, 96, 
98; newspapers in, 214; radio and tele- 
vision broadcasting in, 215; skill levels, 
146 

English-language education, 29-30, 43, 
114, 116; of Baba Chinese, 32, 81; 
under Japanese occupation, 40 

Enlistment Act (1970), 220 

enterprise, domestic, 148 

entrepot, 165, 207; colonial Singapore 
as, xxiv, 15, 24, 123-24, 151; defined, 
122; Singapore as petroleum-servicing, 
126 

entrepot economy, 53, 147 

entrepot trade, xxiv, 3, 5, 7, 121, 151-52, 
154; curtailed by World War II, 40-41 ; 
curtailed by Indonesia's Confrontation, 
xxv, 124; description of, 17, 19; facili- 
ties for, 133; as reason for early success, 
17 

environmental protection: air pollution 
controls, 69-70; intentions of, 70; oil 



311 



Singapore: A Country Study 



spill controls, 70; water pollution con- 
trols, 70 

ethnic distribution (see also Chinese Sin- 
gaporeans; ethnicity; Indian Singapor- 
eans; Malay Singaporeans; multiracial 
policy; Tamil Singaporeans), 92-96; 
Chinese identification with, 96; decrease 
in importance of, 93; multiracialism 
policy and, 93; and occupation, corre- 
lation between, 96; and religion, 106-8 

European Economic Community (EEC), 
154, 157 

European investors, 59 

European settlers, 3, 12, 13, 254 

European traders, 3 

exchange rate, 161 

executive authority (government) (see also 

President of Singapore), 181-82 
Executive Council, 22, 24, 32, 45 
Export Expansion Incentives Act (1967), 
147 

exports, 151; domestic, 151; of flowers, 
172; growth of, 152; insurance plan for, 
161; petroleum, 152; reexports, 151, 
152 



family: Chinese, 101; and class, 101-2; 

functioning of, 101; Indian, 100-101; 

kin networks in, 102; Malay, 101; 

structure of, 100; Tamil, 101 
Family Planning and Population Board, 

73, 188 

family planning program, 60; abortion, 
73-74; voluntary sterilization, 73 

Farquhar, William, 10, 12, 13; legaliza- 
tion of gambling, opium, and liquor by, 
13; replaced, 16 

fashion industry, 149 

Federal Bureau of Investigation Acad- 
emy, 266 

Federated Malay States, 37, 223 

Feedback Unit, 192 

fertility: decline in, 74; of female univer- 
sity graduates, 74-75 

Fifth Light Infantry Regiment, 222-23; 
mutiny of, 31, 254 

financial services, 161-63; incentives for 
development, 162 

fish farming, 173 

fishing, 172-73 

Five-Powers Defence Agreement, xxviii, 
211, 221, 248, 252 



Flying Training School, 228 
Fong Swee Suan, 47, 49, 51, 52 
Food Control Department, 111 
food: imports of, 152 
Foreign Correspondents' Association, 54 
foreign policy, 207-14; balance of power 
in, 209; goals of, 62, 207-9; in late 
1980s, 208-9; and national security, 
219; neutrality rejected in, 209 
foreign reserves, 159-60 
France, 224, 250 

free market: Singapore as, 121, 122, 123 
free trade policy, 121, 122; effect of, 12, 

13; established by Raffles, xxiv, 12 
Fujian, 21 
futures trading, 164 

gambier, 7, 13, 21, 23, 24 
gambling, dens, 15; legalized by Japa- 
nese, 42 
gas, 136-37 

General Labour Union, 44 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
155, 209 

Germany, Federal Republic of, 228, 250; 

trade with, 157 
go-betweens, 22 

Goh Chok Tong, 179, 212; authority of, 
231; as most likely successor to Lee, 
xxvii, 63; political career of, 200; as 
prime minister, xxix; as second- 
generation leader, 62 

Goh Keng Swee, 48, 52, 58, 227, 227-28; 
support for Singapore's integration 
with Malaysia, 53 

Gold Exchange of Singapore, 164 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 214 

government control: focus of, 203; to 
foster Singaporean identity, 203; of 
media, 214-15; and national security, 
219; opposition to, 203, 204; over 
labor, 141-42; over newspaper circu- 
lation, 212 

government of Singapore: absence of lim- 
its on, 197; activism of, 197-98; anti- 
proselytizing policy of, xxiii, 110; 
budgeting and taxation, 127-28; con- 
trolling imports, 147; decreases in, 202; 
economic roles of, 202-3; encouraging 
trading of international securities, 164; 
impact of, on private business, 127; 
perceptions of, 202-3; privatizing, 202; 



312 



Index 



policies and practices, 200-201; recruit- 
ment of university graduates by, 146; 
regulating distribution of enterprises, 
147; regulating exchange markets, 161; 
regulating savings rate, 190; and soci- 
ety, relations between, 200-205; struc- 
ture; style of, 177; wage controls, 202; 
in workers' welfare, 127 
Government Hill, 15 
Government Securities Market, 164-65 
Government of Singapore Investment 

Corporation, 160 
Great Depression, 32, 71, 125 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 
40 

gross domestic product (GDP), xxiv, xxv, 
xxvi; information services' percentage 
of, 158; manufacturing's percentage of, 
147; percentage of devoted to educa- 
tion, 113; ratio of, to trade, 151 

Group of 77, 207 

Guangdong, 21, 108 

Guangzhou, 9, 22 

Guomindang: banned by colonial ad- 
ministration, 34; collaboration of, with 
Chinese Communist Party, 34; precur- 
sor of, 27; Singaporean Chinese sup- 
port for, 4; support of, for Singaporean 
Chinese, 33; under Japanese occupa- 
tion of Singapore, 35, 37 

Guoyu. See Mandarin Chinese dialect 

Hainan, 36, 224 

Hainanese Chinese dialect, 80 

Hakka Chinese dialect, 21, 80; occupa- 
tions of speakers of, 95 

Hari Raya Haji, 106 

Hastings, Lord, 10, 222 

Hawkers Department, 111 

health: AIDS policy, 112; causes of death, 
111; epidemics, 111-12; occupational 
diseases, 112 

Heaven, Earth, and Man Society, 22 

Henghua, 80, 95 

High Court {see also Supreme Court), 181 , 
267 

Hindu religion, xxiii, 108, 109; Brahman 
priests, 87; customs, 88, 102; holidays, 
105; studies, 93; temples, xxii, 103, 105 

Hindu Advisory Board, 94, 106 

Hindu Endowments Board, 106 

Hindu New Year, 105 



Hitachi Zosen, 166 
Hokchia, 80 
Hokchiu, 80 
Hokkaido, 48 

Hokkien Chinese dialect, 21, 92, 104; in 
Baba Malay, 81 ; as market language, 90, 
91; occupations of speakers of, 95; per- 
centage of Singaporean speakers of, 80 

Home Protection Insurance Scheme, 134 

Hong Kong, 17, 29, 31, 82, 142, 222, 
223; Chinese Singaporeans from, 72, 
79; as financial center, xxvi, 162; for- 
eign investment from, 59; foreign 
workers from, 73, 144; as newly indus- 
trializing economy, 121, 154; Singa- 
pore investment in, xxix; Singapore 
trade with, 157 

Honors Degree Liberal Arts and Social 
Science program, 116 

Hoo Ah Kay, 22-23, 27 

Housing and Development Board, 133, 
134, 188-90, 192; accomplishments, 
53, 131; community programs spon- 
sored by, 78; establishment of, 53, 131; 
powers of, 76, 189; rehousing under, 
76, 189-90 

Housing and Development Board apart- 
ments, xxiv, 97; assignment of, 75; 
forced savings used for, 190; govern- 
ment encouragement to buy, 131; as 
improvement in standard of living, 76; 
management of, 192; purchase prices 
for, 189; rents for, 189; residents of, 98 

housing estates, 58; as communities, 78; 
defined, 131; ethnic clustering in, 78; 
Town Councils in, 192 

housing policies, 75-78; social effects of, 
76 

Human Organ Transplant Law, 112 
Hundred Days' Reform Movement 

(1898), 27 
Hussein (Tengku Long), 8, 12, 13; ac- 
knowledged to be sultan of Johore, 12; 
agreement to help suppress piracy, 16; 
treaty establishing settlement bound- 
aries signed by, 12; treaty establishing 
trading post at Singapore signed by, 12 

Ibrahim, 20 
Illanun pirates, 20 

immigrants: categories of, 71-72; origins 
of, 71-72 



313 



Singapore: A Country Study 



immigration: effect of, on population, 73; 

restrictions on, 32, 71-72 
Immigration Department, 72 
Immigration Restriction Ordinance 

(1930), 32 
income, per capita: in 1965, 125 
income distribution, 97 
income level (class): increases in, 99; 

lower, 97-98; middle, 98; upper, 98-99 
India, 3, 5, 9, 10, 29, 37, 87, 222, 223; 

foreign workers from, 144; goods 

traded by, xxiv, 5; immigrants from, 

24, 71; population, 79; trade with 

China, 13 
Indian Ocean, 5 

Indian Singaporeans {see also Tamil), xxi, 
3, 12, 34, 67, 76, 87-88, 94, 252, 253; 
associations of, 94; background of, 23; 
caste distinctions, 88, 102; composition 
of, 27-28; ethnic composition of, 79, 
87; in government, 177, 200; intermar- 
riage with Malays by, 24, 88; issues, 
87; jobs held by, 13, 28, 88; languages 
spoken by, 87-88, 91; population of, 
23, 43; as race, 89; recruitment of, for 
police force, 254; religion of, 87; sex 
ratio, 87; untouchables, 87 

Indian traders, 3 

Indian troops, 38-40 

Indochina, 36, 224; economic ties with, 
208-9; investments in, 211; relations 
with, 211 

Indonesia, 5, 54, 82, 154, 236; Confron- 
tation policy of, xxv, 124, 207, 209, 211, 
221; food imported from, 172; foreign 
workers from, 144; military exercises 
with, 250, 251; potential diplomatic re- 
lations of, with China, 212, 219; rela- 
tions with Singapore, xxvii, 62, 211, 
227; tensions between Singapore and, 
56, 61, 227; trade with, 154 
Indonesia Raya, 54 
Indonesian immigrants, 24 
Industrial Arbitration Court, 142 
industrial development, 151 . 
industrial estates, 59, 133 
industrial relations, 140-42 
Industrial Relations Act (1960), 141 
Industrial Training Board, 188 
industrialization, 125, 146-49; emphasis 
on high-technology, 146-47, 148-49, 
149; export-oriented, 147; in 1960, 147; 
in 1988, 147 



inflation, 125 

information technology, 149-50 
Institute of Education, 114 
Integrated Air Defence System, 252 
Integrated Manpower Information Sys- 
tem, 240-41 
integration, as goal of Singapore govern- 
ment, 58 
Intelsat Business Service, 159 
Inter-Governmental Committee, 211 
Internal Security Act (1960), xxviii; pur- 
pose of, 205-6; uses of, 212, 220, 258, 
259, 260 
Internal Security Council, 52, 55 
Internal security plan, 255 
International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (Interpol), 261 
International Finance Corporation, 165 
International Maritime Organization, 
165 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 165 
International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (Intelsat), 208 
Inter-Religious Organization, 106 
investment: foreign, xxv, 59, 125, 147, 
159; government support for, 161; Sin- 
gapore as magnet for, 59-60 
Ishak, Yusof bin, 57, 59 
Islam, xxiii, 74, 102, 109; study of, 93 
Islamic revival movement, xxiii, 28, 108, 
110, 210 

Israel, 250; military advisers from, 61, 
228 



Jackson, Phillip, 18 
Jaffna, 87 

Japan (see also Japanese invasion of Sin- 
gapore; Japanese occupation of Sin- 
gapore): attack on Malaya by, 4; 
bombing of Singapore by, 36; boycott 
against, 34; capture of Singapore by, 
36-37; demonstrations against, 35; 
flowers exported to, 172; invasion of 
Malaya by, 225; invasion of Manchuria 
by, 34; investments by, xxv; level of 
spending on education by, 113; mar- 
ket orientation of, 156; military train- 
ing of Singaporean officers in, 250; as 
progenitor of Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere, 40; rearmament, 
212; sentiment against, in Singapore, 
34; Singapore's trade deficit with, 155; 



314 



Index 



Southern Army of, 224; surrender by, 
to Mountbatten, 41; trade with Sin- 
gapore, 58-59, 151, 154, 155-56; 
Twenty-One Demands of, 33; workers 
from, 72 

Japanese community in Singapore, 155 
Japanese invasion of Singapore, 224-26, 

248; British preparation for, 223, 254; 

goals of, 224; Japanese strategy for, 37; 

preparatory attacks, 224; strength of 

Japanese force, 37 
Japanese investors, 59 
Japanese Malaya Campaign (see also 

Japanese invasion of Singapore; Jap- 
anese occupation of Singapore), 36-41 
Japanese occupation of Singapore, 38-41, 

256, 258; control of schools under, 40; 

damage to infrastructure by, 42, 227; 

recovery from, xxv, 42-43 
Japanese Red Army: terrorist attack by, 

260-61 

Java, 3, 9, 79; goods traded by, 5-6; 
Malays as immigrants from, 82; oc- 
cupied by British, 10; people of, 73; 
traders from, 3 

Java Sea, 83 

Jawi-Peranakan, 24, 28 

Jeyaretnam, J.B., 63, 205, 206 

Jewish residents, 23, 109 

Jiangsu, 81 

Jiangxi, 81 

Johor, xxv, 144, 156, 258; economic ties 

with, 156; foreign labor from, 144 
Johore, 21, 31, 51, 224 
Johore Baharu, 37, 69 
Johore Causeway, 29 
Johore Strait, 37, 169, 225, 226 
Johore Sultanate, 3; Bugis control of, 7-9, 

10; as entrepot, 15; establishment of, 7 
Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's 

Privy Council, 181, 184-85 
Judiciary, 184-185; Court of Appeal. 

184; Court of Criminal Appeal, 184; 

Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's 

Privy Council, 181, 184-85; Supreme 

Court, 184-85 
Jurong, 41 
Jurong Camp, 244 
Jurong Industrial Estate, 53, 77, 166 
Jurong Marine Base, 133 
Jurong Port and Market Complex, 166, 

167, 172 

Jurong Town Corporation, 59, 132-33 



Justice Party, 206 
Juvenile Court, 267 



Kalimantan Army Command, 258, 259 

Kallang, 38, 136 

Kallang Gasworks, 136 

Kallang River, 70 

kampongs, 58, 76, 84 

Kampuchea, Coalition Government of 

Democratic (see also Cambodia), 62 
Kapitans, 15 
Kedah, 224 
Kelantan, 224 
Keppel Wharves, 166, 167 
Kew Letters, 9, 10 
Khatib Camp, 243 
Khota Baharu, 36, 225 
King Edward Medical College, 30, 42 
King George V Graving Dock (see also 

Sembawang Shipyard), 35, 60 
Konfrontasi. See Confrontation 
Korea (see also South Korea), 35, 60 
Kota Tinggi, 258 
Krause, Lawrence B., 140 
Kuala Lumpur, 5, 37, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 
Kuomintang. See Guomindang 
Kuwait, 261 



labor law, 59, 141-42 

labor unions, 140-42, 202, 256; collective 
agreements for, 143; membership in, 
142; organization of, suppressed by 
colonial government, 34; role and 
structure defined, 142; role and struc- 
ture modified, 142; strikes, 255 

Labour Court, 142 

Labour Front, 4, 48, 52 

Labour Front government, 50 

Lai Teck, 45 

land development and management, 
131-32 

land reclamation, xxi 

land use policy, 77-78 

Lands Acquisition Act (1966), 189 

language (see also under names of in- 
dividual languages): high and low var- 
iations, 90-91; planning, 58, 90-92; 
understood by Singaporeans, 91 

Laos, economic ties with, 209 

law enforcement, 253 



315 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Lee Hsien Loong, xxvii, 180, 197; polit- 
ical career of, 63, 199-200; as poten- 
tial successor to Lee Kuan Yew, 63; 
and Speak Mandarin campaign, 92; 
speech by, on U.S. -Singapore relations, 
212 

Lee Kuan Yew, xxi, xxvi-xxvii, xxviii, 
xxix, 92, 192-3, 227, 230, 251; anti- 
proselytizing policy of, 110; as delegate 
to Merdeka talks, 50; early political 
career of, 48-51; education of, 48; ex- 
ecutive presidency proposed by, 160, 
180; family planning schemes under, 
74-75; formation of People's Action 
Party, 4; independence of Singapore 
under, 5, 57-62; industrialization pro- 
moted by, 54; and international rela- 
tions, xxvii, 210, 211, 213, 219; labor 
relations controlled by, 141-42; leader- 
ship style of, 196; merger into Malaysia 
supported by, 53-54, 56-57; national 
unity promoted by, 53-54; as People's 
Action Party secretary general, 194; 
People's Action Party victory under, 
52, 256, 257-58; referendum on merger 
question announced, 54; succession to, 
62, 63, 198-99, 249; suppression of po- 
litical opposition by, 60-61, 205 

Lee Siew Choh, 205, 207 

legal service, 185 

Legal Service Commission, 186 

Legislative Assembly {see also Parliament): 
description of, 47-48; first elections for, 
4-5, 52; and Merdeka talks, 51; merger 
with Malaysia, vote on, 54; People's 
Action Party control of, 193; prepara- 
tions for self-government by, 52; Sin- 
gapore Independence Bill passed by, 
180 

Legislative Council, 22; Chinese mem- 
bers of, 26; under colonial rule, 33, 
45-46; description of, 24 

legislature (see also Parliament of Singa- 
pore), 182 

Leong Mun Kwai, 207 

Li Teng-hui, 213 

Lim Chin Siong: appointed to govern- 
ment post, 52; communist activities of, 
47, 51; seat in legislature, 50; as secre- 
tary general of Barisan Sosialis, 54-55 

Lim Kim San, 53 

Lim, Linda Y.C., 139-40 

Lim Yew Hock: as chief minister, 50-53, 



255; formation of Labour Front by, 48; 

at Merdeka talks, 52 
liquor, tax on, 15 
living standards, 205 
Liirssen Werft, 228, 235-36 



Macao, 72; foreign workers from, 144 

Macassar, 23 

machinery industry, 148 

Madras, India, 167 

Mahathir, Mohammad, xxvii, 62, 210 

Majapahit Empire, 3, 6 

Malacca, 3, 13, 21, 23; as part of 
Malayan Union, 41; medieval role of, 
7; occupied by British, 10, 222; oc- 
cupied by Japanese, 37; as part of 
Straits Settlements, 3, 17, 24; Por- 
tuguese capture of, 7; traders, 12, 19 

Malacca, Strait of, xxi, 3, 28, 68; as 
border between British and Dutch con- 
trol, 16; Dutch control of, 10, 12; 
Japanese control of, 225; oil spills in, 
70; security of, 211 

Malacca Sultanate, 3, 7; as entrepot, 15; 
establishment of, 7; Singapura con- 
trolled by, 7 

Malay Archipelago, xxiv, 3, 19; as en- 
trepot, 5; as rendezvous point for 
traders, 5; as supply point for traders, 5 

Malay immigrants, 24 

Malay language: Bazaar Malay, 85-86, 
90, 91; as "mother tongue," 90; as na- 
tional language of Singapore, 53; 
newspapers in, 214; radio and televi- 
sion broadcasting in, 215; spoken by 
Chinese Singaporeans, 79, 80, 81, 91; 
spoken in legislature, 182; spoken by 
Indian Singaporeans, 88, 91 

Malay-language education, 29, 43, 52, 
114; under Japanese occupation, 40; 
Mendaki tutoring, 86; number of stu- 
dents in, 32; special considerations 
regarding, 85-86 

Malay Peninsula, xxiv, 3, 7, 9, 19, 20, 
23, 68, 71; British occupation of, 20; 
British defense of, 223, 224; controlled 
by Malacca Sultanate, 7; opposition to 
separating Singapore from, 41, 44; 
overland connecting roads, 169; as 
source of rubber and tin, xxiv, 24, 124; 
unstable conditions in, 24 

Malay press, 56 



316 



Index 



Malay Singaporeans, xxi, 3, 67, 76, 89, 
177, 200, 252, 253, 254; associations 
of, 94; background of, 23; birth pat- 
terns of, 84; education of, 86; ethnic 
composition of, 79; government view 
of, 75; intermarriage with Indians by, 
24, 88; jobs held by, 28, 83, 84, 86; lan- 
guage used by, 85-86; marriage pat- 
terns of, 84, 102; military service by, 
74, 240; origins of, 82-83; population 
of, 79, 82; precolonial Singaporean set- 
tlements of, 6; religion, 84, 102, 106, 
108; social position of, 74 

Malay traders, 3 

Malay troops, 38-40 

Malaya, 36, 43, 54, 54, 222, 257; Chinese 
consulates established in, 27; Japan's 
attack on, 4, 225; Malay immigrants 
from, 82; Singapore's merger with, 53, 
124 

Malaya, Federation of, 45; formation of, 
44; Merdeka talks regarding, 51; merger 
of Singapore with, 52; proposed, 54 

Malaya, University of, 43 

Malayan Chinese, 37 

Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), 
49, 52, 56 

Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 4, 
34, 35, 45, 46; labor activities of, 44; 
popularity of, 43 

Malayan Democratic Union, 44, 45 

Malayan National Liberation Front, 259 

Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, 
40, 43, 45, 256 

Malayan Union, 41, 44 

Malayans, 55, 56 

Malaysia, Federation of, 82, 93, 236, 260; 
conflicts of, with Singapore, 57, 221; 
and Confrontation, 258; first year of, 
56; food imported from, 172; formation 
of, 5, 124, 180; as member of ASEAN, 
209, 219; military exercises with, 251; 
opposition to formation of, 54, 258; 
percentage of Singaporeans from, 72; 
police force, 259; political tensions in, 
56; proposed, 54; relations with Singa- 
pore, xxvii, 62, 210-11, 221, 252; sepa- 
ration of Singapore from, xxv, 57, 61, 
67, 88, 124, 125, 180, 210, 227, 250; 
Singapore as part of, 55-57, 221, 227; 
as source of foreign workers, 71, 144, 
167; stock exchange of, 162; trade with, 
154; water imported from, 69, 136 



Malaysia-Singapore Airlines. See Singa- 
pore Airlines 
Malaysian Agreement (1963), 55 
Malaysian National Alliance Party, 56 
Malaysian Solidarity Convention, 56 
malnutrition, 24 
Manchukuo, 40 
Manchuria, 35 

Mandarin Campaign Secretariat, 91 

Mandarin Chinese dialect (Guoyu), 82, 
88, 109, 182; as "mother tongue," 90; 
newspapers in, 214; radio and televi- 
sion broadcasting in, 215; Speak Man- 
darin Campaign, 91-92 

Mandarin-language education, 33, 43, 
52, 114; discouraged by British, 33-34 

Manila, 13 

manufacturing industry, 28; export-ori- 
ented, 121 

markets, international, 121; services for, 
121-22; Singapore's dependence on, 
121; Singapore's vulnerability to, 121, 
122 

Marshall, David, 4, 48, 50 

marriage (see also divorce), 100-103; 

Chinese, 101; interethnic, 102; Malay, 

101; Tamil, 101 
Maternal and Child Health Service, 1 1 1 
media, 214-15; government restrictions 

on, 214; newspapers, 214-15; radio, 

215; television, 215 
medical services, 110-11; facilities, 111; 

fees, 111 

Medisave Scheme, xxiii, 111, 134, 139 

Members of Parliament Constituent Ad- 
visory Groups, 93 

Mendaki, 86; Central Provident Fund 
contribution, 86-87 

Mercantile activity, 19-20 

merchant houses, 19-20 

merchant marine, 166 

Merdeka talks, 5; first round of, 50; sec- 
ond round of, 51; third round of, 52 

Middle East, 37 

middlemen, 22; system of, 19 

military. See armed forces 

Military Maneuvers Act (1963), 241 

military relations, 250-52; exercises, 
250-51, 252; joint international train- 
ing, 213, 239, 241, 245, 248, 250-51; 
materiel, 250 

Mindanao, 20 

Min-def mafia, 199 

317 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Minimum Sum Scheme, 134 
ministries {see also cabinet; individual 
ministries): ministers chosen for, 179; 
ministerial portfolios, 179-80 
Ministry of Communications and Infor- 
mation, 91 
Ministry of Community Development, 

108, 191 
Ministry of Culture, 191 
Ministry of Defence, 238, 241; business 
interests of, 191, 228-29; civilian as 
minister, 221; conscription regulations 
of, 240; National Cadet Corps ad- 
ministered by, 236; organization of, 
231; political power of former members 
of, 199; reserve units monitored by, 249 
Ministry of Education, 114, 115, 186, 236 
Ministry of Environment {see also Pollu- 
tion Control Department), 69, 70, 111 
Ministry of Finance, 186, 190, 200; Pub- 
lic Service Division, 186 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 211 
Ministry of Health, 111, 140, 186 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 186, 211 
Ministry of Interior and Defence, 228 
Ministry of National Development, 172, 
Ministry of Social Affairs, 191 
Misuse of Drugs Act (1973), 263 
Mohammad, Mahathir, xxvii, 62, 210 
Moluccas, xxiv, 6 

Monetary Authority of Singapore, 161, 
162, 163 

monsoons, 19 

mortality rate, 29 

mother tongue, xxii, 90 

motor vehicles, 167-69 

Mountbatten, Louis, 41, 43 

multiracialism policy, 210; description of, 
93; and ethnic clustering, 78; in hous- 
ing estates, 76, 190 

Mushroom Unit of the Primary Produc- 
tion Department, 172 

Muslim, Chulia, 103; law, 15, 107; 
mosques, 107 

Muslim Law Act (1966), 102, 106-7 

Muslim Ordinance (1957), 107-8 

Muslim Religions Council, 106, 108, 188 

Nagarakertagama, 6 
Nakhodka, 214 
Nanyang, 33, defined, 6 
Nanyang Chinese, 13, 27, 34 



Nanyang Chinese National Salvation 
Movement, 34, 35 

Nanyang Chinese Relief General Associ- 
ation, 35 

Nanyang Communist Party, 34 

Nanyang Technological Institute 

Nanyang University, 46 

National Association of Securities Deal- 
ers (NASDAQ), 164 

National Cadet Corps, 236 

National Computer Board, 149 

National Day, 106 

national holidays, 105-6 

National Police Cadet Corps, 266 

National Productivity Board, 130, 138 

national security: communist threat to, 
219; defensive outlook, 248-49; and 
foreign policy, 219; people's reaction 
to, 249; perceptions, 219; Total De- 
fence concept, 249-50 

national service, 219, 250; conscription 
for, 220, 228, 250 

National Service Ordinance, 47, 257; 
demonstration against, 47, 48 

National Trades Union Congress 
(NTUC), 135, 141, 193 

National University of Singapore, 109, 
114; employment of graduates of, 116; 
enrollment, 115; military scholarships 
to, 239; police scholarships to, 266; tu- 
ition, 113 

National Wages Council, 142, 147-48, 
193, 202; description of, 143 

Nationality Law of Republic of China, 34 

navy, Singapore, 235-36, 249; advanced 
training, 245; basic training, 243; capa- 
bilities of, 236; combat support train- 
ing, 245; evolution of, 228; expansion 
of, 229; Maritime Command, 227, 
228; Midshipman School, 245; mission 
of, 236; officer training, 245; structure 
of, 235 

Negri Sembilan, 223 

Neighborhood Police Force System, 262 

Neptune Orient Line, 60 

Netherlands, 3, 222, 224; capture of 
Malacca by, 9; as colonial rulers of 
Malay Archipelago, 9; East Indian 
trade of, 9; monopoly by, on China- 
India-East Indies trade, 3; restrictive 
trade policies of, 10; taxation of trad- 
ing ships by, 10; trade with, 157; treaty 
of, with sultan of Johore, 9 



318 



Index 



New Guinea, 40 
New York, 60 

New Zealand: emigration of Singapor- 
eans to, 73; in Five-Powers Defence 
Agreement, xxviii, 211, 221, 252; in- 
vested in by Singapore, xxix; military 
relations with, 252; recognition of in- 
dependent Singapore by, 57, 250 

Newly industrializing economy (NIE), 
154; Asian, 121; Hong Kong as, 121, 
154; Singapore as, 67; South Korea as, 
121, 154, 155; Taiwan as, 121, 154 

Newspapers and Printing Presses Act 
(1974), 214 

Ngee Ann Polytechnic, 114 

Nonaligned Movement, 207 

North Borneo {see also Sabah), 54 

occupation: of Chinese, 26, 74, 95-96, 97; 
correlation between ethnicity and, 95, 
96; of Indians, 13, 28, 88; of Malays, 
28, 83, 84, 86; mobility in, 99; patterns 
in, 140, 171 

Official Secrets Act, 191 

oil. See Petroleum 

O level exams, 114, 116 

Ong Teng Cheong, 62, 141 

opium, 13, 24, 29, 42 

orang laut, 9, 23 

Ord, Harry, 253 

Ordnance Development and Engineering, 
247 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation 

and Development (OECD), 154 
Ottoman Empire, 31 
Overseas Training Awards, 239, 250 

Pahang, 224 
Pakistan, 73, 79 
Palembang, 6 

Pan-Island Expressway, 167 
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade 

Unions, 44 
Paramesvara (King): Johore Sultanate 

founded by, 7; Malacca founded by, 7; 

Malaccan Sultanate founded by, 7; 

takeover of Singapura by, 6 
parapolitical institutions: functions of, 

191-92; purposes of, 191-92 
Parliament: members of, 196-97; func- 
tions of, 179; party functions of, 194; 

terms of, 177 



Parliament of Singapore, 57, 177-80, 
181, 186, 188, 205; constituency sys- 
tem in, 177; meetings of, 182; passage 
of laws by, 182; procedure in, 182 

Parliament Privilege, Immunities, and 
Powers Act (1962), 206 

Parliamentary Elections Act, 179 

Parsis, 23, 109 

Pasir Laba Camp, 243, 244, 246 
Pasir Panjang, 29, 38 
Pasir Panjang Wharves, 166 
Patani, 36 

Paya Lebar Air Base, xxviii, 244 
penal system, 23 

Penang, 9, 10, 12, 17, 222, 253; Chinese 
immigrants from, 13, 21; control of, by 
British East India Company, 9; Jap- 
anese occupation of, 37, 225; Ma- 
lays from, 13; as part of Malayan 
Union, 41; as part of Straits Settle- 
ments, 3 

People's Action Party (PAP), xxvi, 
192-95, 205, 256; cadre system, 194; 
communist alliance with, 257; com- 
munist opposition to, 56-57; domi- 
nance of, 60, 139, 193; electoral vote 
for, 204; founding of, 4, 193; hierar- 
chy of, 196; housing and development 
program of, 76, 188-89; inauguration 
of, 48, 49; labor policy of, 193, 202; 
landslide victories of, 5, 55, 59, 62; 
leadership of, 193, 196, 197; low pro- 
file of, 195, 199; platform of, 49, 52; 
purge of, 51; relations of, with labor, 
141 ; relations of, with National Trades 
Union Congress, 141; structure of, 194 

People's Action Party (PAP), Central Ex- 
ecutive Committee: communist attempt 
to take over, 51, 257; second- generation 
leaders in, 63; structure of, 194 

People's Action Party (PAP) government: 
close relationship of, with National 
Trades Union Congress, 141; Confu- 
cianism promoted by, 204; first- 
generation leaders in, 199; future eco- 
nomic goals of, 137-38; goals of, 197; 
leadership in, 196, 197; leadership 
style, 204-5; and organized labor, 
141-42; paternalistic approach of, 
60-61; plans to inspire national unity, 
52-53; power structure of, 196; privati- 
zation policy of, 138-40; role of, in 
macroeconomic management, 122-23, 



319 



Singapore: A Country Study 



127-35; second-generation leaders in, 
141, 198-200; successes of, 206; trans- 
formation to industrialized society, 53 

People's Association Community Cen- 
ters, 93, 191 

People's Defence Force, 230, 236-37; 
function of, 236-37; origins of, 236 

People's Liberation Organization, 260 

pepper, 7, 21, 122 

Perak, 224 

Percival, Arthur E., 37, 38, 224, 226 
petroleum, 150-51; exports of, 152; price 
collapse in 1970s, 125; price erosion in 
1980s, 150; refineries, 68; refining, 
xxv, 60, 121, 150; Singapore as en- 
trepot for, 126, 150 
Philippines, xxviii, 238; foreign workers 
from, 71, 144; as member of ASEAN, 
209; opposition of, to Malaysia, 54; 
pirates from, 20 
Pickering, William, 26 
piracy, 16, 17, 19, 20; of intellectual 

property, 149-50 
plantation agriculture, 21 
Police Academy (Japan), 266 
Police Academy (Singapore), 266 
police force, 84, 185, 254, 263-67; Area 
Command, 265; auxiliary, 265; Brit- 
ish reorganization of, 254-55; coun- 
terterrorist operations, 265; deputy 
commissioners, 265-66; Detachments 
Command, 265; education, 266; 
Gurkha unit, 265; Internal Security 
Department, 259; number of person- 
nel, 265; recruitment for, 266; round- 
up of communists by, 258; training, 
266; women in, 266 
Police Reserve Unit, 255 
Police StafT College (Britain), 266 
political corruption, 199 
political culture, structure of, 197 
political opposition, 193-94, 205-7; gov- 
ernment reaction to, 185; government 
suppression of, 205-7; parties, 206-7 
political participation, 46 
political power: distribution of, 195-96; 

nature of, 195-96 
political succession, 198-99 
politics, government opposition to, 198, 
199 

Pollution Control Department, 69 
population (see also family planning pro- 
gram): abortion, 73-74; birth rate, 70, 



73, 197, 203-4; causes of death, 70; 
control policies, 73-75, 128, 204; death 
rate, 70; density, 131; distribution, 
75-78, 79, 190; ethnic categories, 79; 
fertility rate, 71; government disincen- 
tives, 74; growth of, 71; infant mortal- 
ity rate, 70; native-born, 71; natural 
increase, 71, 73; sterilization, volun- 
tary, 73, 74 

Port Dickson, 223 

port facilities, 29 

Port of Singapore, 60, 165, 265 

Port of Singapore Authority, 70, 133, 
165, 188 

Port of Singapore Police, 265 

Portugual, 3; destruction of Singapore by 
(1613), 3, 7 

Post Office Savings Bank, 127, 133 

poverty, 29, 97 

Presidency of the Straits Settlements. See 

Straits Settlements 
President of Singapore: duties of, 181; 

election of, 180; power of, 180; role of, 

180; term of, 181 
Presidential Council for Minority Rights, 

182 

Prime Minister, Office of the, 180, 191 
Prince of Woks, 36, 224, 225; sinking of, 36 
printing and publishing industry, 150 
prisons and rehabilitation centers, 267- 
69; day-release centers, 267, 269; refor- 
mative training center, 267-69; types 
of, 267 

Private Sector Investment Committee, 
138 

privatization, 138-40; divestment plan, 

138- 39; recommendation against, 

139- 40; and role of state, 139 
processing industry, 28 
productivity, 143, 148, 149 
Productivity 2000, 138 
Progressive Party, 45-46, 49 
prostitution: Chinese women forced into, 

26; legalized by Japanese, 42 
Public Affairs Department, 111 
public enterprises, 186, 187, 190-91, 196; 
Government Printing Office, 190-91; 
Neptune Orient Line, 191; Singapore 
International Airlines (SI A), 191 ; Sin- 
gapore National Printers, 191; Tema- 
sek Holdings, 190 
public health, 110-11; facilities, 111; fees, 
111 



320 



Index 



public service, 186-88; boards and coun- 
cils, 187; civil service, 186-87; prestige 
of employment in, 187 

Public Service Commission, 181, 266, 
267; description of, 185-86; scholar- 
ships awarded by, 187-88 

public transportation, 169 

Public Utilities Board: electricity, 136; es- 
tablished, 136; gas, 135-37; water sup- 
ply system, 136 

Public Works Department, 167 

publishing industry. See printing and pub- 
lishing industry 

Pulau Brani, 28, 228, 245 

Pulau Bukum, 28, 260 

Pulau Seraya Power Station, 136 

Pulau Tekong, 244 

Punjabi language, 91 

Punjabi Muslims, mutiny of, 31, 254 

Queen's Scholarships, 30 
Qing dynasty, 22; fundraising in Singa- 
pore by, 27 
Qing Ming, 103 
Quayle, Dan, 212 



Raffles College, 42 

Raffles Institution, 29, 48 

Raffles Place, 14, 19 

Raffles, Sir Thomas Stamford, xxi, xxiv, 
3, 13, 222; abolishment of slavery by, 
15; administration regulations promul- 
gated by, 15; career of, in British East 
India Company, 10; criminal justice 
under, 15; dream of, for education for 
settlers, 16; establishment by, of trad- 
ing post at Singapore, 3,12; gambling 
abolished by, 15; occupation of Singa- 
pore by, 10-12; plan for town drawn 
by, 12, 13-15; setdement of, with Hus- 
sein and temenggong, 15-16; taxes im- 
posed on liquor and opium by, 15; 
treaties signed with Hussein and the 
temenggong, 12 

Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby, 48, 52, 58, 
207 

Rama V (King Chulalongkorn), 28 
Ramadan, 106 

recession of 1985, 126-27, 145, 148; 
defense spending in, 238-39; effect of, 
on business loans, 148; government 



response to, 127; growth rate in, 162; 
recovery from, 164; savings, capital 
during, 159 

reclamation schemes, 133 

Registry of Citizens, 72 

Registry of Societies, 94 

religion, 103-10; Buddhism, 103; changes 
in, 108-10; Chinese popular religion, 
103-4; Christianity, 103; distribution, 
108-9; and ethnicity, 106-8; Hindu- 
ism, 103; Islam, 103; Jainism, 103; 
Judaism, 103; Sikhism, 103; Zoroastri- 
anism, 23, 103 

religious education: government monitor- 
ing of, 110 

religious festivals, 105-6 

Rendel, George, 47, 48 

Repulse, 36, 224, 225; sinking of, 36 

reserves, armed forces, 250, 270; length 
of duty in, 220; number of personnel, 
229, 230; training, 246 

resettlement policy: aims of, 131-32 

Residents' Committees, 93, 191, 192; 
Group Secretariat, 192 

retirement age, 142 

Riau Islands, 8, 12; Chinese immigrants 
from, 13, 21; entrepot trade in, 7; 
Malay immigrants from, 13, 23, 79; oc- 
cupied by Dutch, 9, 10; plantations 
in, 7 

riots, 254, 255 

road-building program, 167 

Rotterdam, xxv, 60 

rubber, xxiv, 24, 35, 62, 122 

Russia, 30 

Russian navy, 30 



Sabah, as part of Malaysia, 5, 54, 55, 56, 

124, 258 
Saigon, 224 

Sale of Sites Programme, 132 
Sarawak, as part of Malaysia, 5, 54, 55, 

56, 124, 258 
savings, forced, 133-35; effect of, 160; 

rate of contribution, 133-34 
savings rate, 121, 122-23, 159 
School Health Service, 111 
scorched-earth policy, 38 
Seah Eu Chin, 22-23 
secret societies, 21-22, 24, 256-57; 

banned, 22, 26; as criminal groups, 22, 

253; membership, 22; origin of, 21-22 



321 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Securities Industry Council, 165 

Sejara Melayu, 6 

Selarang barracks, 38 

Seletar, 224 

Seletar Air Base, 245 

Seletar Airport, 171 

Sembawang, 224, 245 

Sembawang Shipyard, 60 

Sembawang Wharves, 166, 167 

Sentosa Island, 157, 159, 228 

Seow, Francis, 205 

Seow Khee Leng, 205 

sex ratio, 24, 71, 87 

Shah, Zinul Abiddin Mohammed, 260 

sharia, 94, 108 

Sheng-Li Holding Company, 229 

ship repair, 166, 167 

Shonan, 4, 38-41 

Siabu Air Weapons Range, 251 

Siam (see also Thailand), 7, 19, 28 

Sikhs, 93, 109 

Sikh Advisory Board, 106 

Singapore, 93; alteration of landscape of, 
68-69; climate of, 69; location of, 68, 
69; threat to, 210; topography of, 68 

Singapore Aerospace Corporation, 247 

Singapore Aircraft Industries, 235 

Singapore Armed Forces. See Armed 
forces 

Singapore Association of Trade Unions 

(SATU), 141, 193 
Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, 215 
Singapore Bus Workers' Union, 47 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce, 22 
Singapore Changi Airport, 169-70 
Singapore Chinese Anti-Japanese Volun- 
teer Battalion, 37, 38, 40 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Com- 
merce, 26, 34, 49, 94 
Singapore Chinese General Association 

for the Relief of Refugees, 34 
Singapore Chinese Middle School Stu- 
dents' Union, 50, 51 
Singapore Chinese Party, 206 
Singapore City Committee, 43 
Singapore Civil Service. See civil service 
Singapore, colonial: administration of, 
33; under Bengal, 17; Chinese consu- 
lates established in, 27; under Dal- 
housie, 17; defense of, against Japanese 
invasion, 37-38; education in, 29-30, 
113; ethnic friction in, 13; ethnic 
residential districts established in, 15; 



overnight success of, 13; settlers at- 
tracted to, 13; shipping transportation, 
29; surrender of, to Japanese, 38, 226; 
town plan of, 13-15 

Singapore Corporation for Rehabilitative 
Enterprises, 269 

Singapore Democratic Party, 63, 205 

Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' 
Union, 47 

Singapore Family Planning Association, 
73 

Singapore Foreign Exchange Market, 163 
Singapore Harbour Board, 29 
Singapore Improvement Trust, 131 
Singapore Independence Bill, 180 
Singapore, independent, 52, 57; organi- 
zation of, 57; reaction of, to indepen- 
dence, 57 
Singapore Institution, 16 
Singapore Islamic Party, 206 
Singapore International Airlines (SI A), 

138, 171; earnings, 171 
Singapore Labour Party, 45, 48 
Singapore Legal Service. See legal service 
Singapore Police Force. See police force 
Singapore, postwar: as crown colony, 44, 
223; food shortages in, 42; new consti- 
tution, 44-45; population in, 43; recon- 
struction of, 43 
Singapore People's Alliance, 52 
Singapore Polytechnic Institute, 114, 239 
Singapore, Port of. See Port of Singapore 
Singapore, precolonial, 3; Bugis-Malay 
factionalism in, 7-8; as entrepot, 5, 
17-19; etymology of, 3, 6; history of, 
3, 5-9; means of livelihood in, 9; as part 
of Straits Settlements, 3; as rendezvous 
point for traders, 5; as supply point for 
traders, 5; trading post established by 
Raffles on, 12; written descriptions of, 
6, 10 

Singapore River, 3, 70 
Singapore Science Park, 133 
Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering, 
248 

Singapore Strait, 211, 222 
Singapore Teachers' Union, 47 
Singapore Technology Corporation, 
246-47 

Singapore Tourist Promotion Board, 104, 
106, 157 

Singapore Town Committee, 257 
Singapore Trade Union Congress, 141 



322 



Index 



Singapore Tramway Company, 136 
Singapore University, 30, 114 
Singapore Volunteer Artillery, 31, 32 
Singapore Volunteer Corps, 48, 236 
Singaporean identity, xxii, 5, 58, 67, 
88-90; bilingualism and, 89; creation 
of, 89; as Eastern and Western, 89, 90, 
197; education and, 116; ethnic iden- 
tity in, 89; government efforts to foster, 
203, 204; institutions for promoting, 
191-92; and international culture, 90 
Singapura, 3, 6-7; destruction of, by Por- 
tuguese, 3, 7 
Singlish, 89, 91 
Singora, 36, 225 
Sino-Japanese War, 34 
slavery, abolished by Raffles, 15 
smallpox, 23, 24 

Small Enterprise Bureau, emphasis of, 
129; established, 129 

Small Industry Finance Scheme, 129 

Social Development Unit, 75 

social mobility: effect of education on, 
99-100; potential for, 99-100 

social stratification, 96 

society and government: relations be- 
tween, 200-205 

Soeharto, xxvii, 62, 211, 258-59 

sojourning, 21 

S5ka Gakkai, 110 

Songkhla. See Singora 

South China Sea, 225 

South Korea (Republic of Korea): foreign 
workers from, 144; as newly industri- 
alizing economy, 121, 154, 155 

Southeast Asia, 40, 187 

Soviet Union: aggression in Asia, 220; 
diplomatic relations with, 213-14; eco- 
nomic ties with, 208-9, 213-14; inva- 
sion of Afghanistan, 209; relations of, 
with Vietnam, 213-14, 219; withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, 251 

Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation (1978), 214 

Speak Mandarin Campaign, 91-92; goals 
of, 92 

Sri Lanka {see also Ceylon), 71, 73, 79, 87; 

foreign workers from, 144 
Sri Mariamman Temple, 103, 105 
Sri Tri Buana, 6 

Srivijaya Empire, 3, 6; as entrepot, 15; 

Singapore as port in, 6 
state-owned enterprises: MND Holdings, 



135; Sheng-Li Holding Company, 135; 
Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, 
135; Temasek Holdings (Private) 
Limited, 135 

statutory boards (see also under name of 
board), 186, 187, 188-90; activities of, 
188-90; denned, 188; employees of, 
188; management of, 188, 196 

Statutory Bodies and Government Com- 
panies Act (1984), 191 

sterilization, voluntary, 73; rewards for, 
74 

Stock Exchange of Singapore, 162, 163- 
64 

stock market crash of 1987, 164 
Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute, 248 
Straits Chinese. See Baba Chinese 
Straits Chinese British Association, 27 
Straits Settlements, 3, 17, 20, 29, 222, 

252-53; civil service in, 17; components 

of, 3; as crown colony, 3-4, 17, 24; 

under British Colonial Office, 17; in 

World War II, 35 
Straits Settlements Volunteer Corps, 36, 

223, 254 
Subramanya, 105 
Suez Canal, 4, 28 
Sukarno, 54, 211 

Sumatra, 3, 6, 7, 40, 251; Dutch occu- 
pation of, 20; Malay Singaporeans as 
immigrants from, 13, 23, 71, 79, 82 

Sulawesi, 79 

Supreme Court, 184-85, 254, 262, 267; 
appointment of judges to, 185; subor- 
dinate courts in, 184 

Surabaya, 73 

Sun Yat-sen, 27, 33; support for, 27 
Sungai Gedong Camp, 243 

Taiwan (Republic of China): Singaporean 
immigrants from, 72, 79; foreign work- 
ers from, 144; investment in Singapore 
by, 59; military training in, 213; as 
newly industrializing economy, 121, 
154; relations with, 212-13; Singa- 
pore's trade with, 156 

Tamil language, 87, 91, 182; education, 
29, 32, 43, 52, 114; newspapers in, 214; 
radio and television broadcasting in, 
92, 215 

Tamil Nadu, 87 



323 



Singapore: A Country Study 



Tamil Singaporeans, 87-88 
Tampines Aquarium Fish Farming Es- 
tate, 174 
Tan, Augustine, 160 
Tan Cheng Lock, 32, 33, 49 
Tan Kah Kee, 32, 33, 34, 37, 46 
Tan Lark Sye, 46 
Tan, Tony, 62 

Tanjong Pagar Dock Board, 29 
Tanjong Pagar Terminal, 166 
tax farmers, 29 

tax farming, 13, 22; defined, 13 

Technical Training School, 245 

telecommunications, 28-29, 158-59; in- 
dustry, role of, 149 

Telecommunications Authority of Singa- 
pore (Telecoms), 149, 158; financial 
autonomy of, 158; growth of, 158; in- 
ternational telephone links, 159; ser- 
vices offered, 158-59 

Temasek, 3, 6-7 

Temasek River, 7 

temenggong, defined, 8 

Temenggong of Johore, 23; Ibrahim as, 
20 

Tengah, 224 

Tengah Airfield, 35, 38 

Tengah Air Base, 228, 234 

Teochiu Chinese dialect, 21, 91, 92; oc- 
cupations of speakers of, 95 ; profile of 
speakers of, 80 

Teochiu community, 22 

Terengganu, 224 

textile industry, 148-49 

Thailand, 36, 40, 251, 260; food imported 
from, 172; foreign workers from, 71, 
144, 167; in Japanese Malaya cam- 
paign, 224, 225; as member of 
ASEAN, 209, 219; military training of, 
with Singapore, 248; Singapore's trade 
with, 156; traders from, 3 

Thaipusam, 105 

Third World, 198 

Thomas, Francis, 48 

Thomas, Shenton, 37, 38 

Three Rivers People, 80-81 

tigers, 21; hunting of, 21 

tin, xxiv, 62; mines, 23, 24; production, 
35 

Toh Chin Chye, 48, 52 
Tokyo, xxvi, 162 
Tongmeng Hui, 27 
Topping-up Extension, 134, 139 



Total Defence concept, 209, 219; defined, 
249; as deterrent to war, 219; strengths 
of, 249; weaknesses in, 249-50 

tourism, 157-58; number of arrivals, 158; 
origins of, 158; planned increase in, 
157-58 

Tourism Task Force, 157 

Town Councils, 192 

Trade Development Board, 130-31 

trade, international, 19, 121, 151-52, 
152-57; amount of, 152; with Asian 
communist countries, 152; balance in, 
151; deficit, 151, 152, 157; patterns in, 
154; ratio of, to GDP, 151; summary 
of partners in, 152-53; with United 
States, 154-55, 212 

Trade Union Act, 142 

trading season, 19 

traffic control system, 167 

training, worker, 145-46; goals of, 145; 
job retraining, 60 

transportation, air, 169-70; Headquar- 
ters, 234; land, 167-68; sea, 165-67 

Triad Society (Heaven, Earth, and Man 
Society), 22 

Twenty-One Demands (Japan), 33 



Unicorn International, 248 

United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO), 44, 49, 52, 56 

United Nations, 55, 57, 208 

United People's Front, 206; 

United States, xxv, xxviii, 151, 209, 213, 
224, 252; emigration of Singaporeans 
to, 73; flowers exported to, 172; level 
of spending on education in, 113; mar- 
ket orientation of, 156; navy, 229; 
recognition of independent Singapore 
by, 57; relations with, 211-12; removal 
of Singapore's GSP status by, 155; Sin- 
gapore's exports to, 154-55; trade 
ratio, 155; trade with, 58-59, 154-55; 
training for Singaporean military 
officers in, 239, 245, 250, 251 

Unsinkable, 224 

Urban Renewal Authority, 132, 133 



Vector Control and Research Depart- 
ment, 111 
Vesak Day, 104, 106 
Victoria Memorial Hall, 48 



324 



Index 



Vietnam, 209; aggression in Asia, 220, 
251; economic ties with, 209; fall of 
South, 219 

Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 211; 
ASEAN reaction to, xxviii, 62, 210, 
219-20, 250, 251-52; and Singapore- 
Soviet relations, 214; Singapore's reac- 
tion to, 207-8, 249; Total Defence as 
response to, 209 

Vigilante Corps, 269 

Vladivostok, 214 

Volunteer Rifle Corps, 223, 254 

Vosper Thornycroft, 228, 236 

voting, compulsory, 52, 177; universal 
suffrage, 177 

wage policies, 143-44; description of, 143; 
guidelines, 143; increases, effect of, 
143; reform of, proposals for, 144; re- 
straint policy, 143 

wages and benefits, 97 

Wang Dayuan, 6 

water: importation of, 69, 136; supply 

system, 136 
Wavell, Archibald, 37, 38, 226 
West Indies, 224 
Western values, 68, 110 
wildlife, 21 

women: in armed forces, 241; in civil 
service, 187; education for Chinese, 30; 
forced prostitution of Chinese, 26; in 
police force, 266; in work force, 140 
Women's Charter, 102 
Wong Kan Seng, 209, 210, 211 
workforce, 143; education levels in, 146; 
employment patterns in, 140; men in, 
140; as nation's natural resource, 140; 
percentage of, in financial services, 162; 



retraining in, 160; shipyard, 167; 
women in, 140 

work permits, 144 

workers, blue-collar, 143 

workers, foreign, 144-45; dependency on, 
145; living standards of, 97; proportion 
of, 144, 145; skilled, 144; source of, 
144; unskilled, 144 

workers, native: living standards of, 97; 
provisions for welfare of, 142 

Workers' Party, 205, 206, 260 

Workers' Protection Corps, 257 

Workers, white-collar, 143 

World Bank, 188, 209; as source of capi- 
tal for government, 189; loans from, 
165 

World Health Organization (WHO), 112 

World War I, 4, 31, 223, 253 

World War II, xxiii, 253; economic 

problems following, 124 
Wu Tian Wang, 43, 44 
Wuchang Uprising, 27 

Xiamen, 32 

Xiamen University. See Amoy University 

Yamashita Tomoyuki, as commander of 
Japanese Malaya campaign, 36; stra- 
tegy of, 225; surrender of Percival ac- 
cepted by, 38, 226; troops commanded 
by, 37 

Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, 
260 

Yeo Ning Hong, 179 

Zhejiang, 81 
Zoroastrianism, 23, 103 



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